Russian political scientists. See what the “List of Russian political scientists” is in other dictionaries. Very strong influence

I think this position will not remain vacant: after all, the chief of the Pentagon is an incredibly high-ranking and prestigious position under any president. Therefore, Trump, of course, will find some other general, but how long he will hold out is unknown.

As for Russia, I don’t think that anything will fundamentally change: anyone Trump finds should not be a stranger, but, on the contrary, very rooted in the military environment. This means that he will most likely be tough, he will continue Mattis’s views that Russia and China are strategic rivals and, accordingly, it is necessary to engage in containment, but he is unlikely to be inclined to adventures and any sudden movements. Especially with such a president. Most likely [this will be the case]. Of course, anything can happen - maybe Trump will decide to surprise and appoint some outsider, but this is unlikely. I think he understands that this will lead to complete disorganization. And if so, then the current level of relations between the United States and Russia will remain. And if the United States really leaves Syria, then the last zone of direct contact, direct contact, where there is a risk of technical incidents that threaten escalation, will also leave. This is not the case in other places. Accordingly, it is still very important that there is a sensible person at the head of the Pentagon, but with the disappearance of the immediate field of risk [between Russia and the United States in Syria], this risk will become slightly less. And the fact that overall relations are moving towards remilitarization and competition, including military competition, is already obvious, and this does not depend on the name of the US Secretary of Defense.

Andrey Kortunov, Director General of the Russian International Affairs Council:

It seems to me that for America, Mattis's resignation means that the split between Trump and the political establishment is deepening. There have been great hopes for Mattis over all these years, that he is some kind of anchor of the administration that binds the administration to the political mainstream.

I have heard more than once from colleagues that as long as Mattis is in place, you can rest assured that he will not allow any surprises from the president. It was believed that it was Mattis who kept the situation under control, that [US Secretary of State Mike] Pompeo largely relied on him, like other administration officials, that his position was very strong. Maybe this to some extent ruined him, because it is clear that the president wants to pursue his line. So in terms of American foreign policy, unfortunately, it seems to me that we will face more unpredictability, impulsiveness, as is characteristic of President Trump, and the risks will increase rather than decrease.

As for Russian-American relations, we need to see who can replace Mattis. But I think that our relations are now in such a state that it is hardly possible to spoil them even more.

At the same time, we know that Mattis has repeatedly criticized the president (at least implicitly) for not being tough enough on Russia and China. So in this sense, of course, a certain limiter that previously set the parameters in relations with our country disappears. That is, now Trump’s room for maneuver is increasing slightly. Although we know that all the restrictions remain: there is still Congress, and the bureaucracy, and the Pentagon has not gone away. Therefore, of course, we should not expect any serious progress, but a small “festival of disobedience” [on Trump’s part] is possible, since now there is no person who could strictly tell the president that this is exactly what cannot be done.

President of the communication holding "Minchenko Consulting" Evgeniy Minchenko sees two components in Mattis’s resignation: a protest against isolationism and a rejection of the management style of President Trump, who makes impulsive decisions and relies on PR rather than systemic steps. It seems that Mattis learned about the withdrawal of American troops from Syria from Trump’s Twitter, the expert notes. He recommends that those involved in Russian foreign policy begin to take a closer look at the figure of American Vice President Michael Pence. “The likelihood of him coming to power is far from zero,” says Minchenko.

Ruslan Pukhov, director of the Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies:

Along with Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, who was fired earlier this year, US Defense Secretary James Metis has been the most sane member and important checker in the Trump administration. Largely thanks to Mattis’s personal efforts, there was no slide into escalation between Russian and American armed forces in the Baltic and Syria. Although Mattis met with Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu only once, he showed an act of civil courage and expressed condolences to his Russian colleague in connection with the shooting of college students in Kerch, which caused displeasure on the Ukrainian side.

Prokhor Tebin, expert of the Russian International Affairs Council:

Apparently Mattis has run out of patience. He did not really approve of pressure on NATO allies, and initially disagreed with President Trump on many issues. It is worth remembering at least the question of the use of torture - Mattis was opposed to this. And now, perhaps, the “withdrawal” of troops from Afghanistan and Syria has finally finished him off. Although it is quite difficult to talk about the reasons for his resignation. There could be many other, and most unpredictable factors - from uncertainties with military spending to the creation of the Space Corps.

It is difficult to guess who will replace him, but it is interesting who this person will be - a civilian or a military man, a bright leader and expert or a functionary.

Andrey Sushentsov, president of the MGIMO consulting agency “Eurasian Strategies”:

Rumors about Mattis's possible resignation have been circulating for quite some time. Probably the specific reason for her was that Trump did not warn him about his decision to withdraw troops from Syria. The letter that Mattis published in connection with his resignation is cautiously critical, in which he outlines points of disagreement with the president. First: regarding the need for solidarity with allies, respect for their interests and confirmation of security guarantees. And second: countering strategic rivals, which he names in the following order - China and Russia. On both of these counts, Mattis likely believes President Trump is being ineffective. He does not point out stylistic differences between them, but I think they also occurred: President Trump’s style of doing business may not have been entirely convenient for the Secretary of Defense.

For Russia, this resignation does not have any far-reaching consequences, since any American secretary of defense will have in mind this new maxim about the strategic rivalry between Russia and the United States.

I believe that the transition to a new defense minister will be gradual. Mattis will formally relinquish his duties only at the end of February; before that time, Senate hearings on the confirmation of a new Secretary of Defense must take place, and this may take all of these two months until the end of February. To summarize: I don’t think that Russia is a participant in this process and that somehow our interests can be affected positively or negatively.

"Russian Society of Political Scientists"(all-Russian public organization) is a non-governmental organization uniting the Russian expert community in the field of political science.

The organization declares its main goal to be the integration of the Russian political science community, strengthening ties between science, education and political practice. One of the priority tasks is the promotion of Russian scientific schools in the field of political science in the international academic community. The ROP consists of over 650 political scientists. The Russian Society of Political Scientists positions itself as a community of professional scientists who are also public experts on current political events and processes. According to researchers of Russian political science A. Yu. Sungurov and M. E. Karyagin, the “soil science” part of the political science community has institutionalized itself in the ROP.

Story

As researchers A. Yu. Sungurov and M. E. Karyagin write, the process of creating the “Russian Society of Political Scientists” was initiated by the deans of the political science faculties of Moscow State University and St. Petersburg State University. The new professional community was planned as an “umbrella organization” that was supposed to overcome the segmentation of domestic political science, integrate all Russian political scientists and their “small associations, like RAPN and others.”

The founding congress of the organization took place at the M.V. Lomonosov Moscow State University on November 25, 2013. Representatives from more than 50 regions took part in the founding congress. At the congress, the governing bodies of the organization were formed, members of the council and presidium were elected, and a charter was adopted. Former Chairman of the Russian Government, Academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences Evgeniy Maksimovich Primakov was elected honorary president of the Russian Society of Political Scientists.

Membership composition

According to political scientist S. A. Lantsov, the organization, along with the Russian Association of Political Science (RAPS) and the Academy of Political Science, unites political scientists working in universities, academic institutions, as well as in government bodies. According to A. Yu. Sungurov and M. E. Karyagin, university professors predominate among political scientists who are members of the ROP. This segment of the academic community (the so-called “East Side”, as opposed to the “West Side”) is more student-oriented and has to do with government funding; researchers prefer publications in domestic journals and attach no less importance to domestic scientific developments than to foreign ones.

Initiatives and activities of the organization

On July 3, 2014, within the framework of the congress of the All-Russian public organization “Russian Society of Political Scientists” (ROP), the Youth Branch of the Russian Society of Political Scientists (MOLROP) was created. The ROP Congress was dedicated to the topic “Russia’s national interests: global priorities, political strategies and prospects.” MolROP was formed through the creation of regional representative offices in the constituent entities of the Russian Federation. Representative offices were among the first to be established in Moscow, St. Petersburg, Volgograd, Astrakhan, Saratov and Tambov regions, the Republic of Bashkortostan, Krasnoyarsk and Krasnodar territories. By the end of 2015, the corporation of the youth branch of the ROP has more than 35 regional offices and about 500 members.

At the end of 2016, the Second Congress of the Russian Society of Political Scientists was held in Kazan on the topic: “Russian politics: an agenda in a changing world.” About 400 Russian political scientists took part in the congress, as well as several dozen guests from 25 countries. In general, the work of the congress reflected the general goals of the local authorities and the Russian Society of Political Scientists.

As of 2016, 60 regional branches were created in the ROP.

September 10-12, 2018 at the Faculty of Political Science of Moscow State University. M. V. Lomonosov hosted the III Congress of the Russian Society of Political Scientists.

Management

• Shutov Andrey Yuryevich, Doctor of Historical Sciences, Dean of the Faculty of Political Science of Moscow State University named after M.V. Lomonosov, Chairman of the Expert Council of the Higher Attestation Commission of the Russian Federation on Political Science;
• Yakunin Vladimir Ivanovich, Doctor of Political Sciences, Head of the Department of Public Policy, Faculty of Political Science, Moscow State University named after M. V. Lomonosov;
• Eremeev Stanislav Germanovich, Doctor of Economics, Rector of Leningrad State University named after A. S. Pushkin.

Ratings and criticism

Finnish researcher S. Mäkinen examines the organization, which, in her assessment, is a competitor to RAPN (a member of the International Association of Political Science), in the context of Russian academic debates about the applicability of Western political theories to Russian political realities. The establishment of the ROP is an attempt to create a national school of political science, as opposed to Western concepts. At the first ROP congress, held in July 2014, speakers emphasized the need for the formation of a Russian political science school and, in particular, the need for a Russian political science textbook that would take into account the “peculiarities of the country” (in other words, “Russian” values) when presenting political theories.

Researchers A. Yu. Sungurov and M. E. Karyagin provide excerpts from interviews with three political science professors, members of the Russian Academy of Political Sciences, as well as the regional head of the ROP. They expressed critical opinions about working methods that were less open than in RAPN; about propaganda as the main task of the ROP; about the emergence of ROP as a result of “a certain plot in the public administration system”; about ROP as an artificial project in which conflicts are possible due to the presence of both ideologists and scientists in it. Sungurov and Karyagin, considering the ROP in the context of the formation of the Russian political science community, which, in their opinion, has generally already been formed, conclude that the creation of the ROP indicates its “development and differentiation.” The researchers conclude that the “soil” part of the academic community has become institutionalized in the ROP, which is more focused on “serving the tasks of the state.”

Comments

Notes

1. , With. 61-62.
2. Pshenichnikova M. Russian political science - at the service of civil society. Expert analytics (undefined) . International Affairs (September 2, 2015). Retrieved November 11, 2018.
3. , With. 18.
4. Discussion of the prospects for creating new associations within the political science community. Information letter of the RAPN Board dated June 14, 2012 (undefined) . Russian Association of Political Science (June 14, 2012). Retrieved October 22, 2018.
5. , With. 14.
6. Samarina A., Savitskaya N. Political scientists were called to serve the fatherland. The new union has joined the ranks of existing associations in the ideological sphere (undefined) . Nezavisimaya Gazeta (November 26, 2013). Retrieved October 23, 2018. Archived August 6, 2018.
7. Deputy Director of RISI took part in the II Congress of the Russian Society of Political Scientists in Kazan (undefined) . (RISI) (November 14, 2016). Retrieved November 11, 2018. Archived November 20, 2016.
8. Political science: textbook for academic bachelor's degree / S. A. Lantsov. - 2nd ed., rev. and additional - M.: Yurayt, 2018. - P. 29. - 454 p.
9. , With. 13-14.
10. , With. 155-158.
11. , With. 179-183.

About Russian political scientists.

Alexey Tokarev,

Research Fellow at the Center for Global Issues

IMI MGIMO (U) Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia

At the end of last year, two months before the start of the discussion (and my own defense), I proposed a journalistic text about who Russian political scientists are to one popular socio-political publication. The publication was not interested.

And then the discussion initiated by M.V. Ilyin, discovered that an attempt to classify political scientists and “political scientists” was made by Yu.G. Korguniuk. I believe that the high scientific authority of the debaters and their ethics do not allow them to call a spade a spade, forcing them to use the art of euphemisms. “You won’t get last names from me!” - A.Yu. told me (albeit on a different occasion) at the last congress of political scientists. Melville. My degree has not even been approved by the Higher Attestation Commission yet, and therefore I can afford notes of youthful enthusiasm, subjectivity and labeling.

Over the past 20 years, the Russian authorities and the Russian mass media have formed a stable stereotype of mass consciousness regarding political analysis. A political scientist is a subjective commentator on political events with a claim to expert knowledge that has no boundaries. Where the label was applied by the media (often presented as a political scientist, Mikhail Khazin periodically denies the title), where it was attached independently (my good friend does not at all master the categorical apparatus of political science, but in all interviews he proudly introduces himself as a “political scientist”) - it is already difficult to figure out.

Meanwhile, political science is a science, and a political scientist is a scientist. Political science: with its own categorical apparatus, its own approaches, research methods, theoretical and applied level of knowledge, etc. Political scientist: not necessarily with a position in an academic institute, a scientific degree or a claim to scientific speech.

A political scientist is a style of thinking, an objective description of a phenomenon as the goal of scientific activity. Increasing the volume of knowledge about specific political processes, which is achieved through painstaking work using scientific methods, and not by talking about everything political from the height of a giraffe, to which feathered parrots assent.

The political scientist has no civic position. He is beyond ideology. There are no liberal, conservative, socialist, Eurasian, pro-Western political scientists. A laboratory technician examining tissue under a microscope cannot get between the cells.

According to the degree of objectivity, modern Russian political scientists and “political scientists” can be divided into the following groups.

1) Propagandists. They are on both sides of the barricades and the TV. All of them are united by a clear designation of the team for which they play (those who do not play “for” play “against”). The authorities and the conditional anti-authorities use them not to clarify their position, bringing it closer to the truth, but to form public opinion. Just. Definitely. Totally.

These people are not political scientists, despite their positions, degrees, education and the inscription on their business cards or interlinear letters. Alexander Dugin (MSU), Pavel Danilin (kreml.org), Vitaly Ivanov (Institute of Politics and State Law), Vladimir Burmatov (Plekhanov Russian Economic University, BINH), Sergey Kurginyan (“Experimental Creative Center”), Maxim Shevchenko and Mikhail Leontyev ("First channel"). And less odious: Konstantin Zatulin (Institute of CIS Countries), or those close to the “anti-government” Georgy Bovt (Gazeta.ru), Leonid Radzikhovsky (Echo of Moscow), Dmitry Oreshkin (Ogonyok), Stanislav Belkovsky (Institute of National Strategy ).

2) Political strategists are not political scientists (Igor Mintusov, Dmitry Gusev, Oleg Matveychev, Anton Bakov, Andrey Bogdanov, etc.). They make politicians and politics rather than study them.

3) The group of “moderate allies of the authorities” includes people who are not directly associated with the authorities, but are closely associated with them. For the average person, they look like experts removed from groups, parties, towers and entrances. Many have their own funds, created independently or “launched” from above in exchange for loyalty. Some of them are indeed political scientists who temporarily left science for power. Vyacheslav Nikonov (“Politics”, “Russian World”, “Unity in the Name of Russia”), Dmitry Badovsky (Institute of Socio-Economic and Political Research), Vitaly Tretyakov - all three from Moscow State University.

Smart and beautiful scientific words that are written after their names in interlinear a priori mislead the audience: these are experts who are not correlated with the authorities. Dmitry Orlov (Agency for Political and Economic Communications), Maxim Grigoriev (Foundation for Research on Democracy), Mikhail Remizov (Institute of National Strategy), Alexander Tsipko (Institute of Economics of the Russian Academy of Sciences), Leonid Polyakov (Higher School of Economics), Joseph Diskin and Valery Khomyakov (Council on national strategy), Sergei Markov (Plekhanov Russian University of Economics, Institute of Political Studies) play, albeit for different teams under the leadership of different captains (curators), but still, obviously, on the same side.

4) The group of “political commentators” includes people who are constantly present in the media. Unlike propagandists and moderate supporters of power, they do not express anyone’s interests explicitly, remaining “above the fray.” As a rule, commentators translate personnel changes and major internal political events into the language of the average person. As in the previous group, political scientists meet here. Konstantin Simonov (National Energy Security Fund), Boris Makarenko, Igor Bunin and Alexey Makarkin (Center for Political Technologies), Alexey Mukhin (Center for Political Information), Sergey Mikheev and Alexey Zudin (Center for Political Conjuncture), Mikhail Tulsky (Political Analytics) , Evgeny Minchenko (“Minchenko Consulting”), Mikhail Vinogradov (“St. Petersburg Politics”). This group has a common feature in the form of expert reports addressed to the broadest segments of society.

5) Real scientists are known to the public much less than “political scientists.” For example, few ordinary people know the vice-president of the International Association of Political Science Mikhail Ilyin (MGIMO (U), NRU-HSE), the dean of applied political science at the NRU-HSE Andrey Melville, the head of the department of political management of the Faculty of Political Science of St. Petersburg State University Leonid Smorgunov, doctors of political sciences Andrey Akhremenko (MSU), Petra Panov (Perm State University), Elena Brodovskaya (MSU), Irina Batanina (Tula State University).

Among the professionals there are famous people whom the media often turn to, but on specific topics: elites - to the President of the Russian Association of Political Science Oksana Gaman-Golutvina (MGIMO (U), National Research University - Higher School of Economics), regional development - to Rostislav Turovsky (MSU, National Research University -HSE), psychological aspects of politics - to Elena Shestopal (MSU), problems of the Caucasus and Islam - to Alexey Malashenko (Carnegie Moscow Center), political processes of the CIS countries - to Alexey Vlasov (MSU), etc. Scientific ethics does not allow them to comment on everything at once, as many colleagues called political scientists in the media do.

In a simplified form, a picture of political theater would look like this. Rag dolls are not of the highest quality - they are propagandists. The best-performed dolls and independent actors are moderate supporters of power. Puppet masters, stagehands, lighting technicians, installers - political strategists. Theater critics who explain the meaning of performances to the public are commentators. There are few real directors in the theater (although there are some with education in the field of mass performances). And there is only one director.

Those who went behind the stage, examined the scenery, read the files on the actors, directors and directors, delved into the history of the theater and each performance, studied the structure of the puppets, the weaving of threads and the passes of dexterous and hard-working hands - these are political scientists. The audience knows almost nothing about them.

When preparing the publication, I took on the useless effort of conducting a mini-research that does not pretend to be scientific or representative. I entered the word “political scientist” into the lines of the two most frequently used search engines in Russia and then changed only the letter, looking at the auto-completion offered by the machines. Assuming initially that it reflects the main requests of the audience, I received the following. Political scientists are: Alexandra: Tsipko, Ulitin, Podoprigora, Andrey Lavrov, Alexey Vorobyov, Igor Bunin, Stanislav Belkovsky, Boris Mezhuev, Valery Khomyakov, Vyacheslav Nikonov, Mikhail Vinogradov, Gleb Pavlovsky, Dmitry: Orlov, Oreshkin, Petrov, Evgeniy: Minchenko and Satanovsky, Nikolay Zlobin, Igor Panarin, Boris Kagarlitsky, Sergey Kurginyan, Ivan Kuzmin, Vadim Karasev, Leonid Polyakov, Sergey Markov, Alexander Nikitin, Pavly: Danilin, Svyatenkov and Salin, Andrey Piontkovsky, Vitaly Tretyakov, Mikhail Khazin, Maxim Shevchenko, Yuri Romanenko.

Perhaps the almost single presence of representatives of the academic community on the list is due not only to work “from the outside,” but also to shortcomings from within. Is the academic community involved in the popularization of science, like, for example, Lev Nikolaev or Sergei Kapitsa? Does PR pay due attention to the results of its research? Simply put, how many people in Russia know about the existence of the largest scientific project of recent years, “Political Atlas of Modernity”? Isn’t permanent defeat by “political scientists” in the battle for minds natural, since representatives of the academic community do not want/are not ready/can’t come to the media and speak to the audience in an accessible language? Is the community able to write textbooks a la “entertaining physics”, in which objective physical laws are explained in an accessible and interesting language with examples, the meaning of which is not lost in a non-academic form of presentation? Deeper: is it possible to make Russian political science interesting to the masses without resorting to the words and methods of political scientist propagandists?

In conclusion, I would like to note that without inviting “political scientists” to the discussion, it looks like a highly professional, highly ethical eternal Russian conversation in the kitchen (this time - corporate). A community within a community discusses how to protect the community. This is probably why they know a little less about the community than about Pavlovsky’s programs, Kurginyan’s social movement or Nikonov’s foundations. Will the community be able to hear the arguments, relatively speaking, of the opposing side and formulate a response? Maybe we will be interested to know why Mikhail Leontyev, Stanislav Belkovsky, Pavel Danilin, Georgy Bovt and others call themselves political scientists? And who do they think we are?

Our rating, as before, is dedicated to political strategists and political consultants - people who “make” politicians the way we see them, and are also ideologists and organizers of political processes and election campaigns. In 2017, a little over a year before the day of the Russian presidential elections, we continue our project.

Work on the rating continued at the end of 2016 – beginning of 2017 and was carried out by our analysts, journalists, experts and regional correspondents. We decided, as last year, to coincide with the release of the rating to coincide with the beginning of the new political season. Today we present the result of our research. Based on it, one can understand exactly who and how effectively manages elections and political campaigns in Russia.

The research methodology has changed significantly. The main part of the survey traditionally involved 100 current politicians, deputies, political strategists, political scientists, and journalists. The survey participants were asked to name the “top twenty political strategists.” The respondents were warned that they could only name those with “political technological competence,” that is, people who are specialists in the field of forming public opinion, the real organizers of election and political campaigns. In addition, a questionnaire was sent to 150 experts with a list of 50 candidates who, according to Obshchaya Gazeta analysts, could be among the top 20 political strategists. Participants in the survey could mark any number of participants in it, as well as add no more than 10 participants who were not in the questionnaire. Depending on the frequency of mentioning certain names during the survey and in the questionnaires received, a rating was compiled.

The following are excluded from the rating: 1) the President and Prime Minister of Russia; 2) politicians not related to political technologies (for example, A. Vaino, I. Shuvalov, D. Rogozin, V. Matvienko); 3) politicians and officials related to the development of the political consulting market, but who are not political strategists themselves (for example, V. Volodin, S. Kiriyenko, D. Peskov, N. Timakova); 4) party leaders (for example, G. Zyuganov, S. Neverov, V. Zhirinovsky, S. Mironov); 5) political scientists-experts who do not work in the field of political technologies (for example, S. Markov, M. Remizov, B. Mezhuev); 6) sociologists (for example, V. Fedorov, A. Oslon); 7) journalists and media managers (for example, K. Ernst, A. Gabrelyanov, P. Gusev).

1. Konstantin Kostin

174 mentions. Chairman of the Board of the Civil Society Development Fund. It is expected that he will be one of the Kremlin operators in working with regions and parties in the 2018 elections. Advisor S. Kiriyenko, was an advisor to V. Volodin, previously deputy chief, head of the internal policy department of the Presidential Administration. Participates in closed meetings between V. Putin and political consultants. He took part in the training of vice governors on domestic policy in December 2016. Coordinated the preparation of reports in the interests of the Kremlin. Influences the editorial policy of several “political” Internet portals. Compiler of the “Governor Efficiency Rating”.

2. Dmitry Badovsky

165 mentions. Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Institute of Socio-Economic and Political Research. A major operator working with the expert community and humanitarian projects. Adviser to V. Volodin, formerly deputy head of the internal policy department of the Presidential Administration, formerly adviser to the mayor of Moscow Yu. Luzhkov. Participates in closed meetings between V. Putin and political consultants. Author of the analytical project “Notebooks on Conservatism.” Publisher of the magazine "Historian". Compiler of the “Rating 2016” and the “Rating of Legislators”. Compiler of the “Index of Political Science and Analytical Centers”, which also influences the development of the political technology market.

3. Igor Bunin

142 mentions. President of the Center for Political Technologies. Political consultant, political analyst, one of the founders of the political consulting market in Russia. A traditional consultant to S. Sobyanin and the United Russia party in Moscow, he previously advised Yu. Luzhkov for a long time. Most likely, he will lead part of the campaign of United Russia and its candidates in the municipal elections in Moscow. Consultant A. Kudrina. Participates in closed meetings between V. Putin and political consultants. Owner of the portal Politkom.ru. At the end of 2016 he was awarded the Order of Friendship.

4. Dmitry Orlov

128 mentions. Director of the Agency for Political and Economic Communications, member of the Supreme Council of United Russia. Political consultant, political analyst, specializes in creating expert networks. Operates in many regions of Russia. Coordinator of the “Region” club, uniting Russian experts on regional politics. Supervises the implementation of the Regional Policy Award. Editor of the collection “Regional Policy 2016”. Participates in closed meetings between V. Putin and political consultants. He took part in the training of vice governors on domestic policy in December 2016. In 2016, he published reports on the primaries, the elections to the State Duma, and the situation in several regions. Compiler of the “Rating of 100 Leading Politicians”, “Rating of the Influence of Heads of Subjects”, “Rating of Management Efficiency in the Subjects of the Russian Federation”, several regional ratings. Owner of the portal “Regional Comments”. At the end of 2016, D. Medvedev congratulated him on his anniversary.

5. Andrey Parfenov

125 mentions. Deputy head of the Central Election Commission of the United Russia party. Political strategist, oversees regional and technological work in the party. In 2016, he supervised technological work in United Russia during the parliamentary election campaign. Participates in closed meetings between V. Putin and political consultants.

6. Evgeniy Minchenko

122 mentions. President of the Minchenko Consulting holding, head of the International Institute of Political Expertise. Head of the Committee on Political Technologies of RASO. Political consultant, political analyst, closely monitors the development of the US political system and the American political consulting market, including during a long stay in the United States. At the beginning of 2016, he was awarded the “Silver Archer” prize for the book published as a result of this work. Leading Russian coach in the field of political technology, regularly conducts training seminars. Supervises the implementation of the RASO “Hamburg Account” award. In 2016, he published research on the US elections, a new version of the Politburo 2.0 report, forecasts of the results of the Duma elections, and other studies. He took part in the training of vice governors on domestic policy in December 2016. Compiler of the “Political Survival Rating of Governors” (with M. Vinogradov).

7. Igor Mintusov

118 mentions. President of the Agency for Strategic Communications "Niccolo M". Political consultant, one of the founders of the political consulting market in Russia. President of the Russian Association of Political Consultants (RAPK). Supervises (together with A. Kurtov) the holding of the RAPC Prize. Operates on the Russian market, CIS and foreign markets. Publisher of professional and political literature.

8. Oleg Smolkin

102 mentions. Head of the executive committee of the Moscow branch of the United Russia party. Political strategist, head of the “New Communication Systems” group. Coordinated the campaign for the State Duma elections in Moscow. Most likely, he will coordinate the campaign of United Russia and its candidates in the municipal elections in Moscow. Previously worked in a number of Siberian regions.

9. Oleg Matveychev

97 mentions. Political consultant, one of the founders of the Bakster Group. Professor at the Higher School of Economics. In the past, deputy governor of the Vologda and Volgograd regions, ex-employee of the Presidential Administration. Conducts active consulting activities in the regions. Took part in the training of vice governors on domestic policy in December 2016. Famous blogger.

10. Konstantin Kalachev

92 mentions. Head of the “Political Expert Group”. Political consultant, one of the founders of the political consulting market in Russia. Founder of the “Party of Beer Lovers”, ex-vice mayor of Volgograd. He was one of the main technologists of the United Russia party. Consults campaigns in Russian regions.

11. Andrey Gnatyuk

88 mentions. President of the IMA Group holding. The contractor for most of the PR projects of the former capital mayor Yu. Luzhkov, partially retains this role under S. Sobyanin. Most likely, he will lead part of the campaign of United Russia and its candidates in the municipal elections in Moscow. Controls (together with I. Pisarsky) the main all-Russian award in the field of PR - “Silver Archer”.

12. Andrey Bogdanov

85 mentions. Political consultant, head of the Andrei Bogdanov Center. Former leader of the Democratic Party of Russia, a spoiler candidate in the presidential elections. Creator of an “incubator” for small batches and spoiler batches. He heads one of the Masonic lodges, uses international and regional lodges as expert networks and lobbying channels.

13. Andrey Maksimov

83 mentions. Political consultant, head of Maksimov Consulting. Vice President of RAPC. Conducts campaigns in Russian regions. Owner of an extensive database of propaganda materials.

14. Dmitry Gusev

80 mentions. Chairman of the Supervisory Board of Bakster Group. He worked in the Ural region and is known for his aggressive style of campaigning. He was deputy head of the department of territorial authorities of the Moscow City Hall. Conducts campaigns in Russian regions.

15. Andrey Polosin

76 mentions. Political strategist, political consultant, was previously one of the most famous regional supervisors in the Presidential Administration. Deputy Head of the Department for Work with Regions of the Rosatom State Corporation. Close to S. Kiriyenko and A. Kharichev. Oversaw election campaigns in the regions where the corporation operates. It will probably influence the course of election campaigns in the regions.

16. Grigory Kazankov

72 mentions. Political strategist. Coming from the team of Yu. Rusova. Works in the regions, including in the interests of United Russia.

17. Alexey Chesnakov

67 mentions. Political consultant, general director of the Center for Political Conjuncture. Close to V. Surkov. Previously, for a long time, he was deputy head of the internal policy department of the Presidential Administration. Influences the “Ukrainian” direction of the policy of the Russian authorities.

18. Evgeny Suchkov

63 mentions. Political strategist, director of the Institute of Electoral Technologies. One of the founders of the political consulting market in Russia. Operates in a number of regions of Russia. In 2016, he published the book “Political Technologies: Working on Mistakes.”

19. Andrey Kolyadin

58 mentions. Political strategist, works in Russian regions. Close to Rosatom State Corporation. Previously, he was deputy presidential envoy in the Ural Federal District.

20. Gleb Pavlovsky

52 mentions. Political consultant, works with the Russian opposition. Formerly an adviser to the head of the Presidential Administration and the most influential humanitarian technologist in Russia. Owner of the Internet portals “Russian Journal” and “Gefter”. Famous blogger.

The following political strategists and political consultants also received more than 40 mentions: P. Bystrov, V. Poturemsky, S. Belkovsky, V. Bianki, A. Kurtov, V. Sergeev, A. Pirogov, E. Ostrovsky, I. Mitkin (Spokoinov), S. Markelov, A. Trubetskoy (Koshmarov), A. Sitnikov, V. Smirnov, S. Mikheev, M. Mincheva, A. Bakov, A. Vysotsky, Y. Rusov, M. Sergeeva.