Battle under Prokhorovka loss. Tank battle near Prokhorovka on the Kursk Bulge. Rotmistrov: amazing courage

The battle continued. The Oryol-Kursk section of the Central Front successfully resisted the Wehrmacht soldiers. In the Belgorod sector, on the contrary, the initiative was in the hands of the Germans: their offensive continued in a south-eastern direction, which posed a threat to two fronts at once. The site of the main battle was to be a small field near the village of Prokhorovka.

The choice of area for combat operations was carried out based on geographical features - the terrain made it possible to stop the German breakthrough and deliver a powerful counterattack by the forces of the Steppe Front. On July 9, by order of the command, the 5th Combined Arms and 5th Tank Guards Armies moved to the Prokhorovka area. The Germans advanced here, changing their attack direction.

Tank battle near Prokhorovka. Central battle

Both armies concentrated large tank forces in the village area. It became clear that an oncoming battle simply could not be avoided. On the evening of July 11, the German divisions began an attempt to attack the flanks, and our troops had to use significant forces and even bring in reserves to stop the breakthrough. On the morning of July 12, at 8:15, she launched a counteroffensive. This time was not chosen by chance - the Germans' aimed shooting was made difficult as a result of being blinded by the rising sun. Within an hour, the Battle of Kursk near Prokhorovka acquired a colossal scale. At the center of the fierce battle were approximately 1,000-1,200 German and Soviet tanks and self-propelled artillery units.

For many kilometers the grinding of colliding combat vehicles and the roar of engines could be heard. The planes flew in a whole “swarm”, resembling clouds. The field was burning, more and more explosions shook the ground. The sun was obscured by clouds of smoke, ash, and sand. The smell of hot metal, burning, and gunpowder hung in the air. Choking smoke spread across the field, stinging the soldiers’ eyes and preventing them from breathing. The tanks could only be distinguished by their silhouettes.

On this day, battles were fought not only in the main direction. South of the village, a German tank group attempted to penetrate our forces’ left flank. The enemy's advance was stopped. At the same time, the enemy sent about a hundred tanks to capture the heights near Prokhorovka. They were opposed by soldiers of the 95th Guards Division. The battle lasted three hours and the German attack ultimately failed.

How the Battle of Prokhorovka ended

At approximately 13:00, the Germans once again tried to turn the tide of the battle in the central direction and launched an attack on the right flank with two divisions. However, this attack was also neutralized. Our tanks began to push the enemy back and by evening they were able to push him back 10-15 km. The Battle of Prokhorovka was won and the enemy advance was stopped. Hitler's troops suffered heavy losses, their attacking potential on the Belgorod sector of the front was exhausted. After this battle, right up to the Victory, our army did not let go of the strategic initiative.

“In Soviet official historiography, this battle is given not only the resounding title of the greatest tank battle that took place during the Second World War, it is also called one of the largest battles using tank troops in the entire military history,” writes Alexander Dedov. “However, until now the history of this battle is full of "blank spots". There is still no exact data on the chronological framework, the number of armored vehicles that took part in it. And how the battle itself took place is described by different researchers very contradictory; no one can objectively assess the losses.

And at the same time they forget to mention the battle of Senno! It was here, more than 50 kilometers southwest of Vitebsk, on July 6, 1941, that more than two thousand combat vehicles of the USSR and the Third Reich fought to the death in a brutal, bloody battle. And this is more than twice the amount of equipment that was involved in the battles on the Kursk Bulge, where, according to the official Soviet version, 1,200 Soviet and German tanks and self-propelled artillery units fought.

For the general reader, information about the “tank duel” appeared only ten years after the battle, in 1953, when “The Battle of Kursk,” a book by I. Markin, became available. It is the Battle of Prokhorovka that is called one of the most important components of this battle, since after Prokhorovka the Germans were forced to retreat to their original positions. The question arises: why did the Soviet command hide information about the battle near Prokhorovka?

The answer, most likely, lies in the desire to keep the huge losses, both human and armored vehicles, secret, especially since it was the fatal mistakes of the military leadership that led to their occurrence.

July, 12 -a memorable date in the military history of the Fatherland. On this day in 1943, the largest tank battle in World War II between the Soviet and German armies took place near Prokhorovka.

Direct command of the tank formations during the battle was exercised by Lieutenant General Pavel Rotmistrov on the Soviet side and SS Gruppenführer Paul Hausser on the German side. Neither side managed to achieve the goals set for July 12: the Germans failed to capture Prokhorovka, break through the defenses of Soviet troops and gain operational space, and Soviet troops failed to encircle the enemy group.

“Of course, we won at Prokhorovka, not allowing the enemy to break into operational space, forced him to abandon his far-reaching plans and forced him to retreat to his original position. Our troops survived a four-day fierce battle, and the enemy lost its offensive capabilities. But the Voronezh Front had exhausted its strength, which did not allow it to immediately launch a counteroffensive. A stalemate situation has developed, figuratively speaking, when the command of both sides still wants to, but the troops can’t!”

PROGRESS OF THE BATTLE

If in the zone of the Soviet Central Front, after the start of their offensive on July 5, 1943, the Germans were unable to penetrate deeply into the defense of our troops, then a critical situation developed on the southern front of the Kursk Bulge. Here, on the first day, the enemy brought into the battle up to 700 tanks and assault guns, supported by aviation. Having met resistance in the Oboyan direction, the enemy shifted his main efforts to the Prokhorovsk direction, trying to capture Kursk with a blow from the southeast. The Soviet command decided to launch a counterattack against the wedged enemy group. The Voronezh front was reinforced by the reserves of the Headquarters (5th Guards Tank and 45th Guards armies and two tank corps). On July 12, in the Prokhorovka area, the largest tank battle of World War 2 took place, in which up to 1,200 tanks and self-propelled guns took part on both sides. Soviet tank units sought to conduct close combat (“armor to armor”), since the range of destruction of the 76 mm T-34 gun was no more than 800 m, and the rest of the tanks were even less, while the 88 mm guns of the Tigers and Ferdinands hit our armored vehicles from a distance of 2000 m. When approaching, our tankers suffered heavy losses.

Both sides suffered huge losses at Prokhorovka. In this battle, Soviet troops lost 500 tanks out of 800 (60%). The Germans lost 300 tanks out of 400 (75%). For them it was a disaster. Now the most powerful German strike group was drained of blood. General G. Guderian, at that time the inspector general of the Wehrmacht tank forces, wrote: “The armored forces, replenished with such great difficulty, due to large losses in people and equipment, were out of action for a long time ... and even more so in the Eastern there were no quiet days at the front.” On this day, a turning point occurred in the development of the defensive battle on the southern front of the Kursk ledge. The main enemy forces went on the defensive. On July 13-15, German troops continued attacks only against units of the 5th Guards Tank and 69th armies south of Prokhorovka. The maximum advance of German troops on the southern front reached 35 km. On July 16, they began to retreat to their original positions.

ROTMISTROV: AMAZING COURAGE

I would like to emphasize that in all sectors of the grandiose battle that unfolded on July 12, the soldiers of the 5th Guards Tank Army showed amazing courage, unshakable fortitude, high combat skill and mass heroism, even to the point of self-sacrifice.

A large group of fascist “tigers” attacked the 2nd battalion of the 181st brigade of the 18th tank corps. The battalion commander, Captain P. A. Skripkin, bravely accepted the enemy’s blow. He personally knocked out two enemy vehicles one after another. Having caught the third tank in the crosshairs, the officer pulled the trigger... But at the same instant his combat vehicle shook violently, the turret filled with smoke, and the tank caught fire. Driver-mechanic foreman A. Nikolaev and radio operator A. Zyryanov, saving a seriously wounded battalion commander, pulled him out of the tank and then saw that a “tiger” was moving right at them. Zyryanov hid the captain in a shell crater, and Nikolaev and loader Chernov jumped into their flaming tank and went to ram, immediately crashing into the steel fascist hulk. They died having fulfilled their duty to the end.

The tankmen of the 29th Tank Corps fought bravely. The battalion of the 25th brigade, led by the communist Major G.A. Myasnikov, destroyed 3 "tigers", 8 medium tanks, 6 self-propelled guns, 15 anti-tank guns and more than 300 fascist machine gunners.

The decisive actions of the battalion commander and company commanders, senior lieutenants A. E. Palchikov and N. A. Mishchenko, served as an example for the soldiers. In a heavy battle for the village of Storozhevoye, the car in which A.E. Palchikov was located was hit - a caterpillar was torn off by a shell explosion. The crew members jumped out of the car, trying to repair the damage, but were immediately fired upon by enemy machine gunners from the bushes. The soldiers took up defensive positions and repelled several attacks by the Nazis. In this unequal battle, Alexei Yegorovich Palchikov died the death of a hero, and his comrades were seriously injured. Only the mechanic-driver, candidate member of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, foreman I.E. Safronov, although he was also wounded, could still fire. Hiding under a tank, overcoming the pain, he fought off the advancing fascists until help arrived.

REPORT OF THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE Supreme High Command Headquarters MARSHAL A. VASILEVSKY TO THE SUPREME COMMANDER IN CHIEF ON COMBAT OPERATIONS IN THE PROKHOROVKA AREA, July 14, 1943.

According to your personal instructions, since the evening of July 9, 1943, I have been continuously in the troops of Rotmistrov and Zhadov in the Prokhorovsky and southern directions. Until today, inclusively, the enemy continues on the Zhadov and Rotmistrov front massive tank attacks and counterattacks against our advancing tank units... From observations of the progress of the ongoing battles and from the testimony of prisoners, I conclude that the enemy, despite the huge losses, both in manpower , and especially in tanks and aircraft, still does not give up the idea of ​​​​breaking through to Oboyan and further to Kursk, achieving this at any cost. Yesterday I personally observed a tank battle of our 18th and 29th corps with more than two hundred enemy tanks in a counterattack southwest of Prokhorovka. At the same time, hundreds of guns and all the PCs we had took part in the battle. As a result, the entire battlefield was littered with burning German and our tanks within an hour.

Over the course of two days of fighting, Rotmistrov's 29th Tank Corps lost 60% of its tanks irretrievably and temporarily out of action, and the 18th Corps lost up to 30% of its tanks. Losses in the 5th Guards. mechanized corps are insignificant. The next day, the threat of enemy tanks breaking through from the south into the Shakhovo, Avdeevka, Aleksandrovka areas continues to remain real. During the night I am taking all measures to bring the entire 5th Guards here. mechanized corps, the 32nd motorized brigade and four iptap regiments... The possibility of an oncoming tank battle here and tomorrow cannot be ruled out. In total, at least eleven tank divisions continue to operate against the Voronezh Front, systematically replenished with tanks. The prisoners interviewed today showed that the 19th Panzer Division currently has about 70 tanks in service, the Reich Division has up to 100 tanks, although the latter has already been replenished twice since July 5, 1943. The report was delayed due to late arrival from the front.

The Great Patriotic War. Military historical essays. Book 2. Fracture. M., 1998.

THE COLLAPSE OF THE CITADEL

On July 12, 1943, a new stage of the Battle of Kursk began. On this day, part of the forces of the Soviet Western Front and Bryansk Front went on the offensive, and on July 15, the troops of the right wing of the Central Front attacked the enemy. On August 5, troops of the Bryansk Front liberated Oryol. On the same day, troops of the Steppe Front liberated Belgorod. On the evening of August 5, an artillery salute was fired for the first time in Moscow in honor of the troops who liberated these cities. During fierce battles, troops of the Steppe Front, with the assistance of the Voronezh and Southwestern Fronts, liberated Kharkov on August 23.

The Battle of Kursk was cruel and merciless. Victory in it came at great cost to the Soviet troops. In this battle they lost 863,303 people, including 254,470 permanently. Losses in equipment amounted to: 6064 tanks and self-propelled guns, 5244 guns and mortars, 1626 combat aircraft. As for Wehrmacht losses, information about them is fragmentary and incomplete. Soviet works presented calculated data according to which during the Battle of Kursk, German troops lost 500 thousand people, 1.5 thousand tanks, 3 thousand guns and mortars. Regarding losses in aircraft, there is information that during the defensive stage of the Battle of Kursk alone, the German side irretrievably lost about 400 combat vehicles, while the Soviet side lost about 1000. However, in fierce battles in the air, many experienced German aces, who had been fighting for many years in the East, were killed. front, among them 9 holders of the Knight's Cross.

It is undeniable that the collapse of the German Operation Citadel had far-reaching consequences and had a decisive influence on the entire further course of the war. After Kursk, the German armed forces were forced to switch to strategic defense not only on the Soviet-German front, but also in all theaters of military operations of the Second World War. Their attempt to regain the strategic initiative lost during the Battle of Stalingrad suffered a crushing failure.

EAGLE AFTER LIBERATION FROM THE GERMAN OCCUPATION

(from the book “Russia at War” by A. Werth), August 1943

(...) The liberation of the ancient Russian city of Oryol and the complete liquidation of the Oryol wedge, which threatened Moscow for two years, was a direct result of the defeat of the Nazi troops near Kursk.

In the second week of August I was able to travel by car from Moscow to Tula, and then to Orel...

In these thickets, through which the dusty road from Tula now ran, death awaits a person at every step. “Minen” (in German), “mines” (in Russian) - I read on old and new tablets stuck in the ground. In the distance, on a hill, under the blue summer sky, the ruins of churches, the remains of houses and lonely chimneys could be seen. These miles of weeds were no man's land for almost two years. The ruins on the hill were the ruins of Mtsensk. Two old women and four cats were all the living creatures that Soviet soldiers found there when the Germans withdrew on July 20. Before leaving, the Nazis blew up or burned everything—churches and buildings, peasant huts and everything else. In the middle of the last century, Leskov and Shostakovich’s “Lady Macbeth” lived in this city... The “desert zone” created by the Germans now stretches from Rzhev and Vyazma to Orel.

How did Orel live during the almost two-year German occupation?

Of the 114 thousand population in the city, only 30 thousand now remain. The occupiers killed many residents. Many were hanged in the city square - the same one where the crew of the Soviet tank that was the first to break into Oryol is now buried, as well as General Gurtiev, the famous participant in the Battle of Stalingrad, killed on the morning when Soviet troops took the city in battle. They said that the Germans killed 12 thousand people and sent twice as many to Germany. Many thousands of Oryol residents went to the partisans in the Oryol and Bryansk forests, because here (especially in the Bryansk region) there was an area of ​​active partisan operations (...)

Wert A. Russia in the war of 1941-1945. M., 1967.

*Rotmistrov P.A. (1901-1982), Ch. Marshal of Armored Forces (1962). During the war, from February 1943 - commander of the 5th Guards. tank army. Since Aug. 1944 - Commander of the armored and mechanized forces of the Red Army.

**Zhadov A.S. (1901-1977). Army General (1955). From October 1942 to May 1945, commander of the 66th Army (from April 1943 - 5th Guards) Army.

July 12th, 2013

Exactly 70 years ago, in 1943, on the same days when this note is being written, one of the largest battles in the entire history of mankind took place in the area of ​​Kursk, Orel and Belgorod. The Kursk Bulge, which ended with the complete victory of the Soviet troops, became a turning point in the Second World War. But assessments of one of the most famous episodes of the battle - the tank battle of Prokhorovka - are so contradictory that it is very difficult to figure out who actually emerged victorious. They say that the real, objective history of any event is written no earlier than 50 years after it. The 70th anniversary of the Battle of Kursk is an excellent occasion to find out what really happened near Prokhorovka.

The “Kursk Bulge” was a protrusion on the front line about 200 km wide and up to 150 km deep, which was formed as a result of the winter campaign of 1942-1943. In mid-April, the German command developed an operation code-named “Citadel”: it was planned to encircle and destroy Soviet troops in the Kursk region with simultaneous attacks from the north, in the Orel region, and from the south, from Belgorod. Next, the Germans had to advance east again.

It would seem that it is not so difficult to predict such plans: a strike from the north, a strike from the south, envelopment in pincers... In fact, the “Kursk Bulge” was not the only such protrusion on the front line. In order for the German plans to be confirmed, it was necessary to use all the forces of Soviet intelligence, which this time turned out to be on top (there is even a beautiful version that all the operational information was supplied to Moscow by Hitler’s personal photographer). The main details of the German operation near Kursk were known long before it began. The Soviet command knew exactly the day and hour appointed for the German offensive.

Battle of Kursk. Scheme of the battle.

They decided to greet the “guests” accordingly: for the first time in the Great Patriotic War, the Red Army built a powerful, deeply echeloned defense in the expected directions of the enemy’s main attacks. It was necessary to wear down the enemy in defensive battles, and then go on a counter-offensive (Marshals G.K. Zhukov and A.M. Vasilevsky are considered the main authors of this idea). The Soviet defense, with an extensive network of trenches and minefields, consisted of eight lines with a total depth of up to 300 kilometers. Numerical superiority was also on the side of the USSR: more than 1,300 thousand personnel against 900 thousand of the Germans, 19 thousand guns and mortars against 10 thousand, 3,400 tanks against 2,700, 2,172 aircraft against 2,050. However, here we must take into account the fact that the German army received significant “technical” replenishment: Tiger and Panther tanks, Ferdinand assault guns, Focke-Wulf fighters of new modifications, Junkers-87 D5 bombers. But the Soviet command had a certain advantage due to the favorable location of the troops: the Central and Voronezh fronts were supposed to repel the offensive, if necessary, troops of the Western, Bryansk and Southwestern fronts could come to their aid, and another front was deployed in the rear - Stepnoy, the creation of which Hitler’s military leaders, as they later admitted in their memoirs, completely missed.

The Junkers 87 bomber, modification D5, is one of the examples of new German technology near Kursk. Our plane received the nickname “laptezhnik” for its non-retractable landing gear.

However, preparing to repel an attack is only half the battle. The second half is to prevent fatal miscalculations in combat conditions, when the situation is constantly changing and plans are being adjusted. To begin with, the Soviet command used a psychological technique. The Germans were scheduled to launch their offensive at 3 a.m. on July 5th. However, at exactly that hour, massive Soviet artillery fire fell on their positions. Thus, already at the very beginning of the battle, Hitler’s military leaders received a signal that their plans had been revealed.

The first three days of the battle, for all their magnitude, can be described quite briefly: German troops were bogged down in dense Soviet defense. On the northern front of the “Kursk Bulge”, at the cost of heavy losses, the enemy managed to advance 6-8 kilometers in the direction of Olkhovatka. But on July 9 the situation changed. Having decided that it was enough to hit the wall head-on, the Germans (primarily the commander of Army Group South, E. von Manstein) tried to concentrate all their forces in one, southern direction. And here the German offensive was stopped after a large-scale tank battle at Prokhorovka, which I will consider in detail.

The battle is perhaps unique in its own way in that the points of view on it among modern historians differ literally in everything. From the recognition of the unconditional victory of the Red Army (the version enshrined in Soviet textbooks) to talk about the complete defeat of the 5th Guards Army of General P.A. Rotmistrov by the Germans. As evidence of the last thesis, the figures for the losses of Soviet tanks are usually cited, as well as the fact that the general himself almost ended up in court for these losses. However, the position of the “defeatists” cannot be accepted unconditionally for several reasons.

General Pavel Rotmistrov - commander of the 5th Guards Tank Army.

Firstly, the battle of Prokhorovka is often considered by supporters of the “defeatist” version outside the overall strategic situation. But the period from July 8 to July 12 was the time of the most intense fighting on the southern front of the “Kursk Bulge”. The main target of the German offensive was the city of Oboyan - this important strategic point made it possible to combine the forces of Army Group South and the German 9th Army advancing in the north. To prevent a breakthrough, the commander of the Voronezh Front, General N.F. Vatutin concentrated a large tank group on the enemy’s right flank. If the Nazis had immediately tried to break through to Oboyan, Soviet tanks would have hit them from the Prokhorovka area to the flank and rear. Realizing this, the commander of the 4th German Panzer Army, Hoth, decided to first take Prokhorovka and then continue moving north.

Secondly, the very name “battle of Prokhorovka” is not entirely correct. The fighting on July 12 took place not only directly near this village, but also to the north and south of it. It is the clashes of tank armadas across the entire width of the front that make it possible to more or less objectively assess the results of the day. Tracing where the popular name “Prokhorovka” came from (in modern terms) is also not difficult. It began to appear on the pages of Russian historical literature in the 50s, when Nikita Khrushchev became the General Secretary of the CPSU, who - what a coincidence! — in July 1943, he was on the southern front of the Kursk salient as a member of the military council of the Voronezh Front. It is not surprising that Nikita Sergeevich needed vivid descriptions of the victories of Soviet troops in this sector.

Scheme of the tank battle near Prokhorovka. The three main German divisions are designated by abbreviations: "MG", "AG" and "R".

But let's return to the fighting on July 10-12. By the 12th, the operational situation at Prokhorovka was extremely tense. The Germans had no more than two kilometers to reach the village itself - it was just a matter of a decisive attack. If they managed to take Prokhorovka and gain a foothold in it, part of the tank corps could easily turn north and break through to Oboyan. In this case, a real threat of encirclement would hang over the two fronts - Central and Voronezh. Vatutin had at his disposal the last significant reserve - the 5th Guards Tank Army of General P.A. Rotmistrov, which numbered about 850 vehicles (tanks and self-propelled artillery guns). The Germans had three tank divisions, which included a total of 211 tanks and self-propelled guns. But when assessing the balance of forces, one must keep in mind that the Nazis were armed with the latest heavy Tigers, as well as modernized fourth Panzers (Pz-IV) with enhanced armor protection. The main strength of the Soviet tank corps was the legendary “thirty-four” (T-34) - excellent medium tanks, but for all their advantages, they could not compete on equal terms with heavy equipment. In addition, Hitler's tanks could fire over long distances and had better optics and, accordingly, shooting accuracy. Taking into account all these factors, Rotmistrov’s advantage was very insignificant.

The Tiger heavy tank is the main strike unit of the German tank forces near Kursk.

However, one cannot write off several mistakes made by Soviet generals. The first was done by Vatutin himself. Having set the task of attacking the Germans, at the last moment he moved the time of the offensive from 10 a.m. to 8.30 a.m. The question inevitably arises about the quality of reconnaissance: the Germans stood in positions in the morning and themselves waited for the order to attack (as it later became known, it was planned for 9.00), and their anti-tank artillery was deployed in battle formation in case of Soviet counterattacks. To launch a pre-emptive strike in such a situation was a suicidal decision, as the further course of the battle showed. Surely Vatutin, if he had been accurately informed about the German disposition, would have preferred to wait for the Nazis to attack.

The second mistake, made by P.A. Rotmistrov himself, concerns the use of T-70 light tanks (120 vehicles in two corps of the 5th Guards Army that launched the morning attack). Near Prokhorovka, the T-70s were in the front ranks and suffered especially hard from the fire of German tanks and artillery. The roots of this error are rather unexpectedly revealed in the Soviet military doctrine of the late 1930s: it was believed that light tanks were intended primarily for “reconnaissance in force,” and medium and heavy ones for the decisive blow. The Germans acted exactly the opposite: their heavy wedges broke through the defense, and light tanks and infantry followed, “cleaning up” the territory. Undoubtedly, by Kursk, Soviet generals were thoroughly familiar with the Nazi tactics. What made Rotmistrov make such a strange decision is a mystery. Perhaps he was counting on the effect of surprise and hoped to overwhelm the enemy with numbers, but, as I wrote above, the surprise attack did not work out.

What really happened near Prokhorovka, and why did Rotmistrov barely manage to escape the tribunal? At 8.30 am, Soviet tanks began to advance on the Germans, who were in good positions. At the same time, an air battle ensued, where, apparently, neither side gained the upper hand. The first ranks of Rotmistrov's two tank corps were shot by fascist tanks and artillery. Towards noon, during fierce attacks, some of the vehicles broke through to the Nazi positions, but they failed to push back the enemy. Having waited for the offensive impulse of Rotmistrov’s army to dry up, the Germans themselves went on the attack, and... It would seem that they should have easily won the battle, but no!

General view of the battlefield near Prokhorovka.

Speaking about the actions of Soviet military leaders, it should be noted that they wisely managed their reserves. On the southern sector of the front, the SS Reich division advanced only a couple of kilometers and was stopped mainly by anti-tank artillery fire with the support of attack aircraft. The Adolf Hitler division, exhausted by attacks by Soviet troops, remained in its original place. North of Prokhorovka, the “Dead Head” tank division operated, which, according to German reports, did not encounter Soviet troops at all that day, but for some reason only covered 5 kilometers! This is an unrealistically small figure, and we can rightfully assume that the delay of the “Dead Head” is on the “conscience” of Soviet tanks. Moreover, it was in this area that a reserve of 150 tanks of the 5th and 1st Guards Tank Armies remained.

And one more point: the failure in the morning clash near Prokhorovka does not in any way detract from the merits of the Soviet tank crews. The tank crews fought until the last shell, showing miracles of courage, and sometimes pure Russian ingenuity. Rotmistrov himself recalled (and it is unlikely that he invented such a vivid episode) how the commander of one of the platoons, Lieutenant Bondarenko, towards whom two “tigers” were moving, managed to hide his tank behind a burning German vehicle. The Germans decided that Bondarenko’s tank had been hit, turned around, and one of the “tigers” immediately received a shell on its side.

Attack of Soviet "thirty-fours" with infantry support.

The losses of the 5th Guards Army on this day amounted to 343 tanks. The Germans, according to modern historians, lost up to 70 vehicles. However, here we are talking only about irrecoverable losses. Soviet troops could bring up reserves and send damaged tanks for repairs. The Germans, who had to attack at all costs, did not have such an opportunity.

How to evaluate the results of the battle at Prokhorovka? From a tactical point of view, and also taking into account the ratio of losses - a draw, or even a slight victory for the Germans. However, if you look at the strategic map, it is obvious that the Soviet tankers were able to complete their main task - to slow down the German offensive. July 12 was a turning point in the Battle of Kursk: Operation Citadel failed, and on the same day the Red Army counteroffensive began north of Orel. The second stage of the battle (Operation Kutuzov, carried out primarily by the Bryansk and Western fronts) was successful for the Soviet troops: by the end of July the enemy was driven back to their original positions, and already in August the Red Army liberated Orel and Kharkov. The military power of Germany was finally broken, which predetermined the victory of the USSR in the Great Patriotic War

Broken Nazi equipment near Kursk..

Interesting fact. It would be unfair not to give the floor to one of the initiators of the Soviet operation near Kursk, so I give the version of events of Marshal of the Soviet Union Georgy Zhukov: “In his memoirs, the former commander of the 5th Tank Army P. A. Rotmistrov writes that he played a decisive role in the defeat of the armored forces The “South” armies were played by the 5th Tank Army. This is immodest and not entirely true. The troops of the 6th and 7th Guards and 1st Tank armies, supported by the reserve artillery of the High Command and the air army, bled and exhausted the enemy during the fierce battles of July 4-12. The 5th Panzer Army was already dealing with an extremely weakened group of German troops, which had lost faith in the possibility of a successful fight against the Soviet troops.”

Marshal of the Soviet Union Georgy Zhukov.

On July 12, 1943, one of the central events of the Great Patriotic War took place - a tank battle in the area of ​​Prokhorovka station. When Stalin learned of the losses of Soviet troops in this battle, he became furious. “The Supreme decided to remove me from my post and almost put me on trial,” recalled Chief Marshal of the Armored Forces P. A. Rotmistrov. Only the intervention of the Chief of the General Staff Vasilevsky saved the army commander from the tribunal. What made the Generalissimo so angry?

Preparation for a tank battle: losses on the march On July 5, 1943, according to the Citadel plan, German troops went on the offensive in the direction of Kursk and Belgorod. In the zone of operation of the Voronezh Front, the enemy managed to advance 35 kilometers. Soviet troops suffered heavy losses: from July 5 to July 8, 527 tanks were knocked out, 372 of them burned.

Having exhausted its defensive potential, the commander of the Voronezh Front, Army General N. F. Vatutin, on July 6 turned to the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command (SHC) with a request to strengthen the front. It was decided to transfer the 5th Guards Tank Army under the command of P. A. Rotmistrov to the battle area.

An entire tank army had to be redeployed over a distance of 350 kilometers in just 3 days. Despite Stalin's urgent advice, Rotmistrov decided not to use the railway, but to transport the combat vehicles under his own power. The advantage of this decision was that the tanks could join the battle on the move. This is what happened later. A significant drawback was the exhaustion of engine life and inevitable breakdowns on the road.

The tank columns, stretching for many kilometers, were practically not subject to air attacks. Perhaps the coordinated work of Soviet aviation helped with this.

However, it was not the combat losses that were impressive. During the redeployment, more than 30% of tanks and self-propelled artillery units (self-propelled guns) failed. By July 12, only half of the broken equipment had been restored. 101 combat vehicles fell behind for various reasons. One tank hit a mine. In addition, one officer of the 25th Tank Brigade was killed on the march and two motorcyclists were injured.

However, in general, the redeployment of 40 thousand people and about a thousand tanks, self-propelled guns and other equipment was carried out successfully, and by the time of the counter-offensive near Prokhorovka, the 5th Guards Tank Army was fully combat-ready.

Resources before the battle

The oncoming tank battle on the field near Prokhorovka is considered a turning point in the Kursk defensive operation. However, at the Supreme Command Headquarters this counterattack was perceived as a failure. And the point is not only that the assigned combat missions were not completed, but also in the enormous amount of broken and burned military equipment and human losses.

Before the start of the battle, P. A. Rotmistrov’s 5th Guards Tank Army had 909 tanks, of which 28 were heavy Mk. IV Churchill Mk.IV, 563 T-34 medium tanks and 318 T-70 light tanks. However, after the march, only 699 tanks and 21 self-propelled guns remained on the move.

They were opposed by the 2nd SS Panzer Corps, which had 294 tanks and self-propelled assault guns, of which only 273 combat vehicles were operational, including 22 T-VIE Tigers.

Thus, 232 heavy and medium tanks of the Wehrmacht and 699 light and medium tanks of the Red Army collided near Prokhorovka - a total of 931 combat vehicles.

Losses in the battle of Prokhorovka

N. S. Khrushchev in his memoirs describes the situation when he, together with Georgy Zhukov and the commander of the 5th Tank Army Rotmistrov, were driving in the vicinity of Prokhorovka. “In the fields one could see many destroyed tanks, both enemy and ours. There was a discrepancy in the assessment of losses: Rotmistrov said that he saw more destroyed German tanks, but I saw more of ours. Both, however, are natural. There were significant losses on both sides,” Khrushchev noted.

The calculation of the results showed that there were significantly more losses on the part of the Soviet army. Given the impossibility of maneuvering in a field crowded with armored vehicles, light tanks were unable to take advantage of their advantage in speed and, one after another, perished under long-range shells from enemy artillery and heavy combat vehicles.

Reports from commanders of tank units indicate large losses of personnel and equipment.

The 29th Tank Corps lost 1,033 people killed and missing, and 958 people were wounded. Of the 199 tanks that took part in the attack, 153 tanks burned out or were knocked out. Of the 20 self-propelled artillery units, only one remained on the move: 16 were destroyed, 3 were sent for repair.

The 18th Tank Corps lost 127 people killed, 144 people missing, and 200 people wounded. Of the 149 tanks that took part in the attack, 84 burned out or were knocked out.

The 2nd Guards Tank Corps lost 162 people killed and missing, and 371 people were wounded. Of the 94 tanks that took part in the attack, 54 burned out or were knocked out.

The 2nd Tank Corps, out of 51 tanks that took part in the counterattack, irretrievably lost 22, that is, 43%.

Thus, summing up the reports of the corps commanders, Rotmistrov’s 5th Guards Tank Army lost 313 combat vehicles, 19 self-propelled guns and at least 1,466 people killed and missing.

The official data of the Wehrmacht differs somewhat from the above. Thus, according to reports from German headquarters, 968 people were captured; 249 Soviet tanks were knocked out and destroyed.

The discrepancy in numbers refers to those combat vehicles that were able to leave the battlefield under their own power, and only then completely lose their combat effectiveness.

The Nazis themselves did not suffer large losses, losing no more than 100 pieces of equipment, most of which were restored. The very next day, judging by the reports of the commanders of the Adolf Hitler, Death's Head and Reich divisions, 251 pieces of equipment were ready for battle - tanks and self-propelled assault guns.

The vulnerability of Soviet tanks, so clearly revealed in the Battle of Prokhorovka, made it possible to draw appropriate conclusions and gave impetus to the reorientation of military science and industry towards the development of heavy tanks with a cannon firing over long distances.