Modern political elites: expert opinions. Elite theories

One thing is certain - the current Russian elite is characterized to a greater extent than the Soviet elite by such qualities as greed, a tendency to corruption (noted by 44% of respondents), irresponsibility, a tendency to put their interests above the interests of the people (41%), cosmopolitanism, pliability to external influence, contempt for the interests of their country and their people (39%). The Soviet elite, Russians believe, was characterized by patriotism, concern for the fate of the country (considered by the majority of respondents - 57%), responsibility to the country and people (39%), hard work, efficiency (34%). The Russian and Soviet elites are united by a tendency to transfer power by inheritance, only to “their” people or even to children (43%), closedness from society, casteism, and the desire to resolve all issues in a narrow circle, without consultation with the people (41%). The fact that neither one nor the other is characterized by democracy or closeness to the people is indicated by 33% of respondents; 31% of respondents noted openness to new people and a readiness to attract talented and distinguished professionals to govern the country.

The Soviet elite appears to public opinion to be more professional, while the current Russian elite appears to be more proactive. Nevertheless, it was the Soviet party and Komsomol nomenklatura (together with the bureaucracy of the period of Boris Yeltsin’s presidency, as well as crime) that served as the main base for recruiting the modern Russian elite, according to 24 to 37% of respondents. The closest circle of President V. Putin (24%) is considered to be the main source of personnel for the elite. A fifth of the respondents (20%) included heads of former state-owned enterprises among the groups on the basis of which the elite was formed. Almost the same number (18 and 17%) of the elite see people from law enforcement agencies and children of high-ranking and wealthy parents. The scientific and creative intelligentsia, according to Russians, is last on the list of social groups from which the Russian elite comes (6%).

Well, the development of society, sciences, relations between people gives rise to new concepts and, consequently, new terms. It is quite natural to deal with them, to find the meaning and reasons for their appearance. Just don’t use them to hide, disguise the vices of modern society, to ignore those forces that inexorable history calls upon to take control of this society. It was precisely in order to lead people’s consciousness away from this necessity that it was necessary to give the long-known concept of “elite” a new life.

Post-Soviet political strategists had to change terminology, come up with abstruse formulations claiming to be scientific, in order to look like innovators in the field of social change.

Dealing with the apologists of the current elite is a useful and necessary thing. After all, they are increasingly trying to set the tone in the life of Russian society.

And here we should note another very significant feature of the problem of elitism in our time.

In the era of globalization, it outgrows the role and affairs of individual, even the most influential individuals or groups, and becomes a characteristic feature of the activities of large international or regional organizations that set the tone and influence the activities in the sphere of politics and economics of large groups of countries, which, moreover, is not only open, but in some cases also hidden.

It often brings their leaders more tangible results than officially recognized organizations. Their creators and leaders (which is typical for the United States) use their elitism in an effort to rule the whole world. That is why the modern national and international elite require particularly careful study, which is what the authors strive for.

Modern sociology divides the elite into three groups that overlap. political elite- This is, first of all, the ruling elite in society and that part of the opposition layer that makes claims to power functions. The field of action of the political elite is the struggle for power.

Business elite- This is also an elite, but not always claiming power. Although in this area there is economic power that forces people to act in a certain direction without resorting to the open use of political resources. This is the attractiveness of the economic elite, one of the motives for its activities.

And finally intellectual elite. Perhaps at this stage it will be better if we separate the concepts of the intellectual elite and the cultural elite. In the sphere of their activity - politics, economics, culture - here there are groups of a subjective nature that, under the proposed conditions, with the participation of the masses in the transformation of society, construct this society in a certain way and ensure the balance of social relations and their reproduction. We can give the following definition of the intellectual elite: this is that part of society that produces rationality in all other areas of activity.

Intellectual elite groups:

First group– intellectuals who comprehend and explain social, political, economic problems, events and processes occurring in society. This group includes scientists, journalists, politicians and other professionals.

Second group consists of scientists who, with their research and development, contribute to the scientific and technological progress of the country, maintaining the world prestige of Russia, especially in the field of innovative technologies. They make a real contribution to the development of industry and the country's economy.

IN third group includes professionals with a high level of competence, experience and practical thinking, the ability to make decisions in conditions of uncertainty and rapid change. These are engineers, managers of various levels and profiles, civil, military scale, enterprise, city, province, etc. And the success of various kinds of initiatives in local spheres and in certain areas of the social and economic life of our country depends on their intellectual level.

TO fourth group I include figures in the education system, teachers who themselves constitute the intellectual potential of the country and cultivate the intellectual potential of the next generation. Through their activities, they not only convey relevant knowledge, but also look for ways of thinking that meet modern requirements.

Reasons for the decline in Russia's intellectual potential: financial insecurity of science and, as a consequence, migration of scientists; suboptimal combination of teaching and scientific activities by scientists; archaic or ineffective organization of science across multiple positions and areas; lack of a strategic approach to the priority of scientific and technical problems and directions. And finally, the most important reason is the decline in the prestige of intellectuals. There are also internal personal and psychological reasons: dissatisfaction with one’s professional social position, insecurity, etc.

The population consists of two layers: the lower layer, not involved in the elite; the upper layer is the elite, divided into ruling and non-ruling. The basis of social division is the irreducible uneven distribution of wealth. The struggle for the redistribution of wealth and power, even when the masses participate in it, only leads to the replacement of one ruling minority by another.

The elite of society is a social stratum that has such a position in society and such qualities that allow it to manage society, or have a significant impact on the process of managing it, influence (positively or negatively) value orientations and behavioral stereotypes in society and, ultimately , more actively, more effectively than all other layers of society, participate in shaping the development trends of society, while at the same time possessing much greater sovereignty in shaping their own position than other groups.

We focus on the political elite.

Firstly, this includes the ruling elite, performing government functions in legislative and executive bodies at various levels.

Secondly, the political elite includes leaders of political parties and movements, public organizations that are not directly involved in the performance of government duties, but have a significant impact on political decision-making.

Thirdly, the political elite undoubtedly includes the heads of the media that are significant in society, major entrepreneurs and bankers, and famous scientists in the field of social sciences.

Fourthly, it is not easy to determine the boundaries of the elite as a whole and its individual groups. The same individuals can be classified simultaneously as different elites, for example, businessmen involved in economic and government activities, or only economic ones, but influencing the political decisions of the top government leadership.

The following main functional groups can be distinguished in the ruling elite: government, parliament, regional business elite.

The elite is a complex formation; individual groups of the elite (elites) may be in more or less acute and even antagonistic conflicts. The main sources of such conflicts are: competition for status, for access to power, contradictions and conflicts of non-elite social groups, whose interests are represented by one or another group of the elite (this or that elite).

There are two types of intra-elite connections: dominance (dominance) and coordination (coordination), which can operate simultaneously.

Stages of development of the political elite in Russia

1917 -early 20s. The coming to power of professional revolutionaries - the Leninist Guard and the replacement of the institutions of state power with party authorities, i.e. establishment of monopoly power of the Communist Party.

Early 20s-late 30s. Transformation of the ruling elite into the ruling class of Soviet society. Development of the institution of “nomenklatura” - a hierarchy of positions, the appointment to which requires coordination with party authorities. Replacement of professional revolutionaries with party nomenklatura.

Early 40s-mid 80's. The preservation of the homogeneity of the political elite, its gradual (since the mid-60s) degeneration, the aging of the nomenklatura, the slowdown in the rotation of the elite, which accompanied the “stagnation” of the economy by the beginning of the 80s.

The beginning of perestroika-1990 Renewal of the union political elite by replacing the nomenklatura appointment with a legitimate election procedure. Increasing the role of the republics of the USSR in the political process, in other words, the decline in the role of the center and the rise of the outskirts. The departure of the Communist Party to the periphery of political life.

1990-present

Thus, the modern political elite of Russia began to form in the early 90s. There are 2 stages in the formation of the post-Soviet elite: “Yeltsin” and “Putin”

Let's consider the “Yeltsin” stage.

The beginning was made on May 29, 1990, when B. Yeltsin was elected Chairman of the Supreme Council of the RSFSR, who also took on the functions of the head of state.

Features of the evolution of the political elite of the “Putin” period

Putin became the winner of the competition of applicants during Operation “Successor” for two reasons: undoubted loyalty to the President of the Russian Federation (as evidenced by Putin’s position as head of the FSB) and determination in defending his former patron A. Sobchak, accused of corruption. These qualities were critically important in Yeltsin’s perception, since ensuring security and integrity (personal and immediate environment) after resignation due to the imperfection of the property of the bygone era was the decisive criterion for choice.

With the assumption of office by a new energetic president, despite the expectations of broad sections of the population, there were no quick and dramatic changes in the highest ruling elites.

During the initial period of Vladimir Putin's first reign, the top political elite seemed to remain the same. But in the political depths, a struggle gradually began between the Yeltsin elite and the new one, which entered sociological and journalistic usage as the “St. Petersburg” elite.

The president's desire to deprivatize state power was inevitably associated with a reduction in the power of those whose powers under Yeltsin had expanded at the expense of the powers of the federal political elite. These are economic and regional elites. A significant reduction in the influence of these two categories of elites has become Putin’s strategic line in the field of domestic policy. If the regional elites accepted the new rules of the game almost without a fight, then the desire to subjugate big business, as one would expect, was accompanied by an intense struggle. The vicissitudes of relations between business and government (reflected, in particular, in the confrontation between the “siloviki” and the “liberals”) not only became the main intrigue of “Putin’s” presidency, but appeared as a new stage in the development of the central collision of post-Soviet politics - the confrontation between the bureaucracy and the oligarchy.

The history of relations between the state and big business under Putin includes two stages.

Under Putin, the military and civilian bureaucracy became the main source of recruitment for the elite.

There was a massive influx into the federal political elite of Putin’s colleagues from work in the KGB and the St. Petersburg mayor’s office. It was these circumstances that determined the most noticeable trend in the renewal of the political elite under Putin - the increase in the number of former and current employees of the military and special departments.

The main distinguishing features of the Putin elite were a decrease in the proportion of “intellectuals” with an academic degree (under B. Yeltsin - 52.5%, under V. Putin - 20.9%), a decrease in the already extremely low representation of women in the elite (from 2 .9% to 1.7%), “provincialization” of the elite and a sharp increase in the number of military personnel, who began to be called “siloviki.”

Thus, the most significant social categories of the elite under Putin became the military and entrepreneurs. And if during the first term the key posts of the head of the Administration of the President of the Russian Federation and the head of the Government of the Russian Federation were occupied by Yeltsin’s personnel, then the team of Putin’s second term consists almost entirely of his nominees.

The “Putin” stage is characterized by the elimination of the reasons that led to the destruction of the management vertical under Boris Yeltsin. The new president returned a significant amount of power over the regions to the federal center, expanded the center's local support base, and outlined ways to restore territorial governance mechanisms without formally violating democratic principles. A controlled, orderly system of executive power was created. If under B. Yeltsin power was dispersed, moving from the center to the regions, then under V. Putin power again began to return to the center, centrifugal tendencies gave way to centripetal ones.

Hence, Dmitry Medvedev’s rise to power took place in a “palace” situation, in the complete absence of elite competition. And the new president has to deal with representatives of the political and economic elite, who focus not on the new head of state, but on the powerful prime minister and manage a state apparatus dominated by people loyal to Putin, including Medvedev himself.

In this vein, Medvedev’s project to form a personnel reserve is especially interesting - a list of 1,000 people who will be taken into account in the future when distributing posts at the top of the state apparatus. Obviously, this step pursues not only the official goal of updating and rejuvenating the country's ruling elite. Much more important is that with the help of this list, Medvedev will be able to promote people who will owe their rise to him personally.

It is also obvious that V. Putin, by refusing a third term, destroyed the consensus of the elites and created the preconditions for a “civil war of the elites.”

Thus, during the six years of perestroika, the structure of power in the USSR underwent significant changes.

Features of the modern Russian elite

One of the important features of the ruling elite is its social composition and its dynamics.

A significant difference between the elite of Putin’s call is the rejuvenation of the ruling stratum, and the average age of the top leadership is higher than the representatives of the regional elite.

One of the characteristic manifestations of such connections among the modern political elite is clanism and fraternity.

Let us dwell on some of the features of clanism inherent in the Russian political elite.

Clanism gives rise to localism, i.e. the desire to observe only one’s narrow local interests (to the detriment of the common cause). The other side of clanism is the lack of purposeful state activities of power structures, the impossibility of implementing promising programs, because When officials leave, so does their team. The government, as a set of independent players, is not capable of generating a predictable economic policy - it needs to be updated. Of particular interest is the entrepreneurial layer, which is not only beginning to enter the Russian political elite, but also influencing the behavior of the elite and the alignment of political leaders.

Many members of the elite are directly linked to questionable or illegal activities. According to the director of the FBI, in today's Russia, criminal activity is especially noticeable in the field of financial speculation, manipulation of the banking system, and illegal fraudulent transactions with state property.

many representatives of the ruling political elite, responsible for making economic and political decisions, are directly involved in illegal business.

The ideological fragmentation of our political elite, the inability, and perhaps the absence of a single desire for consolidation, is one of its main features.

However, despite the indicated “divorce” of the various current factions of the former nomenklatura, they still remain connected, not only by common origin, personal relationships, but also institutionally.

Introduction. 3

The emergence of the concept and theory of political elites. 4

The main directions of modern elite theory. 6

Typology of elites. 14

Functions of the political elite. 16

Political elite in Russia. Types of political elite. 16

Features of the political elite in Russia. 18

The structure of the political elite in Russia. 20

Conclusion. 22

Bibliography. 24

Introduction.

Politics, which is one of the spheres of society, is carried out by people who have power resources or political capital. These people are called the political class, for whom politics becomes a profession. The political class is the ruling class, since it is engaged in governance and manages the resources of power. Its main difference is its institutionalization, which consists in the system of government positions occupied by its representatives. The formation of a political class is carried out in two ways: appointment to public office (such representatives of the political class are called bureaucracy) and through elections to certain government structures.

The political class forms the elite and at the same time is the source of its replenishment. The elite not only rules society, but also controls the political class, and also creates such forms of state organization in which its positions are exclusive. The elite is a full-fledged social group with a complex structure. The political elite is a relatively small layer of people occupying leadership positions in government bodies, political parties, public organizations, etc. and influencing the development and implementation of policies in the country. This is an organized minority, a controlling group that has real political power, the ability to influence all functions and political actions of society without exception.

The emergence of the concept and theory of elites.

The political elite is a relatively small social group that concentrates in its hands a significant amount of political power, ensures integration, subordination and reflection of the interests of various sectors of society in political attitudes and creates a mechanism for the implementation of political plans. In other words, the elite is the highest part of a social group, class, political social organization.

The word "elite" translated from French means "best", "selected", "chosen". In everyday language it has two meanings. The first of them reflects the possession of some intense, clearly and maximally expressed features, the highest on a particular scale of measurements. In this meaning, the term “elite” is used in such phrases as “elite grain”, “elite horses”, “sports elite”, “elite troops”. In the second meaning, the word “elite” refers to the best, most valuable group for society, standing above the masses and called upon, due to the possession of special qualities, to control them. This understanding of the word reflected the reality of a slave-owning and feudal society, the elite of which was the aristocracy. (The term “aristos” means “the best”; aristocracy means “the power of the best.”) In political science, the term “elite” is used only in the first, ethically neutral meaning. Defined in the most general form, this concept characterizes the bearers of the most pronounced political and managerial qualities and functions. The theory of elites seeks to eliminate leveling, averaging in assessing the influence of people on power, reflects the unevenness of its distribution in society, competitiveness and rivalry in the field of political life, its hierarchy and dynamism. The scientific use of the category “political elite” is based on well-defined general ideas about the place and role of politics and its direct bearers in society. The theory of the political elite proceeds from the equality and equivalence or even priority of politics in relation to the economy and social structure of society. Therefore, this concept is incompatible with the ideas of economic and social determinism, represented, in particular, by Marxism, which treats politics merely as a superstructure over the economic base, as a concentrated expression of the economy and class interests. Because of this, and also due to the reluctance of the ruling nomenklatura elite to be the object of scientific research, the concept of the political elite in Soviet social science was viewed as pseudoscientific and bourgeois-tendentious and was not used in a positive sense.

Initially, in political science, the French term “elite” became widespread at the beginning of the 20th century. thanks to the works of Sorel and Pareto, although the ideas of political elitism arose outside of France in ancient times. Even during the time of the disintegration of the tribal system, views appeared that divided society into higher and lower, noble and rabble, aristocracy and common people. These ideas received the most consistent justification and expression from Confucius, Plato, Machiavelli, Carly, and Nietzsche. However, this kind of elitist theories have not yet received any serious sociological justification. The first modern, classical concepts of elites arose at the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th centuries. They are associated with the names of Gaetano Moschi, Vilfredo Pareto and Robert Michels.

The characteristic features of the political elite are the following:

this is a small, fairly independent social group;

high social status;

a significant amount of state and information power;

direct participation in the exercise of power;

organizational skills and talent.

The political elite is the reality of the current stage of development of society and is determined by the action of the following main factors:

Psychological and social inequality of people, their unequal abilities, opportunities and desires to participate in politics.

The law of division of labor requires professional management.

The high importance of managerial work and its corresponding stimulation.

Wide possibilities for using management activities to obtain various kinds of social privileges.

The practical impossibility of exercising comprehensive control over political leaders.

Political passivity of the broad masses of the population.

The main directions of modern elite theory.

Machiavellian school.

The concepts of the elites of Mosca, Pareto and Michels gave impetus to broad theoretical and subsequently (mainly after the Second World War) empirical studies of groups that lead the state or pretend to do so. Modern theories of elites are varied. Historically, the first group of theories that have not lost modern significance are the concepts of the Machiavellian school. They are united by the following ideas:

1. Special qualities of the elite, associated with natural talents and upbringing and manifested in its ability to govern or at least to fight for power.

2. Group cohesion of the elite. This is the cohesion of a group, united not only by a common professional status, social status and interests, but also by an elite self-awareness, the perception of itself as a special layer called upon to lead society.

3. Recognition of the elitism of any society, its inevitable division into a privileged ruling creative minority and a passive, uncreative majority. This division naturally follows from the natural nature of man and society. Although the personal composition of the elite changes, its dominant relationship to the masses is fundamentally unchanged. So, for example, in the course of history, tribal leaders, monarchs, boyars and nobles, people's commissars and party secretaries, ministers and presidents were replaced, but the relations of dominance and subordination between them and the common people always remained.

4. Formation and change of elites during the struggle for power. Many people with high psychological and social qualities strive to occupy a dominant privileged position. However, no one wants to voluntarily give up their posts and positions to them. Therefore, a hidden or overt struggle for a place in the sun is inevitable.

5. In general, the constructive, leading and dominant role of the elite in society. It performs the management function necessary for a social system, although not always effectively. In an effort to preserve and pass on their privileged position, the elite tends to degenerate and lose its outstanding qualities.

Machiavellian theories of elites are criticized for exaggerating the importance of psychological factors, anti-democracy and underestimation of the abilities and activity of the masses, insufficient consideration of the evolution of society and the modern realities of welfare states, and a cynical attitude towards the struggle for power. Such criticism is largely not without foundation.

Value theories.

The value theories of the elite are trying to overcome the weaknesses of the Machiavellians. They, like Machiavellian concepts, consider the elite to be the main constructive force of society, however, they soften their position in relation to democracy and strive to adapt the elite theory to the real life of modern states. The diverse value concepts of the elites differ significantly in the degree of protection of aristocracy, attitude towards the masses, democracy, etc. However, they also have a number of the following common settings:

1. Belonging to the elite is determined by the possession of high abilities and performance in the most important areas of activity for the entire society. The elite is the most valuable element of the social system, focused on satisfying its most important needs. In the course of development, many old needs, functions and value orientations die out in society and new needs, functions and value orientations arise. This leads to the gradual displacement of the bearers of the most important qualities for their time by new people who meet modern requirements.

2. The elite is relatively united on the basis of the healthy leadership functions it performs. This is not an association of people seeking to realize their selfish group interests, but cooperation of individuals who care, first of all, about the common good.

3. The relationship between the elite and the masses is not so much in the nature of political or social domination, but rather of leadership, implying managerial influence based on the consent and voluntary obedience of the governed and the authority of those in power. The leading role of the elite is likened to the leadership of the elders, who are more knowledgeable and competent in relation to the younger ones, who are less knowledgeable and experienced. It meets the interests of all citizens.

4. The formation of an elite is not so much the result of a fierce struggle for power, but rather a consequence of the natural selection by society of the most valuable representatives. Therefore, society should strive to improve the mechanisms of such selection, to search for a rational, most effective elite in all social strata.

5. Elitism is a condition for the effective functioning of any society. It is based on the natural division of managerial and executive labor, naturally follows from equality of opportunity and does not contradict democracy. Social equality should be understood as equality of life chances, and not equality of results and social status. Since people are not equal physically, intellectually, in their vital energy and activity, it is important for a democratic state to provide them with approximately the same starting conditions. They will reach the finish line at different times and with different results. Social “champions” and underdogs will inevitably emerge.

The elite of society in any period of the history of human civilization has played and is playing a primary role in the formation and functioning of the institutions of a particular human society.

Roughly speaking, the state elite, as the dominant social stratum (class) of society, is called upon to have a direct impact on the essence, character, capabilities and guidelines of society as a whole.

Where does the “elite of society” in the classical sense begin?

First of all, this is a certain group located at the top of the conventional pyramid of social classes and strata.

Secondly, the elite must have clearly defined and defined guidelines. A specific and general Idea, Goal, Task - this is what unites the elite, makes it the very “elite of society”, which receives a universal and complex tool in the form of that very society for solving and achieving specific tasks and goals (I would like to immediately note that the ideology of fascism , which has a similar model of building public institutions with the formation of a social elite, is not meant here).

The elite of society is a designer, a foreman, a supplier, and a foreman at a construction site. What ultimately comes out - the Tower of Babel or the Taj Mahal - depends on her competent actions during construction.

The elite should not make vital social processes chaotic. The elite is a shepherd, the elite is a guiding star, the elite is a bearer of spiritual, moral potential. And it should not dissipate its original essence.

In reality, there must be obvious and hidden mechanisms for the formation of such an elite. What is the elite of the modern Russian Federation like?

Firstly, like any other elite, it is divided into two main groups: the power (political) elite, which exercises direct control over state institutions, as well as over political and social processes; the secular elite, which is a potential bearer of spiritual and moral guidelines, setting the main directions of spiritual development for the rest of society. What is the character and essence of each of these elites?

The political elite is a special social group, just like any other professional group, which has its own corporate interests and its own corporate consciousness. However, there are no special reasons to consider it a separate class. The political elite is formed from representatives of not all social strata and classes, but only those of them that can be classified as the highest politicized stratum of society.

In the modern Russian Federation, such a layer of society is a gigantic bureaucratic apparatus with a well-functioning bureaucratic machine. A modern official is one of the most permanent, “reliable” and sought-after “recruits” in the system of formation of the power elite. In addition to “His Majesty the official,” the modern large industrial and raw materials bourgeoisie, large owners of natural monopolies, and a small part of the secular intelligentsia take part in the formation of the power elite. But the determining role is still played by bureaucratic officials. There is nothing surprising in this fact. Rather, this is a familiar picture of the structure of any state.

What are the priorities of the power elite of the Russian Federation in concrete actions in practice?

Of course, these are the modern world generally accepted economic “market values”. Russia has long been integrated into the circulatory dollar system of the world economy and has taken a not particularly honorable place there. Based on this fact, the real actions of the Russian power elite are built.

In simplified terms, the main problems that the power elite seeks to solve are maintaining power in the state by any means and harmonious coexistence in the economic sphere with the world system. The remaining issues are of secondary importance. Thus, it becomes obvious that such an elite lacks clear moral guidelines in the formation of society, the absence of a clear Goal and Idea at the state-national level (this is despite the prevailing rhetoric of “patriots” in the last few years, which is designed to create the illusion of the emergence of such Goals and Ideas), which was mentioned above, in the construction of institutions of such a society, vagueness of criteria and assessments of their activities, lack of awareness of their pastoral mission. That is, the rest of the social processes that do not relate to the two above-mentioned problems are, by and large, left to chance. Those problems that arise from such gravity are solved by the power elite not as the reason for their appearance, but as a consequence. And he solves it using a predominantly wide range of violent actions. Therefore, the structure of state institutions is built on the same principle. This is how we can briefly characterize the power elite of the modern Russian Federation.

The main problems of such a society are the absence of the role of society in direct control over the formation of the power elite, the absence of a conventional institution of “orderlies” who will be able to separate and isolate the “black sheep” and, finally, the absence of real common goals and objectives of the power elite with society. Unfortunately, the created and artificially cultivated consumer society has nothing to do with the national interests of Russia and its future generations.

The secular elite of the modern Russian Federation is also imbued with the spirit of corporatism and opportunism. She is absolutely divorced, “stewing” in her own juice, from the real life of society. However, in general, she is inclined to talk about her “invaluable influence” on various processes occurring in society, pathetically place herself at the forefront of control over such processes, and flaunt her “missionary” pseudo-idea.

The secular elite, consisting of the creative intelligentsia and public figures, is, at first glance, a very politically amorphous environment. In fact, the power elite actually imposes such amorphousness on the secular elite. This is all done for the same precise control over the two above-mentioned problems. After all, if the secular elite takes steps aimed at actively participating in the internal political life of the country, it will certainly attract serious attention and cause all the main social strata of society to awaken from hibernation. And this already calls into question the retention of power by the modern power elite and peaceful coexistence with the global economic system. So it is obvious that the power elite tried to forever deprive the secular elite of its original essence, the essence of the “salt of the Russian soil,” an intercessor for the common people (this is what it really was in the 19th and 20th centuries).

Otherwise, the secular elite, which does not get involved in solving internal political and economic problems, is given a wide range of freedoms, a whole system of pretentious and lulling incentives, honors, attention, etc. The secular elite, like a river that suddenly changed its usual course, created a whole distorted world of abstract reality, “universal human values of a civilized community,” slutty glamor, reeking of expensive champagne and show business cocaine. All this is presented to the rest of society as a real revelation of new theologians, the ultimate truth.

Thus, in the modern Russian Federation, the root cause of all problems and social disorders is the absence of a real national state-forming elite of society. No, of course, today’s elite is also a completely real elite - it manages, manages, and solves problems that are important to it. But this elite has nothing to do with the real interests of Russia, its future generations. But this is the first indicator of the quality and capacity of the elite of society during critical episodes of human history. It’s just that such truly critical moments have not yet arisen before the modern elite of the Russian Federation. I am sure that as soon as such problems appear, such an elite will not be able to solve them.

Ideally, such problems in the future, as I think, should be solved by a group of desperate brave “extremists”, “intellectual scumbags” led by a Teacher or Leader, through the accompanying events of a dramatically changing reality and the very crisis situation that will be proclaimed in words and words. matter: “I tell you the truth: it must be so!”

One thing must be remembered - the elite, in its original essence, represents the skeleton of any society. Therefore, it should be formed neither according to clan, nor according to matchmaker-friendly, nor according to any other principles, except the principle of usefulness and devotion to a common Idea, a common Goal, for the sake of which it will not be a pity to sacrifice one’s own life.

6.1. About the concepts of ruling and political elite

Politics, which is one of the spheres of society, is carried out by people who have power resources or political capital. These people are called political class, for whom politics becomes a profession. The political class is the ruling class, since it is engaged in governance and manages the resources of power. It is heterogeneous due to differences in the possession of power, the nature of activities, methods of recruitment, etc. Its main difference lies in institutionalization, which consists in the system of government positions occupied by its representatives. The formation of a political class is carried out in two ways: appointment to public office (such representatives of the political class are called bureaucracy) and through elections to certain government structures.

In addition to the political class, politics can be influenced by individuals and groups with either official powers or informal opportunities. T.I. Zaslavskaya calls such a set of individuals and groups ruling elite, to which she includes politicians holding senior government positions, the top echelon of the bureaucracy and the business elite. Since the most significant resource of the ruling elite is political capital, or power that gives the legitimate right to manage the property and finances of the state, there is a direct or latent connection between all groups of the ruling elite and state structures.

O. Kryshtanovskaya gives this definition elite: “this is the ruling group of society, which is the upper stratum of the political class. The elite stands at the top of the state pyramid, controlling the main, strategic resources of power, making decisions at the national level. The elite not only rules society, but also controls the political class, and also creates such forms of state organization in which its positions are exclusive. The political class forms the elite and at the same time is a source of its replenishment.” From her point of view, any elite is ruling, i.e. if the elite does not rule, then it is not the elite. The remaining members of the political class - professional managers who do not belong to the ruling elite - constitute the political-administrative elite, whose role is reduced to preparing general political decisions and organizing their implementation in those structures of the state apparatus that they directly supervise.

The elite is a full-fledged social group with a complex structure. Various parts of a single ruling elite are called sub-elites, which can be sectoral (political, economic), functional (administrators, ideologists, security officials), hierarchical (subelite layers), recruitment (appointees, elected officials). According to O. Kryshtanovskaya, “the elite cannot but be political.” At the same time, it is possible to use this term to designate a sub-elite group whose functions include direct management of the political process.

In this context we can characterize political elite as a relatively small layer of people occupying leadership positions in government bodies, political parties, public organizations and influencing the development and implementation of policy in the country.

The political elite includes high-ranking professional politicians endowed with power functions and powers, senior government officials involved in the development and implementation of political programs and social development strategies. It can be divided into groups corresponding to the branches of government - legislative, executive, judicial, and also by its location - federal and regional.

The authority of the elite is the most important condition for its staying in power and maintaining power; the ruling elite must be legitimate. When a political or state community ceases to sanction the power of a given political elite, it loses the social basis of its existence and ultimately loses power.

Political elites can come to power as a result of elections, winning the political struggle against other organized minorities that aspire to the role of a political controlling group. In this case, the interaction between the elite and the masses is legal and legitimate. However, the political elite can come to power through revolutionary means or through a coup d'etat. In such a situation, the new political elite seeks to gain the necessary legitimacy through informal recognition from the unorganized majority. In any case, the relationship between the elite and the masses is based on the principles of leadership and authoritative guidance, and not on blind submission. The legitimation of the political power of the elite distinguishes it from an oligarchy.

In countries with the legitimate existence of power, the content and boundaries of the functions performed by the political elite are determined by the constitution of the country. However, in real life there are frequent cases of discrepancies between constitutions and real power. This is possible in the event of a sharp change in the political situation, when the changes are not yet reflected in the constitution, as well as in the event of a deviation from the norms of the constitution. For example, the Constitution of the USSR declared that power at all levels belonged to the Soviets, but the real political picture did not confirm this.

6.2. Characteristics and functions of the ruling Russian elite

The elite is not uniform. Within the ruling elite there is a small, close-knit group standing at the very top of the power pyramid. T. Zaslavskaya calls it the “upper (sub-elite) layer”, O. Kryshtanovskaya - “top-elite”, L. Shevtsova - “super-elite”. This group consists, as a rule, of 20-30 people and is the most closed, united and difficult to access for research.

To the most important characteristics of the elite researchers include cohesion, awareness of one's group interests, a developed network of informal communications, the presence of esoteric norms of behavior and coded language, hidden from outside observers and transparent to initiates, and the absence of a clear line separating official activities and private life.

Russia, as well as other post-communist states, is characterized by common features that define the peculiarities of the ruling elite: strengthening the role of the executive branch, increasing the importance of informal connections and procedures, accelerating the circulation of elites, intensifying intra-elite rivalry and increasing mobility.

Under elite mobility understand entry into the elite, movement of personnel within the political system and exit from the elite. Thus, mobility can be divided into upward, horizontal and downward. Elite mobility in Russia has significant differences from the mobility of other social groups, which, according to O. Kryshtanovskaya, is associated with a number of factors:

1. Higher competition between candidates for positions than other groups, which occurs at all levels of the political hierarchy.

2. Uncertainty of requirements for candidates who must satisfy conditions that are not disclosed anywhere.

3. Elite mobility is subject to much more regulation and planning than other professional mobility, since there is an institutionalized personnel reserve to fill vacant positions.

4. The mobility of the elite is regulated not so much by labor legislation as by intra-group norms.

5.Unlike all other professions, joining the elite is the endowment of an individual with primary political capital, which he can develop or leave unchanged.

Some researchers have noted changes in the type of organization of the power elite. Thus, O.V. Gaman-Golutvina distinguishes two types: bureaucratic and feudal (oligarchic). Bureaucratic is based on the separation of the functions of economic and political management, oligarchic is based on their fusion. Historically, the basis of the Russian state was the universality of responsibilities to the state, which presupposed the service principle of recruiting elites, which ensured the priority of the political elite over the economic one. As a result of the reforms carried out, the service principle began to be replaced by the oligarchic principle. As a result, the model of elite education characteristic of the feudal, rather than the modern West, was reproduced. One of the most characteristic features of the modern ruling elite of Russia is the shadow merging of state power with business. This process covered all levels of government. Place and connections in the political system became the main factor in the increase of property, and property became a powerful source of political influence.

The content of political functions is greatly influenced by the political regime. T.I. Zaslavskaya considers the development, legitimization and implementation of a general strategy for reforming society to be the main functions of the elite in the transformation process. A.V.Malko inhighlights the following most significant functions of the political elite:

strategic - defining a political program of action by generating new ideas that reflect the interests of society, developing a concept for reforming the country;

organizational- implementation of the developed course in practice, implementation of political decisions;

integrative - strengthening the stability and unity of society, the sustainability of its political and economic systems, preventing and resolving conflict situations, ensuring consensus on the fundamental principles of the life of the state.

To these functions we should also add the communicative function - the effective representation, expression and reflection in political programs of the interests and needs of various social strata and groups of the population, which also involves the protection of social goals, ideals and values characteristic of society.

In order to effectively implement these functions, the elite must be characterized by such qualities as a modern mentality, a state type of thinking, a readiness to protect national interests, etc.

6.3. Formation of the federal elite

In the political history of Russia XX - early XXI centuries The ruling elite has repeatedly undergone significant transformations. The first significant “revolutionary political transformation,” as S.A. Granovsky put it, occurred in October 1917, when a party of professional revolutionaries came to power. The Bolsheviks monopolized power and established the dictatorship of the proletariat. After the death of V.I. Lenin, a struggle broke out in the ruling elite for the possession of Lenin’s legacy, the winner of which was J.V. Stalin. Even under Lenin, a special ruling class was created - nomenclature(list of leadership positions, the appointment of which was approved by party bodies). However, it was Stalin who perfected the process of reproduction of the Soviet elite. The nomenclature was built on a strictly hierarchical principle with a high degree of integration based on a common ideology, with a low level of competition and a low degree of conflict between intra-elite groups. In the mid-1980s. processes of structural disintegration intensified in the ruling elite, which led to an intra-elite conflict of values and personnel associated with changes in the political course. By the end of the 1980s. The process of rapid formation of a counter-elite begins, which includes leaders and activists of various democratic movements, representatives of the creative and scientific intelligentsia. At the same time, there is a change in the mechanism for recruiting the elite. Instead of the nomenklatura principle, the democratic principle of election is affirmed.

The German scientist E. Schneider, who studies the political system of modern Russia, believes that the new Russian political elite was formed in the depths of the old Soviet system as a type of counter-elite in various groups at the federal level. The beginning was made on May 29, 1990, when Boris Yeltsin was elected Chairman of the Supreme Council of the RSFSR, who also took on the functions of head of state. The second step followed after the election of B. Yeltsin as President of Russia on June 12, 1991. B. Yeltsin created his own administration, numbering 1.5 thousand people, and approaching in size the apparatus of the former Central Committee of the CPSU. The third step towards the formation of a central Russian political elite was the elections of deputies of the State Duma and the Federation Council on December 12, 1993. The parliamentary elections of 1995 and the presidential elections of 1996 led to the fourth stage. That is, E. Schneider connects the process of formation of a new Russian political elite with the election a process that has become characteristic of post-Soviet Russia.

An important factor that had far-reaching consequences for the ruling elite was the ban on the CPSU in 1991, which caused the liquidation of the traditional institutions of Soviet power, the liquidation of the institution of the nomenklatura, and the transfer of powers from the Union authorities to the Russian ones.

Researchers distinguish two stages in the formation of the post-Soviet elite: “Yeltsin” and “Putin”. Thus, O. Kryshtanovskaya, the author of the book “Anatomy of the Russian Elite,” notes that during the nine years of his rule (1991-1999), Boris Yeltsin was never able to integrate the supreme power. At the same time, no single state structure became dominant. In conditions of a power vacuum, informal groups and clans took over government functions, competing with each other for the right to speak on behalf of the president. According to the scientist, “during the Yeltsin period there was a collapse of the supreme power. The diffusion of power did not lead to a democratic separation of powers, but to managerial chaos.”

Researchers note that the modern ruling elite of Russia differs from the Soviet elite in many important qualities: genesis, recruitment models, socio-professional composition, internal organization, political mentality, the nature of relations with society, the level of reform potential.

The personal composition of the political elite is changing, but its official structure remains virtually unchanged. The political elite of Russia is represented by the President, Prime Minister, members of the government, deputies of the Federal Assembly, judges of the Constitutional, Supreme, and Supreme Arbitration Courts, the presidential administration, members of the Security Council, presidential plenipotentiaries in federal districts, heads of power structures in the constituent entities of the federation, the highest diplomatic and the military corps, some other government positions, the leadership of political parties and large public associations, and other influential persons.

Higher political elite includes leading political leaders and those who occupy high positions in the legislative, executive and judicial branches of government (immediate circle of the president, prime minister, speakers of parliament, heads of government bodies, leading political parties, factions in parliament) . Numerically, this is a fairly limited circle of people who make the most significant political decisions for the entire society, concerning the fate of millions of people who are significant for the entire state. Belonging to the highest elite is determined by reputation (advisers, consultants to the president) or position in the power structure. According to O. Kryshtanovskaya, the top leadership should include members of the Security Council, which in modern Russia is the prototype of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee.

The size of the ruling elite is not constant. Thus, the nomenclature of the CPSU Central Committee (in 1981) included approximately 400 thousand people. The highest nomenklatura (nomenklatura of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee) included approximately 900 people. The nomenclature of the secretariat of the Central Committee consisted of 14-16 thousand people. The accounting and control nomenclature (nomenclature of departments of the CPSU Central Committee) included 250 thousand people. The rest was made up of the nomenklatura of lower party committees. Thus, the political class during Soviet times constituted approximately 0.1% of the country's total population.

In 2000, the size of the political class (the number of civil servants) increased 3 times (while the country's population decreased by half) and began to amount to 1 million 200 thousand people. or 0.8% of the total population. The number of the ruling elite increased from 900 to 1060 people.

According to the same studies, the main suppliers to the ruling elite in 1991 were the intelligentsia (53.5%) and economic managers (about 13%). During the transition period of Yeltsin's rule (1991-1993), the role of workers, peasants, intelligentsia, economic managers, and employees of ministries and departments declined. The importance of others, on the contrary, increased: regional administrations, employees of security and law enforcement agencies and, especially, businessmen.

Gradually, parliamentary and government careers became two different paths to the top, which was not typical for the Soviet elite, for which a parliamentary mandate was a corresponding attribute of nomenklatura status. Now a new professional group has emerged within the elite - elected officials.

In the absence of state support, weak social groups - workers, peasants - were almost completely forced out of the political field, the share of women and youth, whose high percentage of participation in power had previously been artificially supported by the CPSU, fell sharply.

For parliamentarians, there remains a fairly high percentage of those who entered the elite back in Soviet times. In the State Duma of the first convocation (1993) there were 37.1% of them, in the third convocation (1999) - 32%; in the Federation Council in 1993 - 60.1%, in 2002 - 39.9%.

Researchers notice another feature: if in the early 1990s. the share of party and Komsomol functionaries fell, then their share among the deputies of both chambers increased to almost 40%. After 10 years of the post-Soviet period, involvement in the nomenklatura ceased to be a stain on a political career. A number of studies (S.A. Granovsky, E. Schneider) show that the foundation of the new Russian ruling elite is mainly made up of representatives of the second and third echelons of the old Soviet nomenklatura, transferring to the new political elite the special knowledge and experience that it needs.

The composition of the new political elite of Russia has undergone significant changes in educational, age and professional terms.

Thus, the government and elite in the regions have become almost ten years younger. At the same time, parliament has aged a little, which is explained by its artificial rejuvenation during the Brezhnev period. The end of age quotas freed the country's highest legislative power, both from Komsomol members and from young workers and collective farmers subject to quotas.

Boris Yeltsin brought young scientists, brilliantly educated city politicians, economists, and lawyers closer to him. The share of rural residents in his surroundings fell sharply. Despite the fact that the elite has always been one of the most educated groups of society, nevertheless, in the 1990s. there was a sharp jump in the educational qualifications of the elite. Thus, B. Yeltsin’s inner circle includes famous scientists and public figures. More than half of B.N. Yeltsin’s presidential team consisted of doctors of science. The percentage of those with academic degrees in government and among party leaders was also high.

The changes affected not only the level of education of the elite, but also the nature of education. The Brezhnev elite was technocratic. The overwhelming majority of party and state leaders in the 1980s. had an engineering, military or agricultural education. Under M. Gorbachev, the percentage of technocrats decreased, but not due to an increase in the number of humanities students, but due to an increase in the proportion of party workers who received a higher party education. And finally, a sharp decrease in the proportion of people who received a technical education (almost 1.5 times) occurred under Boris Yeltsin. Moreover, this is happening against the background of the same educational system in Russia, where the majority of universities still have a technical profile.

Under V. Putin, the proportion of people in uniform in the ruling elite increased significantly: every fourth representative of the elite became a military man (under B. Yeltsin, the share of military men in the elite was 11.2%, under V. Putin - 25.1%). This trend coincided with the expectations of society, since the reputation of the military as honest, responsible, politically unbiased professionals distinguished them favorably from other elite groups, whose image was associated with theft, corruption, and demagoguery. The massive recruitment of military personnel into public service was also caused by the lack of a personnel reserve. The main distinguishing features of the Putin elite were a decrease in the proportion of “intellectuals” with an academic degree (under B. Yeltsin - 52.5%, under V. Putin - 20.9%), a decrease in the already extremely low representation of women in the elite (from 2 .9% to 1.7%), “provincialization” of the elite and a sharp increase in the number of military personnel, who began to be called “siloviki” (representatives of the armed forces, the federal security service, border troops, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, etc.).

The latest wave of the ruling elite is also characterized by an increase in the share of fellow countrymen of the head of state (from 13.2% under B. Yeltsin to 21.3% under V. Putin) and an increase in the share of businessmen (from 1.6% under B. Yeltsin to 11.3 % under V. Putin).

6.4. Regional political elite

At the regional level, a new political elite was formed in different subjects at different times. This process was associated with the transition to an electoral system for the formation of a regional elite. The heads of the executive branch in Moscow and Leningrad, as well as the president of the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, were elected on June 12, 1991. After the failure of the putsch on August 21, 1991, by resolution of the Supreme Council of the RSFSR, the position of the head of administration was introduced in the territories, regions and districts as the head of the executive branch. The presidential decree of November 25, 1991 determined the procedure for appointing heads of administrations. By January 1992, a new government had been established in almost all territories, regions and autonomous okrugs. True, it was only partially new. Half of the heads of administration were appointed from among the former heads of executive or representative authorities, about a fifth consisted of lower-level employees of the Soviet apparatus, and only a third consisted of new appointees - directors of enterprises, employees of scientific institutions and other representatives of the non-political sphere.

In the autonomous republics, the head was the president, elected in popular elections, which contributed to the transformation of the Soviet model into a democratic one. By the end of 1994, most of the leaders of the autonomous republics were elected by popular vote.

In 1992-1993 There was a struggle between the President and the Supreme Council for influence on the formation of heads of regional administrations. This struggle ended after the dissolution of the representative body of power with the adoption of the presidential decree “On the procedure for the appointment and dismissal of heads of administrations of territories, regions, autonomous districts, cities of federal significance,” issued on October 7, 1993. The decree stated that heads of administrations are appointed and dismissed from positions of the President of the Russian Federation on the proposal of the Government of the Russian Federation.

However, electoral trends were gaining momentum. Therefore, in a number of regions, as an exception, back in 1992-1993. The supreme power allowed the holding of elections of heads of administration. This process continued to develop and ended with the adoption of a presidential decree on September 17, 1995, which determined the date for the election of heads of administrations of the constituent entities of the federation appointed by the president - December 1996. Thus, the transition to an elective system of heads of executive power of the constituent entities of the federation was carried out. The last appointment of the head of administration took place in July 1997 in the Kemerovo region.

The formation of the regional elite was continued by the elections of people's representatives, which, after the dissolution of councils at all levels at the end of 1993, became full-fledged legislative bodies of power.

The elections were one of the most significant achievements of democracy in Russia, leading to profound changes in the entire political system. The consequences of this transition were both positive and negative. On the one hand, a basis was created for the separation of powers, the formation of civil society, and the creation of equal subjects of the federation. On the other hand, the election of heads of subjects destabilized the political situation, allowing governors to become independent from the center. There was a danger of a new wave of “parade of sovereignties”, which could end in the collapse of the country. The federal government has virtually no leverage left over the regional elite.

In December 1995, the principle of forming the Federation Council changed. In accordance with the new provision, the upper house of the Russian parliament began to be formed by delegating two leaders of the subject of the federation - the heads of the executive and legislative branches. In the Federation Council, interregional associations began to be formed on territorial and economic principles, which threatened the center with the loss of political and financial control.

To prevent negative trends, the new President V.V. Putin initiated political reforms with the aim of strengthening the power vertical. In 2000, the procedure for forming the Federation Council changed: one representative each from the executive and legislative branches of the constituent entity of the federation began to be delegated to the upper house of parliament, but not top officials, as was previously the case. At the end of 2004, a federal law was adopted that changed the procedure for electing heads of federal subjects: they began to be elected by the corresponding legislative assemblies on the proposal of the president of the country. The last popular election of the head of the administration took place in March 2005 in the Nenets Autonomous Okrug.

As a result, the power of the federal center was restored, and the heads of the regions became completely dependent on the president. The danger of the country's collapse was overcome by abandoning the democratic procedure of popular elections.

An analysis of regional leaders indicates that the overwhelming number of governors entered the elite long before their appointment to the post of head of the region. Thus, according to the data provided in the study by O. Kryshtanovskaya, in 2002, the average number of years spent in the elite of regional leaders before their appointment (election) as head of the region was 15 years, and the average number of years spent as the head of a federal subject was 6 years.

The average age of a regional leader under L. Brezhnev was 59 years old, under M. Gorbachev - 52 years old, under B. Yeltsin - 49 years old, under V. Putin - 54 years old.

The weight of the Soviet nomenclature still remains very high. In 2002, 65.9% of the heads of the federal subjects were previously members of the Soviet nomenklatura (in 1992 - 78.2%, in 1997 - 72.7%).

As O. Kryshtanovskaya notes, “the paradox is that it was not elections, but appointments that brought new people to the top.”

Describing professional qualities regional political elite, many researchers note its redistributive (rental) relationship to economic activity. At the same time, it should be noted such a trend as the promotion of an influential layer of intellectual, political, cultural, professional, highly educated leaders who form the core of the regional political elite. As S.A. Granovsky notes, “the nomenklatura origins of the current government, which are not easy to get rid of, represent a brake on reforms, preventing the true democratization of society, the transformation of not only political, but also all other spheres of our life. Russia has not yet formed an elite that would correspond to the new statehood that has already manifested itself.”

An important characteristic of the elite is its mentality. Practical orientations and their actual implementation in the affairs of regional political and administrative elites are reflected both in their own worldview and in the assessments of the population. Characterizing the mental characteristics of regional administrative and political elites, it should be noted their federalist thinking, the main parameters of which are the preservation of the integrity of the Russian Federation, the problems of equality of all subjects, the priority of federal laws over republican ones.

One can state a significant weakening of centro-paternalistic hopes among the regional political elite. In the minds of the elites, hopes for the center's capabilities and their own strength in developing the economy and economic relations have almost leveled off. In many regions, the mood of “reliance on one’s own strength” already prevails. Thus, ethno-federalist, economic-federalist and political-federalist factors are combined into one complex and now act in one direction, contributing to the more rapid formation of a federalist paradigm of thinking.

On the other hand, many researchers emphasize its unprincipledness and “servility” as the most important characteristics of the political mentality of the ruling elite. Thus, O. Gaman-Golutvina notes that “admiration for power remains the dominant attitude of behavior of both the central and regional authorities, and the population.” This leads to unconditional devotion to the President, on the one hand, and a stable priority of clan interests over national ones, on the other.

6.5. Circulation and reproduction of the elite

Two waves of renewal of the upper strata can be distinguished. The first of them was associated with the invasion of reformers. The second marked the arrival of counter-reformers, whose actions should be considered as the normal completion of the reform cycle. In classical images it looks like this: “young lions” are replaced by “old foxes”.

Models circulation And reproduction elite groups should be supplemented with a third element - expansion of the elite composition. Increase in the elite ranks in the first half of the 1990s. happened more than twice. There has been a significant increase in the number of positions considered “elite.” This is caused by the growth in the number of new economic structures, the leaders of which can be classified as a new economic elite. But this is no less true and is due to the growth of political and administrative structures.

The acceleration of the circulation of Russian elites is an obvious fact. It began during the reign of M. Gorbachev due to the promotion to the top of numerous representatives of the so-called pre-nomenklatura groups from various public sectors (mostly we are talking about former middle managers - heads of departments, divisions, services).

In the 1990s. quickened pace elite traffic(movement of the elite - a term coined by O. Kryshtanovskaya) required a change in approaches to working with personnel. Under Boris Yeltsin, there were frequent resignations and reshuffles of high-ranking officials, whom he first brought closer to himself, then became disappointed and exchanged them for others. The rapidity of personnel changes led to the destruction of the personnel reserve that helped maintain continuity. There was a need to create some kind of reservations for high-ranking officials who had fallen out of power. As a result, structures such as “state business” were created - commercial organizations based on state resources and having multiple privileges compared to private business, as well as foundations, associations, socio-political organizations, the leadership of which was assumed by retirees. In recent years, parliamentary activity has acted as a kind of reservation, which provides the necessary honor to all former officials.

With the widespread use of alternative elections, the ruling elite no longer had complete control over the removal of undesirable individuals from the elite. Officials who lost their positions in the executive branch could be elected to the federal or regional parliament, go into big business and influence the political situation with the help of economic resources, or create a political party and actively participate in political life.

If in Soviet times resignation meant “political death,” then in post-Soviet times returns to power began to occur. Thus, among the government elite of 1992, the share of returns was 12.1%, for the government of 1999 - 8%.

Under V. Putin, the personnel situation begins to gradually change. The personnel reserve is being restored, the civil service is strengthening, and loyalty to the regime becomes a guarantee of status stability. Administrative reform, launched in 2004 and designed to reduce the number of bureaucrats, only restructured departments and significantly increased the salaries of civil servants. In the 2000s. It is not vertical, but horizontal mobility among the elite that is increasing. Thus, former governors become members of the Federation Council, former ministers become deputies, former officials of the presidential administration go into state business.

As studies show, according to most indicators, the nature of appointments and resignations under V. Putin has undergone minor changes: the age of entry and exit, the average number of years in office, the proportion of people of retirement age among retirees are approximately the same as under the previous president. But the main thing is that the atmosphere has changed: the growing self-confidence of the political elite, the basis of which is the high level of public trust in the president.

Changing the norms and rules of power interactions largely stems from the process elite reconversion(i.e. transfer of capital from one form to another). The decisive element of this process was the “capitalization” of elite groups. It manifested itself primarily in two phenomena. Firstly, part of the political elite converted their political influence into economic capital. Representatives of the political nomenklatura themselves entered the new business elite or protected close relatives in the economic sphere. Secondly, “capitalization” affected the political elite itself - through the expansion of corruption. Corruption has always existed, but it is in modern Russia that it has become more widespread and open than ever.

As a result, politics became associated with the most profitable business. On the one hand, large entrepreneurs seek the protection of the state and try to obtain property and privileges from the state. On the other hand, politicians are no longer satisfied with the usual attributes of power and fame. Their status positions must be supported by income into private bank accounts. As a result, large businessmen become politically influential persons, and politicians turn into very wealthy people.

The next process, which deserves special attention, is related to the mutual relations of various elite groups. Here two opposing trends usually collide - fragmentation and consolidation of elites. The fragmentation hypothesis states that there is a process of pluralization of elites and the emergence of numerous pressure groups and interests.

Confrontation between the legislative branch, presidential structures and the government, federal and regional government bodies, party groups of the left and right, political, military and economic elites, industry lobbies representing various economic complexes - all this contributes to the situation of power pluralism. Such a situation can be seen as a manifestation of the democratization of society, but more often it is seen as evidence of a power vacuum and a lack of effective management.

The struggle for power between the “old” and “new” elite also leads to fragmentation. The goal of the first is to retain power, the second is to seize key positions in the state and oust their opponents from their posts.

Opposite assessments are expressed within the framework of the hypothesis of elite consolidation. It is argued here that the dividing lines between various elite groups are increasingly blurred, and power is concentrated in the hands of a limited number of subjects. Legislatures have no special power; federal bodies retained enough administrative and financial influence over the regions to determine policy at the regional level; the military elite is still loyal and subordinate to political forces; "left" and "right" party groupsdrifting towards the political “center”.

The confrontation between the political and economic elites should also not be exaggerated. On the contrary, the stage of transformation of the Russian elite is characterized by the integration of the political and economic elite. The reason for this rapprochement is mutual benefit: the economic elite is interested in the appropriate distribution of budget funds and federal investments, certain personnel policies, making political decisions beneficial to themselves, and the political elite wants to benefit from the transformation of the economy.

Thus, despite visible confrontations, consolidation of elite groups occurs.

6.6. Political corporatism

In the Western political elitethe priority is social origin, which determines the starting opportunities, conditions and guidelines for primary and secondary socialization, in contrast to Russian, where the place of this factor is taken by the previous connection with the nomenklatura elite and commitment to the leader - the manager. In other words, corporate origin.

American political scientist F. Schmitter considers corporatism“as one of the possible mechanisms that allow associations of interests to mediate between their members (individuals, families, firms, local communities, groups) and various counterparties (primarily state and government bodies).” Corporatism fits organically into the democratic legal order, as evidenced by the spread of this phenomenon in countries with developed democratic institutions, and with significant relapses in countries of unconsolidated democracy. It manifests itself especially negatively in the political sphere.

Political corporatism means the dominance in the political system of a set of persons united to achieve, implement and retain state power. The interaction of political corporations allows them to divide the market of power, not allowing representatives of the wider population to enter it. There is a mechanism of “linking” and coordination of interests between corporations. Corporations can be built according to social class, professional, family and other characteristics, but they are always based on unity of interests. The political system of modern Russia is an example of corporations interacting with each other.

Political corporations, in order to be effective, must have a certain degree of monopoly on the representation of interests. This is necessary from the point of view of influence on political decisions made, since state power, when forming the goals and objectives of its activities (especially in the transition period, when the leading groups are formed from a plurality of interests), inevitably takes into account only those groups interests and corporations that have the appropriate resources, i.e. able to mobilize and control large groups of the population. Thus, certain corporatist representations take shape, and the state becomes a “corporatist state.” The basis of his policy in this case is not “public interest,” but the interest of the political corporation whose representatives are currently at the helm of state power or have the greatest influence on it.

The most powerful corporations in modern Russia are those that are based on the foundation of financial-industrial groups, possessing enormous financial resources, controlling the most important enterprises and productions, gradually monopolizing the media market and thereby being able to influence the decision-making process on government and parliamentary channels.

Features of the corporatist system in Russiais that it is built on the basis of the interdependence of the most influential interest groups and the state and is of a contractual nature. For example, the former government of V. Chernomyrdin, patronizing the Gazprom corporation, received in return the opportunity with its help to solve problems in social policy. State power in Russia, driven by the need to overcome the crisis, provided opportunities for such a monopolization of interests in exchange for political and financial support. Therefore, corporations should be considered as the main support of the political regime in Russia in the 1990s.

T.I. Zaslavskaya notes that “as a result of the “market” reform of basic institutions, the state dissolved into private political and financial corporations... Behind each group of ministries, regions, and industrial complexes of Russia there is a certain ruling clan.”

As a result of the activities of political corporations, state power may find itself hostage to a group of political and economic monopolists and be subject to targeted pressure from representatives of private interests, which can lead to the oligarchization of the political regime and increased social tension in the country.

In the 2000s. a new corporatist structure emerged, associated with belonging to the intelligence services. In this structure, there is a corporate spirit of unity inherent in security employees. The statement of President V. Putin: “there are no former security officers” is a confirmation of the corporate spirit of the special services, which cements power. In such an elite, solidarity prevails. According to O. Kryshtanovskaya, despite the fact that “the whole country is becoming an arena of operational work,” ... “such power is doubly stable, especially since it is cemented by the ideology of patriotism, diluted, however, with liberal economic ideas.”

Russian scientist S.P. Peregudov, summarizing F. Schmitter’s reasoning about corporatism, identified several main positions that could make corporatism “new”, not undermining, but strengthening democracy and social peace. “Firstly, this is the presence of independent interest groups independent of the state and their focus on interacting with it for the sake of strengthening social partnership and increasing economic efficiency. Secondly, this is one or another degree of institutionalization of this interaction and the ability of the state to “impose” during the negotiation process priorities dictated by national interests. And finally, thirdly, this is compliance by all parties with their obligations and an appropriate system of monitoring their implementation.” These principles, transferred to the political sphere, could prevent or weaken the negative consequences of political corporatism.

6.7. Privileges as a sign of the political elite

Privilege- these are legal benefits, first of all, for government structures and officials, which they need to fully fulfill their powers.

Privileges are one of the most important characteristics of the political elite. Exclusive rights and special opportunities are closely associated with the elite because it includes groups of people with natural talent, bright talents, special ideological, social and political qualities that determine the special role of people performing the most important functions of managing society. The political elite, actively participating in the exercise of state power or in directly influencing it, spends a lot of energy, strength, and resources. To manage more effectively, the elite needs appropriate sources of replenishment of this energy. Therefore, the position of the elite is supported by its prestige, privileges, benefits, and therefore it enjoys significant material and spiritual benefits.

Consequently, the formation of a political elite is stimulated by the fact that the high status of managerial activity is associated with the possibility of receiving various kinds of material and moral privileges, advantages, honor, and fame.

As R. Mills writes, the power elite “consists of people who occupy positions that give them the opportunity to rise above the environment of ordinary people and make decisions that have major consequences... This is due to the fact that they command the most important hierarchical institutions and organizations of modern society... They occupy strategic command posts in the social system, in which effective means are concentrated to ensure the power, wealth and fame that they enjoy.”

However, due to the limited resources of power (material and spiritual goods, values), representatives of the elite voluntarily, as a rule, do not give up privileges. In order to win this war, the elites are forced to unite and group. The very high position of the political elite in society determines the need for its cohesion and group interest in maintaining its privileged status. “For the elitist paradigm,” emphasizes G.K. Ashin, - a typical statement is that society cannot function normally without the elite, that it has the right to a privileged position, moreover, it must vigilantly guard its privileges from “encroachments” by the masses.”

A.V. Malko notes another factor, which determines the close connection of the elite with privileges. It consists in the fact that this group of people personifies power, which (due to the fact that it is associated with the distribution of values and resources) opens up wide opportunities for the realization of the individual interests of the elite and its entourage. Consequently, the struggle for privileges is in many ways a struggle for power, opportunities, resources, influence.

After the February and October revolutions of 1917, there was a massive abolition of feudal, unjust, largely outdated privileges, and a change in political elites took place. In addition, legal advantages and exclusive rights for bodies and officials of the Soviet state began to be designated in legislation to a greater extent through the concept of “benefits”. The unfolding struggle against class and estate privileges, incompatible with the ideals of equality and justice, with the principles of socialist construction, led to the fact that the term “privilege” began to be perceived as purely reflecting unlawful advantages. In connection with this, it was practically erased from law-making circulation.

However, contrary to Marxist teaching, in Soviet society from the very beginning there was a stratification of the population into classes occupying different positions in the social structure and, accordingly, having different opportunities in the distribution of life's goods. Inequality in this regard was not some kind of deviation from certain correct norms prescribed by the classics of Marxism, but a manifestation of the objective laws of social existence. By the end of the Brezhnev period, the class stratification of Soviet society had reached a high level. A tendency towards a decrease in the vertical dynamics of the population has become obvious, i.e. the possibilities of transition from one layers to layers of a higher level were reduced. Representatives of the highest echelons of power rarely descended to the lower ones, as they had various privileges and opportunities to acquire the benefits of life thanks to their position in society.

Such privileges, received primarily by the nomenklatura, were not enshrined in the law or were established in closed decisions. These advantages included the following: distribution of housing, summer cottages, vouchers to sanatoriums and prestigious holiday homes, scarce goods, etc.

The new political elite, headed by B.N. Yeltsin, despite the fact that it came to power in the wake of the fight against privileges, not only did not abandon the existing privileges, but also increased them.

Privilege system, as S.V. writes Polenin, unfortunately, became widespread not only during the years of stagnation and deformation of socialism, but also to an even greater extent in the current democratic period. We are talking about benefits with the help of which conditions for increased living comfort are created for a selected circle of “most responsible” persons, identified on the basis of their affiliation or proximity to those in power. In this case, benefits are not based on objective grounds and turn into ordinary privileges, the existence of which contradicts the idea of forming a rule of law state and undermines both the principle of equal rights of citizens and the principle of social justice, under the slogan of which they are usually established.”

A significant part of the ruling modern Russian elite, not possessing high managerial and moral qualities, having received enormous privileges as a result of the nomenklatura privatization of a significant part of state property, turned out to be unable to adequately govern the country and are largely to blame for the crisis that engulfed society in the 1990s. .

In a truly democratic country, illegal and excessive privileges must be abolished.It is necessary to incorporate regulations on benefits for senior officials, including the President of the Russian Federation, on a thematic basis, and then publish them for public information and control over their compliance. In addition, the question increasingly arises of careful control over the existing and emerging political elite (through the institution of elections, referendums, reports of deputies to voters, the media, public opinion polls, etc.) so that it does not turn into a closed the dominant privileged caste, but worked for the benefit of society, the majority of Russian citizens.

A political system can be considered truly democratic if it implements the supremacy of the people, whose influence on politics is decisive, while the influence of the elite is limited, limited by law, a political system in which the elite is controlled by the people. Consequently, if we cannot ignore the thesis that the presence of an elite is a real or potential threat to democracy, then the way out, the condition for preserving democracy, is in the constant control of the people over the elite, limiting the privileges of the elite only to those that are functionally necessary for exercise of its powers, maximum openness, the possibility of unlimited criticism of the elite, separation of powers and relative autonomy of political, economic, cultural and other elites, the presence of opposition, struggle and competition of elites, the arbiter of which (and not only during elections) is spoken by the people, in other words, everything that in its totality constitutes the modern democratic process.”

It is important for Russia to form public opinion in such a way that the political elite itself begins to limit itself to a number of privileges, which, from a moral point of view, look clearly disproportionate against the backdrop of the poor majority of the population.

For the modern Russian state, the problem of developing a qualified, highly professional political elite that the population can trust is becoming increasingly acute. Russian society needs to create such an elite, making significant efforts to, with the help of democratic and legal norms and mechanisms, including through legal and justified privileges, carry out a kind of “selection” of new politicians who have state thinking and are capable of taking personal responsibility for transformations in the country.

Basic concepts: reproduction of the elite, the highest political elite, consolidation of the elite, corporatism, mobility of the elite, nomenclature, political corporatism, political elite, political class, ruling elite, privileges, regional elite, elite reconversion, subelite, federal elite, functions of the political elite, elite fragmentation, elite characteristics, elite circulation, elite, elite traffic.

Questions for self-control:

1.What is the main difference between the political class?

2.What is the relationship between the political class and the ruling elite?

3.What are the different parts of the single ruling elite called?

4. Define the political elite.

5.Name the most important characteristics of the elite.

6. Describe the mobility of the elite.

7.List the functions of the political elite.

8.What is the difference between the “Yeltsin” and “Putin” stages of the formation of the political elite?

9. Who belongs to the political elite in Russia?

10. What changes have occurred in the composition of the new political elite of Russia?

11. What are the main features of the ruling elite formed under V. Putin?

12. Name the main stages in the formation of the modern regional elite of Russia.

13. What reforms did V. Putin initiate with the aim of strengthening the power vertical?

14. Describe the regional political elite of Russia?

15. What is elite reconversion?

16. Explain the relationship between elite fragmentation and consolidation.

17. What is the essence of political corporatism?

18. What are the reasons for the privileges of the elite?

19. What are the necessary conditions for the democratic exercise of elite group privilege?

Literature:

Ashin G.K.Change of elites // Social sciences and modernity. 1995. No. 1.

Ashin G.K.Elitology in the mirror of political philosophy and political sociology // Elitological studies. 1998. No. 1.

Gaman-Golutvina O.V. Bureaucracy or oligarchy? // Where is Russia going?.. Power, society, personality. M., 2000.

Granovsky S.A.Applied political science: Textbook. M., 2004.

Zaslavskaya T.I.Modern Russian society: Social mechanism of transformation: Textbook. M., 2004.

Kretov B.I., Peregudov S.P. New Russian corporatism: democratic or bureaucratic? // Policy. 1997. No. 2. P.24.

Ashin G.K. Elitology in the mirror of political philosophy and political sociology // Elitological studies. 1998. No. 1. P.11.

Polenina S.V. Law as a means of implementing the tasks of forming a rule of law // Theory of Law: New Ideas. M., 1993. Issue 3. P.16.

Ashin G.K. Elitology in the mirror of political philosophy and political sociology // Elitological studies. 1998. No. 1. P.13-14.