What is the difference between the Japanese and North American placement models? Strategy is a way of using means and resources aimed at achieving goals. Quality circle - a group of department employees who, on a voluntary basis,

Exercise 1. Comparative analysis of American and Japanese management models 3

Introduction 3

1. Characteristics of the American model 6

2. Features of the Japanese management model 10

3. Comparative analysis of Japanese and American management models 15

Conclusion 19

Task 2.

1. Provide a general description of the organization 20

2. Develop a description of the professional qualities of lower, middle and senior managers for your organization according to the proposed scheme 23

List of used literature 24

Exercise 1. Comparative analysis of American and Japanese management models

Introduction

Over the entire history of management, many foreign countries have accumulated significant information in the field of theory and practice of management in industry, agriculture, trade and others, taking into account their specific characteristics. Unfortunately, our domestic science of management developed independently and separately, often ignoring foreign experience in the art of management. For many decades, our country was dominated by the administrative-command management system, which mainly directed its efforts to criticize foreign management experience. However, the experience of doing business and implementing management is rich, often ambiguous and very useful for study by those who have embarked on the path of management.

Creating your own management model requires, on the one hand, studying everything valuable that is contained in foreign theory and practice (but not thoughtlessly transferring it to domestic soil), and on the other hand, using its best achievements in your activities. In all the diversity of theories and phenomena of living practice, American management has been and remains the most powerful “managerial civilization.” American management allowed the United States to take a leading position among the countries of the Western world and Japan. In addition, we must keep in mind that it was in the United States that the science and practice of management was first formed. Its leading importance in the world today is undeniable, and its influence on the development of theory and practice is greatest. However, there is no need to blindly follow the conclusions of American theorists and the recommendations of their practitioners, but it is certainly necessary to know their ideas. This explains the relevance of the problem of studying the history of the American management model.

The study of the American management model is of some interest. It was in the USA that the science and practice of management was first formed. American management has absorbed the foundations of the classical school, the founder of which is Henri Fayol. Americans Luther Gulik and Lyndal Urwick did a lot to popularize the main provisions of the classical school. The classical school had a significant influence on the formation of all other directions in American management theory.

The transition from extensive to intensive management methods in the 20-30s. demanded a search for new forms of management. Gradually, an understanding developed that for the survival of production it was necessary to change the attitude towards the position of the worker in the enterprise, to develop new methods of motivation and cooperation between workers and entrepreneurs.

The analysis of Japanese management is of particular interest for the following reasons. Firstly, this is the area where the differences between the Japanese style and the Western (American) style, which is quite well studied and widespread in developed capitalist countries, are most strikingly manifested. The initial premises of personnel policy, as well as the specific methods of its implementation at Japanese enterprises, differ significantly from American ones. Secondly, the results obtained in Japanese enterprises (for example, the growth rate of labor productivity) indicate that the management methods used there are quite effective. It is efficiency that is attracting increasing attention from foreign researchers who, studying Japanese management methods, are considering the possibility of using them in their countries.

When creating your own management model, it is necessary to take into account the influence of such factors as the type of ownership, the form of government and the maturity of existing market relations.

The subject of the study is the features and differences between the American and Japanese management models.

The object of study is the American and Japanese management models.

The purpose of the study is to explore the theoretical foundations and evaluate the American and Japanese management models for the purpose of comparative analysis.

Required tasks:

Describe the American model

Consider the features of the Japanese management model

Conduct a comparative analysis of Japanese and American management models.

The methodological basis of the study was the results of domestic researchers on theoretical and practical problems (Ilyin A.I., Makarova I.K., Kabushkin N.I., etc.).

Basic research methods: theoretical analysis of scientific and methodological literature.

1 Characteristics of the American management model

American management has absorbed the foundations of the classical school, the founder of which is Henri Fayol. Americans Luther Gulik and Lyndal Urwick did a lot to popularize the main provisions of the classical school. Subsequently, other American authors made many additions, clarifications and changes to the system of management principles. The classical school had a significant influence on the formation of all other directions in American management theory

The modern American management model is focused on such an organizational and legal form of private entrepreneurship as a corporation (joint stock company), which arose at the beginning of the 19th century.

The book “The Modern Corporation and Private Property,” published by A. Burley and M. Means in 1932, had a great influence on the formation of the theory of the corporation. Corporations received the status of a legal entity, and their shareholders acquired the right to a portion of the profits, distributed in proportion to the number of shares they owned. Corporations replaced small businesses in which all ownership belonged to the capital owners and they had complete control over the activities of the workers.

According to management theorists, the creation of corporations entailed the separation of property from control over its disposal, that is, from power. An American professor noted the emergence of “a new managerial elite, whose power is no longer based on ownership, but rather on control over the process as a whole.” The real power to manage the corporation passed to its board and managers (specialists in the field of organization and production management). In the American management model, the corporation is still the main structural unit. American corporations widely use strategic management in their activities. This concept was introduced into use at the turn of the 60-70s, and in the 80s. covered almost all American corporations. The strategy formulates the main goals and the main ways to achieve them in such a way that the corporation receives a single direction of action. The emergence of new goals, as a rule, requires the search and development of new strategies.

The content of strategic management consists, firstly, in the development of a long-term strategy necessary to win the competition, and, secondly, in the implementation of real-time management. The developed strategy of corporations subsequently turns into current production and economic plans to be implemented in practice.

The concept of strategic management is based on systemic and situational approaches to management. The enterprise is viewed as an “open” system. The basis of strategic management is a systemic and situational analysis of the external (macroenvironment and competitors) and internal (research and development, personnel and their potential, finance, organizational culture, etc.) environment.

In the 60s XX century The demands of corporate workers to improve their socio-economic situation have become increasingly insistent. In parallel with this, many management theorists have come to the conclusion that a number of organizations do not achieve their goals due to ignoring the contradictions of a rapidly changing social environment. The consequence of this situation was the emergence of the doctrine of “industrial democracy” (“democracy in the workplace”), associated with the involvement of non-professionals in management, both the enterprise itself and consumers of goods and services, intermediaries, etc., i.e. environment external to the enterprise. Some American authors call the involvement of non-professionals in management the “third revolution” in management. The first revolution, in their opinion, is associated with the separation of management from production and its separation into a special type of management activity. The second revolution is characterized by the emergence of managers, i.e. people of a special profession. “Industrial democracy” (or participatory management) began to be seen as a form of participation of all employees of the organization in making decisions that affect their interests.

The authors of the idea of ​​“industrial democracy” are considered to be sociologists J. Cole and A. Gorz, who proposed that corporations be managed through production councils controlled by workers. Through participation in the work of these councils, workers would gradually learn to control the entire production process, first within one corporation, and then throughout industry. Participative management can be considered as one of the general approaches to managing people in an organization. The goal of participative management is to improve the use of the full human potential of the organization.

For clarity, the comparative characteristics of the Japanese and American models can be represented by the following diagram (Table 7.2.).

American industry has experienced steady productivity growth over a long period. For 20 years after the Second World War, the increase in labor productivity was 3% annually, that is, 0.6-0.8% more than in Japan, England, and Germany. In 1960 95% of the cars, steel and consumer electronics in the American markets were made in the USA, and American businesses had 25% of the world market for industrial products.

Suddenly, the picture of the global economy and productivity leadership changed dramatically. SinceFrom 1973 to 1983, productivity growth in the United States fell by about 0.4% per year. In 1979 The drop in productivity was actually already 2%. The share of American exports in the world market fell by 11%. Even more perplexing was the fact that the share of American industry in the domestic market for automobiles fell to 79%, steel to 86%, and consumer electronics to 50%. The United States has lagged behind many trading partners and competitors in terms of labor productivity growth. In Japan, labor productivity growth was significantly higher than the world average. The same trend continued into the 80s. However, in 1983 this trend reversed.

The first reaction of American managers to falling productivity and loss of markets was to look for someone to blame.

Table 7.2.

Comparative characteristics of Japanese and American models

Japanese management model

American management model

1. Management decisions are made collectively based on unanimity

2. Collective responsibility

3. Non-standard, flexible management structure

4. Informal organization of control

5. Collective control

6. Slow employee performance evaluation and career growth

7. The main quality of a leader is ability

carry out coordination and control

8. Orientation of management to the group

9. Assessment of management for achieving harmony in the team and for collective results

10. Personal informal relationships with subordinates

11. Promotion based on seniority and length of service

12. Training of universal type leaders

13. Remuneration based on group performance, length of service, etc.

14. Long-term employment

1. Individual nature of decision making

2. Individual responsibility

3. Strictly formalized management structure

4. Clearly formalized control procedure

5. Individual control

head

6. Quick assessment of the result of work,

accelerated promotion

7. The main quality of a leader is

professionalism
8. Orientation of management towards the individual

9. Management assessment based on individual results
10. Formal relations with subordinates

11. Business career is determined by personal results.

12. Training of highly specialized managers

13. Remuneration based on individual achievements
14. Hiring for a short period

Japan, they believed, competed unfairly because labor was cheap and the government provided subsidies; excessive government regulation undermines American industry; trade unions have too many rights; inflation; rising energy prices. There was some truth in these statements. But a careful and thorough study of the problem revealed interesting facts. For example, the situation with the cost of energy, government regulation, and labor costs in American industry turned out to be less painful than that of its foreign partners. There was absolutely no recognition of the fact that American consumers were buying Japanese cars and electronics not because they were cheaper, but because they were better. Analysis of the situation revealed unusual facts. Many of the Japanese innovation methods are adapted ideas from old management textbooks. So robotics was available to any American company that wanted to implement it, but Japanese industry used it better.

In addition, it was found that Japanese industry had an important advantage over many branches of American industry: the approach of Japanese leaders to management issues was much broader. Unlike their American counterparts, Japanese managers are not looking for quick fixes for falling output and profits. They understood well that increasing production alone does not provide increased productivity and that quality is equally important. In addition, Japanese managers did not develop measures to increase productivity behind closed office doors and did not “dump” them on the heads of unsuspecting workers. They carefully carried out carefully planned changes.

The reason for Japan's leadership in productivity and the key to improving it in US manufacturing is no mystical secret. There is only one reason here - good management. Man, with his weaknesses and capabilities, was placed at the very center of the management concept. Back in the 30s, K. Matsushita realized the need for a deep, comprehensive study of all the subtleties of treating a person as a key element of the economic mechanism, but a fragile, relatively unreliable element, requiring impeccably adjusted management control. Thanks to his ideas, a strictly hierarchical triad of priorities has emerged in the Japanese management system - people, finance, technology.

A true leader sees an organization as a system of interdependent elements, the very survival or success of which depends on continuous interaction with a dynamic external environment. A good leader knows that due to the high degree of interdependence of the elements of the organization, as well as the organization as a whole and the external environment, problems rarely have a simple and quick solution. Like all other important organizational problems, long-term productivity improvement requires an integrated approach.

At the American School of Management, management training can be carried out through lectures, small group discussions, analysis of specific business situations, reading literature, business games and role-playing training. Variants of these methods are courses and seminars on management problems organized annually. Another widely used method is job rotation. By moving a low-level manager from department to department for a period of one month to one year, the organization introduces the new manager to many aspects of the activity. As a result, the young manager learns about the problems of various departments, understands the need for coordination, informal organization and the relationship between the goals of various departments. Such knowledge is vital for successful work in higher positions, but is especially useful for managers at lower levels of the management hierarchy.

Japanese organizations resort to rotation much more often than American ones. Professor Ouchi, author of the best-selling book Theory Z, says: “In Japan, virtually every department has personnel who know the people, problems and practices of every part of the organization. When something needs to be coordinated, both parties can understand each other and come to cooperation. Perhaps most important is the fact that each employee knows that throughout his career he will move from one division of the company to another, even located in different geographical locations. In addition, in many Japanese companies, rotation throughout the working life applies to all its employees. An electrical engineer from circuit design can be sent to production or assembly, equipment can be transferred to new machines or to other departments every year, managers can be moved across all sectors of the business. When people work all the time in one specialty, they tend to form local goals related only to this specialty, and not to the future of the entire company, they do not have the knowledge of people and problems that would allow them to provide effective assistance to other specialists within your organization."

The main characteristics of the status of the group in the management system and their use in various cultures of the national economy are shown in Fig. 7.10.

Japan

USA

Group work as a goal

Group work as a means

Way of life

The path to rationalization

Natural behavior

Implemented behavior

Habit

Consciousness

Efficiency

Performance

Quality and/or way to do things better

Way to do it cheaper

Rice. 7.10. main characteristics of group status

In accordance with the above, we can state the following differences in the functioning of Japanese and American firms in the economies of their countries:

In a Japanese company there is a lower degree of specialization compared to an American one. The American firm strives for efficiency through high specialization and strict delineation of responsibilities, while the Japanese firm focuses on the ability of groups of workers to independently solve local problems;

in an American company, the tasks of coordination and direct production management at both the shop and inter-shop levels are clearly separated and specialized, while in a Japanese company these two tasks tend to be integrated into one. The absence of a centralized service to control and distribute the flow of materials between workshops is a distinctive feature of the assembly plant of a Japanese company;

In an American company, the size of a worker’s remuneration is determined by the category of the workplace. The Japanese company is trying to stimulate workers through a wage system that takes into account the length of service and merit of the latter; promotion of individual employees based on their individual merits; lump sum payments at the time of retirement (an incentive system united by the concept of “lifelong employment”);

In a Japanese company, employee behavior is shaped taking into account the need for it to comply with the long-term orientation of the entire organization. The American company operates in a social atmosphere that preaches equality. Accordingly, workers here are more mobile and easily change their place of work in search of better individual opportunities;

the conclusion of a lifelong employment contract in the Japanese labor market is characterized by significantly higher uncertainty compared to the theory of full-fledged labor contracts used in the United States. Their duration can be several years, but the work itself under such contracts is standardized under the control of the trade union;

the number of management levels in Japanese industry is more than half that in American industry, which is one of the reasons for higher productivity. Thus, in the Japanese automobile industry there are only five levels of management, compared to 11-12 levels of management in the American automobile industry. Thus, good management is the reason for Japan's leading role in labor productivity;

Japan's leading position in the global economy has been driven by three important principles of its production strategy: just-in-time production; using the “do it right first time” concept; application of the principle of comprehensive preventive maintenance;

the use by American firms of the “flow production” system is a powerful lever for maintaining the American economy in the leading group of world economically developed countries;

in Japanese factories, responsibility for solving production problems is actually on average more than one step lower in the management pyramid than the level of managers with formal authority, which is radically different from the situation in American factories;

the degree of “formal” institutionalization of interfunctional relations is higher among American companies, although in other respects they exhibit a higher degree of hierarchical centralization;

In the United States, the vast majority of collective agreements in the manufacturing industry are reached at the enterprise level, while in Japan, agreements at the enterprise level within an industry are often coordinated by a sectoral federation of enterprise unions.

One of the characteristic features of the development of management theory and practice in the West was the “Japanese breakthrough” of the late 70s - early 80s. It consists in recognizing certain advantages of production management in modern Japan in comparison with American management. A comparison of the characteristic features of the “Japanese style” of management with the American one is of significant interest. Consideration of the “Japanese model” of management is all the more important because in previous topics the emphasis was placed on the American experience of economic management.

To understand the systems of intra-company management in Japan and when compared with American practice, it is necessary first of all to take into account the differences in the general economic and socio-cultural conditions of development in these countries. It is important to note here the cultural traditions that stem from the class structure of Japanese society in the past; developed psychology of subordination to authority, relatively low social mobility of the population, the Japanese tendency to conformism, group cohesion.

The structure of financial capital in Japan is determined by the presence of a few powerful monopolistic groups headed by the largest banks, and is characterized by the close intertwining of the interests of firms in them. In Japan, individual investors (individuals) own less than 1/10 of the capital of the 1000 largest corporations / 9-10 of it is owned by legal entities. Cross-shareholding is widespread and leverage is high (80% versus 40%) in American corporations.

All management activities of Japanese corporations are greatly influenced by the system of subcontracting - long-term relationships between a large parent company and many small and medium-sized enterprises (60% of all firms in the manufacturing industry participate in the subcontracting system).

Even a quick comparison of the main management models allows us to highlight the advantages and disadvantages of each of them. It is no coincidence that over the last decade, Americans have been making great efforts to clarify the essence of Japanese management methods and apply elements of this experience in their enterprises. But there was a period when Japanese firms (in the 50-60s) adopted American principles of organizing production.

Table 7.1

Comparison of Japanese and American management systems.
Characteristics of management Features of management
Japan USA
1. Planning Long-term Short term
2. Management organization Non-standard, flexible. Flat structure. Participative style. Soft control Formalized. Strict hierarchical organizational structure with an emphasis on autocracy. The use of “strategic, economic centers” for each new type of product
3. Composition of managers Predominance of engineers Predominance of economists and lawyers
4. Hiring Long-term, lifetime employment system Short
5.Division of labor Combination of professions Clear division of labor
6. Shape

responsibility

Collective Individual

Large firms in Japan pay workers the same percentage of their salary twice a year. This percentage depends only on the activities of the company as a whole. If the company performed poorly, the payments are less, if it is good, more. In the USA, wages depend on the specific contribution of the employee, and they can grow, although the company may be doing worse.

For those working in the PN system, rewards evoke a feeling of involvement in the affairs of the company, since they are associated with it forever and, therefore, know that the improvement of the company's position will certainly affect their well-being. Regulation of payments makes it possible, in the event of a deterioration in the company's performance, to reduce the wage fund by up to 30%, without firing anyone. Every large company in Japan has a large staff of temporary workers (mostly women, who are hired only as rare exceptions). They quit when conditions are unfavorable. There is no such category of employed people in the United States.

The mechanism for using the factors of the PN system, such as trust, loyalty to the company and the desire for highly productive work, is the basis of theory 7. In contrast to Japanese specialists, in the United States, a highly qualified specialist is considered to be an employee who knows only his very narrow field of activity in detail. A study of the careers of senior management employees in fifty large US firms showed that they performed no more than two different functions in the process of promotion in the company, i.e. They were essentially narrow specialists, and therefore their main concern was not the interests of the company, but the desire to keep the services they headed at a good level.

The functional narrowness of American managers also explains the phenomenon observed by one of the Japanese managers, who worked as a link in an American company for two years, which led him to bewilderment. We are talking about cocktails that American managers of various companies gather for and which, according to them, they simply hate.

It is known that some Japanese management innovations - “quality circles” and the “just in time” delivery system - originally originated in the United States, but did not spread there. However, American methods of managing “human resources” did not take root on Japanese soil.

American companies (General Motors), thanks to the just-in-time system, have significantly reduced inventories of raw materials, materials and components. General Electric currently has about a thousand “quality circles” in its factories. About two thousand American companies are members of the International Association of Quality Circles. Managers of American companies are increasingly thinking about increasing the share of engineers in their factories, increasing the role of foremen in production, and introducing targeted programs to increase labor productivity and save resources.

Federal State Budgetary Institution of Higher Professional Education

Russian Academy of National Economy and Public Administration under the President of the Russian Federation

Faculty of State and Municipal Administration

Department of Management


Comparative analysis of American and Japanese management models


St. Petersburg 2011



INTRODUCTION

1 Philosophy and goals of the company

4 Organization of production and labor

CONCLUSION

LITERATURE


INTRODUCTION


A comparative analysis of the American and Japanese enterprise management systems, which have determined the leading position of these countries in the world economy over the past few decades, seems especially interesting at the moment in view of the sad events associated with the earthquakes and tsunamis in Japan in March-April of this year. Many experts in various scientific fields, observing the development of events in this country, draw an analogy with the events in post-war Japan, which then, as now, faced the problems of complete devastation: the destruction of the most important industrial production facilities, human losses and radioactive contamination of the territory . Having experienced a protracted and lengthy recovery, Japan in the 50-60s demonstrated rapid growth, at a rate 2-3 times faster than the development of countries such as the USA, Germany, England, France and Italy. The phenomenon of the “Japanese miracle” was so striking that it was included in all world management textbooks and is still being studied, especially in light of recent events in anticipation of the “second Japanese miracle” .

However, since the 90s, Japan has been experiencing serious economic difficulties: low rates of economic growth, a depreciation of the yen, an increase in the budget deficit and public debt of the country, a decrease in company profits, rising unemployment, an “aging” population, etc. True, it would be a mistake to believe that this is due to the shortcomings of only this management system - the same indicators were characteristic of the American economy during this period, right up to the present day. General Motors, for example, the main automobile manufacturing giant in the world, has been officially bankrupt since 2009 with a debt of $21 billion and exists only due to government support.

In light of these events, it seems logical to return again to a comparative analysis of the two management models to assess the potential for further development of each of them. To do this, you will need to turn to the theory and history of management and consider the structural elements of two management systems that have long competed with each other and symbolized success and prosperity. Having acquired knowledge about various types of management technologies, it will be possible to trace the practice of their application at specific manufacturing enterprises in Japan and the USA, in order to then, in conclusion, characterize the effectiveness of their use and the prospects for development within the framework of world management theory.

In addition to the indicated value, such work will have another useful property. The American and Japanese experience was studied by many European countries (taking into account both useful properties and disadvantages) and became the basis of European management models, many of which are now showing very successful results. Such experience in developing a national management model based on the best achievements of American and Japanese management styles could also be useful in the development of the Russian economic model.


Chapter 1. Comparative analysis of American and Japanese management models


A comparison of American and Japanese management models began in the late 70s and early 80s with the appearance in the West of the term “Japanese breakthrough”, recognizing the existence of certain advantages of production management in Japan in comparison with American management. An analysis of the Japanese management system showed that it developed partly under the influence of local traditions, partly as a result of the American occupation after the Second World War, and partly as a reaction to the need to combat poverty and devastation after the war. And, what is most noteworthy, this development was based on American management ideas that did not immediately find application in their homeland, such as “lifetime employment”, “industrial democracy”, quality control circles of W. E. Deming, etc.

In Japan, these ideas organically overlapped with the traditional features of Japanese culture, such as group solidarity, discipline, respect for elders, etc., which made it possible to talk about the differences in the organizational cultures of American and Japanese firms as the main reason for the differences in their management styles.

Thus, upon first examination, the dominance of the competitive type of culture in the USA is highlighted, while in Japan - the culture of cooperation or collectivist culture. Here, from an early age, children are taught to work together and rejoice in common victories. They develop habits and positive attitudes towards hard work, discipline, perseverance, order, cleanliness, attention to detail, and are taught to respect their work. They develop group work skills and are constantly told about the importance of education. These socialization factors, combined with cognitive skills, become a powerful force in shaping an educated citizen and a competent worker.

In the USA, the emphasis in personal development is on the formation of purely individual qualities, on the development of competitive advantages: highly specialized education, development of leadership qualities, focus on personal material wealth, etc.

The latter can be clearly confirmed by the wage payment systems adopted in Japan and the USA. In the USA, each manager receives a salary for his department and personally assigns it to each employee, who receives it in an envelope and does not know what the payment of his work colleagues is. Asking such questions is unethical. This does not contribute to the development of the spirit of mutual assistance, but rather fosters attitudes toward fierce competition, so the prevailing management principle in the United States can be characterized as “every man for himself.”

In Japan, the salary for all employees of a given position with the same length of service will be the same, and it is not a secret. As production efficiency increases, the company's management increases wages for all employees, so in Japan it is customary to help each other. A Japanese worker receives the maximum salary at the age of 40-50, since it is believed that during this period he incurs the greatest expenses.

These are the general cultural prerequisites for demonstrating the fundamental differences between the American and Japanese management styles, which would be appropriate to continue by considering more specific components of these models in the form of points of comparison taken from I. I. Semyonova’s book “History of Management.”


1 Philosophy and goals of the company


Japanese companies are characterized by an emphasis on philosophy: “what matters is not what we do, i.e. what methods, practices and technologies we use, but why we do it, what motivates us, what principles shape the views and, consequently, the actions of people; business is nothing more than the embodiment of these principles.”


Japanese modelAmerican modelWith a change in management, the company's philosophy does not change. Personnel remain, since the “Lifetime Hiring System” is in effect. Replacement of the company’s management is accompanied by a change in management employees and workers. The goal is to ensure growth in profits and welfare of all employees of the company. The goal is to increase the company’s profits and dividends for individual investors.

American organizations do not notice the key role that values ​​and philosophy play in management methods, but focus on material needs: “the primary goal of companies is to achieve financial results that would meet Wall Street expectations”1 .

American companies highlight accelerating the turnover of invested funds, increasing the rate of return on invested capital and increasing the value of shares as their main tactical objectives. It is by these indicators that the effectiveness of the management apparatus is determined. Japanese companies usually highlight expanding market share and increasing the share of new products in the total volume of products as their main goals, which, according to the leaders of these companies, should ensure increased competitiveness and profits.

“The Japanese management method differs from the methods used in most countries of Europe and America in its focus: the main subject of management in Japan is labor resources. The goal that the Japanese manager sets for himself is to increase the efficiency of the enterprise by increasing the productivity of workers. Meanwhile, in European and American management, the main goal is maximum profit, that is, obtaining the greatest benefit with the least effort.”

Hence the corresponding methods of managing enterprises in the United States during periods of crisis: staff reduction, tightening control over costs, abolition of corporate events and incentives, etc., instead of the systems of training and retraining of personnel accepted in Japan.

The Japanese management model is based on the philosophy “we are all one family.” According to Akio Morita, one of the founders of Sony: “The task of a Japanese manager is to establish healthy relationships with all employees, to create a family atmosphere in the company, so to speak... The focus on the human factor must be sincere, sometimes it requires courage and even willingness take considerable risks..." This tradition leaves a special imprint on the relationship between managers and subordinates. Managers at various levels should be responsible for the development of their subordinates, and subordinates should show respect and submission to their superiors. In addition, managers should take an interest in the daily lives of their employees, since family conflicts and problems affect employees' performance of their job responsibilities. Such problems need to be monitored and helped to resolve them. Along with this, Japanese managers constantly explain the company's goals and policies to their employees, who can freely express their opinions on this matter. Employees have free access to the administration, since the success of the company is their success.

This practice differs sharply from that accepted in the West, where work and personal life are sharply demarcated. In the United States, employers are prohibited by law from asking employees questions that are not related to their job duties. The relationship between managers and subordinates is more alienated and governed by the laws of bureaucracy, which prioritize rationalism and merit to the organization, rather than favoritism and personal relationships. Here everyone takes care of themselves, and what happens outside the workplace should not become public knowledge.

Such different approaches to the work itself explain the difference in the general functioning of organizations: Japanese companies are focused on long-term successful existence within the framework of their chosen ideology and are interested in the formation of permanent and highly qualified workers loyal to the “family” company. American enterprises are characterized by an interest in short-term, highly profitable technologies, methods and areas of activity that are not developed within the organizations themselves, but are taken from outside together with hired specialists. Accordingly, loyalty to the company here is measured by the level of material remuneration, and employees are more mobile and easily change jobs in search of individual benefits.


2 Organizational management structure and decision making


Japanese model American model The company consists of commercially autonomous departments Using project management structures The corporation consists of autonomous departments Using matrix management structures

To clarify, we will add data from N.V. Komarova’s manual.


Table 1.2.1

Comparison of Japanese and American management systems

Characteristics of management Japanese model American model Management organization Non-standard, flexible, flat structure, participative style, soft management Formalized, strict hierarchy of organizational structure with an emphasis on autocracy Decision making Responsibility Collective agreement Collective Sole Sole Structure of management decisions Long preparation phase, short execution phase Short preparation phase, long execution phase Conflict resolution oNegotiations with the help of a mediator, finding consensusNegotiations with the help of lawyers and the court Management technology There are no job descriptions. The motto “Act according to the situation” involves analyzing the situation and making non-standard decisions. A subordinate can temporarily perform more responsible work than a manager; senior management can contact a subordinate through the head of the boss. Detailed development and prescription of management technology for each employee based on job descriptions

The management structure in different companies directly follows from its philosophy and values. By paying attention to form (organization), rather than content (personnel), an American company creates a clear, fixed organizational structure, where everyone occupies a strictly defined place with rights and obligations “legalized” by contract and is personally responsible for every decision.

This technocratic approach gives rise to a complex composition of enterprises, which includes a large number of different functional structural divisions, sometimes not communicating with each other. As a consequence, there is a need for general regulatory bodies, and then the number of management levels reaches eleven to twelve versus five in Japanese industry. The latter fact is very often cited by American researchers to explain the reason for higher productivity in Japanese enterprises.

Fewer levels of management means b ó The greater proximity of managers and executors, which we have already noted in the previous paragraph, is the basis for the special Japanese decision-making system - “ringi” or “ringise”. This method involves a detailed exchange of ideas and tactical plans until full agreement is reached primarily at the lower levels, i.e. where these decisions will have to be implemented. The draft decision put forward by subordinates passes through all services and officials who have at least a minimal relationship to it. The decision reaches the highest level of management only if everyone has reached full agreement (approval of the decision). After group discussion has set general tasks, each employee determines his own and begins to implement them. If it is noticed that a subordinate is not able to control the situation, the middle manager will intervene and will personally provide leadership. This attitude inspires confidence that personal failures and mistakes are not a problem: a senior will always help you get out of a difficult situation. Thus, the emphasis is not on avoiding failure, but on achieving a positive result.

The “ringi” procedure, by Western standards, is lengthy and unusual, but its main idea is that the costs are more than compensated for at the stage of execution of decisions. As for the American system of sole decision, although it has such a quality as high speed, which is very profitable in the modern market, it affects the speed of its implementation, since it requires both costs for training personnel for work and monitoring execution, and fighting resistance or sabotage.

The difference can be clearly demonstrated in the own expressions of representatives of different systems: Americans, for example, say: “If you are going to Japan and intend to conclude or suspend, for example, a sales transaction within two days, count on two weeks, and then if you are lucky. The Japanese take forever to make a decision.” The Japanese say: “The Americans sign a contract or make a decision without delay. But try to get them to do it - it will take them forever.”


3 Recruitment, personnel policy and employee incentives


Japanese model American model The labor of university and school graduates is widely used Retraining and training within the company, on the job Promotion based on length of service Group assessment, assessment of individual contribution to the common cause Hiring workers on the labor market through a network of universities, business schools, etc. Focus on individual, personal career When hiring in special “assessment centers”, its suitability for the vacant position is checked using methods such as competition, assessment of knowledge, skills, passing exams for the position Individual assessment and certification of employees Salary depending on age and length of service in the company ( so-called equalizing wages) If the financial situation is favorable, bonuses are paid twice a year (two to three monthly salaries each time) Payments and benefits from social funds: partial or full payment for housing, expenses for medical insurance and services, contributions to pension funds , delivery to work by company transport, organization of collective recreation, etc. Remuneration depending on the individual results and merits of the employee Incentives for employees are significantly lower than in Japan, although the income of the president of a large American corporation is on average three times higher than that of the president of a Japanese company

As already noted, the basis of Japanese management is people management - as opposed to the American approach in the form of “personnel management”. In Japan, the emphasis is on the individual rather than just the specialist, so there is a lower degree of specialization in Japanese firms. Here, they do not select a person for a position - a clearly described and fixed range of responsibilities - but, on the contrary, having an employee, they carefully study him (including with the help of psychological tests), and then determine what duties can be entrusted to him. It is obvious that the Japanese approach is focused on a more complete use of all employee capabilities. Therefore, they are not afraid to hire university and school graduates - Japanese companies are interested in the employee mastering the techniques and technologies of this particular company, within which he grows and develops, devoting all his strength and skills. For this purpose, a “lifetime employment” system is used, which guarantees the permanent employment of workers and stimulates, through wages that take into account seniority and merit, the promotion of individual workers based on individual merit; guarantees one-time payments at the time of retirement. This approach is aimed at preventing the employee from leaving for another company, and is generally aimed at providing a competitive advantage in the market.

An American company strives for efficiency through high specialization and strict delineation of responsibilities; the size of a worker’s remuneration is determined by the category of the workplace. The duration of an American contract can be several years, but the work itself under such a contract is standardized and is controlled by the union. Firms are interested in updating professional knowledge, but do this by attracting new specialists - there is a constant rotation of personnel, but not at the firm level, as in the Japanese management model, but at the labor market level, when the same professionals move from one company to another . This state of affairs again reflects the focus on individual achievements and remuneration. In the USA, financial incentives for personal success are accepted; salaries depend on the specific contribution of the employee, and they can grow, although the company may be doing worse.

In Japan, this state of affairs is practically impossible: large firms pay employees twice a year compensation that is the same percentage of their salary, and this percentage depends only on the performance of the company as a whole. If the company performed poorly, the payments are lower; if it performed well, the payments are higher. Such rewards create a sense of involvement in the affairs of the company, since employees know that an improvement in its position will certainly affect their well-being. Regulation of payments makes it possible, in the event of deterioration in performance, to reduce the salary fund by up to 30%, without firing anyone.

A typical system in Japan is to divide workers into two groups. The first is the core, consisting of people who work in the company for life. The second group is permanent, consisting of both men and women, whose mutual obligations with the company are not so strong, but, nevertheless, they are provided with more or less stable employment. The core is responsible for the preservation and development of the company, as it is considered part of the corporate family, and its ratio with the constant is approximately 30 to 70.

In American companies, only a few people are considered the core group. Even senior executives are considered external employees rather than members of the corporate family. Most American senior managers feel that employees are expendable and therefore rarely show mutual commitment to the company, as is customary in Japan. Managers and workers within these groups may have different employment contracts and views, but one thing they have in common is that they are employees, not family members. Moreover, some of these employees may be considered temporary, as they may be laid off during economic downturns.


1.4 Organization of production and labor


Japanese model American model The main attention is paid to the workshop - the lower level of production. The just-in-time system (Kanban) is used without creating inventories and interoperational backlogs. The work of quality groups (circles) and the implementation of strict quality control at all stages of the production process by all employees of the company. Responsibilities between employees are strictly not distributed. Workers perform different types of work depending on the situation; the motto is “act according to the situation” The main focus is not on production, but on adaptation to the external environment Employees perform work based on strict execution of job descriptions Wage rates are strictly defined depending on the position, work performed and qualifications Wages are set in accordance with supply and demand in the job market

In an American firm, the tasks of coordination and direct production management, both at the shop and intershop levels, are clearly separated and specialized, while in a Japanese firm these two tasks tend to merge into one. The absence of a centralized service for controlling and distributing the flow of materials between workshops is a distinctive feature of the Japanese company's assembly plant. In practice, this means that in Japan all production management functions are transferred to workshops and other departments (in 97% of Japanese firms versus 56% in the USA). The management of Japanese companies is not involved in ordering materials, organizing production, or shipping finished products - these issues are resolved by departments independently. 60% of American companies use centralized marketing services for this purpose.

The reason for this state of affairs is the concept of total quality control, which has the status of a religion in Japan. Quality control covers all stages of production and involves all employees of the company, including the secretary and typist. And since everyone bears responsibility, they do not look for specific culprits for defects and defects. And here every worker can stop the conveyor if there is a defect. Such awareness of the responsibility of each worker for the quality of the work performed develops in them a sense of self-control and eliminates the need for external monitoring of work performance, as is customary in the USA.

Another reason is the kanban production system adopted in Japan as opposed to the flow conveyor system in the United States. The Kanban system is designed to produce and send items to subsequent stages at the very moment they are needed. This applies both to the production process itself and to the storage of parts (assemblies) in the warehouse, as well as to the organization of activities of suppliers. This system of work is called “pull” - production areas located at subsequent stages of the technological cycle seem to pull the products they need from the previous ones. The American in-line system then acts as a “push” system, which does not take into account the needs for parts (assemblies) experienced by subsequent sections, but pushes out everything that is produced onto them.

The Kanban system makes it possible to increase the utilization rate of production space (at Toyota, one engine produced accounts for a little more than 40 square meters of area, which is almost 2 times less than at Ford). With its help, very high levels of labor productivity and product quality are ensured. The schedule of such technology provides for the production of products at sites not by weeks and days, but by hours and even minutes.

The emphasis of enterprises on operational issues determined the formation of three key principles of the Japanese production strategy:

production based on the “just in time” principle,

using the “do it right the first time” concept

using the principle of comprehensive preventive maintenance.

In American companies, the emphasis is not on production, but on survival in market conditions, so the main role here is played by departments that determine the direction and strategy of the company's development in a competitive environment. Marketing and planning services set and manage production processes, and special technical control departments are created to control quality.


5 Intra-company planning and financial policy


Japanese model American model In-house departments have plans for three years, which include investment policies and measures for the introduction of new technology, as well as long-term plans for 10-15 years. Plans are developed on the principle of rolling planning by departments of the company. The department plan shows production volume, quantity of products in physical terms, profit, staffing, list of suppliers. The planning process is decentralized. The departments plan the main financial indicators, costs of production, sales and R&D, which can be adjusted throughout the year. For each new type of product, “strategic economic centers” (SCC) are used. Part of the department’s profit (up to 40%) is used by it independently. Profits are used to streamline production , reduction of material costs and the introduction of new resource-saving technologies, modernization of equipment Wide attraction of borrowed funds The administration of the company redistributes profits between departments Expansion of production through the purchase (acquisition, merger) of other corporations Self-financing of corporations

In the United States, the planning horizon ranges from 1 year to five years. In Japan, plans are developed for a period of 5 to 15 years, since the company’s goal, as a rule, is not to maximize profits, but to increase the corporation’s market share and ensure prospects for its development. An American company, in accordance with its chosen tactical goals and focus on current profitability, is characterized by a focus on maximum flexibility of management systems in terms of distribution and redistribution of all types of resources to increase profits in the short term.

In Japanese companies, planning is focused on technical and technological innovations. Historically, those corporations that actively adopted the more advanced technology and technology of Europe and America rose and began to prosper in Japan. Innovation is the slogan of Japanese business, which for decades was fueled by the desire of the Japanese to overcome the backwardness of other countries and, ultimately, contributed to the promotion of the Japanese economy to a leading position. Therefore, even now a considerable part of company profits goes to scientific research, development of new products, and full and comprehensive training of employees, most of whom have an engineering specialty. This is also an important difference from American firms, in which the majority of employees have an economic or legal education and have little understanding of production processes.

In addition, the career planning system adopted in Japan for each employee makes him a universal specialist with knowledge about the work of each production unit and the company as a whole, which an American corporation interested in the narrow specialization of workers and competition between them cannot boast of.


Chapter 2. An example of a modern Japanese company. Nissan-Renault


Enough time has passed since the first publications about the principles of Japanese and American management to make it possible to assess their significance for the modern theory of enterprise management. Japanese management has undergone some changes, but in its essence it has retained ó most aspects of running a business. The changes were largely related to the integration of Japan into the world economy and the need to establish mutually beneficial cooperation with large American and European corporations, which required adopting some models of their corporate behavior. But at the same time, foreign partners, paying tribute to the effective technologies of Japanese management, adopt them and use them in modern business. One example of such interaction was the emergence of the Nissan-Renault alliance, which, just like Japan itself in the 60-70s, attracted the attention of the whole world in 2000.

Philosophy and goals of the company. In 1999, Nissan was in a very deplorable state: with a debt of more than 20 billion dollars and producing mostly unpopular cars, the company was doomed to inevitable death. There was nowhere to expect financial injections from, and fierce competition in the domestic market did not allow talking about a merger with any Japanese company. Nissan President Yoshikazu Hanawa, in order to save the company, showed courage and paid visits to all the giants of the global automotive industry, but the only one who seriously responded to this proposal was another company, which was in a no less difficult, though for other reasons, state - French Renault.

Both companies at that time were not the most successful global corporations, but they were national associations with very clear goals - promoting a national product and gaining a solid share in the global automotive market. But to achieve the goals of the Japanese company, there was not enough skill in carrying out financial transactions and a competent marketing policy, while the French side suffered due to technical and production problems. Combining efforts made it possible to solve these problems and bring to life Nissan's long-standing slogan - "catch up and overtake Toyota" - which was the engine of the company's development history, but only together with Renault they were able to achieve this task, reaching second place in the world in car sales after General Motors.

This approach to solving the problem is very much in the spirit of the Japanese collective tradition - a game with a “non-zero” sum, when both sides win. But such a result would hardly have been possible if another element of Japanese culture had not been taken into account and used - teamwork and a comprehensive exchange of knowledge and experience.

True, the appointment of Carlos Ghosn, a protege from the French side, to the leadership position at Nissan went against Japanese traditions and initially raised concerns. According to the rules, holding such a position was conditional on a long professional career within the enterprise, however, Carlos Ghosn’s very successful and considerable experience at Michelin and Renault, as well as respect for the traditions of Japanese management, allowed him to win the trust and support of Japanese managers and workers. While managing the company, he turned to its customs. So, for example, he ordered the return of Japanese specialists fired by his French colleague, who proposed to postpone the launch of a new car model, and ordered him and other colleagues to be careful ó greater sensitivity towards company employees.

From the very beginning, Carlos Ghosn entered into an open dialogue with Japanese employees: for the successful development of the alliance, it was necessary to clearly explain why fundamental changes were necessary, how they would be carried out and what effect was expected. Having understood how and why everything should happen, people gained strong motivation, because everyone was worried about the critical situation in the company, when with the arrival of Ghosn there was hope to save jobs and increase income.

Organizational management structure and decision making. To achieve the goals, the merger of companies into an alliance took place in a special way: mutual repurchase of capital was carried out while maintaining the independence of both enterprises and their trademarks. This meant that each company retained its identity and the possibility of independent development. This was expressed in three postulates: the first is respect for originality (“Nissan is Nissan, and Renault is Renault”). The second is respect for autonomy: decisions regarding Nissan are not made in Paris, and vice versa. And finally, thirdly, joint activity is not an end in itself. Both companies benefit from every common project and decision, everything is aimed at the end result and success. The Alliance Charter, signed in 1999, states: “The principles of the alliance are recognizing and benefiting from differences, mutual respect, openness and a willingness to listen.”

This style of work was completely different from the American approach to mergers and was also appreciated by the Japanese side.

The chosen course of action was a team one: management took place according to the principle of project work. In France, a group of 17 people was formed (which later grew to 30), each of whom was a specialist in the area that needed to be improved in the Japanese partner company. Nissan's administrative board created three positions that had not previously been practiced in Japanese firms: director of current operations (Carlos Ghosn), director of finance and director of planning. This decision was made after analyzing the management structure at a Japanese enterprise, where all management functions were considered unsatisfactory, except for engineering support and production equipment service. This phenomenon has become typical for most Japanese firms. According to Michael Porter and Hirotaka Takeuchi (in Can Japan Compete?), “Although Japanese companies have achieved remarkable success in continuously improving their current operations...most do not have ambitious and innovative strategies...Honda has not achieved a leadership position because it is the best at Kanban or TQM (total quality management) methods...and because its clearly defined strategy was aimed at creating unique cars and unique marketing." (Honda is a company founded by engineers who strive create the most advanced models in the world).

The reason for Nissan's crisis was no less that the company was not focused on making a profit. The managers did not operate with financial performance indicators; the company sold cars and did not know whether it was bringing profit or loss. Of the 43 models in 1999, only four were profitable. The second reason: the company talked a lot about customers, but did not study customer preferences at all. Third: lack of understanding of the importance of speed of response to the actions of a competitor. Toyota has learned to continuously create new platforms and engine types, launch a new car model into various sales networks every month, and immediately stop selling it if the model “doesn’t work.” “Nissan” tried, but “burned out”.

Therefore, specialists in the field of finance, market research, planning, personnel management, purchasing management, marketing, advertising, product promotion, as well as the most experienced engineers were sent from France. It should be noted that only Renault personnel employees were selected for this work from their personnel “nursery”, and not invited persons, and the instructions given to them before leaving for Japan read: “you are not coming to change Japan, but precisely in order to revive Nissan with the help of its own employees.” In this way, the decision-making system adopted in Japan was also supported: the exchange of experience gave Japanese employees the necessary knowledge for independent action, restored their self-confidence, helped to unite efforts and achieve collective results.

The loyal, visually invisible, but very useful contribution of the group somewhat brightened up the management style of Ghosn himself: a fast, direct, frank leader, nicknamed the “cost killer,” with his first actions he violated all the canons of Japanese management: he closed factories, cut staff, and established cost controls etc. From the very first steps, he instilled in everyone that speed is the key to success, and systematically set a very clear time frame for completing tasks.

As for the organizational structure of corporate management as a whole, it should be noted that the approach is unusual for other companies. Having taken over as director and appreciating the scale of the organization around the world, and especially its position in the United States and Europe, Carlos Ghosn abolished the presidential positions in the branches, and instead created regional teams, which included a commercial director, a director of research and development, a director of Production, Purchasing and Product Quality and Director of Administration and Finance. General management began to be carried out by non-residents who are members of the executive committee of Nissan in Tokyo. Relations between the branches and the center were established in such a way that the managers are responsible for the state of affairs in the regions, and the central apparatus helps in every possible way, but does not interfere with their work. The only principle is the transparency of the branches: “if the branches are not transparent, then your powers will be curtailed. We don't need surprises. If you have any difficulties, we are ready to discuss them. We can help you. If things are going well for you, tell us about it, and we will leave you alone, because we have enough of our own to do.” Thus, the central office began to develop and approve the overall strategy, implement policies in the field of company products and brands, make appointments to key management positions and approve the budget. But after the budget was approved, full responsibility fell on local managers; there was no need for the general director to exercise leadership at this level. Japanese American HR Office

Intra-company planning and financial policy. Planning was the Japanese corporation's most vulnerable point. Carlos Ghosn introduced the first financially sound plan in 1999 and left Japanese leaders horrified. The Nissan Revival Plan (NRP) proposed achieving financial balance in the first year of its implementation, eliminating half of the debt ($10 billion) in three years and raising gross profitability to 4.5% of turnover. And the measures that were required to be implemented for this included the elimination of 21 thousand jobs and the closure of five factories in Japan. Solutions that are unprecedented by Japanese standards are in the spirit of American corporations.

However, the plan was completed ahead of schedule - by March 31, 2002 - and the second similar short-term plan "Nissan-180" was aimed at the growth of the company: sales of one million more cars ("1"), profitability at 8% ("8 "), zero debt ("0"). Japanese diligence and diligence in implementing the plan brought Nissan to first place in the world in terms of profitability among general-purpose vehicle manufacturers in the 2002/03 financial year, allowing it to invest in the construction of new factories and the creation of jobs in the United States and China. Nissan has regained the ability and taste for making cars that people love and are fun to drive.

In many ways, this state of affairs was facilitated by the French company’s ability to undertake and competently manage financial risks in a rapidly changing competitive environment, which Japanese managers still have to learn.

To implement the plans, special cross-functional groups (IFGs) were created, which were assigned responsibility both for the process of developing the plan and for its practical implementation. This made it possible to build the change process in such a way that the initiative came not from above, which Carlos Ghosn considered unacceptable, but from the employees themselves.

Nissan already had experience in drawing up such plans, but the goals outlined in them were expressed more in qualitative characteristics; they did not contain specific estimates, deadlines, financing conditions and schedules of events. Nine groups were responsible for: growth - new product creation and market penetration, purchasing, production equipment and logistics, research and development, sales and marketing, support units, finance, end of life and product operations. and for organizational issues and value added. Representatives of several management functions at various levels of government were invited to participate: from specialists to directors. A total of 500 personnel were mobilized, and work on the first plan - the revival - took three months before all issues found a generally satisfactory solution. And such a measure, not the most popular in Japan, as the closure of factories, was approved and supported by Nissan employees as a necessary condition for the company’s return to the market. But after the approval of this plan, the employees had a clear vision of the future of the company. Various departments reached consensus on production goals, such as the engineering department realizing the need to modify certain components to reduce procurement costs and overall production costs. But the implementation of the plan turned out to be very fast and effective, as is customary in Japan.

Recruitment, personnel policy and incentives for employees. Carlos Ghosn set out (and did) to fire 21,000 people in a place where lifetime employment is the norm. The new general director got rid of Nissan's shares in supplier companies, reconsidered relations with partners, and closed one plant in Japan. As a result, the company came out of debt, and the question arose about its further functioning.

To achieve new goals, Ghosn did not involve outside specialists, retaining 99 percent of local management, which made the Japanese fall in love with him. “We did not attract a new team. We just mobilized the old one,” he says. This decision was largely facilitated by the strong support of the Nissan trade union, which assured the director that he would not create any obstacles if he acted in a constructive spirit and contributed to the revival of the company.

The terms of the cuts were also specific and reflected the Japanese mentality: positions were eliminated in production - 4,000 people, in the Japanese sales network - 6,500 people, in various services and administrative personnel - 6,000. However, in scientific research and development - the shrine of the engineering profession - 500 new jobs were created (It should be noted that Ghosn himself has an engineering degree). The reduction was carried out as a result of people taking early retirement, increasing part-time employment and selling subsidiaries, i.e. "soft" methods.

As for personnel policy, a characteristic course was chosen here: “the renewal of Nissan should be the work of the Nissan employees themselves.” However, Shiro Nakamura, who headed the design group that was supposed to create a new, special, spectacular style for the new cars, although he was Japanese, had previously worked for Isuzu (which fell under the wing of General Motors). This bet was made by Carlos Ghosn in view of the new concept of selection and placement of personnel. According to customs, advancement up the career ladder is slow and depends on influence and belonging to certain clans in b ó to a greater extent than from professional knowledge and personal contribution to the achievements of the enterprise. This approach had a particularly strong and painful impact on the financial management of Nissan, in which the place of the financial director was taken, although an honorary leader, but at the same time did not have sufficient knowledge to manage a very capital-intensive enterprise (the development of just one car model requires several hundred million dollars). Therefore, he was replaced by Thierry Mulonguet with his French team, centralizing the financial management function of the entire company in Tokyo, rather than in regional units around the world.

The tradition of career advancement based on length of service had to be abandoned: it was decided that the level of remuneration of each employee and his promotion would be determined by the size of his contribution to the implementation of the Nissan revival plan and the Nissan 180 plan. Thus, the main factor in a career has become productivity - the labor efficiency of a particular employee, although still closely linked through the plan with the efficiency of the entire company. What is important is not how much time an employee devotes to work, but what results he gets from it.

In matters of remuneration, a certain tradition has been preserved: the salary began to consist of two components: constant and variable. The variable is related to the dynamics of the enterprise’s operating efficiency: if it is high, employees enjoy its fruits, if it falls, then the variable part of wages also falls along with it. Considering that it can be up to 40% of the amount paid, it is clear that employees have a strong stake in the success of the company. To assess the size of the variable part, a simple incentive system is used: at the beginning of the financial year - April 1 - it is announced by what criteria the work will be evaluated and what employees will receive depending on the implementation of a particular goal. Moreover, they try to present the criteria in quantitative terms, avoiding a large number of qualitative categories. Under such conditions, every employee knows what to strive for and makes every effort. In addition, this method guarantees the amount of payments and protects against subjective assessment by superiors, which is one of the weakest links in American practice.

The Nissan trade union responded favorably to the changes. Largely due to the fact that other Japanese companies began to adhere to the same policy: Matsushita since the late 90s. eliminated seniority promotions and automatic increases in bonuses and base pay. Other unions also highlighted the issue of job security and supported shifting workers to part-time work. In response to this support, Carlos Ghosn granted the union's request for a wage increase in 2002, while all other auto companies (including the almighty Toyota) froze the base rate.

As for the redistribution of workers, which was practiced at Japanese enterprises depending on circumstances, this trend continued in a very unusual form - the French-Japanese alliance predetermined the exchange of personnel and the transfer of diverse experience not only within one company, but also within the alliance itself, and, according to the participants themselves, was the reason for success in the global market.

Organization of production and labor. With the implementation of the Nissan Revival Plan, the production system adopted in Japan was not greatly changed. The technical side of production remained the company's greatest strength, with Carlos Ghosn confirming that the Sunderland (England) plant is a role model, and the Smyrna plant is the best plant in North America. However, the business processes associated with the functioning of these industries needed to be revised.

The traditional view of business as a collective path to success was rejected: for the survival of Nissan, relationships with all partners and suppliers were analyzed, and among them only those who contributed to its development were selected, the rest fell into the category of losers who had to look for a way out of the situation. This decision caused a large stream of criticism from the losing parties, but as a result, the remaining partners began to establish closer and more productive ties. At the same time, the competitive approach made it possible to unite the forces of not only the company in question, but also competitors’ companies.

The important point to note here is that Japanese corporations are “open”, transparent to the business world. They maintain the transparency of information both within the company: any employee can familiarize themselves with the organization’s plans for the future, with its goals and development prospects, and outside it: regardless of whether things are going well or poorly in the company, it is important to notify all interested parties about this persons The first determines the harmony of relationships in the team and strengthens corporate ties, the second allows you to gain support from both consumers and other companies, especially when there is a need to admit mistakes and get help.

Nissan did both - they practiced absolute publicity when announcing the difficult situation in which they found themselves, numerous speeches and publications, including consolidated quarterly and annual activity reports, which was not the practice of Japanese corporations that submitted reports only the parent company in order to hide the losses of numerous branches. As a result, Nissan secured the support of a huge number of individuals and organizations, including the Japanese government, which promised to take care of all the people affected by the reorganization of Nissan.

As for the work itself, while appreciating the high skill of the production departments, French analysts were horrified by the work of the commercial and marketing services. "Good engineers, but bad salespeople." If Toyota hires independent concessionaire companies to sell its products, sales at Nissan were handled by special branches owned by Nissan itself, whose management consisted of distinguished employees of the company who completed their careers here. Latest in b ó were more concerned with the social well-being of their teams than with the efficiency of their activities. To get out of this situation, it was decided to break tradition and begin closing sales points, and then offer managers of retail enterprises to buy this business from Nissan. Thus, the bet was placed on the traditionally most efficient part of Japanese enterprises - production, which was supposed to be directed towards creating new, more competitive cars with the quality inherent in Japan, so that trading companies themselves would be interested in creating and maintaining a dealer network for Nissan.

To do this, it was necessary to focus on the old, time-tested Japanese slogan - “innovation”. The revival plan included the release of twelve new car models. The bet was made on “March” - the first one manufactured on a common platform with Renault. This mini-car from the lower price segment competed with Toyota's Vitz and Honda's Fit model, and won this competition just three months after entering the market. In addition, Nissan again launched the Z project, based on the Datsun 240-Z model, a sports coupe that was incredibly popular back in the 60s. (especially in the USA), but outdated due to unsuccessful modifications. This event attracted a lot of attention and determined the success of Nissan's advertising and sales campaigns.

Nissan had all the resources to release new products, the only thing it lacked was a competent marketing calculation, which its French colleagues helped to make. According to Carlos Ghosn, in the new conditions, “the manufacturer has to take a constant price as a basis, while each of its new models has higher technical characteristics, b ó greater safety, higher quality, b ó longer service life, better equipment, as a result of which the specific level of costs of automobile companies increases annually by 1%... These are the market requirements. Therefore, the new Micra model is sold at almost the same price as the previous one, although functionally it is at a higher level. ... But at the same time, the old Micra model brought us only losses, and the new one brings profit.” To implement this approach, the Japanese side had to focus attention not only on production, but also on issues of cost control and the time frame for developing new models (the goal was to reduce it from 24 months to 12). At the same time, there is hardly any need to fear a decrease in the quality of such cars, keeping in mind the cultural characteristics of Japanese workers.

It should be noted that the Nissan-Renault cooperation provides another additional effect. Consolidation of vehicle platforms has provided an opportunity to integrate supplier networks and processes, allowing for greater economies of scale.

A special place deserves the question of companies’ not very large investments in R&D, for which the Japanese press reproaches them. Toyota and Honda are making great efforts to develop hybrid power plants (a classic engine for driving on highways plus an electric one for driving around the city). Nissan approached this issue from the best American business position, concluding a contract with Toyota, which developed such an installation, according to which, since 2006, it can assemble and sell cars with hybrid engines from its components in its factories in the USA, where very strict legislation regarding environmental pollution. In the 80-90s, during the high technology race in Japan, such a company decision would have been unacceptable.


Chapter 3. An example of modern American companies. Saturn and General Motors


Unfortunately, American companies are not the biggest fans of the practice of sharing experience, especially in the field of successful business projects. Knowledge in the West is intellectual property that generates income, so finding information about the composition and structure of enterprises, and especially management technologies, does not seem to be the easiest or most rewarding task. Numerous publications devoted to the study of American corporations are collections of various business situations and their assessments from the points of view of various schools of management. It is quite difficult to find a full-fledged study that reveals the activities of one modern company, but we would be more interested in an enterprise in the automotive industry. Especially considering that this area is a source of special pride for the United States and it is difficult for them to admit the fact that over the last decade this pride has been suffering colossal losses and risks losing primacy to Japanese and European companies. It is even more difficult to accept the fact that perhaps this disaster is associated with the economic inefficiency of the management model, which has also played a leading role in the global economy for a long time, but is very often criticized by both academic researchers and business practitioners. And the success of other American corporations directly speaks to the need to use technologies that are not characteristic of traditional American management, such as a “turn” to the person (both to the consumer and the employee), justification of the social goals of the organization, and not just achieving profit by any means, democratization of decisions , and not authoritarian dictatorship, etc.

And yet, to complete the comparative analysis, we will turn to one experience of General Motors (GM), still the leader in the global automotive industry, which was associated with the desire to create a successful division within the holding on the model of a Japanese enterprise. And although this experience is not modern, it can explain why the corporation still cannot establish effective interaction between various enterprises within GM and is forced to sell or close once successful production facilities.

Philosophy and goals of the company. The Saturn division of General Motors was founded in 1985 with the goal of establishing a profitable production of small cars in the United States (as opposed to the then dominant Japanese companies in this market). Its mission was: “Developing and manufacturing in the United States vehicles that will lead the world in quality, price and customer satisfaction through the integration of people, technology, business practices, and the sharing of knowledge, technology and experience within General.” Motors". This approach was unique for that time, and it assumed that the new enterprise would create jobs that would not only bring profit to the company, but also satisfy the needs of employees.

Looking ahead, it should be noted that in 1990 the company half fulfilled its goals: the model developed by Saturn differed very favorably in quality, convenience and fresh design from other American cars, but could not beat the Japanese representatives. The company developed effective methods of teamwork, but this experience was not used in any way at General Motors.

If we were talking about the Japanese management model, then such a result would hardly be assessed as unsatisfactory - instead, most likely, a thorough analysis of the situation would be carried out to eliminate the causes that caused it and adjust or develop a new plan. However, GM management single-handedly felt that the division was focusing too much on the process of creating a car and maintaining an internal culture, while the needs of consumers and the interests of shareholders were left on the sidelines. As a result, having not received the expected profit from the sale of products, GM reduced funding for new developments of this brand, and transferred the most key specialists to corresponding positions in the parent company.

Recruitment, personnel policy and incentives for employees. Saturn's staff consisted almost 100% of General Motors employees transferred from other - closed - enterprises. During the hiring process, special attention was paid to the culture of Saturn: only “suitable people” were hired - not just on a professional basis, but in accordance with the company’s philosophy. “This is what we call a Saturn. The reward system here is different. You must feel like you are working as a team at all times...everyone must share the goals and intentions of the organization, and the work hours are the same for everyone. Employees knew about the existence of rotation... We conducted written tests and assessed group work skills.”

A lot of time and money were allocated for employee training, although Saturn initially employed professionals who, over the course of many years of work at GM, strived for excellence and saw Saturn as an organization where they could develop as specialists. And although management did not guarantee their employment and career, warning them that the company could disappear in three months, they took this risk without fear. Such unity in views and goals greatly contributed to the formation of a unified team spirit, which allowed employees to independently establish technological processes and create a company with an impeccable reputation and excellent product quality. Saturn employees even contributed to the establishment of good relations between the company and trade unions, which, according to historical premises, are at odds with the management of enterprises.

A special attitude towards the staff was also formed by the management of Saturn. Richard LeFauve (former director of Saturn) says, “Training was based primarily on people and their need to understand something before they could do it. When a new employee arrived at Saturn, the first thing leaders did was get to know him, tell him about his and their responsibilities, about the organizational culture, principles and values ​​of the company. I can't tell you how many employees came to Saturn and said, "I worked at GM for 25 years and never saw a plant manager, let alone a president."

If Saturn had been an independent company, it is not known what its fate would have been in the automobile market, but it was a division of GM, and General Motors required fulfillment of obligations, and Saturn's original mission was to disseminate its acquired knowledge throughout the entire GM corporation. It is in this matter that the competitive psychology of American management played an unsightly role.

Saturn employees were a consolidated team, within which there were no disagreements and internal competition, but this competition became external: Saturn opposed itself to GM, because it knew that it was superior to the parent company in all respects. His employees, when asked: “Don’t you work for General Motors?”, without hesitation, answered: “No, I work for Saturn.” This isolation from the main corporation not only prevented the transfer of knowledge towards GM, but also prevented the introduction of any changes in the work of Saturn. The people who worked here began to think of themselves as special and their ways of working as the best, so when General Motors began introducing elements of flexible manufacturing, the division refused to make changes.

In this situation, the head office was unable to assess the problem and switch the emerging competition to another external enemy - a foreign manufacturer. In addition, he himself did not have a single, clearly formulated ideology-strategy that would allow him to unite all divisions of the company, and no such goal was set for Saturn.

Organizational management structure and decision making. The Saturn was distinguished by its simplicity and ease of operation. Only two or three classifications of work tasks were used, although a typical automobile plant has about seventy of them. It was also distinguished by a smaller number of hierarchical levels - three or four, and not six or seven, like other factories. The simplified structure contributed to the rapid and complete dissemination of information, and the plant management communicated quite often with the company’s employees. However, in addition to the internal management structure, Saturn also had an external one.

As a division of a larger company, Saturn did not have the freedom to name its products or choose its own production strategy. From a financial point of view, he was completely dependent on the parent organization, which took a very strict commercial approach to managing the affairs of the enterprise. Mike Bennett, a spokesman for the United Auto Workers: “Saturn no longer makes product and process decisions. Now the GM decides everything... This significantly limits our capabilities. All that was entrusted to us was the production of one model of a small car. At the same time, we were given the condition: “If you succeed, we will continue financing to complete the production line.” We were successful, but they never financed us. They invested in the Delaware plant."

The approach characteristic of the American management model is a zero-sum game: if one wins, the other loses. If we compare the interaction of GM-Saturn with the considered example of Nissan-Renault, then the significance of this phenomenon will be much more tangible.

The French-Japanese cooperation was aimed at a mutually beneficial long-term result, in which one company (Nissan), having found its feet, helps the other (Renault) to succeed. If Renault were only interested in making a quick profit, it could also use the finances generated by the invested company to launch its new projects and thereby jeopardize the development of Nissan and further effective cooperation with it in the Asian market. However, she calculated that pooling resources would bring a much greater economic effect and provide good prospects on the world stage.

In the case of GM-Saturn, such a prospect was apparently not considered. General Motors behaved like a typical American investor interested in good capital turnover, and at the right time transferred assets to a project that seemed more reliable. This is precisely the kind of interaction that Nissan feared at one time: the classic American merger scheme, in which some occupy a dominant position, while others occupy a subordinate position. Saturn found itself in this situation: the parent company GM simply “crushed” the initiative and growth opportunities of the division.

Organization of production and labor. Car production in the USA in the 80s. encountered a very difficult problem: the bet on the production line and two main segments - an affordable simple car and expensive brands - turned out to be losing compared to the Japanese production of cars in the lower and middle price segments of very high quality. Attempts to adopt the features of the Japanese production process, including “kanban” and quality control, although they led to the modernization of American enterprises, did not solve the main issue - the release of technical innovations. Japanese manufacturers consider one of the company's main goals to increase the model range, and this requires a large number of trained specialist engineers and constant investment in development.

General Motors had such specialists at Saturn, but the company failed to take full advantage of this circumstance, instead paying attention to marketing processes, especially in the field of acquisition of other companies - it seems that the holding in this way tried to solve the problem of the shortage of talented specialists in the field of production, simply by purchasing them along with the production itself.

However, this did not help it succeed in the development of advanced technologies and equipment, so the corporation is still characterized by the absence of any of its own innovative projects that could provide it with a competitive advantage. The only experimental development GM has had high hopes for recently is a type of car that uses hydrogen pumped into tanks of solids as fuel. But this project initially aroused a very skeptical attitude on the part of the global automotive community, due to the complexity of both creating such an engine and its use, as well as its high cost.

In addition, GM’s inconsistent and rather “closed” policy undermines public opinion about this manufacturer and exhausts the credibility of the country’s government and international partners.


CONCLUSION


As can be seen from the examples, modern management in Japan and the USA is somewhat different from those management systems that were adopted in the twentieth century. (The auto giants were chosen because of their original historical opposition, precisely to prove the superiority of American or Japanese methods of production and management).

Characterizing the Japanese management model, it can be noted that, just like after the Second World War, it is subject to constructive and very beneficial influence from other models (American, but more European), but this happens in an evolutionary way - as a result of careful consideration and analysis consequences of possible changes or resistance to possible changes.

This is how full-fledged goal setting and planning comes into the practice of managing an organization in Japan, based not on the qualitative characteristics of the desired result, but on very real quantitative indicators (including profit). But at the same time, the traditional focus on the person is preserved both as a necessary and important resource of the company - the employee, and as a valuable and important consumer - the buyer.

The traditional system of lifetime employment is becoming a thing of the past, making way for a system of professional selection and promotion of personnel, but the very participation of personnel in the work of the company, as well as the close relationship with its development prospects, remains entirely in the spirit of Japanese collectivism and ensures the success of any plans of the organization. It is also interesting to see the development of views on the occupation of leadership positions by non-residents of Japan - previously such a phenomenon was categorically unacceptable.

It should be noted that the successful implementation of changes would hardly have been possible if the Japanese model had not been characterized by complete openness and transparency, providing support for the company’s actions both internally and externally.

According to this indicator, the Japanese model is very different from the American one, for a full assessment of which, unfortunately, there is not enough input data. However, the very fact that the company is in a very similar state to the Japanese one (even in terms of the same level of debt) and the inability to get out of it speaks of really serious management problems. If the Japanese manufacturer needed only three months to develop a plan to overcome the crisis and only two years to almost independently restore its shaky position, in which it had remained for more than ten years, then General Motors is safely heading towards complete bankruptcy and is selling off its valuable assets. The reason can also be attributed to the company’s not too far-sighted policy, which did not provide for a long-term development strategy for each of its structural divisions. (The Japanese company learned to set short-term goals, not forgetting about the overall trajectory of movement, but the American company was never able to move from a short distance to a long one). One can accuse her of excessive interest in material achievements and “forgetfulness” about the main purpose of the enterprise - the production of high-quality goods and services needed by the consumer, which resulted in problems of production and sales.

However, it would be best to look for the reason in the personnel policy and management structure, since, apparently, the company simply did not have a sufficient number of loyal specialists who would be interested in the long and productive life of this enterprise.

Unlike the Japanese model, which successfully absorbed methods of work and management that were initially alien to it, the American model retained and further strengthened its characteristic, and not the best, features. Summarizing what has been said, we can conclude that the Japanese model within the framework of a globalizing society has a greater ability to function successfully than the American one.

LITERATURE


1.Bolshakov, A.S. Mikhailov, V.I. Modern management: theory and practice / A.S. Bolshakov, V.I. Mikhailov. - St. Petersburg: Peter, 2002. - 416 p.

2. Borovikova, N.V. Model of the functioning of a large company: comparative analysis of Japanese and American management systems / N.V. Borovikova // Personnel. Business without problems. - St. Petersburg: Business Petersburg, 2002, No. 2-4. -<#"justify">11. Comparative management / Ed. S.E. Pivovarova. - St. Petersburg: Peter, 2006. - 368 p.

"MANAGEMENT IN HIGH-HIGH PRODUCTION"

UDC 669.713.7

E. N. Ivanchenko Scientific supervisor - A. V. Kukartsev Siberian State Aerospace University named after Academician M. F. Reshetnev, Krasnoyarsk

COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF AMERICAN AND JAPANESE MANAGEMENT MODELS

Characteristics of the American management model

Modern American management as it currently exists is based on three historical premises:

1. Market availability.

2. Industrial method of organizing production.

3. Corporation as the main form of entrepreneurship.

American firms that use traditional hiring principles focus on specialized knowledge and skills. General criteria for personnel selection are: education, practical work experience, psychological compatibility, ability to work in a team.

American firms focus on the narrow specialization of managers, as well as engineers and scientists. American specialists, as a rule, are professional in a narrow field of knowledge and therefore their promotion through the management hierarchy occurs only vertically, which means that a financier will make a career only in this field. This limits the opportunities for advancement through management levels, which causes turnover.

management personnel, their transition from one company to another.

American management is characterized by a rigid management organization. It is most characterized by the desire to formalize managerial relations.

American management is characterized by the idea of ​​the personal responsibility of the employee. The effectiveness of a particular manager is determined on the basis of whether he was able to personally achieve the goals that were set for him.

Features of the Japanese management model.

Japan plays a huge role on the world stage, everyone knows this. This country is an economic giant. Japan firmly holds the palm in the production of televisions, cars, etc. Toyota is the largest Japanese corporation.

One of the main reasons for Japan's rapid success is its human-centric management model.

Distinctive features of the Japanese character are economy and frugality. The Japanese system strives to create high-quality products.

The Japanese consider their human resources to be the main wealth of the country.

Criteria Japanese model American model

1. The nature of management decision-making Decision-making based on the principle of consensus Individual nature of decision-making

2. Responsibility Collective Individual

3. Management structure Non-standard, flexible Severely formalized

5. Organization of control Soft informal control Clearly formalized hard control procedure

7. Assessing the qualities of a leader Ability to coordinate actions and control Professionalism and initiative

8. Orientation of management Orientation of management towards the group, increased attention to the person Orientation of management towards the individual, attention to the person as a performer

9. Evaluation of personnel performance Achieving collective results Achieving individual results

10. Relations with subordinates Personal informal relations Formal relations

11. Career Promotion taking into account age, length of service and loyalty to the company Business career is predetermined by personal achievements

13. Remuneration Remuneration based on group performance, length of service Remuneration based on individual achievements

14. Duration of employment at the company Long-term employment of the manager at the company, lifelong employment Employment on a contractual, contractual basis, short-term employment

15. General principle of management “Bottom-Up” “Top-Bottom”

Comparative analysis of models

Current problems of aviation and astronautics. Socio-economic and humanities

The essence of Japanese management is people management. At the same time, the Japanese consider not one person (individual), but a group of people.

In addition, in Japan there is a tradition of subordination to the elder, whose position is approved by the group.

The Japanese worship work. They are often called “workaholics.”

Unlike workers in other countries, the Japanese do not strive to unconditionally fulfill rules, instructions and promises. The Japanese build relationships with their partners on the basis of trust.

In general, in Japan there are fewer complaints and claims against management for two main reasons: firstly, the Japanese worker does not feel oppressed, and secondly, he considers his work to be more important than rights or beliefs. The origins of this lie in the fact that managers of Japanese companies pay great attention to the welfare of their workers.

On March 11, 2011 at 14:46 local time (at 8:46 Moscow time) a major earthquake occurred, which resulted in a tsunami. This is the strongest earthquake in the known history of Japan.

Changes in the industrial sector. Nissan announced the shutdown of 4 of its factories. Hino, Toyota, Honda and Mitsubishi Motors have stopped production at all their factories in Japan. Sony has closed its industrial insulation tape plant. Mitsubishi Chemical Corporation's ethylene plant has stopped production. Toshiba announced the shutdown of 2 factories. It is impossible to transfer one management model to the economy of another country without taking into account its specific conditions and, above all, psychological and socio-cultural factors.

© Ivanchenko E. N., Kukartsev A. V., 2011

UDC 373.167.1

O. A. Lishutina, A. A. Paramonova Scientific supervisor - A. V. Kukartsev Siberian State Aerospace University named after Academician M. F. Reshetnev, Krasnoyarsk

MOTIVATION AND STIMULATION OF WORKERS IN THE INNOVATION FIELD

A brief description of the concept of motivation and its types is given. The methods of motivation characteristic of the innovation sphere in Russia are considered.

Successful innovation activity and its effectiveness are largely determined by the level of management of scientific personnel, qualifications and motivational behavior of employees. The mere presence of a plan and a formal management system does not guarantee that the goals of an innovation project will be achieved. It is necessary to motivate staff and make appropriate decisions in the light of changing circumstances. Planning, analysis and control create only the basis for the implementation of human activities. And in innovation, more than in any other area of ​​industrial management, success depends on people.

The management system can indicate the direction of effort, but the enthusiasm and energy with which movement in this direction will be made largely depends on the motives that guide the scientists and engineers involved in the development. Motivation is the motivation of a person to act in a specific, goal-directed way. There are internal and external motivation for activity. Internal motivation is determined by the content of contradictions and difficulties inherent in the problem being solved, by the internal logic of the development of science, which is manifested in the plans of the researcher. External motivation comes from other forms of his value orientations. These forms can be significant for the individual, but remain external in relation to the projects being developed and their results.

Important external motives for research work and innovative developments are to achieve recognition in the scientific world, establish one’s priority in the invention, and achieve a high level of competence. The basis for the effectiveness of creative work and its results are internal motives. Developing the motives necessary for effective performance of work is the most important psychological task of the head of a scientific unit.

The motivational behavior of employees lies within the framework of A. Maslow's theory of human needs. In accordance with this theory, primary, physiological needs are satisfied with the help of material goods and money. But money motivates only 30-50% of employees to take action. The main part is driven to action by more elevated needs: for knowledge, creativity, authority, recognition, achieving great goals, moral ideals, etc. These factors are often of decisive importance for scientists, developers, scientists.

In relation to Russia, a turning point occurs in the motivational attitudes and motivational behavior of scientists and material factors of motivation and material needs come to the fore. This situation, explained by the low level of remuneration of scientific and technical personnel and the transition to market relations, cannot but affect the forms and methods of personnel management in scientific and technical organizations. When managing