Reasons for failures in the initial period of the Second World War. Why did the USSR fail at the beginning of the Great Patriotic War?

1. Sudden attack by the enemy.

Early in the morning, exactly at half past four, on June 22, 1941, German aircraft attacked airfields, military camps, railway junctions, and settlements in the Baltic states, Belarus and Ukraine. This took most of the divisions and regiments of the border military districts by surprise. The defensive lines were not occupied by troops who had been withdrawn to summer camps back in May. The artillery was located at the district training grounds far from the borders and their divisions. Aviation was not dispersed among field airfields. Only ships and naval bases of the Northern, Baltic and Black Sea fleets, by order of the People's Commissar of the USSR Navy, Admiral N. G. Kuznetsov, were put on high alert in advance. Border troops were also in constant readiness.
Taking advantage of surprise and weak anti-aircraft artillery cover of airfields, German aviation on the very first day of the war destroyed more than 1,200 combat aircraft from border districts and seized complete air supremacy. Communication centers and bridges were captured, troop control was disrupted, etc. As a result of the sudden attack, hundreds of thousands of people were killed, wounded, captured or disappeared.
G.K. Zhukov says in his memoirs: “The main reasons for the defeat of our troops at the beginning of the war were that the war found our armed forces at the stage of their reorganization and rearmament with more advanced weapons; the fact that our border troops were not brought to wartime states in a timely manner, were not brought into full combat readiness and were not deployed according to all the rules of operational art to conduct active defense... These shortcomings further increased the advantages of the enemy, who was already superior to ours troops in quantitative and qualitative terms, and since the enemy had the strategic initiative, all these factors played a decisive role in the beginning of the war.”

2. Numerical superiority of the enemy .

The number of troops of Germany and its allies near the borders of the USSR amounted to 5.5 million people. This formidable invading army was opposed by Soviet troops from the western districts totaling 2.6 million people.

3. Hitler's army was mobilized and had two years of experience in modern warfare, while the professional level of the Soviet troops, especially the command staff, decreased after mass repressions in the army. By the beginning of the war, only 7% of the commanders of the Red Army had a higher military education, and 37% had not even completed a full course in secondary military educational institutions.

As a result of mass repressions in 1937-1938. the country lost more than 40 thousand commanders, political workers, military engineers and specialists. “Without the year thirty-seven, perhaps there would have been no war at all in the year forty-one. In the fact that Hitler decided to start a war in 1941, a large role was played by the assessment of the degree of defeat of the military personnel that occurred in our country. There were a number of divisions commanded by captains, because everyone who was higher was completely arrested,” Marshal A. M. Vasilevsky says about this. At the end of the 30s, the following were repressed: M. N. Tukhachevsky (Marshal of the Soviet Union, participant in the First World War and Civil War, creator of works that had a significant influence on the development of Soviet military science), V. K. Blucher (Marshal of the Soviet Union, participant in the First World War and Civil War, head of the Special Far Eastern Army until 1937), A. I. Egorov (Marshal of the Soviet Union, participant in the First World War and Civil War), I. E. Yakir (commander of the 1st rank, participant in the First World War, October revolution and civil war) and others.
Unlike the USSR, Germany had many commanders who went through the First World War: H. Guderian, W. Keitel, F. Paulus, E. Manstein, etc. Although some military leaders were not repressed, many of them did not show special abilities. Among them are USSR Marshals Voroshilov and Budyonny.
Semyon Mikhailovich Budyonny, in February 1918, formed a cavalry detachment, with which he began military operations against the whites. Being a brilliant cavalry tactician, Budyonny did not have the talents of an outstanding commander and could not think big, which was reflected during the Second World War. After mass purges in the army in 1926-35 and repressions in 1930-38, a situation arose in the army when the highest positions were held by people from the 1st Cavalry Army, and Budyonny and K.E. Voroshilov was turned by Stalinist propaganda into almost the only heroes of the Civil War. Occupying high positions, Budyonny, being a convinced cavalryman and an admirer of civil war tactics, is largely responsible for the fact that the country's leadership slowed down the development of tank and motorized forces, and many new strategic developments were shelved. At all posts, B. showed a complete lack of talent as a commander and an inability to adapt to the new, changed war strategy. In 1942 he was finally removed from command positions and never received them again.
During the hostilities, Kliment Efremovich Voroshilov was always distinguished by the “purity” of his party views, but did not achieve much success. Together with S.M. Budyonny was among the main organizers of the 1st Cavalry Army (November 1919) and became a member of the Army's Revolutionary Military Council. After the death of M.V. Frunze Voroshilov, as a loyal and consistent supporter of Stalin, was appointed by him on November 6, 1925, People's Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs of the USSR and Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR. Voroshilov became the most celebrated commander of the Civil War. In Aug. 1939 headed the Soviet delegation in negotiations with France and Great Britain, and showed himself to be an incompetent diplomat. 7.5.1940, after after the unsuccessful actions of the Red Army during the Soviet-Finnish War it became clear that Voroshilov was absolutely unable to lead the armed forces, Stalin removed him from the post of People's Commissar and made him deputy. prev Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and others Defense Committee under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR (was there until May 1941). 10.6.1941 Stalin appointed Voroshilov commander-in-chief of the forces of the North-Western direction, but already on August 31. He, having shown his complete inability to lead troops in a modern war, was removed from command. On Sept. 1941 Voroshilov was sent to Leningrad as front commander, suffered a crushing defeat, but Stalin, having learned that Voroshilov personally tried to lead the troops into the attack, immediately recalled him and replaced him with G.K. Zhukov. In September - November 1942, Voroshilov held the purely formal post of commander-in-chief of the partisan movement.
In subsequent years, the damage caused to personnel was compensated numerically, but qualitatively this did not happen. Many command and staff positions were filled by insufficiently experienced and trained people. Finding themselves in the most difficult conditions of the initial period of the war, they naturally made many mistakes.

The professional skills of sappers and engineers were clearly insufficient. Air Force and Navy specialists were poorly trained and knew neither new nor old military equipment. Communication facilities at the tactical level were almost completely absent, so troops even at the army-corps level did not have stable communications. The air defense of troops and facilities did not meet the requirements of its time due to the lack of detection and communication equipment. The reasons could be listed endlessly.

4. Major miscalculations of the Soviet leadership in assessing the role of mechanized formations. There was no developed automobile industry in the USSR. A significant part of the guns was moved by horses or old tractors. High degree of motorization
The German army allowed strike groups to rapidly develop an offensive, overcome water obstacles on the move, bypass Soviet formations from the flanks, and disrupt or weaken their counterattacks.

5. The ongoing modernization of military equipment and the reorganization of the main branches of the Soviet Armed Forces were not completed, so a number of old weapons were discontinued, and there were still few new ones in the army.

6. The old system of recruiting the army weakened the preparation of the army. In 1939, the Law “On General Military Duty” was adopted. He established the personnel principle of forming the armed forces and abolished class restrictions in conscription.

7. One of the main reasons for the initial failures of the Red Army in the fight against Nazi Germany was a miscalculation in assessing the military-strategic situation on the eve of the war.

German troops attacked suddenly, violating the non-aggression pact. Based on an erroneous assessment of the intentions of the fascist leadership, Stalin forbade the Soviet military command to carry out the necessary mobilization measures, regroup troops in the border districts and put them on combat readiness.
L.P. Beria rejected all information coming from intelligence agencies. In his memo to Stalin (06/21/41), he insists on the recall and punishment of the ambassador in Berlin, Dekanozov, who assured the Soviet leadership that Hitler planned to launch an attack on the USSR on 06/22/41. Beria is also critical of the messages of the military attache in Germany, V.I. Tupikov, who claimed that Wehrmacht groups would attack Moscow, Leningrad and Kyiv.
“Marshal B.M. Shaposhnikov, while still the Chief of the General Staff, based on an analysis of historical, geographical and operational strategic factors, concluded that in the event of a war with Germany, its command would deliver the main blow in the Smolensk-Moscow direction. Stalin said that Germany needed bread to wage war. Therefore, the main blow may be delivered in Ukraine. “It is clear that Stalin’s opinion has become a directive for our military command,” says N. G. Pavlenko.
Vasilevsky, in his work, partially justifies Stalin, saying that he did not dare to begin the regrouping of the armed forces. The party wanted to delay the timing of entry into the war, and Stalin was unable to correctly grasp the turning point when forced mobilization should begin. Like Pavlenko, he argues that in the event of timely training of troops, the enemy could have suffered heavy losses, which would not have allowed him to advance so far across the territory of the USSR.

It was Stalin who made the biggest mistakes in the strategic level of troop leadership. He, according to Marshal G.K. Zhukov, both before the war and at the beginning of it had a very vague idea of ​​​​military affairs. However, for over a year and a half (starting in the spring of 1941), he paid little attention to the opinions of military experts, believing himself to be the only strategist. Only the harsh reality of the autumn of 1942 diminished his ambitions as a “commander”.
The main feature of the Council of Workers' and Peasants' Defense during the Civil War was that it did not replace or replace party and government bodies. Fundamental issues of conducting military operations were then considered at meetings of the Council of People's Commissars, and at the Politburo and plenums of the Central Committee, and at congresses of the RCP (b). During the Great Patriotic War, no plenums, much less party congresses, were held; all cardinal military issues were resolved in the State Defense Committee, or, more precisely, by Stalin personally. Therefore, it is difficult to agree with the statement that the GKO, headed by Stalin, had its prototype as the Council of Workers' and Peasants' Defense, which was under the leadership of V.I. Lenin.
Stalin actually discarded the experience of the civil war in the field of organizing the strategic leadership of the armed forces. Although there were from six to eight members at Headquarters at different periods, in reality two or three people worked in it. According to Vasilevsky, Stalin attached little importance to the affiliation of certain military leaders to Headquarters.
As is known, during the Great Patriotic War, Stalin held a number of important party and government posts. He was the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR. In addition, he was assigned other senior leadership functions: to head the Transport Committee, deal almost daily with the People's Commissars responsible for the production of weapons and ammunition, resolve issues of improving military equipment with the People's Commissars and designers, etc. Naturally, such an overload of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief could not help but have an effect negatively on the quality of his own military activities, prevented him from delving into the essence of the problems.

The offensive doctrine imposed by the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks in 1939 on the leadership of the General Staff of the Red Army aroused almost no objections - and who could object if the district commanders commanded for 1-2 years, the People's Commissar of Defense Timoshenko a little more. The leadership selected personnel who would not dare to object to the general line of the party. Therefore, the order of the Central Committee to prepare offensive operations was carried out, despite the fact that from 1939 to 1941 the situation changed dramatically, and the General Staff stupidly carried out those directives that were developed two years before the war.

The General Staff closely monitored the course of the two-year war in Europe, but the conclusions were drawn superficially. The achievements of the German command in concentrating the forces of tank formations in the direction of the main attacks, the use of operational and tactical landings, the rapid transfer of force, and the interaction of the forces of the ground forces, aviation, and navy were not noticed. It was denied that the main forces would enter into battle with the start of one or another campaign at the same time. The adoption by the Politburo in June 1941 of the “Resolution on the deployment of troops of the second strategic echelon” (“second line”) mainly along the river was also belated. Dnieper. The same Resolution outlined the construction of a state defense line on the approaches to Moscow.

A series of replacements of people's commissars and chiefs of the General Staff led to the fact that the General Staff, two, one, six months before the start of the war, made miscalculations in the timing of its probable start, in the operational formation of the troops of the first strategic echelon, and most importantly - they miscalculated in the direction of the main blows. Two years of the European war showed that the Germans were planning operations in areas of maximum railway capacity, because the organization of supplies and 90% of the movement of troops were carried out mainly along them. And as post-war analysis showed, the Barbarossa plan was based on the presence of railways in the direction of the main attacks. Despite the fact that the gauge in Europe is narrower, it was easier to use existing railways. Therefore, the first direction was chosen to Leningrad, the second - Minsk-Moscow and the third - to Vinnitsa, since the terrain was favorable for the use of tanks.

In the pre-war years, the People's Commissariat of Defense, in order to please Stalin's political ambitions, overestimated its own troops and underestimated the enemy's troops. Thus, the commander of the Western Special Military District, General of the Army D. Pavlov, argued on December 28, 1940 that our domestic tank corps is capable of solving the problem of destroying 1-2 mechanized divisions or 4-5 infantry divisions, and on January 13, 1941, the Chief of the General Staff, commander of the 2nd rank K.A. Meretskov stated: “When developing the field regulations, we proceeded from the fact that our division is much stronger than the German division and in an oncoming battle it will defeat the German one. In defense, one of our divisions will repel the attack of 2-3 enemy divisions.”

8. The fact that Stalin tried to hide his guilt in the initial defeats of the Red Army in the Second World War had a negative impact on military action, thereby punishing military leaders, generals and others for their misdeeds.

To deflect blame from himself and his inner circle, Stalin organized a trial. A large group of generals were convicted and executed on the basis of falsified verdicts. Among them are the commander of the troops of the Western Front D. G. Pavlov, the chief of staff of the same front V. E. Klimovskikh, the commander of the troops of the 4th Army A. A. Korobkov and other military leaders.
Under conditions of strict control over various kinds of “conversations,” those military leaders who tried to understand the reasons for the defeats came under suspicion and were subjected to repression. Thus, for confidential conversations with colleagues about possible mistakes of the command on strategic issues, a major military researcher, General V. A. Melikov was accused of “defeatism” and imprisoned, where he died.
Along with repressions for attempts to analyze the causes of the defeats, the version about the surprise of the enemy attack and other half-truths was intensively spread.

9. By June 1941, the troops of the border districts were scattered over too large areas. Meanwhile, most of the Wehrmacht forces concentrated in advance and secretly directly near the Soviet borders.

10.The military-economic potential of Germany significantly exceeded the potential of the USSR at the initial stage of the war. In 1940, the USSR produced 18.3 million tons of steel, produced 31 million tons of oil and 166 million tons of coal. In Germany and the regions controlled by it, 32 million tons of steel were smelted per year, 400 million tons of coal and 6.5 million tons of oil were mined.

The USSR lagged behind Germany both in professional training (the army was mobilized and had two years of experience in warfare) and in armament (Germany transferred its economy to the production of the latest military equipment and, in addition, it used the resources of almost all of Western Europe, seized the weapons of more than 200 divisions defeated and capitulated armies: France - 4930 tanks, armored personnel carriers, 3 thousand aircraft).

The Red Army also failed to transform into a modern army, despite the supply of new combat aircraft and tanks. The aircraft industry and tank building looked most characteristic. A comparative analysis of the production of combat aircraft of the USSR and Germany shows that the non-belligerent USSR before the war, in 1939 and 1940, produced more combat aircraft than Germany (see Table 1). At the request of May 13, 1940, People's Commissar of Defense S.K. Timoshenko and Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army B.M. Shaposhnikov Politburo, the aviation industry was placed under martial law with simultaneous restructuring and expansion.

Table 1

9 new ones were built and 9 existing aircraft manufacturing plants were reconstructed; 6 new engine factories were built and all existing factories were reconstructed. At the beginning of the war, the aviation fleet amounted to 15,990 combat aircraft, of which 9,917 were stationed in the western strategic direction. Germany by June 22 had 1820 and 770 allied aircraft. Thus, the Soviet side has a 4.5:1 superiority in aircraft. But on the first day of fighting alone, 1,811 aircraft were lost, of which 1,489 were burned on the ground, and by July 10, 1941, 2,516 aircraft remained in the Soviet Air Force, one third of the existing ones. Almost the entire aircraft industry was lost in 1941. In addition, 22,150 aircraft were delivered under Lend-Lease from the USA and Great Britain.

The ratio between Soviet and German aircraft shot down was 5:1 (for the first month of fighting), and for the entire war - 1.5:1. All pre-war efforts to develop aviation turned out to be meaningless and ruinous due to poor personal training (pilots had 4 hours of flight time in the Kiev Special Military District, and pilots of the Baltic Military District spent only 15 hours in the air), overcrowding at field airfields, lack of control and lack of preparedness of the airfield network. The advantage in numbers was lost immediately, and in terms of air combat we were inferior to the Germans until the end of the war.

The situation was approximately the same with tanks. By the beginning of the war, the USSR had 22,600 tanks. During the war years, industry produced 96,500 tanks; under Lend-Lease, 38,100 tanks were received in the USSR from the USA and Great Britain; by May 9, 8,100 tanks remained at the front. At the same time, the USSR lost 96,500 tanks during the war years, and the Germans on all fronts lost 48,000 tanks. It turned out that the Germans, with one knocked out tank, destroyed two Soviet ones. There are many reasons for this. Before the war, more than half of all tanks were light. Despite the approximate equality in firepower, cross-country ability and armor protection of both light and medium tanks, Soviet tanks were not radio-equipped, in contrast to the total radio equipment of German tanks, self-propelled guns and armored vehicles. Until 1943, only the vehicles of company and battalion commanders, i.e., were radio-equipped. one tank out of ten. Therefore, the Germans sought to knock out tanks with antennas first, while the rest became deaf and uncontrollable. The optics were also inferior to the German ones, which, coupled with a small overview, after the destruction of vehicles with radios of company and battalion commanders, turned the tanks into blind boxes. The requirement to fire on the move was a pointless waste of ammunition and rather a hope for the psychological instability of the enemy, but it made the tanks unarmed after a while. Many tanks were disabled due to inept operation. The driver mechanics had only 1.5-2 hours of driving practice. Tankers were mainly horsemen and infantrymen who had absolutely no shooting, driving or control skills.

11.The German army had strong weapons and rich combat experience. She was psychologically well prepared for war and aimed at victory.

Conclusion

Summing up, the main reason for the first defeats of the Red Army in the Great Patriotic War becomes obvious. It is not a significant superiority in the number of the German army, not a sudden attack by the Nazis, not border troops not brought to the wartime states in a timely manner. The main reason for the war still remains the militarily illiterate government of the USSR.

The incompetent political and military leadership of the USSR prepared the country for war, but not for defense, as many authors of the Soviet formation, defenders of everything Soviet, are trying to convince and prove; to an offensive, aggressive war, on foreign territory, and, knowing the actual combat readiness of the Red Army, no small loss of life. Having knocked out a completely professional core from the army in 1937-1939, the CPSU (b) and the NKVD under the leadership of I.V. Stalin did as much to reduce the country's combat capability as even the Nazis did not do. The professional training of commanders of districts, armies, divisions, and battalions could not be compared with the German one. The frightened, downtrodden commanders blindly fulfilled the requirements of the field regulations, trying not to deviate one iota from the demands of the party, because retribution could follow immediately. That is why patterns in operational art were noted during the war years, and at the tactical level, attacks were carried out in a straight line, in crowds of 500-1000 people, across minefields, since there were barrage detachments and penal companies behind them, because those who doubted their urgent need were immediately shot.

Only the Politburo, the government of the USSR and the NKVD are to blame for the fact that the country's strategic reserves were transferred to the rear of the border districts. The stored reserves were not only not sufficiently provided by railway transport, which was practically impossible, but their destruction was also not provided for - due to the lack of both specialists and means of demolition. Only the Airborne Commissariat is to blame for the fact that, despite the warnings of military experts, simultaneous reconstruction work began at all airfields to increase the length of the runways, and aircraft accumulated at a limited number of airfields that were pushed closer to the border, which made them vulnerable to aviation Nazis.

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Historians and military leaders of the Great Patriotic War are almost unanimous in the opinion that the most significant miscalculation that predetermined the tragedy of 1941 was the outdated doctrine of warfare adhered to by the Red Army.
Historians and military leaders of the Great Patriotic War are almost unanimous in the opinion that the most significant miscalculation that predetermined the tragedy of 1941 was the outdated doctrine of warfare adhered to by the Red Army.

Researchers V. Solovyov and Y. Kirshin, placing responsibility on Stalin, Voroshilov, Timoshenko and Zhukov, note that they “did not understand the content of the initial period of the war, made mistakes in planning, in strategic deployment, in determining the direction of the main attack of German troops.”

Unexpected blitzkrieg

Despite the fact that the blitzkrieg strategy was successfully tested by Wehrmacht troops in the European campaign, the Soviet command ignored it and counted on a completely different beginning of a possible war between Germany and the USSR.

“The People’s Commissar of Defense and the General Staff believed that the war between such major powers as Germany and the Soviet Union should begin according to the previously existing pattern: the main forces enter the battle a few days after the border battles,” Zhukov recalled.

The command of the Red Army assumed that the Germans would launch an offensive with limited forces, and only after the border battles would the concentration and deployment of the main troops be completed. The General Staff hoped that while the covering army would conduct an active defense, exhausting and bleeding the fascists, the country would be able to carry out a full-scale mobilization.

However, an analysis of the strategy of warfare in Europe by German troops shows that the success of the Wehrmacht was primarily associated with powerful attacks by armored forces, supported by aviation, which quickly cut through the enemy’s defenses.

The main task of the first days of the war was not the seizure of territory, but the destruction of the defenses of the invaded country.
A miscalculation by the USSR command led to the fact that German aviation destroyed more than 1,200 combat aircraft on the very first day of the war and actually secured air supremacy. As a result of the surprise attack, hundreds of thousands of soldiers and officers were killed, wounded or captured. The German command achieved its goal: control of the Red Army troops was disrupted for some time.

Poor deployment of troops

As many researchers note, the nature of the location of Soviet troops was very convenient for striking German territory, but detrimental for carrying out a defensive operation. The dislocation that emerged at the beginning of the war was formed earlier in accordance with the General Staff plan to launch preventive strikes on German territory. According to the September 1940 version of the “Fundamentals of Deployment”, such deployment of troops was abandoned, but only on paper.

At the time of the attack by the German army, the military formations of the Red Army were not with their rear deployed, but were divided into three echelons without operational communication with each other. Such miscalculations of the General Staff allowed the Wehrmacht army to quite easily achieve a numerical superiority and destroy Soviet troops piecemeal.

The situation was especially alarming at the Bialystok Ledge, which stretched for many kilometers towards the enemy. This deployment of troops created a threat of deep envelopment and encirclement of the 3rd, 4th, and 10th armies of the Western District. The fears were confirmed: literally in a matter of days, three armies were surrounded and defeated, and on June 28 the Germans entered Minsk.

Reckless counter-offensives

On June 22 at 7 o'clock in the morning, Stalin issued a directive, which said: “troops with all forces and means should attack enemy forces and destroy them in the area where they violated the Soviet border.”

Such an order indicated a lack of understanding by the USSR high command of the scale of the invasion.
Six months later, when German troops were driven back from Moscow, Stalin demanded a counteroffensive on other fronts. Few could object to him. Despite the unwillingness of the Soviet army to conduct full-scale military operations, a counteroffensive was launched along the entire front - from Tikhvin to the Kerch Peninsula.

Moreover, the troops received orders to dismember and destroy the main forces of Army Group Center. The headquarters overestimated its capabilities: the Red Army at this stage of the war was unable to concentrate sufficient forces in the main direction and could not massively use tanks and artillery.
On May 2, 1942, one of the planned operations began in the Kharkov area, which, according to historians, was carried out while ignoring the enemy’s capabilities and neglecting the complications that an unfortified bridgehead could lead to. On May 17, the Germans attacked from two sides and a week later turned the bridgehead into a “cauldron.” About 240 thousand Soviet soldiers and officers were captured as a result of this operation.

Unavailability of inventories

The General Staff believed that in the conditions of an impending war, material and technical means needed to be brought closer to the troops. 340 of the 887 stationary warehouses and bases of the Red Army were located in border districts, including more than 30 million shells and mines. In the area of ​​the Brest Fortress alone, 34 wagons of ammunition were stored. In addition, most of the artillery of the corps and divisions was not in the front-line zone, but in training camps.
The course of military operations showed the recklessness of such a decision. In a short time it was no longer possible to remove military equipment, ammunition and fuel and lubricants. As a result, they were either destroyed or captured by the Germans.
Another mistake of the General Staff was the large concentration of aircraft at airfields, while camouflage and air defense cover were weak. If the advanced units of army aviation were based too close to the border - 10-30 km, then the units of front-line and long-range aviation were located too far - from 500 to 900 km.

Main forces to Moscow

In mid-July 1941, Army Group Center rushed into the gap in Soviet defenses between the Western Dvina and Dnieper rivers. Now the way to Moscow was open. Predictably for the German command, Headquarters placed its main forces in the Moscow direction. According to some reports, up to 40% of the Red Army personnel, the same amount of artillery and about 35% of the total number of aircraft and tanks were concentrated on the path of Army Group Center
The tactics of the Soviet command remained the same: meet the enemy head-on, wear him down, and then launch a counter-offensive with all available forces. The main task - to hold Moscow at any cost - was completed, but most of the armies concentrated in the Moscow direction fell into the “cauldrons” near Vyazma and Bryansk. In two “cauldrons” there were 7 field army departments out of 15, 64 divisions out of 95, 11 tank regiments out of 13 and 50 artillery brigades out of 62.
The General Staff was aware of the possibility of an offensive by German troops in the south, but concentrated most of the reserves not in the direction of Stalingrad and the Caucasus, but near Moscow. This strategy led to the success of the German army in the Southern direction.

On the same topic:

The main reasons why the Red Army failed in 1941 How the Red Army defended the Brest Fortress in 1941

The failures of the first months of the Great Patriotic War for the USSR were due to many objective and subjective factors. Much work has been written on this topic, and numerous studies have been conducted. Analysis of combat operations and assessment of tactical and strategic decisions of the command of the Armed Forces and the political leadership of the Soviet Union are still interesting today.

1. The Red Army is unprepared for war

Preparations for a big war, which began in 1939, a sharp increase in the Armed Forces of the USSR, the production of a large amount of military equipment, combat experience gained in Spain, Khasan and Khalkhin Gol, in the Winter War - all this, it would seem, should have become tangible advantages of the Red Army in battles with the Wehrmacht.

However, in general the country was not yet ready for such a total war. Many divisions formed in 1939-1941 were undermanned and poorly equipped with military equipment, and also had poor command of it. The repressions of the late 30s also had an impact, when a significant part of the experienced command personnel was destroyed, and their place was taken by less competent or inexperienced commanders, in contrast to the German army, in which all the generals and most of the officers had combat experience dating back to the First World War. , as well as the experience of all campaigns of 1939-1941.

Germany's transport capabilities were an order of magnitude higher than those of the Soviet Union. The Germans could move reinforcements much faster, regroup troops, and organize their supplies. The USSR had significant human resources, but these resources were much less mobile than German ones. By the beginning of hostilities, the Wehrmacht outnumbered the Red Army in the number of trucks by approximately two to one, i.e. was more mobile. There are also samples that simply did not have an analogue in the Soviet armed forces. These are high-speed heavy artillery tractors and armored personnel carriers.

In general, the German army was much better prepared for war than the Red Army. If in the USSR this preparation lasted less than two years before the war, then Germany began to intensively develop its armed forces and military industry immediately after Hitler came to power. For example, in Germany, universal conscription was restored on March 16, 1935, and in the USSR - only on September 1, 1939.

2. Strategic miscalculations of the Red Army command

But, if the unpreparedness of the Red Army for war was one of the reasons for the defeat of 1941, then in 1942 the Soviet troops were already experienced, had behind them not only defeats and retreats, but also victories (Battle of Moscow, liberation of Rostov, Kerch-Feodosia operation , continuation of the defense of Sevastopol). But, nevertheless, it was in 1942 that the Wehrmacht achieved its maximum advance on the territory of the Soviet Union. German troops reached Stalingrad, Voronezh, Novorossiysk, and Mount Elbrus.

The reason for these defeats was the overestimation by the command (and primarily Stalin) of the successes of the Soviet troops during the winter counter-offensive of 1941-1942. German troops were driven back from Moscow and Rostov-on-Don, and also abandoned the Kerch Peninsula and reduced pressure on Sevastopol. But they were not completely defeated, especially in the southern direction. The German active actions in 1942 in the southern direction were also logical - these Wehrmacht forces suffered the least.

Another failure of the Red Army in 1942 was the Kharkov operation, which cost the irretrievable loss of 171 thousand Red Army soldiers. Again, as in 1941, the generals - this time A.M. Vasilevsky - asked for permission to withdraw troops, and again Stalin did not give such permission.

An important aspect of the failures of the Red Army during the winter counteroffensive of 1941-1942. there was a lack of the required number of tank formations, which seriously affected the mobility of Soviet troops. Infantry and cavalry broke through the German defenses, but that was often where it all ended - there was almost no one and nothing to surround the enemy, since the superiority in manpower was minimal. As a result, both “cauldrons” (Demyansky and Kholmsky) were rescued by the Germans without any problems after reinforcements arrived. In addition, the encircled German troops in these pockets were supported by transport aviation, which was difficult to fight due to the huge losses of Soviet aviation in the first months of the war.

A common mistake was incorrectly determining the directions of the enemy's main attacks. Thus, in Ukraine, the command of the Southwestern Front, led by General Kirponos, was constantly afraid of the 1st Tank Group turning south, to the rear of the Lvov salient. This led to unnecessary throwing of mechanized corps, and, as a result, to large losses (in the battle of Dubno-Lutsk-Brody - more than 2.5 thousand tanks, during the Lepel counterattack - about 830 tanks, near Uman - more than 200 tanks, under Kiev - more than 400 tanks.)

3. Repressions in the pre-war period

According to various sources, during the repressions of 1937-1941. From 25 to 50 thousand officers were shot, arrested or dismissed from the armed forces. The most significant losses were suffered by the senior command staff - from brigade commanders (major generals) to marshals. This greatly affected the actions of Soviet troops during the first period of the war.

The fact is that old, experienced commanders who went through the school of the First World War, the Soviet-Polish, and the Civil War (Primakov, Putna, Tukhachevsky, Yakir, Uborevich, Blyukher, Egorov and many others) were subjected to repression, and young officers came to their place, often had no experience in commanding large formations, and even in a war against the best army in the world.

Thus, by the beginning of the war, approximately 70-75% of commanders and political instructors had been in their positions for no more than one year. By the summer of 1941, among the command staff of the Red Army ground forces, only 4.3% of officers had a higher education, 36.5% had a secondary specialized education, 15.9% had no military education at all, and the remaining 43.3% completed only short-term courses junior lieutenants or were drafted into the army from the reserve.

But even solid military experience could not always help to win a victory. For example, General D.T. Kozlov fought since 1915, but was unable to oppose anything to the superiority of the Wehrmacht during the battles in Crimea in the spring of 1942. The same thing happened with V.N. Gordova - long military experience, command of the front (Stalingrad), a series of failures that would have happened under any other commander, and, as a result, removal from office.

Thus, the already indicated reasons for the defeats of the Red Army were superimposed on the lack of good experienced command, which together led to the terrifying defeats of 1941 and, to a lesser extent, 1942. And only by 1943 were the military leaders of the Red Army able to adequately master the art of mechanized warfare, encirclement and destruction large enemy forces, powerful all-front offensives (similar to the German one in the summer of 1941).

1. Miscalculations by the top political leadership of the USSR about the timing of the German attack;

3. Qualitative military superiority of the enemy;

4. Repressions in the Red Army;

Conclusion;

Bibliography.

In the first months of the war, serious mistakes made by the country's leadership in the pre-war years were revealed.

Analysis of a wide range of historical literature allows us to identify the following main reasons for the defeats of the Red Army in the first months of the Great Patriotic War:

miscalculations by the top political leadership of the USSR about the timing of the German attack;

qualitative military superiority of the enemy;

the delay in the strategic deployment of the Soviet Armed Forces on the western borders of the USSR;

repressions in the Red Army;

1. Miscalculations by the top political leadership of the USSR about the timing of the German attack

One of the serious mistakes of the Soviet leadership should be considered a miscalculation in determining the possible time of an attack by Nazi Germany on the Soviet Union. The non-aggression pact concluded with Germany in 1939 allowed Stalin and his inner circle to believe that Germany would not risk violating it in the near future, and the USSR still had time to systematically prepare for the possible repulsion of aggression from the enemy. In addition, I.V. Stalin believed that Hitler would not start a war on two fronts - in Western Europe and on the territory of the USSR. The Soviet government believed that until 1942. will be able to prevent the USSR from being drawn into the war. As you can see, this belief turned out to be wrong.

Despite the clear signs of an approaching war, Stalin was confident that he could, through diplomatic and political measures, delay the start of Germany's war against the Soviet Union. Stalin's views were fully shared by Malenkov, who was the secretary of the party's Central Committee in those years. 18 days before the start of the war, at a meeting of the Main Military Council, he sharply criticized the draft directive on the tasks of party political work in the army. Malenkov believed that this document was drawn up taking into account the imminent possibility of an attack and therefore was not suitable as a guideline for troops:

“The document is presented in a primitive manner, as if we are going to fight tomorrow”

Intelligence from numerous sources was not taken into account. Due importance was not given to reliable reports from Soviet intelligence officers, including the famous communist, hero of the Soviet Union R. Sorge. But at the same time, it should be noted that the information was often contradictory, made it difficult to analyze the information and could not contribute to revealing the main goal of the disinformation of the Nazi intelligence services - to achieve surprise in the first strike of the Wehrmacht.

Intelligence came to the government from sources such as

foreign intelligence of the Navy;

The conclusion of the head of the GRU, Lieutenant General F.I., had a very negative impact. Golikov dated March 20, 1941. that information about the impending German attack on the USSR should be considered false and coming from the British or even from German intelligence.

A lot of misinformation came through diplomatic channels. The Soviet ambassador to France sent him to the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs on June 19, 1941. this message:

“Now all the journalists here are chatting about the general mobilization in the USSR, that Germany has presented us with an ultimatum to secede Ukraine and transfer it under German protectorate, and so on. These rumors come not only from the British and Americans, but also from their German circles. Apparently, the Germans, taking advantage of this agitation, are preparing a decisive attack on England.”

The USSR hoped that the declaration of war would occur closer to 1942. and from the presentation of an ultimatum, i.e. diplomatically, as was the case in Europe, and now the so-called “game of nerves” was being waged.

The most truthful data came from the 1st Directorate of the NKGB. On the channel of this body on June 17, 1941. Stalin was presented with a special message from Berlin, which said:

“All German military measures to prepare an armed uprising against the USSR have been completely completed, and a strike can be expected at any time.” Thus, the information about Germany’s imminent attack on the USSR, being reported in a disjointed form, did not create a convincing picture of the events taking place, and could not answer the questions: when could a border violation occur and war break out, what are the goals of the aggressor’s conduct of hostilities, it was regarded as provocative and aimed at aggravating relations with Germany. The USSR government was afraid that an active build-up of armed forces in the area of ​​the western borders could provoke Germany and serve as a reason for starting a war. It was strictly forbidden to hold such events. June 14, 1941 A TASS message was broadcast in the press and on the radio. It said: “... Rumors about Germany’s intention to undermine the pact and launch an attack on the USSR are devoid of any basis, and the recent transfer of German troops... to the eastern and north-eastern regions of Germany is connected, presumably, with other motives that have nothing to do with to Soviet-German relations."

This message could only further disorient the population and the Armed Forces of the USSR. June 22, 1941 showed how deeply mistaken the state leaders were about the plans of Nazi Germany. Marshal K.K. Rokossovsky notes: “what happened on June 22 was not foreseen by any plans, so the troops were taken by surprise in the full sense of the word.

Another miscalculation of the leadership of the USSR and the General Staff of the Red Army was the incorrect determination of the direction of the main attack of the Wehrmacht forces. The main blow of Nazi Germany was considered not the central direction, along the Brest-Minsk-Moscow line, but the southwestern direction, towards Kyiv and Ukraine. In this direction, literally before the war itself, the main forces of the Red Army were transferred, thereby exposing other directions.

Thus, conflicting information about the timing of Germany’s attack on the USSR, the hopes of the country’s political leadership that the enemy would comply with previously reached agreements, and an underestimation of the Wehrmacht’s plans for its own state did not make it possible to prepare in time to repel the attack.

2. Delay in the strategic deployment of the Soviet Armed Forces

The strategy covers the theory and practice of preparing the country and armed forces for war, planning and conducting war and strategic operations.

Many authors, researchers of military operations during the war of 1941-1945, note that the amount of equipment and personnel of the armies at the beginning of the attack was approximately equal, in some positions there is some superiority of the Soviet Armed Forces.

What prevented us from using all the equipment and weapons to repel the attack of the fascist army?

The fact is that an erroneous assessment of the time of a possible German attack on the Soviet Union caused a delay in the strategic deployment of the Armed Forces of the Union, and the surprise of the attack destroyed a lot of military equipment and ammunition depots.

Lack of preparation in repelling an attack was primarily manifested in poor organization of defense. The significant length of the western border also determined the stretching of the Red Army's forces along the entire line of the border.

Annexation of Western Ukraine, Western Belarus, Bessarabia, and the Baltic states to the USSR in 1939-1940. led to the disbandment of the old, well-organized border outposts and defense lines. The border structure has moved to the west. We had to hastily build and re-form the entire border infrastructure. This was done slowly, and there was a shortage of funds. In addition, it was necessary to build new roads and lay railway lines for the transport of material resources and people. Those railways that were on the territory of these countries were narrow-gauge, European. In the USSR, the tracks were wide gauge. As a result, the supply of materials and equipment, equipment of the western borders lagged behind the needs of the Red Army.

The defense of the borders was poorly organized. The troops that were supposed to cover the borders were at an extreme disadvantage. Only individual companies and battalions were located in the immediate vicinity of the border (3-5 km). Most of the divisions intended to cover the border were located far from it and were engaged in combat training by peacetime standards. Many formations conducted exercises far from facilities and their home bases.

It should be noted that before the war and at its very beginning, the army leadership made mistakes in manning the formations with personnel and equipment. Compared to pre-war standards, the staffing level of most units was no more than 60%. The operational formation of the front was single-echelon, and reserve formations were small in number. Due to a lack of funds and manpower, it was not possible to create the connections required by the standards.

In Belarus, out of 6 mechanized corps, only one was equipped with materiel (tanks, vehicles, artillery, etc.) according to standard standards, and the rest were significantly understaffed.

Divisions of the 1st echelon (a total of 56 divisions and 2 brigades) were located at a depth of up to 50 km, divisions of the 2nd echelon were 50-100 km from the border, reserve formations were 100-400 km away.

Border cover plan developed by the General Staff in May 1941. did not provide for the equipment of defensive lines by troops of the 2nd and 3rd echelons. They were tasked with taking positions and being ready to launch a counterattack. The battalions of the 1st echelon were supposed to prepare engineering and take up defensive positions.

In February 1941 at the suggestion of the Chief of the General Staff G.K. Zhukov, a plan was adopted to expand the ground forces by almost 100 divisions, although it would have been more expedient to complete and transfer the existing divisions to wartime levels and increase their combat readiness. All tank divisions were part of the 2nd echelon.

The deployment of mobilization reserves was extremely unsuccessful. A large number were located near the borders, and, therefore, were the first to be attacked by German troops, depriving some of their resources.

Military aviation by June 1941 relocated to new western airfields, which were insufficiently equipped and poorly covered by air defense forces.

Despite the increase in German troop groups in the border areas, only on June 16, 1941. The transfer of 2 echelons of covering armies from places of permanent deployment to the borders began. The strategic deployment was carried out without leading the covering troops to repel the aggressor's preemptive strike. The deployment did not meet the objectives of repelling a sudden enemy attack.

A miscalculation of the General Staff of the Red Army in assessing the direction of the enemy's main attack played a negative role. Literally on the eve of the war, strategic and operational plans were revised, and this direction was recognized not as the central one, along the Brest-Minsk-Moscow line, but as the southwestern one, towards Kiev and Ukraine. Troops began to gather in the Kiev Military District, thereby exposing the central and other directions. But, as you know, the Germans delivered the most significant blow precisely in the central direction.

Analyzing the pace of the strategic deployment of the Soviet Armed Forces, most historians come to the conclusion that the full deployment could have been accomplished no earlier than the spring of 1942. Thus, the delay in the strategic deployment of our troops did not allow us to sufficiently organize the defense of the western borders and give a worthy rebuff to the forces of Nazi Germany.

3. Qualitative military superiority of the enemy

Despite the non-aggression agreements between the USSR and Germany, no one doubted that sooner or later the Soviet Union would become the target of an attack by the Nazis. It was only a matter of time. The country tried to prepare to repel aggression.

By mid-1941 The USSR had a material and technical base that, when mobilized, ensured the production of military equipment and weapons. Important measures were taken to rebuild industry and transport, ready to fulfill defense orders, the armed forces were developed, their technical re-equipment was carried out, and the training of military personnel was expanded.

Allocations for military needs increased significantly. The share of military expenditures in the Soviet budget was 43% in 1941. versus 265 in 1939 The output of military products exceeded the rate of industrial growth by almost three times. Factories were urgently relocated to the east of the country. New defense plants were built at a rapid pace and existing defense plants were reconstructed; they were allocated more metal, electricity, and new machine tools. By the summer of 1941 one fifth of defense plants operated in the eastern regions of the USSR.

New warehouses with fuel and ammunition were built everywhere, new airfields were built and old airfields were reconstructed.

The armed forces were equipped with new small arms, artillery, tank and aviation weapons and military equipment, samples of which were developed, tested and put into mass production.

The quantitative superiority of the Red Army in military equipment in many respects did not mean qualitative superiority. Modern combat required modern weapons. But there were many problems with him.

Resolving issues regarding new types of weapons was entrusted to the deputy. People's Commissar of Defense G.I. Kuliku, L.Z. Mehlis and E.A. Shchadenko, who, without sufficient grounds, removed existing models from service and for a long time did not dare to introduce new ones into production. Leading officials of the People's Commissariat of Defense, based on incorrect conclusions from the experience of the Soviet-Finnish war, urgently pushed large-caliber guns and ammunition into production. Anti-tank weapons, 45 mm and 76 mm guns, were discontinued. Before the start of the war, production of anti-aircraft artillery guns had not begun. Ammunition production fell sharply behind.

There were too few new models of aircraft and tanks, especially T-34 tanks and heavy KV tanks, and they did not have time to fully master their production by the beginning of the war. This was led to by a rash decision to eliminate large formations of armored forces and replace them with more maneuverable and controllable individual brigades, based on the specific experience of military operations in Spain in 1936-1939. This reorganization was carried out on the eve of the war, but it must be admitted that the Soviet command soon realized the mistake and began to correct it. Large mechanized corps began to be formed again, but by June 1941. they were unprepared for war.

The provision of troops in border districts with modern types of weapons was 16.7% for tanks and 19% for aviation. The old material was significantly worn out and required repair. The new technology was not fully mastered by the personnel of the Armed Forces. The old equipment was not used to train newly drafted military personnel and those coming from the reserves in order to preserve the remaining motor and flight resources. As a result, by the beginning of the war, many tank driver mechanics had only 1.5-2 hours of practice driving vehicles, and the pilots' flight time was approximately 4 hours (in the Kyiv Special Military District).

Bombers of old models were used - SB, TB-3, which flew on combat missions without the necessary fighter cover and in small groups, which led to significant losses.

There were also complaints about small arms. The 50mm caliber mortars supplied to the Red Army turned out to be practically unsuitable for use. The combat capabilities of artillery were reduced due to a lack of mechanical propulsion, communications and reconnaissance equipment.

The weak motorization of the Red Army sharply reduced the maneuverability of its units and formations. They moved untimely to deployment lines and left positions untimely when it was necessary to escape from enemy attack.

Among other things, there was a lack of modern radio stations, telephones, and cable. The beginning of the war revealed the insufficient preparedness and vulnerability of the fixed lines and nodes used by the Supreme High Command from enemy influence. This greatly complicated the command and control of troops and required the necessary measures to be taken. The warning about the appearance of enemy aircraft was poorly organized. Therefore, fighters often took to the air to cover their targets late.

Thus, the country’s leadership’s miscalculations in identifying the most important types of weapons to successfully resist the aggressor and equipping troops with new types of equipment could not but affect the defense of state borders and allowed the enemy to advance deeper into the USSR. This point of view is shared by many historians.

In general, assessing the combat capabilities of the Soviet border districts at the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, we can state their good combat capabilities, although inferior in some components to the aggressor’s army, which, if used correctly, could help repel Germany’s first strike.

4. Repressions in the Red Army

Mass repressions of the late 30s significantly weakened the command and officer corps of the USSR Armed Forces; by the beginning of the war, approximately 70-75% of commanders and political instructors had been in their positions for no more than one year.

According to the calculations of modern war researchers, only for 1937-1938. Over 40 thousand commanders of the Red Army and the Soviet Navy were repressed, of which more than 9 thousand were senior and senior command personnel, i.e. approximately 60-70%.

It is enough to provide the following data to understand how the army command staff suffered:

out of five available by 1937. Three marshals were repressed (M.N. Tukhachevsky, A.I. Egorov, V.K. Blyukher), all were shot;

of the four commanders of the 1st rank - four (I.F. Fedko, I.E. Yakir, I.P. Uboevich, I.P. Belov);

of the two flagships of the fleet of 1st rank - both (M.V. Viktorov, V.M. Orlov);

out of 12 commanders of 2nd rank - all 12;

out of 67 corps commanders - 60;

out of 199 division commanders - 136 (including the head of the Academy of the General Staff D.A. Kuchinsky);

out of 397 brigade commanders - 211.

Many other military leaders were under threat of arrest; incriminating material was collected on S.M. Budyonny, B.M. Shaposhnikova, D.G. Pavlova, S.K. Timoshenko and others, on the eve and at the very beginning of the war, the NKVD authorities arrested a group of prominent military leaders of the Red Army: K.A. Meretskov, P.V. Rychagov, G.M. Stern and others. With the exception of Meretskov, they were all shot in October 1941.

As a result, by the summer of 1941. Among the command staff of the Red Army ground forces, only 4.3% of officers had a higher education, 36.5% had a specialized secondary education, 15.9% had no military education at all, and the remaining 43.3% completed only short-term courses for junior lieutenants or were called up into the army from the reserve.

In modern history, the issue of repression in the Red Army is interpreted ambiguously. Most researchers believe that the repressions were carried out with the aim of strengthening Stalin's personal power. Repressed military leaders were considered agents of Germany and other countries. For example, Tukhachevsky, who owes a lot to

L. Trotsky's career, was accused of treason, terrorism and military conspiracy, because he did not exalt the name of Stalin, and thus was a person disliked by him.

But on the other hand, Trotsky declared abroad that not everyone in the Red Army was loyal to Stalin, and it would be dangerous for the latter to leave his friend Tukhachevsky in the high command. The head of state dealt with them according to the laws of war.

W. Churchill notes: “The cleansing of the Russian army from pro-German elements caused heavy damage to its combat effectiveness,” but at the same time notes that “a control system based on terror can be strengthened by the merciless and successful assertion of its power.”

Unlike Wehrmacht officers who had a special military education and gained enormous experience in fighting the war of the Polish and French military companies of 1939-1940, and some officers also had experience of the First World War, our commanders in the overwhelming majority did not have it.

In addition, as noted earlier, the time of a possible attack on the USSR was incorrectly determined. Stalin was convinced that Hitler would not risk attacking the Soviet Union, waging a war on two fronts. Propaganda was carried out among the troops about the superiority of the communist system and the Red Army, and the soldiers became increasingly convinced of a quick victory over the enemy. For many ordinary soldiers, the war seemed like a “promenade.”

The deep conviction of the Red Army that its troops would fight only on foreign territory and with “little bloodshed” did not allow them to prepare in a timely manner to repel aggression.

In May 1940 a specially created commission headed by the Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks A.A. Zhdanov conducted an inspection of the People's Commissariat of Defense, as a result of which it was noted that the People's Commissariat did not know the true state of affairs in the army, did not have an operational plan for the war, and did not attach due importance to the combat training of soldiers.

The Red Army was left without battle-hardened, experienced commanders. The young cadres, although they were devoted to Stalin and the Soviet state, did not have the talent and proper experience. Experience had to be gained during the outbreak of war.

Thus, mass repressions created a difficult situation in the army, affected the fighting qualities of soldiers and officers, who turned out to be poorly prepared for a serious war, and weakened moral principles. In the order of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR dated December 28, 1938. “On the fight against drunkenness in the Red Army” it was said:

“... the tarnished honor of a Red Army soldier and the honor of the military unit to which you belong is of little concern to us.”

There was no necessary experience and the Headquarters, therefore, had serious miscalculations at the beginning of the war.

Conclusion

Great Patriotic War 1941-1954. was a difficult test for the entire country and the entire Soviet people. The courage and heroism of our soldiers and home front workers, perhaps, has no analogues in world history. The Soviet people endured the difficulties of the war years, learned the bitterness of loss and the joy of Victory. Although more than 60 years have passed since the end of the war, its lessons should not pass unnoticed for future generations.

We must remember the lessons of history and try to prevent them from happening in the future. The victory of the Soviet people in the last war came at a heavy price. From the first days of the war, the country suffered significant losses. Only the mobilization of all forces made it possible to turn the tide of the war.

Analyzing the reasons for the failures of the Red Army in the first days and months of the war in a broad aspect, we can conclude that they were largely the result of the functioning of the totalitarian political regime that formed in the USSR by the end of the 30s.

The main, most important reasons for the failures of the first stage of the war - repression in the Red Army, miscalculations of the top leadership of the state in determining the time of Germany's attack on the USSR, the delay in the strategic deployment of armed forces on the western borders, errors in the strategy and tactics of the first battles, the qualitative superiority of the enemy, were determined by the cult personality.

Repressions in the Red Army, political, scientific, and economic circles contributed to the underestimation of the situation in the country and the world and jeopardized the combat capability of the state. The lack of qualified personnel, especially senior management, in almost all areas did not allow us to respond in a timely and proper manner to the constantly changing situation in the world. Ultimately, this led to colossal losses in the Great Patriotic War, especially at the initial stage.

Bibliography

1. E. Kulkov, M. Malkov, O. Rzheshevsky “War 1941-1945.” World history. War and Peace / M.: “OLMA-PRESS”, 2005 - 479 p. 2. A.I. Balashov, G.P. Rudakov “History of the Great Patriotic War (1941-1945)”

2. Recent history of the fatherland. XX century: Textbook. A manual for university students; in 2 volumes - T.2 / ed. A.F. Kiseleva, E.M. Shchagina.- M.: Humanitarian Publishing Center VLADOS, 1998 - 448 p.

3. Zuev M.N. Domestic history: A textbook for high school students and those entering universities in 2 books. : Book. 2: Russia of the 20th - early 21st centuries. - M. Publishing house "ONICS 21st century", 2005. - 672 p.

4. Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union 1941-1945. Short story. Moscow. : Military Publishing House of the Ministry of Defense. - 1965 - 632 p.

5. The Great Patriotic War 1941-1945: Encyclopedia. . -.ch. ed. MM. Kozlov-M.: “Soviet Encyclopedia”, 1985. - 832 p. from illus.

6. E.M. Skvortsova, A.N. Markov “History of the Fatherland.” - M. Ed. UNITY.- 2004.

7. Munchaev Sh.M., Ustinov V.M., History of Russia: Textbook for universities. - 3rd ed., rev. and additional - M.: Publishing house NORMA (Publishing group NORMA-INFRA-M), 2002. -768 p.

8. Rokossovsky K.K. "Soldier's Duty" M.: OLMA-PRESS, 2002

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2. On the morning of June 22, 1941, Nazi Germany invaded the USSR without declaring war. At the beginning of the war, the Nazis suffered heavy losses. In the first 20 days of the war, Germany lost more equipment and people than in two years of war in Europe. However, our Army suffered even greater losses. Until December 1, 1941, losses in killed, missing and captured amounted to 7 million people, about 22 thousand tanks, up to 25 thousand aircraft. In the first months of the war, the country lost up to 40% of its economic potential.

The failures of the Red Army were due to the following reasons:

1. Miscalculation in determining the timing of a likely clash with Germany. Stalin was confident that the attack would occur no earlier than the end of spring 1942. By this time, it was planned to complete all preparations for war.

2. The main reason for the failures of K.A. at the beginning of the war there were unjustified repressions in the country. Only for 1937-1938. More than 40 thousand commanders and political workers were exterminated. In 1937-1940 out of 264 military leaders (from marshal to division commander), 220 were repressed, out of 108 representatives of the highest political composition of the Red Army - 99. The command and political composition of brigades and regiments were subjected to widespread repression.

3. Inability to organize available resources to repel the enemy.

4. K.A. was in a state of reorganization and rearmament. The reorientation of the defense industry towards the production of military equipment began belatedly. Stalin’s subjectivist assessments and incompetence in assessing the situation played an extremely negative role.

5. On the eve of the attack, the troops of the border military districts were not put on high alert. This allowed the enemy to easily win border battles and inflict heavy damage on K.A.

6. The construction of defensive lines on the new USSR border was not completed, and the fortifications on the old border were mostly dismantled.

7. It is also negative that the army and people were oriented toward an easy victory. They said that if there was a war, it would be fought on enemy territory and would end with little bloodshed.

However, Stalin considered the main reason for the retreat to be the betrayal of commanders and Red Army soldiers. On August 16, an order was issued for troops in the western direction. By this order, a large group of military specialists, heads of military production, and generals were arrested: People's Commissar of Armaments B.L. Vannikov, deputy. People's Commissar K.A. Meretskov, designer Taubin, more than 10 military generals. Many of them were shot on October 28, 1941 in Kuibyshev and Saratov.

12. Restructuring the life of the country on a military basis. 1941

On June 30, 1941, the State Defense Committee (GKO) was formed under the chairmanship of I.V. Stalin. All power was concentrated in the hands of the State Defense Committee. Centralization became the main principle of leadership even more than before the war. All military organizational work has been seriously restructured, and has acquired enormous proportions:

1. In the first 7 days of the war alone, 5.3 million people were drafted into the army. A conscription was announced for 32 ages (from 1890 to 1922, the reserve was large 30 million).

2. The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command was created.

3. The institution of military commissars was introduced.

4. A system for training command personnel and reserve personnel has been created and established (universal compulsory military training has been introduced).

5. Military militia units from the people began to form.

6. The redistribution of communists from territorial to military party organizations began, and the conditions for admission to the party at the front were eased.

7. From the first days of the war, the organization of the partisan movement began behind enemy lines. There were 70 million people in the occupied territory. They behaved differently: some joined the partisans, and some went over to the side of the enemy. There were approximately the same number of both – about 1 million people. 500 thousand took part in the partisan movement in Ukraine, 400 thousand in Belarus. There were few partisans in the newly annexed (before the war) territories.

The country's economy was put on a war footing; its main directions were:

1. Redistribution of material and financial resources for the needs of the front.

2. Strengthening centralization in economic management.

3. Solving the problem of workers: legislative consolidation in production, mobilization on the labor front, attracting housewives, pensioners, teenagers (13-16 years old), canceling vacations and days off. The working day was 11 hours.

4. Tightening of sanctions for violation of labor discipline: for being late, from 3 months to 1 year in prison, for unauthorized leaving the enterprise from 6 to 8 years.

5. Taxes and loans were introduced, deposits were frozen, income tax was doubled, and a card system was introduced.

6. Churches and houses of worship have been opened, some clergy have been returned from the Gulag.

7. There was a relocation of industrial enterprises to the east. In July - November 1941 alone, 1,523 enterprises were evacuated to the east, incl. 28 in Tyumen. Production was established in the shortest possible time.

8. Party leadership of the national economy has sharply strengthened.

Within the country, the party and state leadership of the USSR focused on total mobilization and use of all available resources in order to repel aggression. In this regard, the USSR surpassed all other countries that participated in the Second World War. AKS demonstrated its advantages under extreme conditions of war. The Soviet government was able to determine the main directions of the people's activities. Even slogans were developed for each category of the population: for the army - fight to the last drop of blood; for the rear - everything for the front, everything for victory; for the occupied territories - the creation of a party-Komsomol underground and a partisan movement.