Military Observer. Battle of Borodino: wiki: Facts about Russia

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50. Who won the civil war? In historical literature, the phenomenon of the Red Terror is usually directly associated with the civil war. There was no war, and the terror stopped, the “blessed” NEP began. And only Stalin breaks off the idyll when he turns

About the Battle of Borodino

Golenitsev-Kutuzov-Smolensky Mikhail Illarionovich,
taking command of Russian troops.
Engraving by I.I. Terebenev based on his own drawing. 1813

Position under Borodino

After my report that the enemy on the 24th carried out an attack with important forces on the left flank of our army, the 25th passed in that he was not engaged in important enterprises, but yesterday, taking advantage of the fog, at 4 o'clock at dawn he sent all our forces are on the left flank of our army. The battle was general and lasted until nightfall. The loss on both sides is great: the enemy’s damage, judging by his persistent attacks on our fortified position, should greatly exceed ours. Your Imperial Majesty's troops fought with incredible courage. The batteries changed hands and the end result was that the enemy did not win a single step of ground with his superior forces.

Your Imperial Majesty would like to agree that after a bloody battle that lasted 15 hours, our and the enemy armies could not help but be upset, and due to the loss that was made this day, the position previously occupied, naturally, became larger and inappropriate for the troops, and therefore, when things go wrong about the glory of the battles won, but the whole goal being aimed at the extermination of the French army, having spent the night at the battle site, I decided to retreat 6 versts, which will be beyond Mozhaisk, and, having gathered the troops upset by the battle, refreshing my artillery and strengthening myself with the Moscow militia, in With warm hope for the help of the Almighty and for the incredible courage of our troops, I will see what I can do against the enemy.

Notes

For a detailed report from M.I. Kutuzov about the Battle of Borodino - see document No. 131.

In the text of this report Alexander I made significant changes. He crossed out some of the text and “edited” certain phrases. In this form, the report was published in newspapers in 1812 and in a number of subsequent publications.

The beginning of the paragraph with the words: “Your Imperial Majesty...”, ending with the words: “extermination of the French army,” is crossed out in pencil in the original.

The words: “...I set my intention... for Mozhaisk” are crossed out in pencil in the original.

The end of the report by the hand of Alexander I was changed as follows: the words “I can’t” were corrected to “couldn’t”; part of the text, starting with the word “to understand...” and to the end, is crossed out, and on top of it is written in pencil in the hand of Alexander I: “Collect detailed information.”

[Reproduced from the book: Borodino. Documents, letters, memories. M.: Soviet Russia, 1962. Document N 89. P.101-102]

Reports of Russian military leaders about the Battle of Borodino

The electronic publication of the documents was prepared by Elena Bobrova and Oleg Polyakov with the participation of Natalia Gutina and Maxim Goncharov.

Library of the Internet project "1812".

Battle of Borodino(in French history - the battle on the Moscow River, French Bataille de la Moskova) - the largest battle of the Patriotic War of 1812 between the Russian and French armies. It took place on August 26 (September 7), 1812 near the village of Borodino, 125 km west of Moscow.

During the 12-hour battle, the French army managed to capture the positions of the Russian army in the center and on the left wing, but after the cessation of hostilities, the French army retreated to its original positions. The next day, the command of the Russian army began to withdraw troops.

It is considered the bloodiest one-day battle in history.

General description of the Battle of Borodino

The Battle of Shevardino and the disposition of troops before the Battle of Borodino are indicated in the diagram. Napoleon's initial plan, which consisted of bypassing the left flank of the 2nd Army along the Old Smolensk Road and pushing the Russian army back to the confluence of the Moscow River and Kolocha, was thwarted, after which Napoleon launched a frontal attack on the 2nd Army with the forces of the corps of Davout, Ney, Junot and Murat's reserve cavalry with the aim of breaking through its defenses in the direction of the village. Semyonovskoye with an auxiliary attack by the forces of the 1st division on the village. Borodino. The French troops, having a 1.5 - 2-fold superiority in forces, several times thrown back and pursued to their positions by significantly smaller Russian forces, by noon, at the cost of huge losses, took the advanced positions of the left wing of the Russian troops - the flushes. The withdrawal of the main forces of the left wing to the main positions led to the retreat of Russian troops on the Old Smolensk Road in order to eliminate the gap in the front. The attack of the French troops on the main positions of the left wing behind the ravine of the Semenovsky stream was repulsed, and the reserves were pinned down by the maneuver of the light and Cossack cavalry, which reached the rear of Napoleon’s army. At 2 o'clock in the afternoon, Napoleon transferred the main attack to the center of the Russian army, creating a decisive numerical superiority against it and concentrating selected heavy cavalry units here (In repelling the third attack on the Raevsky battery from the Russians, the following took part: 6th Infantry Corps D.S. Dokhturov, consisting of the 7th and 24th infantry divisions - a total of 8539 people; the 4th Infantry Corps of A. I. Osterman-Tolstoy - the 11th and 23rd infantry divisions, a total of 9950 people; 2nd ( F.K. Korf) and the 3rd Cavalry Corps (under his command) - 2.5 thousand people each; part of the forces of the 5th Infantry Corps - 6 battalions and 8 squadrons. Total number of troops: about 21.5 thousand infantry and 5.6 thousand cavalry. Napoleon concentrated for the attack: 3 infantry divisions - Morand, Gerard, Brussier - about 19 thousand people; 3 cavalry corps - Latour-Maubourg, Caulaincourt (who replaced Montbrun), Grouchy - about 10.5 thousand cavalry; Italian Guard (about 7 thousand infantry and cavalry); part of the forces of the Young Guard (14 battalions). Total over 40 thousand people. The number of units is indicated as standard. By the time the attack began, many units on both sides suffered significant losses . Borodino. ed. "Soviet Russia", 1975. p. 17 - 37). As a result, French troops, at the cost of huge losses, especially in the cavalry, stormed Raevsky’s battery, but when they tried to develop an offensive against the center of the Russian troops with the forces of two cavalry corps, the latter were driven back.

“Kutuzov forced Napoleon to use the excellent French cavalry in frontal attacks in the conditions of the terrible crowded battlefield. In this crowded environment, most of the French cavalry died under Russian grapeshot, under bullets and bayonets of Russian infantry, under the blades of Russian cavalry. The losses of the French cavalry were so great that The Battle of Borodino in history is called “the grave of the French cavalry” (V.V. Pruntsov. Battle of Borodino. M, 1947) The reserves remaining with Napoleon were not brought into the battle because of the probable threat of their extermination, perceived by Napoleon. Thus, the French troops , having advanced 0.5 - 1 km, were stopped by Russian troops in all directions."
V. V. Pruntsov. Battle of Borodino. M, 1947

The Battle of Borodino, planned by Napoleon to a considerable depth with the important role of flanking the 2nd Army by Poniatowski’s corps, was in fact a set of bloody frontal battles, directly on the line of defense of the left wing of the Russian troops, in which the main masses of the French troops were bled dry. During these battles, both sides alternately attacked and defended the flushes, and the French troops, capturing the flushes, defended them in a disadvantageous position, since they were subject to counterattacks from the unprotected and vulnerable to gunfire rear of the flashes. Napoleon's attempt to change the nature of the battle by defeating the Russian troops in the center had a similar result: a fierce battle for Raevsky's battery led to the mutual destruction of the forces of both sides. The French troops who, due to numerical superiority, occupied the Raevsky battery were unable to develop an offensive.

The question of the exact course of the battle remains open due to the inconsistency of both domestic reports on the battle (the most famous discrepancies are in the reports of K. F. Tol, M. B. Barclay de Tolly, A. P. Ermolov), and because inconsistencies between domestic and French evidence about the timing and number of French attacks. The most convincing version of the battle about the six-hour battle for the flushes is based on the chronology presented by K. Tol and confirmed on the French side by F. Segur (As reliable and independent evidence in favor of long battles for the flushes, one can cite the testimony of the English general Robert Thomas Wilson (1777-1849 ), a participant in the Battle of Borodino, who was at the headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief of the Russian army. Already in 1813, that is, before the formation of the domestic tradition of describing the battle, the first edition of his book “Narration of the events that happened during the invasion of Napoleon Bonaparte into Russia and during the retreat of the French army in 1812". In this work, the decisive battle for flushes and the wounding of Bagration are attributed to the 1st o'clock in the afternoon. See Robert Thomas Wilson. Uk soch. M.: ROSSPEN - 2008, 494 pp. art. 140).

Despite the advantage in the defensive battle of Borodino, the Russian army was forced to resume its retreat. The reasons for the departure were:

• In significant losses, which, despite the significant numerical superiority of the enemy (who suffered no less losses) at the beginning of the battle, determined the remaining unfavorable balance of forces for the Russian army at the end of the battle. This point of view is widespread, however, there is evidence that Kutuzov, after the news of the losses, intended to continue the battle and canceled the decision only in connection with the approach of reinforcements to Napoleon, which changed the balance of forces: “The commander-in-chief of all armies saw that the enemy in today’s battle weakened us no less and ordered the armies to form a battle formation and resume the battle with the enemy tomorrow...” (“Note from M. B. Barclay de Tolly to K. F. Baggovut, August 26”)
• It was fundamentally impossible for the Russian army to make up for losses through trained replacements, which the enemy had, which created a fundamentally unequal balance of forces. Already on August 27 (September 8), 6 thousand people joined Napoleon’s main forces. Pinault's division, and on September 11 - Delaborde's division (in two divisions in total - 11 thousand people);); The total number of divisions and reserve battalions that were on the approach to Napoleon was about 40 thousand people. (“Borodino”, art. 108. M., Soviet Russia, 1975).
• In the strategic plan of waging war, M.I. Kutuzov, who did not intend to defend Moscow and considered a general battle for Moscow unnecessary. The corresponding defensive tactics of Kutuzov in the Battle of Borodino were subordinated to this plan and had the goal of preserving the army in the general battle, which Kutuzov agreed to due to the demands of all layers of Russian society. /Cm. below/

Result of the Battle of Borodino

The result of the Battle of Borodino is a combination of two facts, the reliability of which is beyond doubt:

1) Tactical acquisitions of the French army, due to the actions of Napoleon, who concentrated a powerful group in the direction of attack.

2) Demonstration by Russian troops of unconditional superiority over French troops in terms of overall combat effectiveness, incl. in perseverance and military skill (“moral victory”), coming from the disruption of Napoleon’s intentions to decisively defeat the Russian army with forces that actually had a superiority in numbers over the Russian troops by 2 times or more. The attribution of this fact to the result of the battle is due to the fact that it was the indicated superiority of the Russian troops, in the opinion of Leo Tolstoy, that led to victory in the war:

The direct consequence of the Battle of Borodino was the causeless flight of Napoleon from Moscow, the return along the old Smolensk road, the death of the five hundred thousandth invasion and the death of Napoleonic France, which for the first time at Borodino was laid down by the hand of the strongest enemy in spirit

Tactical victory

The material results of the battle (without taking into account the moral victory of the Russian army) are greater losses of French troops and the reflection of their offensive with significantly smaller forces, the fire advantage of Russian artillery that developed in the afternoon, the futility of territorial acquisitions of the French, a self-destructive frontal attack of the French cavalry on Kurgan height - a kind of “gesture of despair of Napoleon” - indicate the tactical victory of the Russian army in the Battle of Borodino.

The Battle of Borodino, like the Battle of Novi for the French army, had a pronounced defensive character on the part of the Russians. With a significant numerical superiority of the French army at the beginning of the battle (by more than 20 thousand) / see. below/, the faster expenditure of French troops led to the fact that by the end of the battle the difference in the number of fresh troops was reduced to 10 thousand (According to the encyclopedia “Patriotic War of 1812”, Napoleon’s reserve retained the Old and most of the forces of the Young Guard - approx. 18 thousand people; in Kutuzov’s reserve there are the Preobrazhensky and Semenovsky guards regiments, as well as 4, 30, 48 ranger regiments - up to 9 thousand people in total.). However, neither the numerical superiority of the attackers nor their more intensive introduction of reserves into the battle turned the tide of the battle. The French army, attacking with far superior forces, was stopped after advancing 0.5 - 1 km. In this new position, the French troops were subjected to devastating fire and by evening they were mostly withdrawn from the captured positions.

Not only Kutuzov, but also Barclay de Tolly, who criticized Kutuzov for miscalculations in the Battle of Borodino, was categorically convinced that the Battle of Borodino was not only a moral and strategic, but also a tactical victory for the Russians. Regarding the question of the importance of the positions of the Russian army, Barclay believed that it was at the end of the battle that the Russian army retreated to the most advantageous positions in which it should have fought. This point of view was shared by many other generals.

“Military history is part of historical science, because it examines one of the aspects of the history of human society; at the same time, it is part of military science, because it studies and generalizes the experience of preparing for and waging past wars.”

At the end of the 20th century, some Russian civilian historians who do not have special military knowledge (N. Troitsky, V. Zemtsov, etc.) without any hesitation begin to judge the tactical victory in the Battle of Borodino, which they see as the result of the French army. General formulation: the French captured all supposedly key positions. Without following the example of these amateurs in the field of military tactics, we state the facts:

1) Discussions about military tactics and the concept of “tactical victory” belong to the sphere of military thought. The historian cannot allow himself to do this without falling into bias. When coming into contact with special aspects of an event (in particular, a military one), the historian’s intelligence manifests itself in being able to, having illuminated them, refrain from controversial judgments. An example is Karamzin’s description of Timur’s actions in the battle with Tokhtamysh on the Terek.

2) Kurgan Height, taken by French troops, dominated the surrounding area. However, the conclusion from this about its “key role” is illogical. Indeed, the Novi fortress can be cited as a key position in the center: its capture by the Russians led to the immediate defeat of the French army in the Battle of Novi. The capture of Kurgan Heights did not lead to a decrease in the stability of the Russian center. The same applies to flashes, which were only defensive structures of the position of the left flank of the Russian army. Military historian, participant in the Battle of Borodino I.P. Liprandi, who defended Raevsky’s battery throughout the battle, criticized the opinion of Raevsky’s battery as the “key of the position” (“I.P. Liprandi.” Comments on “Description of the Patriotic War of 1812” "Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky"")

On October 3, 1812, the English newspapers “Courier” and “Time” published a report from the English Ambassador Katkar from St. Petersburg, in which he reported that the armies of His Imperial Majesty Alexander I had won the most stubborn battle of Borodino. During October, The Times wrote about the Battle of Borodino eight times, calling the day of the battle “a grand memorable day in Russian history” and “Bonaparte’s fatal battle.” The British ambassador and the press did not consider the retreat after the battle and the abandonment of Moscow as a result of the battle, understanding the influence on these events of the unfavorable strategic situation for Russia. (N. B. Krylova. “Responses to the Battle of Borodino in the countries of Western Europe and the USA” Collection “Domestic War of 1812. Abstracts of a scientific conference", 1992. pp. 24 - 27) The same opinion was shared by Soviet historiography, which developed the study of the Battle of Borodino through the efforts of qualified historians with special knowledge in the field of military affairs. Their insight and research qualities are lacking in a number of modern domestic historians who publish low-quality, often Russophobic studies under the pretext of reviving the “critical point of view.”

Napoleon's goal in the Battle of Borodino

Napoleon, having missed the opportunity to defeat the 1st and 2nd armies separately, sought to defeat the main forces of the Russian army in a general battle. Considering offensive options in the Battle of Borodino, he rejected the option of bypassing the southern flank of the Russian army for fear that a flanking maneuver would force Kutuzov to continue his retreat. Napoleon’s plan, developed on August 25 after reconnaissance, was as follows: transfer troops to the right bank of the Kolocha and, relying on Borodino, which became like an axis of approach, bring down the main forces on the 2nd Army and defeat it; then, directing all forces against the 1st Army, push it to the corner of the confluence of the Moscow River and Kolocha and destroy it. In accordance with this plan, on the right bank of the Kolocha, from the evening of August 25 to August 26, up to 115 thousand people were concentrated and a huge superiority was created over the 2nd Army, which, together with the Cossacks, numbered up to 34 thousand people. Thus, Napoleon's plan pursued the decisive goal of destroying the entire Russian army in a general battle. Napoleon had no doubt about victory, the confidence of which he expressed at sunrise on August 26 with the words “this is the sun of Austerlitz!”

However, after the battle for the flushes, Napoleon's goal changed radically. The refusal to bring the last reserves into the battle, according to Napoleon’s explanation, quoting the military historian General G. Jomini, looked like this: ““ as soon as we captured the position of the left flank, I was already sure that the enemy would retreat during the night. Why was it voluntarily to expose yourself to the dangerous consequences of the new Poltava?"

From this it is clear that 1) the assumption that Napoleon was saving the guard for a new battle near Moscow is untenable - Napoleon was afraid of being exposed to “the consequences of the new Poltava” precisely on the Borodino field. 2) if before the Battle of Borodino Napoleon was waiting for an opportunity to destroy the Russian army, not content with seizing space (which corresponded to Napoleon’s strategic views), then after capturing the flushes he wanted the outcome of the battle in the form of a voluntary retreat of the Russian army, which happened from the very beginning of the war and could not be the purpose of a general battle.

The goal of M.I. Kutuzov in the Battle of Borodino

In the strategic plan of M.I. Kutuzov’s war, a general battle with Napoleon was unnecessary, and was accepted by him under the pressure of circumstances (“Kutuzov knew that they would not allow him to give up Moscow without a general battle, despite his Russian surname, just as they were not allowed to do this is Barclay. And he decided to give this battle, unnecessary, in his deepest conviction... Strategically unnecessary, it was necessary morally and politically." Tarle E. "Napoleon". M.: Nauka, 1991, p. 266). Kutuzov spoke to the emperor about holding Moscow upon his departure from St. Petersburg (When leaving St. Petersburg, Kutuzov made a promise to Alexander I that he would “rather die than allow the enemy to approach Moscow.” But at the same time he was writing a letter Miloradovich - the head of the reserve troops about the need for reserve forces, without which the 1st and 2nd armies may not withstand the enemy's onslaught) ... the troops were instructed to have a secondary wall against the enemy forces to Moscow on the road from Dorogobuzh in the hope that our enemy will find others obstacles on the road to Moscow, when, more than aspirations, the forces of the 1st and 2nd Western armies were insufficient to resist him. "Upon arrival at the Kutuzov army, entering the circumstances and becoming convinced of the numerical superiority of the enemy and the lack of trained reserves among the Russians, continued to express confidence in the defense of Moscow and victory. But at the same time, he set the condition for success on the presence of trained reserves, which did not exist at that time. Instead of the expected 60 thousand trained soldiers near Gzhatsk, about 15.5 thousand joined the Russian army, instead of the promised 80 thousand trained Moscow militia F. Rastopchin gathered about 7 thousand poorly trained and almost unarmed militia. Kutuzov focused the emperor’s attention on the lack of serious reserves and the losses that the army suffered in the clash with the enemy’s vanguard. Kutuzov’s personal correspondence by this time contains clear doubts about the possibility of defending Moscow (Kutuzov’s letter to his daughter dated August 19 demanding that she leave the Moscow region for Nizhny Novgorod: “I must say frankly that I don’t like your stay near Tarusa at all... that’s why I want you moved away from the theater of war... But I demand that everything I said be kept in the deepest secret, because if it becomes public, you will greatly harm me... leave, by all means."). In conditions of continued numerical superiority of the enemy, Kutuzov retreated from Tsarevo-Zaimishche on August 19. In letters to N. I. Saltykov, P. Kh. Wittgenstein, F. To F. Rostopchin August 19 - 21, Kutuzov writes about the need for a general battle to “save Moscow,” which he is going to fight in the Mozhaisk region. From this it is clear that, not feeling confident that he will be able to stop the enemy, Kutuzov does not disclose his uncertainty in order to avoid undermining the morale of the army before the general battle, which he in any case had no opportunity to avoid. On August 22, Kutuzov made a reconnaissance of the Borodino field.

On August 22, after reconnaissance, Kutuzov wrote in a letter to Rostopchin: “I hope to fight a battle in the current position... and if I am defeated, then I will go to Moscow and defend the capital there” (M. I. Kutuzov. Documents. vol. 4, part. 1, document No. 157, p. 129). From these words one can clearly see Kutuzov’s intention not only not to run the risk of defeating his troops, but also to be able, if necessary, to retreat in an organized manner under conditions of persecution by the enemy. It should be noted that the actual withdrawal of the Russian army from the Borodino field was carried out by Kutuzov in the consciousness of his victory over the enemy.

In general, Kutuzov’s lack of desire to defend Moscow at any cost was well known to many participants in the Battle of Borodino, some of whom became its historians. Clausewitz wrote: “Kutuzov probably would not have given the Battle of Borodino, in which he did not expect to win, if the voice of the court, the army and all of Russia had not forced him to do so. One must assume that he looked at this battle as a necessary evil.” Kutuzov expressed doubts about the purpose of the Battle of Borodino as the salvation of Moscow by I.P. Liprandi. P. Bagration’s extremely negative reaction to the appointment of Kutuzov as commander-in-chief is known: “this goose will bring the enemy to Moscow.” Kutuzov’s strategic thinking is best characterized by the phrase attributed to him: “I’m not thinking about how to defeat Napoleon, but about how to deceive him.”

Thus, the salvation of Moscow is a false goal of Kutuzov in the Battle of Borodino, which in reality did not take place, and the abandonment of Moscow by the Russian army is a false result of the Battle of Borodino, which is resorted to by French historians and some Russian historians of modern times. Kutuzov's goal in the battle was to preserve the army, and the only material result of the Battle of Borodino was the successful repulsion of attacks by French troops with half the strength of Russian troops with insignificant acquisitions of the French on the battlefield - Raevsky's battery and Bagration's flushes - which were not key to the defense system of the Russian army.

Some questions of the Battle of Borodino

Losses of the parties

The losses of the parties on August 24 - 26 were: the Russian army, including Cossack troops and militia - about 40 thousand people; Napoleon's army, according to reasonable scientific estimates, ranged from 50 to 60 thousand people. The losses of the officers of the parties are precisely determined. They amounted to: in the Russian army - 1487 people (maximum estimate); in Napoleon's army - 1928 people. The Battle of Borodino was and still remains one of the bloodiest one-day battles in the history of war.

Losses of the Russian army

A common estimate of the losses of the Russian army is up to 15,000 killed and up to 30,000 wounded. (In the first time after the battle, A. I. Mikhailovsky-Danielevsky’s estimate of losses was distributed at 59,000 people - of which, losses in the 1st Army, according to the report of the general on duty of the 1st Army, were about 39,000, and the losses of the 2nd Army were arbitrary estimated at 20,000. These data were no longer considered reliable when the Brockhaus and Efron Encyclopedic Dictionary was created, which indicated the number of losses “up to 40,000.” Modern historians believe that the December report on the 1st Army also applied to the 2nd army, so the latter was disbanded in September, its units and units became part of the 1st (Main) Army and Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky’s losses were summed up due to a misunderstanding.) In total, up to 45,000 with possible errors (not taking into account a number of individual units) and losses of the Cossacks and militias. This figure, however, should be considered exaggerated, since the estimated losses of the Cossacks (not reflected in the documents) are several hundred people, and the estimated losses of the militia are up to 1 thousand. Regular troops on August 24-26 lost approx. 39,200 - 21,766 in the 1st Army and 17,445 in the 2nd):

Below are the losses according to the corps records, which contain information about the maximum possible losses of the Russian army from August 24 to 26 (S.V. Lvov. “On the losses of the Russian army in the battle of Borodino”)

• 2nd Inf. bldg. (Lieutenant General K.F. Baggovut) - 3,017 (out of 11,452)
• 3rd Inf. bldg. (Lieutenant General N.A. Tuchkov - 1) - 3,626 (out of 12,211)
• 4th Inf. bldg. (Lieutenant General A.I. Osterman - Tolstoy) - 4001 (out of 9950)
• 5th Inf. bldg. (Lieutenant General N.I. Lavrov) - 5704 (out of 17,255)
• 6th Inf. bldg. (Infantry General D.S. Dokhturov) - 3875 (out of 8539)
• 1st Cav. bldg. (Lieutenant General F.P. Uvarov) - 137 (out of 2440)
• 2nd Cav. bldg. (Major General F.K. Korf) - 587 (out of 2505)
• 3rd Cav. bldg. (subordinate to Major General F.K. Korf) - 819 (out of 2505) Total in the 1st Western Army 21,766 people killed, wounded, missing

• 7th Inf. bldg. (Lieutenant General N. N. Raevsky) - 6278 (out of 11,853)
• 8th Inf. bldg. (Lieutenant General M. M. Borozdin - 1) - 9473 (out of 14,504)
• 4th Cav. bldg. (Major General K.K. Sievers) - 874 (out of 2256)
• 2nd brick div. (Major General I.M. Duka) - 920 (out of 2044) Total in the 2nd Western Army 17,445 people killed, wounded, missing

In total there are 39,211 people in both armies. Of this number: 14,361 people were killed; 14,701 people wounded; 10,249 people missing.

A number of units on both sides lost most of their personnel. The 2nd combined grenadier division of M. S. Vorontsov, which took part in the Battle of Shevardin and withstood the 3rd attack on the flushes, retained about 300 people in its composition (it should be noted that this combined division was small in number and consisted of 11 combined battalions of the 3rd x-company composition with a total number of up to 4 thousand people). The French infantry regiment Bonamy was subjected to similar extermination, retaining 300 out of 4,100 people in its ranks after the battle for Raevsky’s battery. The 30th regiment of the French line infantry, numbering 3,078 people on August 23, had a strength of 268 people by the end of the battle.

The 6th Infantry Corps of D. S. Dokhturov, according to the research of V. S. Lvov, lost a total of 3875 people out of 8539. Of this number, the 24th Infantry Division, which repelled the 3rd th attack on Raevsky's battery.

French army losses

The situation with the losses of the French army is less certain, since most of the archives of the Grand Army shared its fate in 1812. There is a widespread estimate of losses of about 30 thousand, the source of which is the report of the inspector at the General Headquarters of Napoleon Denier about 28,000 killed and wounded. Denier’s data on total losses cannot be verified by other documents, but attention is drawn to the implausible ratio in the report of the killed and the total number of wounded - 1: 3.27 (6550 and 21,450, respectively) in relation to that ratio in the Russian army (1: 0 ,6-1:1,7)

That part of the data in Denier’s report (concerning officer losses), which was verified, all the more indicates that the report does not reflect the losses of the French army. This was established in 1899 by the French historian A. Martinien, who discovered a huge discrepancy between the number of killed officers given by Denier - 269 and the result of his own research - 460. Later studies increased the number of killed officers known by name to 480 - that is, by almost 80%. . French historians admit that “since the information given in the statement about the generals and colonels who were out of action at Borodino is inaccurate and underestimated, it can be assumed that the rest of Denier’s figures are based on incomplete data.” A. Lashuk. "Napoleon. Campaigns and battles 1796-1815. F. Segur estimates the losses of the Great Army at Borodino at 40 thousand people.

Currently, the following losses of officers of the Great Army at Borodino are considered established: 480 killed and 1,448 wounded.
The losses of officers of the Russian army are significantly lower: 237 killed and missing and about 1250 wounded according to the maximum estimate / see. article by V. Lvov/. There is a lower estimate of Russian casualties: 211 killed and about 1,180 wounded. (Vdovin. Borodino. M, Sputnik+, - 2008. 321 p.)

Testimonies from individual participants in the battle play a role in reconstructing the picture of the losses of French troops. These include K. Clausewitz’s data on Junot’s 8th Corps, which numbered 5,700 people after the battle (the number at the beginning of the battle was 9,656 people). At the same time, Junot’s corps, which according to this evidence lost up to 4 thousand people, that is, about 40% of its strength, was not one of the corps that suffered the greatest losses, since it did not storm the fortifications from the front and did not participate in the Battle of Shevardin.

An important source that can shed light on the total losses of the French is information about the number of those buried on the Borodino field. Russian historians, and, in particular, employees of the museum-reserve on the Borodino field, estimate the number of people buried on the field at 48 - 50 thousand people (according to the director of the museum A. Sukhanov, the number of those buried on the Borodino field does not include burials in the surrounding villages and in the Kolotsky Monastery, as well as burials of the Great Patriotic War, - 49,887 ("Motherland", No. 2, 2005. According to A. Sukhanov, 39,201 horses were also buried on the Borodino field.) An approximate estimate of the number of buried Russians (including militia and Cossacks ) does not exceed 25,000: no more than 15,000 dead and no more than 10,000 dead on the battlefield (minus 700 prisoners from the 10,149 missing and taking into account militia losses).
The corresponding number of French killed or wounded and dying in the near future is 25,000.

An assessment of the ratio of those killed and those who died from wounds to total losses in the Russian army - 39.2/25 for the French army gives a number of similar losses of ~ 39,200.

However, the real number of buried Frenchmen was significantly higher, since, in contrast to 25,000 Russian burials (their total number, since the wounded Russians (over 14 thousand) taken to the rear, most of them did not have serious wounds and did not die from their wounds (As you know, over 20 thousand wounded Russian soldiers and officers, including those wounded in the Battle of Borodino, were taken to Moscow.) The 25,000 French burials do not include the many thousands of burials in the Kolotsky Monastery, where the main hospital of the Great Army was located, in which, according to the testimony of the captain of the 30th linear regiment, Charles Francois, in the 10 days following the battle, 3/4 of all the wounded in it died. In other words, if the 25 thousand Russians buried on the Borodino field are the killed and seriously wounded who died subsequently, then the 25 thousand French buried on the field were mostly killed in the battle, since the seriously wounded were taken to the vicinity of the Kolotsky monastery (F. Segur. “Campaign to Russia” “The remnant of it (Napoleon’s army - author) scattered across the battlefield to raise there were 20,000 wounded. They were taken 2 miles back to the Koloch Monastery"), where they died. Accordingly, the total losses of the French army in the Battle of Borodino were significantly higher than the figure of 39 thousand.

The estimate of losses of French troops at 30 thousand (the fallacy of which for many French historians is undoubted) and thereabouts (for example, the estimate of losses proposed by A. Lashuk and J. Blond at 35 thousand) is in contradiction with both the ratio of officer losses of both armies, and with the results of research by Russian scientists on the Borodino field.

Scientific domestic historiography, based on the totality of studies of losses, adheres to the estimate of the losses of the French army from 50 to 60 thousand people, with a priority estimate of 58 - 60 thousand people, including by branch of the military: 44% of infantry and 58% of cavalry of their total number.

Methodology for assessing losses by analogy with other battles

Historian A. Vasiliev, in defense of Denier’s data, proposes a method for indirectly assessing French losses, based on a comparison of the Battle of Borodino with the “similar in scale” (A. Vasiliev’s expression - author) Battle of Wagram on July 5-6, 1809. Since the losses of the French in the latter are taken by A. Vasiliev to be exactly known - 33,854 people, including 1862 command personnel, then, according to A. Vasiliev’s conclusion, the French losses at Borodino (with approximately equal losses of command personnel) should be about 30 thousand people

This reasoning, although it mentions the “similar scale” of the battles (which is not entirely true: 170 thousand French and 110 thousand Austrians took part in the Battle of Wagram. The front of the Austrian army was stretched over more than 20 km. A specific feature of the battle was the prolonged crossing by the French troops of the Danube under heavy fire from the Austrians), essentially based on the ratio of losses of general and command personnel. In addition, the difference in the nature of the battles, which significantly determines losses, is fundamentally set aside. Since this method is empirical, its result should be confirmed using as many examples as possible. As such, it is convenient to take the battle of Trebbia, in which the French losses are also precisely known. In this battle, the French army, which consisted of 6 divisions identical to the divisions of the Grand Army, was defeated. The losses in prisoners amounted to more than a third of the entire army, and thus can reliably reflect the desired ratio. For 12,280 prisoners, there were 514 command prisoners (including 4 generals, 8 colonels, 502 officers). The ratio of 1/23.9 gives the total losses of the French army at Borodino to 46 thousand people - 50% higher than the result of A. Vasiliev. Consequently, this technique leads to conflicting results. It is based on a comparison of two different battles (in relation to which the author, however, is trying to attempt unification), while a more reliable method of comparing the losses of command personnel of the Russian and French armies in the Battle of Borodino does not require dubious theorizing

Methodology for assessing losses by analyzing the balance of army strength

This method of assessing losses can clarify the issue of losses, but only on the condition that all losses and additions to the army are taken into account. A. Vasiliev, using this technique, names among the reinforcements that arrived to the French army from September 7 to 20
2 divisions numbering 11 thousand people and 4 cavalry regiments (2 thousand people). The marching replenishment battalions remain unattended (the total number of battalions on the way to the French army was about 30 thousand people (see the section “General description of the Battle of Borodino”). For example, the 30th linear regiment, which was reduced as a result of the battle from 3 thousand to 268 people, a week later, according to S. Francois, it already had 900 people. Most of the wounded in the Battle of Borodino did not survive at all. By ignoring the issue of marching reinforcements, A. Vasiliev estimates the losses of the French army on August 24 - 26 at 34 thousand people.

Number of parties

The question of the absolute number of sides is controversial, but not the relative one: the French army had a significant numerical superiority - 130-135 thousand against 103 thousand in the Russian regular troops (97,510 people consisting of 7 infantry and 5 cavalry corps and 1 cuirassier division, as well as 2644 - artillery reserve and 2.5 thousand at the Main Apartment. In total - 71,297 in the 1st Army, 31,357 in the 2nd Army), to which Cossack troops are usually added - about 8.2 thousand people (5,500 and 2,700 in the 1st and 2nd armies).

Number of military branches:

Infantry: from 86 to 90 thousand (without non-combatant units) - French; OK. 72 thousand (without militia) - Russians

Cavalry: from 28 to 29 thousand - French; 17 thousand (without Cossacks) - Russians

Artillery, engineering troops, etc.: 16 thousand - French; 14 thousand - Russians
Total: 130 - 135 thousand - French; 103 thousand - Russians

The numerical superiority of the French army in regular cavalry was especially pronounced, and the share of heavy cavalry in it exceeded that in the Russian army. The Russian army had a slight superiority in artillery, but the share of heavy guns in it exceeded that of the enemy. (see below)

In addition to regular troops, there were irregular troops on both sides - from 10 to 20 thousand Russian militia (the number is strictly proven to be 10 thousand) and about 15 thousand non-combatant soldiers in Napoleon’s army, and the latter fact is kept silent by N. Troitsky and some other modern historians , to which both B. Abalikhin and S. Lvov draw attention (Abalikhin B.S. On the issue of the size of the Russian army in the Battle of Borodino). The material is available on the website of the Borodino Museum-Reserve). In addition, the use of an uncritical approach to sources gives them a basis for overestimating the size of the Russian army from 154 to 157 thousand people ("see ibid., Abalikhin B.S."). Kutuzov's poorly trained militia, armed mostly with axes and pikes, was not considered a significant military force.

“The Smolensk and Moscow militias, whose regiments had not yet all joined the army, had almost no firearms. In general, they barely had a semblance of a military structure. For a month, taken from the plow ... although they were burning with zeal to fight, it was still impossible to fight them into the right battle with the experienced regiments of Napoleon. (A. I. Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky)."

The militia performed auxiliary functions and took a limited part in the battles on the Old Smolensk Road, where they showed high moral qualities.
The only direct evidence of the participation of the militia in the battle is the report of K. F. Baggovud about the support of five hundred warriors of the Moscow militia for the attack of the Ryazan and Vilmanstrand regiments. The militia did not suffer significant losses in the Battle of Borodino. (V. Khlestkin. Moscow and Smolensk militias under Borodino. Moscow magazine, 09/1/2001)

Artillery actions on both sides

The actions of the artillery of both sides received high mutual praise. There is a significant amount of evidence from participants in the battle on both sides about the significant losses inflicted by their artillery on the enemy and the destructive impact of enemy artillery fire. The number of shots fired by the French artillery - about 60 thousand - exceeded the number of Russian shots, since the smaller-caliber French artillery for the most part had a higher combat rate of fire (the French artillery included, for the most part, 3 and 4 pound cannons, while the Russian artillery includes only 12-pound and 6-pound cannons, as well as unicorns. (A. Nilus. History of the material part of artillery). The shorter recoil length of light guns and the smaller efforts of gun personnel to roll up guns, the lighter weight of the cannonballs determined the higher rate of fire of French artillery during periods of greatest activity - that is, relatively short periods of fire preparation that preceded attacks by French troops. During counter-battery fire and during the long-term methodical shelling of positions that took place in the last phase of the battle, this advantage of light artillery lost its significance. At the same time, the average destructive power of the shot was on the side of the Russian artillery, both due to the larger average caliber and due to the unicorns, which fired explosive grenades at a greater distance, which were significantly superior in the damaging effect of cannonballs.) 12-pound cannons and half-pound cannons Unicorns accounted for up to 1/4 of Russian artillery, while only 10% of French artillery was represented by 12 and 8 pound guns. The actual firing range of the 12-pound Russian guns was 1200 m, the French - no more than 1000 m. The French side carried out more intensive artillery maneuvering. In the final phase of the Battle of Borodino, with the troops in a generally stable position, Russian artillery won counter-battery fire and inflicted huge losses on the French troops, including those who occupied Kurgan Heights, as a result of which the French artillery fell silent and the French troops retreated along the front, leaving the Borodino field.

Progress of the Battle of Borodino

A number of historians, who give preference to the testimony of participants in the battle who adhered to the view of a more transient course of the battle on the left wing, are making attempts to reconstruct the corresponding consistent course of the battle. These attempts are based on individual erroneous testimonies from participants in the battle and the falsified statement that the version of the battle for flushes before noon is based solely on the words of Toll, while already in 1813 the English general T. Wilson, an eyewitness of the battle, wrote about the same duration of these battles . Such a reconstruction is presented, in particular, in the work of L. Ivchenko “The Battle of Borodino. The history of the Russian version of events." In accordance with this reconstruction, the French carried out 3 attacks on the flushes: the first - by the forces of Davout's corps - at 6 o'clock in the morning; The second attack by the corps of Davout and Ney began at 8 am. It was during this attack that Bagration carried out the famous bayonet counterattack. The French were driven back at about 9 o'clock, Bagration was wounded, after which the French captured the flushes a second time; soon after this, Konovnitsyn’s division, which was coming to the aid of Bagration, again threw the French off the flushes, after which Konovnitsyn withdrew the troops of the left wing to the Semyonov Heights. French troops, having occupied the flushes for the third time, began an attack at about 10 a.m. on the main positions of the left wing behind the Semyonovsky ravine, but were unsuccessful. In this reconstruction, the movement through the Utitsky forest of Junot's corps is explained by Ney's desire to fill the gap between Davout's corps, which had advanced a kilometer forward, and Poniatowski's corps. There were two attacks on Raevsky’s battery - the first at 8 a.m., simultaneously with the main attack on the flashes, which was repulsed at about 9 a.m. and the second, which began at about 2 p.m.

Problems with alternate battle chronologies

Lev Nikolaevich Tolstoy's point of view on the chronology of the battle

One of the problems with the alternative chronology is the fact that Leo Tolstoy adhered to the first option - defending flushes until noon. The attitude of historians towards Tolstoy is well known: since Tolstoy spoke far from commendably about the activities of historians, candidates and doctors of historical sciences prefer to pretend that Tolstoy never wrote about any Battle of Borodino. Meanwhile, Tolstoy was not only a great thinker who comprehended the events of 1812, having, at the same time, personal rich military experience, but also a scrupulous researcher of actual events. It is known that in the Yasnaya Polyana library alone he collected more than 2 thousand works on the Patriotic War, which were studied by Tolstoy from a critical position. Tolstoy adhered to the version about 6-hour attacks on flushes.

Kutuzov’s strategic ideas and the first steps towards their implementation

In 1812, Kutuzov was 68 years old. During the difficult period of the war, he took command of the retreating army. Kutuzov's entry into command of the army is directly related to the use of a completely different strategic line than before him: the participation of the masses in the war significantly expanded.

The appointment of Kutuzov relieved the extreme tension in the army, which increased with every step of its retreat. Kutuzov instilled faith in victory in the troops and raised their morale. In his hands was concentrated not only the leadership of all armies, but also the solution of important issues related to the logistics of the troops and strengthening them with manpower reserves.

Upon assuming the post of commander-in-chief, Kutuzov did not receive any plan for waging war. He was given great independence in this regard, but at the same time he was entrusted with enormous responsibility. Kutuzov understood well that the people and the army expected decisive actions from him that would stop the enemy’s further advance into the interior of the country.

But neither the people nor the army could know that there were not enough trained forces either at the front or in the rear for this. Soberly assessing the situation directly at the front, Kutuzov came to the conclusion that the available troops operating against superior enemy forces were extremely insufficient. The army needs serious reinforcements

On August 11, Kutuzov sent an official request to the War Ministry, in which he wrote: “I humbly request that the following information be delivered to me:

1st - about all the recruiting depots currently in existence, about the number and armament of them.

2nd - about those regular troops that are formed within the empire; where and what kind of success of this formation occurs.”

This was the first document emanating from the new commander-in-chief. It is extremely important to note that Kutuzov’s extensive military experience gave him the opportunity to correctly identify the main force that was capable of changing the course of military operations. Reserves were what interested Kutuzov primarily.

By increasing the army at the expense of reserves and militia, Kutuzov hoped to stop Napoleon’s further advance into the interior of the country and prevent the enemy from approaching Moscow. However, the War Department exaggerated the presence of ready armed forces in the country.

Information from the War Ministry gave Kutuzov grounds to count on a significant increase in the army at the expense of reserves and militia, and first of all, of course, on the use of the corps of M. A. Miloradovich and the Moscow militia for this purpose. Having strengthened the army with these troops, Kutuzov believed it was quite possible to stop Napoleon’s further advance into the interior of the country and defeat the French even before they approached Moscow.

The commander-in-chief counted not only on strengthening the armies operating in the Moscow direction. Of course, these were the main forces. The complete defeat of the enemy undoubtedly required coordination of the actions of all armies and their active participation in the fight. The commander came to the conclusion that it was necessary to shift the main efforts of the Danube and 3rd Western armies also against the main group of Napoleonic troops approaching Moscow.

Thus, Kutuzov’s main strategic idea was to unite the efforts of all armies in the most important operational area, where the fate of the war was being decided.

Kutuzov sought to ensure that, having strengthened the 1st and 2nd Western armies at the expense of the large reserve formations promised by the War Ministry, move to active defense, stop the further advance of the Napoleonic army, and then together with the troops of the Danube and 3rd Western armies ( which should have reached the enemy’s right flank and rear by this time) to launch active offensive operations and inflict a crushing defeat on the enemy. The implementation of this plan could lead to a drastic change in the entire strategic situation.

The mature idea of ​​fighting Napoleon was based on the specific military-strategic situation that was outlined to the commander in documents received from the War Ministry. Until Kutuzov’s arrival in the army, when he did not yet know the actual situation at the front and while the actual situation with the reserves was hidden from him, this idea of ​​​​transitioning to active offensive actions against Napoleon found its expression in both the words and actions of the commander.

Arriving in Gzhatsk on August 17, Kutuzov met here staff officers sent by Barclay de Tolly to inspect defensive positions along the Moscow road. “We don’t need any positions behind the armies; We have already retreated too far,” said Kutuzov and sent the officers back to the army.

However, on August 19 (30), unexpectedly for everyone, the troops received Kutuzov’s order to retreat. It was not easy for Kutuzov to decide to take this step. His adjutant, Prince Golitsyn, testifies that the commander-in-chief spent the entire night before in calculations, pondering the current situation.

There were about 150 kilometers left to Moscow. The Russian army, which had covered more than 800 kilometers in two months of retreat, needed rest, and most importantly, reinforcement with fresh forces, since the Russian army was relentlessly followed by the numerically superior French army, ready to attack its enemy at any moment.

The biggest blow for Kutuzov at that moment was that the reserves, the availability and readiness of which he was assured by the Ministry of War, and on the strength of which he had high hopes, in reality did not turn out. There was nothing to stop and defeat the enemy. Instead of the expected arrival of Miloradovich’s 60,000-strong corps to the army, only 15-16 thousand hastily assembled untrained soldiers arrived in Gzhatsk.

Rostopchin, who boastfully reported on the successful formation of the militia, assured the War Ministry that its composition would soon be increased to 75 thousand people. In reality, Rostopchin was able to send only 15 thousand insufficiently trained militias to the active army. This is all that could be obtained to staff and increase the size of the army. It is quite obvious that such forces could not influence the outcome of the struggle.

Thus, the “second wall” that Kutuzov hoped to rely on in the battles with Napoleon collapsed at the most crucial moment of the Patriotic War of 1812. Behind, from Gzhatsk to Moscow itself, there were no more regular troops.

The difficult strategic situation, and above all the lack of forces and the lack of reserves, forced the commander-in-chief to decide to withdraw the armies into the interior of the country in order to further separate Napoleon’s army from bases and reserves and, having strengthened his army, inflict a crushing defeat on him in an exhausting big battle.

Kutuzov decided to use a fundamentally new form of struggle. If Napoleon sought to achieve victory with one blow in a general battle, concentrating all his forces for this, then Kutuzov opposed Napoleon with another strategy, which combined a whole system of individual battles, extended in depth, maneuvers, active defense with a subsequent transition to a counteroffensive.

By continuing to withdraw the army into the interior of the country, Kutuzov was thereby, as it were, preparing the necessary conditions for the subsequent transition to active offensive actions. In this regard, the grandiose battle of Borodino played a huge role. It was determined primarily by strategic expediency aimed at disrupting Napoleonic’s plan to achieve victory in one general battle.

But the main thing was that Moscow was behind. It was impossible to retreat further without a battle.

battle of Borodino

Extensive literature is devoted to the historical day of August 26 (September 7), 1812. Historians and writers, strategists and tacticians wrote about Borodin.

For a long time, there was an opinion in the literature about the supposedly spontaneous occurrence of the Battle of Borodino. Foreign historians persistently argued that Napoleon, having the strategic initiative and striving to defeat the Russian army at all costs, forced Kutuzov to go to this battle. Their arguments basically boiled down to the fact that Napoleon, developing an offensive against Moscow, put the Russian army in a hopeless situation, that the advancing Napoleonic army pressed the Russians so hard that they simply had nowhere to go.

Another, rather large group of historians argued that the reason for the battle at Borodin was the need to satisfy public opinion and that Kutuzov, contrary to military considerations, to please only the tsar and the nobility, decided to go to this bloody battle.

Military historian General N.P. Mikhnevich believed that Kutuzov, contrary to military considerations (just to acquire the moral right to leave Moscow to the enemy), decided on this battle.

Upon careful examination of the situation preceding the battle, with the orders and actions of Kutuzov, the complete inconsistency of these assumptions becomes clear. If we look at the documents that came from Kutuzov a few days before the battle, they all confirm two main points: firstly, that this battle was planned by Kutuzov in advance and undertaken on his own initiative, and secondly, that its main goal was not only is to bleed the enemy, disable his best forces and stop further offensive, but also to prevent Napoleon from approaching Moscow.

Kutuzov communicates his decision to give battle to Napoleonic army in letters to the War Ministry, the Tsar, and others. “Be that as it may,” Kutuzov wrote to Alexander I, “Moscow must be defended.”

In preparation for the Battle of Borodino, the Russian command launched active activities. It sought to provide its troops with the most favorable conditions of battle and, for this purpose, brought up available reserves; The people's militia were brought in to assist the regular troops. Kutuzov ordered General D.I. Lobanov-Rostovsky, who was preparing reserve regiments, from Kostroma, Vladimir, Ryazan, Tambov, Yaroslavl and Voronezh, to send two regiments from each place to Moscow. Three days before the battle, Kutuzov, in a letter to N.I. Saltykov, asked him: “For God’s sake, dear Mr. Count Nikolai Ivanovich, try to get the second line recruiting depots closer to Moscow in order to maintain the army in some form. If my shelves are included, then, by God, I’m not afraid of anyone! "

Simultaneously with the strengthening of the army at the expense of the reserves located in the rear, orders were given to the commanders of the 3rd Western and Danube armies to turn their main forces to the main direction, the need to act on the enemy’s right flank and reach his rear. The actions of the Russian command were aimed at defeating the main enemy forces in a general battle and then putting them under double attack: on the one hand, the advancing troops of the 1st and 2nd Western armies, on the other, the troops of the Danube and 3rd Western armies that were supposed to enter the enemy’s retreat route and thereby close all roads to him and put him in a hopeless situation. Unfortunately, the commander-in-chief's demands to join the Danube and 3rd Western Armies remained unfulfilled, although the Bucharest Peace Treaty concluded with Turkey made it possible to transfer the Danube Army to defend the western borders.

Thus, the Battle of Borodino took place in a very unfavorable situation: firstly, the significant strengthening of the army promised by the government was frustrated; secondly, the commander-in-chief’s orders to coordinate the actions of all armies were not followed. All this, of course, affected both the outcome of the Battle of Borodino and further events of the war.

Mistakenly imagining the concept of the battle, Western military historians unfairly accuse Kutuzov of failing to choose a suitable area for the battle. This same version is repeated by some Russian historians, believing that Kutuzov did not choose positions at all, but, pressed by Napoleon, settled on an incorrectly chosen and assessed area. Military historian A.K. Bayov argued that Kutuzov did not attach importance to the choice of position for the Battle of Borodino: “The deployment of troops in the position did not fully correspond to either the significance or the properties of its various participants.” Such conclusions are erroneous from both a historical and military point of view. The choice of terrain for battle or battle is, of course, not a minor factor. The location has always, and especially in those days, been extremely important. It influenced the choice of the direction of the main attack; the location and grouping of troops and their use in battle depended on it.

Preparing for a battle with a numerically superior enemy, Kutuzov, naturally, took all measures to find the most convenient position on the road from Tsarevo-Zaimishche to Mozhaisk. For this purpose, experienced officers were sent ahead in advance. Upon arrival in Gorki, Kutuzov on the morning of August 22 immediately went to inspect the position and personally gave orders to strengthen it.

The chosen position protected the main routes leading to Moscow: its flanks could not be bypassed, since they were covered: the right flank by the Moscow River, and the left by a strip of forests. The position was elevated above the terrain ahead and provided good visibility and artillery fire. Rivers and ravines located ahead of the front prevented the French army from freely maneuvering. The flat terrain allowed, with the exception of certain areas, infantry attacks in battalion columns and the use of large cavalry formations. The southern part of the position was wooded, closed and hampered the actions of troops, especially cavalry.

The position was well equipped in engineering terms. In the center, at the height of Kurgannaya, the Russians erected an 18-gun battery. It was named after General N.N. Raevsky, whose troops defended in this area. On the right flank, near the village of Maslovo, there were several redoubts and lunettes (“Maslovsky fortifications”). On the left flank, near the village of Semenovskoye, three flashes were built. Later they were called “Bagrationovs” - in honor of P.I. Bagration. To the west of the flashes, near the village of Shevardino, a redoubt was built, which played the role of a forward strong point. The rear of the position, especially on the left flank, was covered by a forest, which ensured the secret deployment of troops and maneuver of reserves.

Borodino's position sharply limited Napoleon's ability to choose the form of maneuver. The most vulnerable part of the battle formation - the flanks - was reliably covered as a result of skillful use of the terrain. Covering the flanks was difficult. It was possible to carry out a deep detour, but this would lead to excessive stretching of the front and a weakening of forces.

Napoleon was thus forced to accept the battle on unfavorable terrain and use a frontal attack on a narrow section of the front. It is quite obvious that it was not Napoleon, but Kutuzov who dictated the terms of the upcoming battle. Kutuzov rightfully reported to the Tsar: “The position in which I stopped, near the village of Borodino, 12 versts ahead of Mozhaisk, is one of the best, which can only be found in flat places. The weak point of this position, which is on the left flank, I will try to correct with art. It is desirable that the enemy attack us in this position; then I have great hope of victory.”

In preparation for the battle, the command of the Russian army skillfully positioned its troops in position, creating a deep battle formation. It was based on four groups: the right wing, the center, the left wing and reserves. On the right wing, in the area from the village of Maloe to the village of Gorki, were located the 2nd and 4th infantry corps, and behind them was the 2nd cavalry corps. The reserve of the Russian troops of the right wing consisted of the 1st Cavalry Corps of General F.P. Uvarov, located on the right behind the open flank of the position. Nine Cossack regiments of M.I. Platov, also in reserve, stood on the edge of the Maslovsky forest. Thus, two infantry, two cavalry corps and Platov’s Cossack regiments, totaling more than 30 thousand people, were concentrated on the right wing. The command of this group of troops was entrusted to General Miloradovich. The troops of the right wing were supposed to reliably cover the shortest route to Moscow. In addition, they were the reserve that Kutuzov could use for maneuver in order to strengthen the left flank and center, as well as for delivering strong counterattacks to the enemy.

In the center of the position from the village of Gorki to Raevsky's battery was Dokhturov's 6th Infantry Corps, and behind it was the 3rd Cavalry Corps. The troops of the center covered the New Smolensk road and the approaches to the Raevsky battery from Borodino. Both of these groups consisted of troops of the 1st Army and were subordinate to Barclay de Tolly.

In the area between the Raevsky battery and Shevardin, the 7th Infantry Corps of N.N. Raevsky, the 8th Infantry Corps of M.M. Borozdin with the 27th Infantry Division of D.N. Neverovsky under the overall command of Gorchakov 2 were located. Behind the 7th Corps was the 4th Cavalry Corps. Behind the open left flank, a special reserve was placed consisting of: the 2nd Cuirassier Division, the combined grenadier division of M. S. Vorontsov and the reserve artillery of the 2nd Army. Eight Cossack regiments of A. A. Karpov were allocated to monitor the left flank of the position. The troops of the left flank with a total number of about 30 thousand people, including the private reserve, were subordinate to the commander of the 2nd Army, General Bagration.

Chains of rangers were deployed in front of the entire location of the Russian troops. The center of the position was covered by three advanced detachments, which were located at Borodino, on the right bank of the Kolocha River and opposite Raevsky’s battery.

The general reserve of both armies, consisting of the 3rd and 5th infantry corps, the 1st cuirassier division, reserve artillery and militia, was located behind the center of the position - in the Knyazkovo area, near the New Smolensk road. The number of reserves reached 40 thousand people.

Reserves were given great importance. The presence of large reserves, including artillery, made it possible to give the defense an active character and conduct a long battle, exhausting the attacking enemy. Kutuzov’s disposition stated that “reserves should be saved as long as possible, because the general who still retains the reserve will not be defeated.”

The main group of the army concentrated on the right flank. About 70% of all forces were concentrated near the New Smolensk road. As a result of a comprehensive analysis of the situation, Kutuzov came to the right decision: to firmly cover the New Smolensk Road as the main strategic direction to Moscow (the remaining points were only of tactical importance).

The powerful right-flank group of the Russian army created a constant threat to the enemy’s flank and rear, his artillery parks and constrained the actions of his troops. In addition, most of the forces concentrated on the right wing were supposed to play the role of the main reserve, ready to prevent the enemy from bypassing this sector of defense and capable of supporting the center and left wing. Kutuzov, knowing the strategic and tactical techniques of Napoleon, created such a grouping of forces that did not allow Napoleon to use his favorite methods of attacks.

Napoleon was also intensively preparing for the upcoming general battle.

Various data are provided in military-historical literature regarding the number of troops participating in the battle. The figures given were 160-180 thousand French and 100-140 thousand Russian armies. But despite all the discrepancies in determining the number of troops, all researchers agree on one thing: the French forces were superior to the Russian army. The figures are closer to the truth: 120 thousand Russian army and 640 guns; 130-135 thousand French with 587 guns.

The almost twelve-hour Battle of Borodino took place 110 kilometers from Moscow. The field outside Mozhaisk, where the battle took place, covers 8 kilometers along the front. It is limited from the north and northeast by the Moscow River, from the south - by the Old Smolensk Road: from the west - by a conditional line passing through the villages of Valuevo, Fomkino, Elnya, and from the east - by the villages of Maslovo, Tatarinovo, Psarevo.

The beginning of the battle was the battle near the village of Shevardino, where there were important commanding heights. Here, the day before, a pentagonal redoubt had been erected, which initially served as part of the position of the Russian left flank, and after the left flank was pushed back, it became a separate position. Napoleon, as soon as he saw the Shevardinsky redoubt in front of him, ordered to take it - the redoubt prevented the French army from turning around. Shevardino was defended by Russian troops consisting of 8 thousand infantry, 4 thousand cavalry with 36 guns. Here, at the unfinished redoubt, hot and persistent battles broke out around noon on August 24 (September 5). The corps of Davout, Murat and Ney that arrived here and the Polish cavalry of Poniatowski immediately sought to capture the Shevardinsky redoubt. In total, Napoleon moved about 30 thousand infantry, 10 thousand cavalry to the redoubt and concentrated the fire of 186 guns.

The redoubt and the approaches to it were defended by the legendary 27th division of D.P. Neverovsky, militias and several cavalry regiments under the overall command of Lieutenant General Gorchakov. The nephew of A.V. Suvorov, who distinguished himself in the Italian and Swiss campaigns of his great uncle, was already a general at the age of 21, Andrei Ivanovich Gorchakov experienced his “finest hour” here. Five enemy infantry and two cavalry divisions attacked the defenders of the redoubt. A fierce battle broke out, first with fire, and then with hand-to-hand combat. The Russian units defending the redoubt showed great courage and heroism. Despite their three-fold numerical superiority, the French managed to occupy Shevardino only after a stubborn four-hour battle at the cost of heavy losses. But they could not keep the redoubt in their hands. The approaching 2nd Grenadier Division, led by Bagration, knocked the enemy out of the redoubt. Then the redoubt changed hands three times. It was already dark when Murat’s cuirassiers came to Poniatowski’s aid. Only by midnight did Gorchakov leave the redoubt on the orders of Kutuzov, when it was already inappropriate to defend the destroyed redoubt, which was distant from the main line of defense, and withdrew the troops to the main position.

The battle for the Shevardinsky redoubt gave the Russians the opportunity to gain time to complete defensive work at the main position and allowed them to more accurately determine the grouping of enemy forces and the direction of their main attack. As a result of this battle, it was established that the main enemy forces were concentrated in the Shevardin area against the center and left flank of the Russian army. On the same day, Kutuzov sent Tuchkov’s 3rd Corps to the left flank, secretly positioning it in the Utitsa area, almost perpendicular to the 8th Corps. With this arrangement, a simple frontal movement brought him to the enemy's flank. Kutuzov spoke about the tasks of this corps: “When the enemy uses his last reserves on Bagration’s left flank, then I will send a hidden army to his flank and rear.” Unfortunately, this plan was thwarted by General Bennigsen, who, just before the battle, ordered Tuchkov to advance and stand in front of the enemy. In addition to the 3rd Infantry Corps, the Moscow militia and part of the Cossacks were transferred to the Utitsa area. The regrouping of troops significantly strengthened the left flank of the Russian army. These changes, secretly and quickly carried out just before the battle, were a complete surprise to Napoleon. The battle of Shevardino strengthened the Russian troops' confidence in victory.

At dawn on August 26, over 100 enemy guns opened fire on the Bagration flushes. Russian artillery responded, and a firefight ensued between the advanced units. At the same time, troops of the Beauharnais corps attacked the chasseur regiment defending Borodino

The actions of the Beauharnais troops were of a distracting nature. Napoleon believed they would bind the forces of the right wing of the Russian troops. But this attempt ended in failure. It was promptly solved by Kutuzov, and during the battle he boldly transferred first the 2nd Corps of Baggovut to Utitsa, and then the 4th Corps of Osterman-Tolstoy to the Raevsky battery.

The main events unfolded on the left wing of the Russian army, in the area of ​​the Bagration flushes. Fierce fighting here lasted more than six hours, during which the enemy launched eight attacks. To capture Bagration's flushes, Napoleon sent the main forces of the corps of Davout, Murat, Ney, and Junot. The bulk of the artillery operated in this sector.

Kutuzov carefully watched the progress of the battle. He noticed the danger threatening the 2nd Army in time and sent part of the general reserve forces to Bagration’s disposal, namely three guards regiments (Izmailovsky, Lithuanian and Finland), a brigade of combined grenadier battalions with artillery, brigade 1 1st Cuirassier Division and 100 guns from the artillery reserve. But since these troops could arrive at Bagration only by 11 o’clock, the enemy still had more than double superiority in the nearest attacks.

At about 9:20 a.m. the fourth attack on the flushes followed.

To ease Bagration’s situation and help him, Kutuzov ordered Platov’s Cossacks and Uvarov’s 1st Cavalry Corps to launch a surprise attack on the left flank and rear of the French, thereby forcing Napoleon to pull his forces here and weaken the blows in the Semenovsky area. At this time, Kutuzov places part of his reserve forces at Bagration’s disposal.

The defense of Bagration's flushes, carried out by the Russian army with exceptional courage and tenacity, bled the main enemy group out of blood.

With the enemy's capture of the village of Semenovskoye, the central stronghold - Raevsky's battery - found itself under fire from three directions. Napoleon brought more than 35 thousand troops and about 300 guns to this area and was preparing to launch an attack. But at this time, the cavalry regiments of Uvarov and the Cossacks of Platov, directed by Kutuzov, suddenly attacked the left flank of the French. The unexpected appearance of Russian cavalry on the flank and in the rear caused panic among the enemy, which delayed the decisive French attack on Raevsky’s battery for two hours. Kutuzov was given the opportunity to regroup his troops and strengthen the center of the battle formation.

Having strengthened the left wing and made sure that the actions of the Russian cavalry no longer posed a danger, Napoleon resumed the attack on Raevsky’s battery. The troops of the corps of Beauharnais, Grouchy, Caulaincourt, and Latour-Maubourg were thrown there.

Raevsky's battery was defended by troops of the 24th Infantry Division of General P. G. Likhachev from the 6th Corps of General D. S. Dokhturov. To the right was the 7th Infantry Division of P.M. Kaptsevich of the same 6th Corps, and to the left was the 4th Infantry Corps of General A.I. Osterman-Tolstoy. Behind him were the Preobrazhensky and Semenovsky guards regiments and the regiments of the cuirassier division.

The French brought down fire from more than 120 guns on the defenders of the heights

At the cost of the greatest tension, Napoleon managed, using his superiority in cavalry, to strike at Raevsky’s battery from the front and both flanks and capture this important stronghold. But he could no longer develop his success due to huge losses in infantry and cavalry, physical fatigue of the troops and stubborn resistance of the Russians. The Russian troops retreated in perfect order, without losing contact with the rest of the army.

The battle for Raevsky's battery brought the French only some tactical success, but at the same time, along with battles in other directions, it led to the disruption of Napoleon's overall plan. Just as at the beginning of the day, so now the enemy had in front of him a solid, unshaken Russian front. Napoleon had to make a new effort using his last reserve - the guard, or admit his failure and refuse to continue the battle.

As a result, Napoleon declared that 800 leagues from France he could not sacrifice his last reserve.

The Russian army was determined to fight to the end. To the envoy of Barclay de Tolly, who intended to begin a retreat to Moscow, the indignant Kutuzov sharply replied: as for the battle, its course is known to me very well. The enemy is repulsed at all points.

Kutuzov promptly took into account changes in the situation in a particular sector of the battle and responded very quickly to these changes. He most correctly determined that the French, as a result of continuous and bloody attacks, were tired and exhausted by the battle to a much greater extent than the Russians. The richest combat experience told Kutuzov that victory remains on the side of the one who, at the turning point of the battle, finds the strength to survive to the end.

And so it happened. Napoleon, waiting for darkness to fall, gave the order to withdraw his frustrated troops to their original position.

Thus, by the end of the day the Borodino position remained in the hands of the Russian army. During the night, the Raevsky battery and the villages of Semenovskoye and Utitsa were again occupied, i.e., the original position of the troops was almost completely restored. In a report to Alexander I, Kutuzov rightfully reported: “The battle was general and lasted until the night. The loss on both sides is great: the enemy’s damage, judging by his persistent attacks on our fortified position, should greatly exceed ours.” The Russian troops “fought with incredible courage. The batteries changed hands, and the end result was that the enemy did not win a single step of land with his superior forces.”

After 12 hours of continuous fighting, the battle ended where it began.

As a result of the Battle of Borodino, Kutuzov failed to stop the enemy, block his road to Moscow and begin expelling him from Russian territory.

However, the Battle of Borodino marked a crisis in Napoleonic strategy for a general battle. On the Borodino field, for the first time, the inconsistency of the Napoleonic theory of achieving victory in one general battle, which became a kind of “recipe for victory,” was revealed with particular force.

When assessing the Battle of Borodino, at least three main results should be emphasized. Firstly, Napoleonic army failed to break the resistance of the Russians, defeat them and open a free path to Moscow. Secondly, the Russian army disabled almost half of the enemy’s troops. And finally, thirdly, on the Borodino field, the French army suffered irreparable moral damage, while the Russian troops had increased confidence in victory over the enemy.

On the Borodino field there was not only a battle between two fighting armies, in which their fighting qualities were tested, but also a competition between two great commanders - Napoleon and Kutuzov. Some works published in the West express an opinion about the supposedly passive role of both commanders in the battle. Thus, the English historian and writer Christopher Duffy in the book “Borodino and the War of 1812” writes that Kutuzov allegedly left the leadership of the battle to his army commanders - Barclay and Bagration, and he himself only occasionally made minor comments. According to the author, Napoleon behaved similarly, although he was 24 years younger than Kutuzov.

An objective analysis of the course of events shows that such an assessment does not correspond to reality. Both commanders felt the “pulse of the battle” and quickly responded to its changes. During the battle, both Napoleon and Kutuzov showed colossal energy and skill in leading troops on the battlefield. In the battle of Borodino, the Russian army held back the onslaught of an army that had been considered invincible for over 10 years, an army led by the largest commander of that time.

In the successful outcome of the Battle of Borodino for the Russians, the high morale of the troops was decisive.

The Battle of Borodino was replete with examples of the tactical skill of Russian troops. First of all, it should be noted that the Russians used wide maneuver on the battlefield, both from the depths and along the front. Such events made the positions of the Russian army especially stable and deprived the French of the opportunity to achieve ultimate success. All attacks by enemy troops were fruitless.

In the Battle of Borodino, three types of troops skillfully interacted: infantry, cavalry and artillery. The main brunt of the fighting, naturally, fell to the infantry, which was the basis of the entire battle formation.

The Battle of Borodino was of great importance in the Patriotic War of 1812. L.N. Tolstoy wrote in “War and Peace” that “the direct consequence of the Battle of Borodino was Napoleon’s causeless flight from Moscow, return along the Old Smolensk Road, the death of a five hundred thousandth invasion and the death of Napoleonic France...”

The same idea was expressed by Academician E.V. Tarle, who believed that “Tarutino and Maloyaroslavets were a direct and inevitable consequence of Borodin... The enemy after Borodin began to run out of steam and gradually move toward death.”

Borodino required a lot of effort from the Russian army, significant losses in people and cavalry, ammunition was used up, and there was not enough food for the troops. In order to defeat the enemy, the Russian army needed to move from defense to active offensive actions.

But the experienced commander understood that the forces and means remaining after the battle were clearly not enough to solve such a problem. It was necessary to strengthen the army, reinforce it with fresh forces, supply it with ammunition, food and fodder.

All of Kutuzov’s actions were aimed at this. However, despite Kutuzov’s insistent demands to support the army and strengthen it in order to fully realize the success of the Battle of Borodino, neither the tsar nor the War Ministry took any effective measures to reinforce the troops. The army received no fresh troops, no ammunition, no food.

In the situation that developed after the Battle of Borodino, when the army, having suffered significant losses, did not have the opportunity to make up for them, and especially did not have reserves to build up forces during the offensive, the transition to active offensive actions with available forces was completely excluded. That is why Kutuzov, informing Alexander I of his decision to withdraw the army to Moscow, wrote that he “must retreat also because none of the troops that are coming to me for reinforcement have yet approached me...”.

The Battle of Borodino alone was not enough for victory. I had to withdraw the army to Moscow “When it is not about the glory of the battles won only,” Kutuzov reported to the tsar, “but the whole goal, being aimed at the destruction of the French army ... I decided to retreat.” “I won the battle before Moscow, but we must protect the army...” stated Kutuzov. “Soon our entire army, that is, Tormasov, Chichagov, Wittgenstein and others, will begin to act towards one goal, and Napoleon will not stay in Moscow for long.” These words have a deep meaning. Without receiving reserves, without achieving a turn of the 3rd and Danube armies to the main direction, the commander-in-chief made the only correct decision in that situation: to retreat in order to preserve the army, gather strength, and then go on a counter-offensive and defeat the invaders.