Who destroyed the USSR?, was the collapse of the USSR an evil intention? Possible reasons for the collapse

The collapse of the USSR: a pattern, an accident, a conspiracy?

The USSR is a great powerful power, where there is equality and unity, where there are no poor and rich, all people are equal. The huge country relied on the idea of ​​socialism. So why did the USSR collapse? Why did the seemingly ideal country fall apart?

The ideal political system was not so ideal. The main reason was the country's economy; it was falling apart before our eyes. There were always huge queues where people stood for days. Shortages of goods generated dissatisfaction among citizens. The leaders did not care about producing the necessary products; heavy industry had prevailed in the country since the war; production technologies had long been outdated. The industry could not compete with other countries. The decline in oil prices as a result of its overproduction has shaken the country's already shaky economy. People did not want to work for the same, meager wages. The attitude towards work was of course at a very weak level. Another reason was the degradation of power. The administrative apparatus was old, and the new leadership was not an ardent supporter of socialism. People had no real choice of leaders of the country; only one candidate was nominated, already elected by the top of the government. Not an honest leadership that hid many facts, including the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant. The republics' exit from the Soviet Union dealt no small blow to the country's ideology. Drunkenness also served as a reason - people's absence from work worsened the situation of the country and affected the quality of goods. The collapse of Soviet ideology. The younger generation did not need socialism. Many looked to the West and wanted to live like them. The disclosure of many classified facts caused dissatisfaction with the country's government. The USA, the Cold War, the arms race and much more also took part directly in the collapse of the USSR.

Possible reasons for the collapse

· degradation of the power elites, a sharp aging of the top bureaucrats (the average age of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee was already 75 years by 1980), which led first to the Age of Funerals, and then to the rise of Gorbachev due to his relatively young age (54 years at the time of his election 5th General Secretary of the CPSU);

· the incompetence of the union leadership, the selfish desire of the leaders of the union republics to get rid of the control of the central authorities and use Gorbachev’s democratic reforms to destroy the foundations of the state and society;

· deep internal crises and conflicts, including national ones: the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, the Transnistrian conflict, the Georgian-South Ossetian conflict, the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict;

· strong inequality in the development of the republics of the USSR, including in terms of shortages of goods, as well as the possibility of building a shadow economy;

· unsuccessful attempts to reform the Soviet system, which led to stagnation and then the collapse of the economy, which led to the collapse of the political system;

· crisis of confidence in the economic system: in the 1960-1970s, the main way to combat the inevitable shortage of consumer goods in a planned economy was to rely on mass production, simplicity and cheapness of materials; most enterprises worked in three shifts, producing similar products from low-quality materials quality. The quantitative plan was the only way to evaluate the efficiency of enterprises, quality control was minimized. The result of this was a decline in the quality of consumer goods produced in the USSR. The crisis of confidence in the quality of goods became a crisis of confidence in the entire economic system as a whole;

· a decline in world oil prices caused by overproduction, which shook the rather weak raw materials economy of the USSR;

· growing dissatisfaction of the population associated with periodic food shortages (especially during the era of stagnation and Perestroika) and other essential and durable goods (refrigerators, televisions, toilet paper, etc.), prohibitions and restrictions (on the size of the garden plot and etc.); a constant lag in living standards compared to developed Western countries and unsuccessful attempts to “catch up” with it;

· artificial closure of the country, which by the 80s had already become clear to the entire USSR, including the mandatory issuance of exit visas for traveling abroad (including to the countries of the socialist camp), bans on listening to enemy voices, and the suppression of a number of facts about problems within the USSR, as well as about the much higher standard of living in Western countries;

· Severe censorship in the press and on television. Lack of goods from capitalist countries on free sale with an ongoing and increasing shortage of goods;

· denial, and then sharp recognition of the problems of Soviet society - prostitution, drug addiction, alcoholism, criminalization of society and others. Active growth of the shadow economy;

· The Cold War, continuous financial assistance to the countries of the socialist camp, disproportionate development of the military-industrial complex to the detriment of other sectors of the country's economy;

· a number of man-made disasters (plane crashes, the Chernobyl accident, the crash of the Admiral Nakhimov, gas explosions, etc.) and the concealment of information about them;

· subversive activities of Western countries led by the United States, which was an integral part of the Cold War, including through “agents of influence” within the leadership of the USSR - such an assessment (with varying degrees of recognition of this factor as decisive) is expressed in some analyzes, in particular , a number of former high-ranking leaders of the KGB of the USSR, as well as some communist movements.

The fall of the USSR ended the Cold War. Naturally, the victors in this war hastened to take credit for the collapse of their enemy, but for us it is much more important to analyze not the external, but the internal causes of this event. There was, of course, external pressure; the active and highly professional work of foreign intelligence services was of great importance. However, what happens inside is always decisive. The system could not have collapsed so quickly and painlessly if there had been no internal prerequisites for this. We have to admit that the collapse of the USSR was natural and inevitable.

Here two events should be distinguished: 1) the death of the USSR state as a union socialist republics; 2) the actual collapse of a single state entity and the emergence of independent states on the territory of the former USSR.

The second is due to the first. As long as the state declared socialism as its ideological basis, it was possible to unite rather heterogeneous elements. The economically and socially lagging Asian republics caught up, adapting to the voiced socialist ideals, while the Baltic republics, gravitating toward the West, were restrained in this endeavor, which was again justified by socialist ideology. Once socialism was dismantled, there was no platform left to realize geopolitical unity. The Asian republics have largely returned to their traditional way of life. The Baltic states have integrated into Europe. The Slavic republics, which retained the mentality developed by Orthodoxy, found themselves in search of their own path, in which the experience of community and conciliarity would be realized. The unified geopolitical structure was torn apart.

The fall of socialist statehood in the USSR was also predetermined. It is determined by the dialectics of the psychology of Soviet man. While the state was experiencing objective difficulties, people believed that solving public problems had a higher priority than solving their private problems. The socialist nature of the state made it possible to solve social problems quite effectively, and the existence of the USSR seemed justified. Once the main difficulties were overcome, a person's private life came to the fore.

This attitude was embedded in the original message of socialist ideology. Socialism was supposed to provide a good life for the common man. Accordingly, the main criterion by which the quality of government was assessed was the standard of living of an individual. While objective difficulties made it possible to attribute this good life to a fairly distant future, the USSR was strong and socialism was attractive. When the time came to fulfill the promise, it turned out that the capitalist system was more suitable for realizing the concept of success in life. Having received a basic background of public goods of quite acceptable quality, and deciding that this is how it should be, the person wanted more. The principles of socialism, which binds a person to his social environment, began to be perceived as a hindrance, and capitalism, which encourages entrepreneurship and initiative, seemed more attractive. It was not possible to integrate the encouragement of entrepreneurship into socialism, and it could not have been possible, since the individualism required for this contradicted the emphasis on the importance of social values. As a result, the population preferred the possibility of individual well-being to the general, but smaller in the personal dimension, good.

I believe that the political system of the USSR has long been ineffective and has outlived its usefulness. And the fact that the country fell apart was a pattern and a confluence of certain circumstances.

The socialists tried to create a large, friendly and equal family. But as it turned out, not everyone wants to live in a stable and equal society, and in the end the USSR remained only on the pages of Russian history.

Introduction………………………………………………………………………………......3

Topic: “Collapse of the USSR”

2 The collapse of the USSR - a pattern or an accident………………………...21

3 Geopolitical position of Russia after the collapse of the USSR………………20

Conclusion………………………………………………………………………………….21

References…………………………………………………………………………………24

Topic: “The Formation of Christianity in Russia” ………………………………………………………25

Answers to control tasks……………………………………………………28

Introduction

The topic of the work is relevant because at this stage of development and political transformations taking place in the Russian Federation and neighboring states, the successors of the former USSR, when the main characters of that period have already left the political scene, the interest in this period in Russian history has subsided somewhat, you can try to consider this time in the history of our state in order to find answers to the questions and problems that we have now.

The purpose of the work is a geopolitical analysis of the causes of the collapse of the USSR.

As for the sources, periodical literature of that time was used as the main ones, namely the newspapers “Moskovsky Komsomolets” and “Arguments and Facts”, some magazines - the international yearbook “Politics and Economics”, “Business People”, etc. The last two sources I trust a little more than newspapers, since these are serious publications. In addition, textbook sources are “History of the Soviet State by N. Werth” and “History of the Fatherland” (school textbook). But these sources cannot be used as the main ones for the reason that they reflect a certain ideological position, and comments that are free of this shortcoming are important to us. This is why I prefer to rely mainly on magazines.

In order to understand the processes that took place in the USSR and led to its collapse, it is necessary to consider the features of the development of this state, the form of government in the USSR, the state regime, the form of the administrative-territorial structure, as well as some other problems of Soviet statehood.

"Collapse of the USSR"

1. The August 1991 events and their assessment.

August putsch- an attempt to forcibly remove M. S. Gorbachev from the post of President of the USSR and change his course, undertaken by the self-proclaimed State Committee for a State of Emergency (GKChP) - a group of conservative conspirators from the leadership of the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR government on August 19, 1991, which led to radical changes in the political situation in the country. It was accompanied by the declaration of a state of emergency for 6 months, the deployment of troops to Moscow, the resubordination of local authorities to military commandants appointed by the State Emergency Committee, the introduction of strict censorship in the media and the banning of a number of them, the abolition of a number of constitutional rights and freedoms of citizens. The leadership of the RSFSR (President B.N. Yeltsin and the Supreme Council of the RSFSR) and some other republics (Moldavian SSR, Estonia), and subsequently also the legitimate leadership of the USSR (President and Supreme Council of the USSR) qualified the actions of the State Emergency Committee as a coup d'etat.

The goal of the putschists. The main goal of the putschists was, according to their official statements, to prevent the liquidation of the USSR, which, in their opinion, was to begin on August 20 during the first stage of signing a new union treaty, turning the USSR into a confederation - the Union of Sovereign States. On August 20, the agreement was to be signed by representatives of the RSFSR and Kazakhstan, and the remaining future components of the commonwealth during five meetings, until October 22.

Choosing the moment. Members of the Emergency Committee chose the moment when the President was away on vacation in Crimea and announced his temporary removal from power for health reasons.

GKChK forces. The State Emergency Committee relied on the forces of the KGB (Alpha), the Ministry of Internal Affairs (Dzerzhinsky Division) and the Ministry of Defense (Tula Airborne Division, Taman Division, Kantemirovskaya Division). In total, about 4 thousand military personnel, 362 tanks, 427 armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles were brought into Moscow. Additional airborne units were transferred to the vicinity of Leningrad, Tallinn, Tbilisi, and Riga.

The airborne troops were commanded by generals Pavel Grachev and his deputy Alexander Lebed. At the same time, Grachev maintained telephone contact with both Yazov and Yeltsin. However, the putschists did not have complete control over their forces; So, on the very first day, parts of the Taman division went over to the side of the defenders of the White House. From the tank of this division, Yeltsin delivered his famous message to the assembled supporters.

Information support for the putschists was provided by the State Television and Radio Broadcasting Company (for three days, news releases certainly included revelations of various acts of corruption and violations of the law committed within the framework of the “reformist course”), the State Emergency Committee also secured the support of the Central Committee of the CPSU, but these institutions were unable to have a noticeable impact on the situation in the capital , but for some reason the committee was unable or unwilling to mobilize that part of society that shared the views of the members of the State Emergency Committee.

Leader of the coup. Despite the fact that Yanaev was the nominal head of the conspirators, the real soul of the conspiracy, according to many analysts, was Kryuchkov

Opponents of the GKChK. The resistance to the Emergency Committee was led by the political leadership of the Russian Federation (President B. N. Yeltsin, Vice President A. V. Rutskoi, Chairman of the Government I. S. Silaev, Acting Chairman of the Supreme Council R. I. Khasbulatov).

In an address to Russian citizens on August 19, Boris Yeltsin, characterizing the actions of the State Emergency Committee as a coup, said:

At the call of the Russian authorities, masses of Muscovites gathered at the House of Soviets of the Russian Federation (“White House”), among whom were representatives of a wide variety of social groups - from supporters of anti-Soviet political organizations, students, intelligentsia to veterans of the Afghan war. The three killed during the incident in the tunnel on the Garden Ring were representatives of various professions - an architect, a driver and an economist.

The former head of the Yukos company, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, claims that in 1991 he “went to defend the White House”

Background.

· On July 29, Gorbachev, Yeltsin and the President of Kazakhstan N.A. Nazarbayev met confidentially in Novo-Ogaryovo. They scheduled the signing of a new Union Treaty for August 20.

• On August 2, Gorbachev announced in a televised address that the signing of the Union Treaty was scheduled for August 20. On August 3, this appeal was published in the Pravda newspaper.
• On August 4, Gorbachev went to rest at his residence near the village of Foros in Crimea.
• August 17 - Kryuchkov, Pavlov, Yazov, Baklanov, Shenin and Gorbachev’s assistant Boldin meet at the “ABC” facility - the closed guest residence of the KGB at the address: Academician Vargi Street, possession 1. Decisions are made to introduce a state of emergency from August 19, to form the State Emergency Committee, to demand Gorbachev to sign the corresponding decrees or resign and transfer powers to Vice President Gennady Yanaev, Yeltsin to be detained at the Chkalovsky airfield upon arrival from Kazakhstan for a conversation with Yazov, then act further depending on the results of the negotiations.

• The beginning of the coup. On August 18 at 8 o’clock in the morning, Yazov informs his deputies Grachev and Kalinin about the upcoming introduction of a state of emergency.
• In the afternoon, Baklanov, Shenin, Boldin and General V.I. Varennikov travel on Yazov’s personal plane to Crimea to negotiate with Gorbachev in order to secure his consent to introduce a state of emergency. At about 5 p.m. they meet with Gorbachev. Gorbachev refuses to give them his consent.

The Emergency Committee agreed that the group would go to Crimea to see Gorbachev in order to persuade him to make a decision to introduce a state of emergency. ... Another purpose of our visit to Foros to see Gorbachev was to disrupt the signing of a new union Treaty scheduled for August 20, which, in our opinion, had no legal basis. On August 18, we met with him, where, as you know, we did not agree on anything.

- V. Varennikov, interview

• At the same time (at 16:32) all types of communications were turned off at the presidential dacha, including the channel that provided control of the strategic nuclear forces of the USSR. In a later interview with Gorbachev, it is stated that a group of guests cut the communication lines only in his cabin, and the facility itself in Foros and the lines in other rooms worked properly. In addition, communications in Gorbachev’s cars, incl. control of strategic forces also worked.
• On August 19, at 4 a.m., the Sevastopol regiment of the USSR KGB troops blocked the presidential dacha in Foros. By order of the Chief of Staff of the USSR Air Defense Forces, Colonel-General Maltsev, two tractors blocked the runway on which the President's flight assets are located - a Tu-134 plane and a Mi-8 helicopter. In a later interview with Gorbachev, it is stated that in essence there was no blockade, because “About 4,000 people in the nearest units and units were directly subordinate to me, and these were mainly units of my personal security.”

Development of main events.

• At 6 o’clock in the morning, the USSR media announced the introduction of a state of emergency in the country and the inability of USSR President Mikhail Gorbachev to perform his functions “for health reasons” and the transfer of all power to the State Emergency Committee. At the same time, troops were sent to Moscow and other large cities, and political figures of the “democratic opposition” were put on the wanted list.
• At night, Alpha moved to Yeltsin’s dacha in Arkhangelskoye, but did not block the president and did not receive instructions to take any action against him. Meanwhile, Yeltsin urgently mobilized all his supporters in the upper echelon of power, the most prominent of whom were Ruslan Khasbulatov, Anatoly Sobchak, Gennady Burbulis, Mikhail Poltoranin, Sergei Shakhrai, Viktor Yaroshenko. The coalition compiled and faxed an appeal “To the Citizens of Russia.” B. N. Yeltsin signed a decree “On the illegality of the actions of the State Emergency Committee.” Echo of Moscow became the mouthpiece of opponents of the coup.
• Yeltsin's condemnation of the State Emergency Committee during a speech from a tank of the Taman division at the White House. Russian President B.N. Yeltsin arrives at the “White House” (Supreme Council of the RSFSR) at 9 o’clock and organizes a center of resistance to the actions of the State Emergency Committee. Resistance takes the form of rallies that gather in Moscow near the White House on Krasnopresnenskaya Embankment and in Leningrad on St. Isaac's Square near the Mariinsky Palace. Barricades are being erected in Moscow and leaflets are being distributed. Directly near the White House there are armored vehicles of the Ryazan regiment of the Tula Airborne Division under the command of Major General Alexander Lebed and the Taman Division. At 12 o'clock, from a tank, Yeltsin addresses those gathered for the rally, where he calls what happened a coup d'etat. From among the protesters, unarmed militia groups are created under the command of deputy Konstantin Kobets. Afghan veterans and employees of the private security company Alex take an active part in the militia. Yeltsin is preparing space for retreat by sending emissaries to Paris and Sverdlovsk with the right to organize a government in exile.
• Evening press conference of the State Emergency Committee. V. Pavlov, who developed a hypertensive crisis, was absent from it. The members of the State Emergency Committee were noticeably nervous; The whole world went around the footage of G. Yanaev’s shaking hands. Journalist T. Malkina openly called what was happening a “coup,” the words of the members of the State Emergency Committee were more like excuses (G. Yanaev: “Gorbachev deserves all respect”).

• By order of the State Emergency Committee, preparations were made for the previously unplanned seizure of the building of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR by special forces of the KGB of the USSR. However, the generals responsible for preparing the assault began to doubt the feasibility. Alexander Lebed goes over to the side of the White House defenders. The commanders of Alpha and Vympel, Karpukhin and Beskov, ask Deputy Chairman of the KGB Ageev to cancel the operation. The assault was called off.
• In connection with the hospitalization of V. Pavlov, the temporary leadership of the Council of Ministers of the USSR was entrusted to V. Kh. Doguzhiev, who did not make any public statements during the putsch.
• For the first time in its modern history, Russia is creating its own Ministry of Defense. Konstantin Kobets is appointed Minister of Defense.

• On the night of August 21, tank units controlled by the State Emergency Committee carried out maneuvers in the area of ​​the White House (the building of the Supreme Council of the RSFSR). Supporters of Boris Yeltsin clash with a military column in the tunnel under New Arbat. (see Incident in the tunnel on the Garden Ring)
• Alpha Group refuses to storm the White House. At 5 o'clock in the morning Yazov gives the order to withdraw troops from Moscow. On the afternoon of August 21, a session of the Supreme Council of the RSFSR begins, chaired by Khasbulatov, which almost immediately accepts statements condemning the State Emergency Committee. Vice-President of the RSFSR Alexander Rutskoi and Prime Minister Ivan Silaev fly to Foros to see Gorbachev. Some members of the Emergency Committee fly to Crimea on another plane to negotiate with Gorbachev, but he refuses to accept them.

• Mikhail Gorbachev returns from Foros to Moscow together with Rutskoi and Silaev on a Tu-134 plane. Members of the State Emergency Committee were arrested.
• Moscow declared mourning for the victims. A mass rally was held on Krasnopresnenskaya embankment in Moscow, during which demonstrators carried out a huge banner of the Russian tricolor; At the rally, the President of the RSFSR announced that a decision had been made to make the white-azure-red banner the new state flag of Russia. (In honor of this event, in 1994 the date August 22 was chosen to celebrate the Day of the State Flag of Russia.)
• The defenders of the White House are supported by rock groups (“Time Machine”, “Cruise”, “Shah”, “Metal Corrosion”, “Mongol Shuudan”), who are organizing the “Rock on the Barricades” concert on August 22.

Live, Yeltsin, in the presence of Gorbachev, signs a decree suspending the Communist Party of the RSFSR

Much later, in 2008, Gorbachev commented on the situation as follows:

One of the members of the State Emergency Committee, Marshal Yazov, about the lack of levers to control the situation:

Architect of the design and construction cooperative "Kommunar" Ilya Krichevsky

Afghan veteran, forklift driver Dmitry Komar

Economist of the Ikom joint venture Vladimir Usov

All three died on the night of August 21 during an incident in a tunnel on the Garden Ring. All three were posthumously awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

Meaning. The August putsch was one of those events that marked the end of the power of the CPSU and the collapse of the USSR and, according to popular belief, gave impetus to democratic changes in Russia. Changes took place in Russia itself that contributed to the formation of its statehood, in particular, even during the events of August 20, 1991, it had its own Ministry of Defense.

On the other hand, supporters of preserving the Soviet Union argue that the country began to be in chaos due to the inconsistent policies of the then government.

2. Is the collapse of the USSR a pattern or an accident?

The reasons for the collapse of the USSR and the collapse of the Soviet Empire require an objective analysis, which in no case can be reduced to identifying external (hostile) and internal (subversive) influence, i.e. to a "conspiracy theory". The external pressure of the liberal-democratic West on the USSR was truly enormous, and the activities of “subversive elements” within the country were extremely effective and coordinated. But both of these factors became decisive only in a situation when the existence of the Soviet Empire entered a stage of internal crisis, which had deep and natural causes rooted in the very specifics of the Soviet system and the Soviet system. Without understanding these internal reasons for the collapse and their analysis, any attempts to restore the USSR (and especially to create a New Empire) will be futile and unpromising. Moreover, any purely inertial conservatism in this matter can only worsen the situation.

Let us identify several factors that led the Soviet Union to geopolitical and socio-economic collapse.

Firstly, at the ideological level, during the entire existence of the socialist regime, purely national, traditional, spiritual elements were never introduced into the general complex of communist ideology. Being largely national-communist de facto, it was never transformed into one de jure, which hindered the organic development of Russian-Soviet society, gave rise to double standards and ideological contradictions, and undermined clarity and awareness in the implementation of geopolitical and socio-political projects. Atheism, materialism, progressivism, "enlightenment ethics", etc. were deeply alien to Russian Bolshevism and the Russian people as a whole. In practice, these provisions borrowed from Marxism (by the way, and in Marxism itself, which are rather arbitrary elements of a kind of tribute to old-fashioned positivist humanism in the style of Feuerbach) were understood by Russian communists in the key of folk-mystical, sometimes unorthodox eschatological aspirations, and not as the rationalistic fruits of Western European culture. However, the ideology of National Bolshevism, which could find more adequate, more Russian terms for the new socio-political system, was never formulated. Consequently, sooner or later the limitations and inadequacy of such an ideologically contradictory structure were bound to have a negative impact. This especially made itself felt in the late Soviet period, when senseless dogmatism and communist demagoguery finally crushed all ideological life in society. This “freezing” of the ruling ideology and the persistent refusal to introduce organic, national and natural components into it for the Russian people resulted in the collapse of the entire Soviet system. Responsibility for this lies not only with the “agents of influence” and “anti-Soviet”, but, first of all, with the central Soviet ideologists of both the “progressive” and “conservative” wings. The Soviet Empire was both ideologically and actually destroyed by the communists. To recreate it in the same form and with the same ideology is now not only impossible, but also pointless, since even hypothetically this will reproduce the same preconditions that have already led to the destruction of the state once.

Secondly, at the geopolitical and strategic level, the USSR was uncompetitive in the long term to resist the Atlanticist Western bloc. From a strategic point of view, land borders are much more vulnerable than sea borders, and at all levels (number of border troops, cost of military equipment, use and deployment of strategic weapons, etc.) After World War II, the USSR found itself in an unequal position compared with the capitalist bloc of the West, grouped around the United States. The USA had a gigantic island base (the American continent), completely controlled and surrounded on all sides by oceans and seas, which were not difficult to defend. Plus, the United States controlled almost all coastal zones in the South and West of Eurasia, creating a gigantic threat to the USSR and at the same time remaining practically out of reach of potential destabilizing actions of the Soviet Union. The division of Europe into Eastern (Soviet) and Western (American) only complicated the geopolitical position of the USSR in the West, increasing the volume of land borders and placing it close to a strategic potential enemy, and in a situation of passive hostility of the European peoples themselves, who found themselves in the position of hostages in a geopolitical duel. the meaning of which was not obvious to them. The same thing happened in the southern direction in Asia and the Far East, where the USSR had immediate neighbors either controlled by the West (Pakistan, Afghanistan, pre-Khomeinist Iran) or rather hostile powers of a non-Soviet socialist orientation (China). In this situation, the USSR could acquire relative stability only in two cases: either by rapidly advancing to the oceans in the West (to the Atlantic) and in the South (to the Indian Ocean), or by creating neutral political blocs in Europe and Asia that were not under the control of any one country. from the superpowers. This concept (of neutral Germany) was tried to be proposed by Stalin, and after his death by Beria. The USSR (together with the Warsaw Pact), from a geopolitical point of view, was too big and too small at the same time. Maintaining the status quo was beneficial only to the United States and Atlanticism, since at the same time the military, industrial and strategic potential of the USSR was increasingly exhausted, and the power of the United States, a protected island, was increasing. Sooner or later, the Eastern Bloc was bound to collapse. Consequently, the reconstruction of the USSR and the Warsaw bloc is not only almost impossible, but also unnecessary, because even in the case of (almost incredible) success it will only lead to the revival of an obviously doomed geopolitical model.

Thirdly, the administrative structure of the USSR was based on a secular, purely functional and quantitative understanding of intrastate division. Economic and bureaucratic centralism did not take into account either the regional, much less the ethnic and religious characteristics of the internal territories. The principle of leveling and purely economic structuralization of society led to the creation of such rigid systems that suppressed, and at best “preserved” the forms of natural national life of various peoples, including (and to a greater extent) the Russian people themselves. The territorial principle operated even when nominally we were talking about national republics, autonomies or districts. At the same time, the process of regional-ethnic leveling became more and more distinct as the entire Soviet political system “aged”, which towards its last stage was increasingly leaning towards the type of Soviet “nation-state” rather than the Empire. Nationalism, which largely contributed to the creation of the USSR in the early stages, in the end became a purely negative factor, as excessive centralization and unification began to give rise to natural protest and discontent. The atrophy of the imperial principle, the ossification of bureaucratic centralism, the desire for maximum rationalization and purely economic productivity gradually created from the USSR a political monster that has lost its life and is perceived as the forcefully imposed totalitarianism of the center. Some communist theses of literally understood "internationalism" are largely responsible for this. Consequently, this aspect of the Soviet model, which operates not with a specific ethnic group, culture, religion, but with abstract “population” and “territory,” should not be revived under any circumstances. On the contrary, it is necessary to get rid of the consequences of such a quantitative approach as soon as possible, the echoes of which are so tragically reflected today in the issue of Chechnya, Crimea, Kazakhstan, the Karabakh conflict, Abkhazia, Transnistria, etc.

These four main aspects of the former Soviet model are the main factors in the collapse of Soviet statehood, and they are responsible for the collapse of the Soviet Empire. It is quite natural that with a hypothetical re-creation of the USSR, radical conclusions should be drawn in this regard and radically destroy those reasons that have already historically doomed a great nation to state disaster.

It is generally accepted that the collapse of the USSR was inevitable, and this point of view is held not only by those who considered it a “prison of nations”, or “the last of the endangered species - a relic” - a “multinational empire”, as an expert on problems of interethnic relations in the USSR put it M. Mandelbaum in the preface to the almanac of articles published by the American Council on Foreign Relations on the eve of the collapse of the USSR.*

3. Geopolitical position of Russia after the collapse of the USSR.

Russian foreign policy at the end of the 20th century. has become more defined, forward-looking and geopolitically sensitive. But serious problems remain related to the possibilities of its implementation. They are due to such circumstances as: the discrepancy between ideas in our country and abroad about the future of Russia, incl. about its positions in the world order; risks of new isolation of the country; the emergence of alternative geopolitical models that do not take into account or infringe upon the interests of our state.

To realistically assess the possibilities of Russian geopolitical projects embedded in the country’s foreign policy in the second half of the 1990s, it is necessary to once again analyze the features of the current situation. The geopolitical position of a state is determined not only by physical geography, but also by changes in the global geopolitical order and geo-economic processes. After the collapse of the USSR, Russia's geopolitical status declined. In the post-Soviet space, not excluding parts of the territory of the Russian Federation itself, external centers of power began to establish themselves. Disintegration processes have called into question Russia's geopolitical subjectivity.

The current geopolitical position of our country in the world can be viewed from two points of view. In the first case, Russia is assessed as the geographic center of the global system (heartland) and the integration core of Eurasia. The idea of ​​Russia as a kind of “bridge” between Europe and Asia is also widespread (this also has a philosophical justification: domestic thinkers, in particular N. Berdyaev, spoke of Russia as a “mediator” between the West and the East).

Modern Russia retains its geopolitical potential as the center of Eurasia, but with limited possibilities of use, which leads to its transformation into a regional power with a tendency to further decline in its geopolitical status. Economic weakness (according to IMEMO data for 1998, our country produces only 1.7% of world GDP), lack of state will and public consensus on development paths do not allow the implementation of the heartland model in its new interpretation: Russia as the integration core of Eurasia.

The geopolitical structure of the post-Soviet space is changing qualitatively, which is losing its original “Russian-centrism”. The CIS, which includes all the former Soviet republics except the three Baltic ones, is very ineffective. The main factors restraining its collapse are the dependence of many post-Soviet states on Russian fuel raw materials, other economic considerations, and, to a lesser extent, cultural and historical ties. However, as a geopolitical and geo-economic center, Russia is clearly weak. Meanwhile, European countries are actively interacting with the post-Soviet republics, especially Germany, Turkey with its attempts to restore the unity of the Turkic world “from the Adriatic to the Great Wall of China,” China (Central Asia), the USA (Baltic states, Ukraine, Georgia), etc. On status Uzbekistan and Ukraine are claiming new regional powers, which Western geostrategists see as a natural counterweight to Russia and its “imperial ambitions” regarding the territories of the former USSR (Brzezinski’s idea).

Post-Soviet states are included in a number of geopolitical unions alternative to the CIS (European, Turkic, Islamic and other types of integration). Their role is underestimated in Russia, where there is still a strong belief that “they will not get away from us.” New regional cooperation systems are emerging on the borders of the Russian Federation. In some of them she takes part as much as she can - the Baltic, Black Sea, Caspian, Asia-Pacific systems, but in a number of cases the unification takes place without her presence. The countries of Central Asia are actively interacting. Meetings of the “troika” (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan) and the “five” (the same plus Turkmenistan and Tajikistan) regularly take place here, formulating their special interests. As an alternative to the CIS, this region is considering its own Central Asian Union, Turkic integration (including Turkey) or the unification of Muslim countries within the framework of the Organization of the Islamic Conference. A characteristic event is the meeting in Dushanbe (December 1999) of the heads of government of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, dedicated to the development of the Central Asian Community in the 21st century.

An important geopolitical phenomenon is the consolidation of Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia and Azerbaijan (the association is called GUAM); in 1999, Uzbekistan (from now on - GUUAM) joined the process. This bloc is conceived as a geopolitical counterbalance to Russian influence in the post-Soviet space. Ukraine is very active here, whose leaders have repeatedly exchanged visits with the heads of the countries that make up GUUAM. Official Kyiv, with the encouragement of the West, is trying to play the role of a geopolitical alternative to Moscow. In addition, the experience of recent years shows: in Eastern Europe, the ideas of a union of any configuration, but without Russia, are, as a rule, projects of an alliance against Russia, which means that the prospects for recreating the medieval Balto-Pontic belt (the “cordon sanitaire” along its western border) should cause our state has concerns.

The important task of overcoming transport dependence on Russia by the CIS countries is already being solved. For example, the Central Asian states are “cutting a window” to the Indian Ocean. The Tejen - Serakhs - Mashhad railway was built, connecting Turkmenistan with Iran, which gives the countries of the region access to this ocean (which in the future will also be useful for Russia, especially in the case of the construction of the North - South transport corridor along the relatively short route Kazakh Eraliev - Krasnovodsk - Kizil56 Atrek - Iran). Options for an alternative communication axis connecting Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan through Afghanistan to Pakistan are being considered. The idea of ​​the Great Silk Road (GSR) has been revived, which almost completely removes the southern neighbors of the Russian Federation from its influence on communications. It is unlikely that Caspian (Azerbaijani) oil will be transited through Russia: oil pipelines leading to Georgia (Supsa) and Turkey (Ceyhan) are now considered promising. Only oil exports from Kazakhstan can go through the port of Novorossiysk. In addition, it is natural for Turkmenistan to introduce visas for Russians. Our country itself gave the reason for such actions, accusing Georgia and Azerbaijan of supporting Chechen separatists and initiating the process of establishing a visa regime with these countries. In fact, this means their exit from the CIS.

As a result, the CIS participants “scatter”, reorienting themselves to other geopolitical centers. Only the Moscow-Minsk axis remains geopolitically stable: it strengthens the unity of Eurasia on a pro-Russian basis and prevents the creation of the Balto-Pontic belt. Russia is clearly on the path to losing its geopolitical role as the center of Eurasia. Based on this circumstance, many Western researchers already believe that the main global processes are determined by the relations between America, Europe and the Asia-Pacific region (APR).

The geopolitical unity of the Russian Federation itself is in question; the National Republics are developing their external relations, guided by ethnocultural criteria. In a number of them, Turkish influence increased, especially in the North Caucasus and the Volga-Ural region (Tatarstan, Bashkortostan). In republics with a Muslim population, the influence of Saudi Arabia and Iran is felt (to a lesser extent). Islamic countries even compete for such influence. The result of the geopolitical stratification of the Russian space was the actual “autarky” of Chechnya, and the North Caucasus as a whole became a risk zone within Russian borders.

Geopolitical problems are also associated with other regions of the Russian Federation. Thus, the Far East remains an abandoned outskirts of Russia and is forced to independently develop ties with China, Japan, etc. The exclave Kaliningrad region is in a difficult situation, at the same time maintaining the role of the country’s western military outpost. In this problematic situation, pressure from neighboring countries claiming parts of Russian territory (Karelia, Pskov region, border with China, Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands) is increasing.

After the collapse of the USSR, Russia's access to the sea was severely limited. The role of geopolitical “windows” is played by: in the Baltic Sea, St. Petersburg with the Leningrad region (it is clear that the Kaliningrad exclave does not count here); on the Black Sea - Krasnodar Territory (Novorossiysk) and Rostov Region (attempts to revive Taganrog); in the Caspian - Astrakhan (Dagestan is excluded due to ethnopolitical problems); on the Pacific Ocean - Primorsky Territory and (much less) Khabarovsk Territory, Sakhalin and Kamchatka. It is important that the Baltic and Black Seas are classified as “closed”, because the straits are controlled by other powers (hence the minimal geopolitical significance of the Baltic and Black Sea fleets). The Sea of ​​Japan is also “closed”. Therefore, the Kola and Kamchatka peninsulas are of particular military strategic importance - the only territories of Russia that have access to the open spaces of the World Ocean: the Northern and Pacific fleets are based here, respectively [Kolosov and Treyvish 1992].

Our country’s role as a transit hub is also becoming problematic. Really functioning international communications now bypass Russia. Relations between Europe and the Asia-Pacific region are mainly carried out by sea, bypassing its territory (sea transportation is quite cheap). Russian land communications are also not operational. But the GSR is being recreated in the form of a trans-Eurasian corridor connecting East Asia and Europe by land. Work begins on the implementation of the transport corridor project - "Europe - Caucasus - Central Asia" (TRACECA), which finds support both in China and Japan, and in the European Union (especially in Germany). The TRACECA project was approved in 1993 at a conference in Brussels (the leaders of eight states of Transcaucasia and Central Asia participated; later Mongolia, Ukraine and Moldova joined the program). And in September 1998, a meeting of the leaders of Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Turkey, Ukraine, Moldova, Romania and Bulgaria was held in Baku, where an agreement was adopted on the development of a transport corridor, transit and communications.

Thus, the trans-Eurasian corridor, due to geopolitical changes at the end of the 20th century. must bypass the largest state that considers itself the center of Eurasia - Russia. The most important highway of the future is supposed to be laid from China through Kazakhstan (Kyrgyzstan), Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, Georgia to Turkey and further to Europe (via Turkey and Bulgaria or through Ukraine, Moldova and Romania). Theoretically, its “northern” version is still possible from Europe through Belarus or Ukraine, Russia and Kazakhstan with access through Turkmenistan to Iran and the Indian Ocean, i.e. simpler in terms of the number of boundaries overcome. But the West today supports the option of bypassing our territory, preferring not to make its relations with the Asia-Pacific region dependent on unstable Russia (despite the fact that the internal political stability of a number of GSR countries is even more questionable). Russia is paying such a high price for the geopolitical disintegration of the USSR space with the loss of Transcaucasia and Central Asia, its “soft underbelly.”

True, there are vulnerabilities in the emerging belt of small states to the south and southwest of Russia's borders. Ethnopolitical instability is typical for the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region of the People's Republic of China, bordering Central Asian countries. The location of the connection between the HSR and Chinese communications has not been determined. This is claimed by Kazakhstan, which is already connected to China in transport terms, and by Kyrgyzstan, which can be supported by Kazakhstan’s geopolitical rivals (in this case, it is necessary to build roads in the high mountainous regions of the Tien Shan, which the Chinese are ready for). A special position is occupied by Iran and Armenia, pushed aside from the GSR. They insist on using their land communications, but other participants in the project, for geopolitical reasons and with the support of the West, propose using a ferry from Turkmenistan to Azerbaijan (bypassing Iran) and a road directly connecting Azerbaijan with Georgia (bypassing Armenia). Finally, communication between Georgia and Ukraine is planned to be carried out by sea, since land communications pass through semi-independent Abkhazia and Russia.

So, on the southern outskirts of the post-Soviet space and in South-Eastern Europe, a “new rimland” is being formed, covering the “Eurasian heartland” in a semi-ring. Russia turns out to be the remote northeastern corner of Eurasia, located on the side of trade routes. Existing communications, such as the Trans-Siberian Railway, are poorly used as a transit “bridge”; the prospects for their reconstruction are unclear (although Japan has shown interest in the reconstruction of the Trans-Siberian Railway, it is investing money in the reconstruction of the roads that make up the HSR). At the turn of the century, Russia poorly used its “triple” geopolitical potential: the integration core of Eurasia, a transit state and a developed economic center. In the meantime, we have to talk only about potential, prospects, opportunities, and not about decisions, actions and achievements.

Conclusion

In conclusion, we will summarize the results and draw appropriate conclusions.

The implementation of economic reforms with the subsequent abolition of the USSR and a gradual transition to the market caused an abundant flow of contradictory discussions about the collapse of the so-called. Soviet Empire. But it should be noted that the collapse of the USSR was not the collapse of a classical empire. Let us note once again: the collapse of a unique multinational country did not occur for natural reasons, but mainly at the will of politicians pursuing their goals, contrary to the will of the majority of peoples living in the USSR in those years.

In 1978, Collins put forward several general points regarding territorial expansion and contraction of states. When, two years later, Collins, having formalized his principles and given them quantitative form, applied them to the Soviet Union, the conclusions he obtained completely contradicted the generally accepted point of view. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, many American politicians and interest groups expressed alarm over the supposedly rampant Soviet military buildup that threatened the United States and its allies. Collins foresaw the onset of a period of instability in the USSR, partly due to the excessive military-imperial expansion of the Soviet power. In the long term, such instability could lead to the disintegration of the “Russian Empire”, incl. to the Soviet Union's loss of control over Eastern Europe and its own collapse. He foresaw that the disintegration of the central power of the Russian state would be a precondition for the emergence of powerful ethnic separatist movements. The scientist noted that the formal mechanism for the dismemberment of the Soviet Union already exists in the form of 15 union republics with nominal autonomy and their own state institutions. This federal structure, while rendered meaningless under a strong central government, supports ethnic identities while at the same time providing an organizational framework that allows for the emergence of truly independent states once the power of the center is seriously weakened. Collins believed that the disintegration of the Soviet Union he predicted would most likely occur under the leadership of dissident communist politicians, and that these favorable structural opportunities would encourage some communist leaders to align themselves with regional ethnic groups.

Much of his analysis seems accurate and insightful today. The collapse of the USSR, however, was also predicted by other observers. But in contrast to their expectations that it would be the result of a war with China or the uprising of the Islamic republics of the USSR, Collins, for the most part, pointed to the true reasons for the collapse that occurred. The main drawback of the forecast was its timing. According to the scientist, the disintegration of the Soviet Union should have taken many decades.

Collins' analysis was carried out along three dimensions: a) the principles of this model as applied to the history of the Russian Empire over a long period of time; b) the applicability of the model to the collapse of the Soviet Union; c) its sources in Weber's social theory, as well as aspects of Weber's thinking that Collins may have missed. Collins lists five geopolitical principles that outline the factors that influence the expansion, contraction, or stability of national borders over long periods of time. These principles concern mainly the ability of a state to wage war and control its population.

1. Advantage in size and resources. All other things being equal, large and resource-rich states win wars; therefore they expand, while smaller and poorer ones contract.

2. Advantage in location.. States bordering militarily powerful countries in fewer directions, i.e. “peripheral” are in an advantageous position compared to states that have powerful neighbors in a greater number of directions, i.e. with "core" ones.

3. Fragmentation of core states. Core territories facing adversaries on multiple fronts tend to fragment over the long term into an ever-increasing number of small states.

4. Decisive wars and turning points.

5. Overexpansion and disintegration. Even “world” empires may be subject to weakening and long-term decline if they achieve excessive, from a military point of view, expansion.

So, more than 10 years before the collapse of the Soviet Union, Collins compiled a plausible scenario for the future collapse, based on the principles of geopolitics and ethnopolitical science. In its external characteristics, this scenario seemed to correspond to what actually happened.

Collins' opponents, in particular the political scientist G. Derlugyan, argue that nuclear weapons, despite their “symbolic significance,” lead to a deadlock “in interstate rivalry. Competition was imposed on the Soviet Union in non-military areas - economic, political, cultural and ideological production , where America's significant advantages left him no chance of victory." The USSR basically ensured its territorial security in the traditional sense (which is why Gorbachev could afford to take numerous unilateral initiatives in the field of arms limitation), but in the post-Stalin era, something more was required from Soviet leaders and from Soviet society, and, above all, concern for improving the level and quality of life associated with changes in the structure of the population (growth of the urban population employed in industry).

Literature

1. Boffa J. History of the Soviet Union. M: International Relations, 2004.

2. Butenko V. Where we are coming from and where we are going. Lenizdat, 1990.

3. Weber M. Selected works. M.: Progress, 1990.

4. Derlugyan G.M. 2000. The collapse of the Soviet system and its potential consequences: bankruptcy, segmentation, degeneration. - "Polis", No. 2, 3.

5. Collins R. 2000. Prediction in macrosociology: the case of the Soviet collapse. - "Time of the World", Almanac. Vol. 1: Historical macrosociology in the 20th century. Novosibirsk

6. International Yearbook: Politics and Economics, 1991

7. International Yearbook: Politics and Economics, 2001.

8. Sanderson S. Megahistory and its paradigms // Time of the World. Almanac. Issue 1. Historical macrosociology in the twentieth century / Ed. N.S. Rozova. Novosibirsk, 2000. P. 69.

9. Tikhonravov Yu.V. Geopolitics: Textbook. - M.: INFRA-M, 2000. -269 p.

10. Igor Kommersant-Bunin. Union republics: putsch as an indicator of chemical composition // Kommersant, No. 34 dated August 26, 1991.

11. Olga Vasilyeva. “Republics during the coup” // In the collection “Putch. Chronicle of troubled days." - Progress Publishing House, 1991.

12. Resolutions of the State Emergency Committee No. 1 and No. 2

13. B. N. Yeltsin. Biography. 1991-1995 // Website of the Yeltsin Foundation

THE FORMATION OF CHRISTIANITY IN Rus'

Following Kiev, Christianity gradually comes to other cities of Kievan Rus: Chernigov, Novgorod, Rostov, Vladimir-Volynsky, Polotsk, Turov, Tmutarakan, where dioceses are created. Under Prince Vladimir, the vast majority of the Russian population accepted the Christian faith, and Kievan Rus became a Christian country.
Residents of the north and east of Rus' showed much greater resistance. The Novgorodians rebelled against Bishop Joachim, who was sent to the city, in 991. To conquer the Novgorodians, a military expedition of the Kievites, led by Dobrynya and Putyata, was required. Residents of Murom refused to allow Vladimir's son, Prince Gleb, into the city and declared their desire to preserve the religion of their ancestors. Similar conflicts arose in other cities of the Novgorod and Rostov lands. The reason for such a hostile attitude is the population’s commitment to traditional rituals; it was in these cities that elements of a religious pagan organization developed (regular and stable rituals, a separate group of priests - magi, magicians). In southern and western cities and rural areas, pagan beliefs existed more as superstitions than as formal religions. In rural areas, resistance to Christianity was not so active. Farmers and hunters who worshiped the spirits of rivers, forests, fields, and fire most often combined faith in these spirits with elements of Christianity.
Dual faith, which existed in villages for decades and even centuries, was only gradually overcome through the efforts of many, many generations of clergy. And now everything is still being overcome. It should be noted that elements of pagan consciousness are highly stable (in the form of various superstitions). So many of Vladimir’s orders, designed to strengthen the new faith, were imbued with a pagan spirit.
One of the problems after formal baptism was the education of subjects in the Christian spirit. This task was performed by foreign priests, mainly immigrants from Bulgaria, whose inhabitants adopted Christianity back in the 9th century. The Bulgarian Church had independence from the Patriarch of Constantinople, in particular, it could elect the head of the church. This circumstance played a big role in the development of the church in Rus'. Not trusting the Byzantine emperor, Vladimir decided to subordinate the Russian Church to the Bulgarian, and not the Greek, hierarchs. This order was maintained until 1037 and was convenient because Bulgaria used service books in the Slavic language, close to spoken Russian.
Vladimir's time cannot be considered a period of harmony between government and society. The historical significance of this time was as follows:
Creating conditions for full-blooded cooperation of the tribes of the East European Plain with other Christian tribes and nationalities.
Rus' was recognized as a Christian state, which determined a higher level of relations with European countries and peoples.
The immediate consequence of the adoption of Christianity by Vladimir and its spread in the Russian land was, of course, the construction of churches. Vladimir immediately after baptism ordered churches to be built and placed in the places where the idols had previously stood: thus, the Church of St. Basil was erected on the hill where the idol of Perun and other gods stood. Vladimir ordered to build churches and assign priests to them in other cities as well, and to bring people to baptism in all cities and villages. Here two questions arise - in which cities and regions and to what extent was Christianity spread under Vladimir, and then - where did the clergy at the churches come from? There is news that the Metropolitan with bishops sent from Constantinople, with Dobrynya, Uncle Vladimirov, and with Anastas went to the north and baptized the people; Naturally, they first walked along the great waterway, up the Dnieper to the northern end of this route - Novgorod the Great. Many people were baptized here, a church was built for new Christians; but from the first time Christianity was not widespread among all the inhabitants; From Novgorod, in all likelihood, the preachers went by water to the east, to Rostov. This ended the work of the first Metropolitan Michael in 990; in 991 he died. It is easy to imagine how his death must have saddened Vladimir in his new position; the prince could hardly be consoled by other bishops and boyars; soon, however, a new metropolitan, Leon, was called from Constantinople; with the help of Bishop Joachim Korsunyan, who he installed in Novgorod, paganism was completely crushed here. Here is an interesting piece of news about this from the so-called Joachim Chronicle: “When they learned in Novgorod that Dobrynya was going to baptize, they gathered a veche and swore they would not let him into the city, not to give idols to be overthrown”; and exactly when Dobrynya arrived, the Novgorodians swept away the large bridge and came out against him with weapons; Dobrynya began to persuade them with gentle words, but they did not want to hear, they took out two stone-shooting machines (vices) and placed them on the bridge; The chief among the priests, i.e., especially persuaded them not to submit. their wise men, a certain Bogomil, nicknamed the Nightingale for his eloquence.
The Russian Church, which developed in cooperation with the state, became a force that united residents of different lands into a cultural and political community.
The transfer of the traditions of monastic life to Russian soil gave originality to the Slavic colonization of the northern and eastern Slavs of the Kyiv state. Missionary activity in lands inhabited by Finnish-speaking and Turkic tribes not only drew these tribes into the orbit of Christian civilization, but also somewhat softened the painful processes of the formation of a multinational state. This state developed on the basis not of a national, but of a religious idea. It was not so much Russian as Orthodox.
When the people lost faith, the state collapsed. The state collapse of Rus' reflected the ongoing collapse of the ethnic system: although Russians still lived in all the principalities and they all remained Orthodox, the sense of ethnic unity between them was destroyed. The adoption of Christianity contributed to the widespread spread of literacy in Rus', the enjoyment of enlightenment, the emergence of rich literature translated from Greek, the emergence of its own Russian literature, and the development of church architecture and icon painting.
Since the Christianization of ancient Russian society was an ideological action undertaken by the grand ducal authorities in order to illuminate feudal relations, the introduction of Kievan Rus to Christianity stimulated the socio-cultural development of our ancestors not directly, but indirectly. The development of the process of Christianization of some types of socio-cultural activities was accompanied by simultaneous opposition to others. For example, while encouraging painting (frescoes and icons were needed for religious purposes), the newly established church condemned sculpture (there is no place for sculpture in an Orthodox church). Cultivating a cappella singing, which accompanies Orthodox worship, she condemned instrumental music, which had no liturgical use. Folk theater (buffoonery) was persecuted, oral folk art was condemned, and monuments of pre-Christian Slavic culture were exterminated as “pagan heritage.”
Regarding the adoption of Christianity in Ancient Rus', only one thing can be said unequivocally: it became a new round in the development of social relations of the Eastern Slavs.

Answers to test tasks.

Exercise 1.

1.What were the names in Rus' of the participants in military predatory campaigns, immigrants from Northern Europe, the founders of the Old Russian state? Varangians.

2. The upper class of feudal lords in Rus' in the 9th–13th centuries Boyars .

3. People's Assembly in Rus' in the 9th–12th centuries. Veche.

4. Type of land ownership in Russia, family estate, inherited. Patrimony .

5. Armed detachments under the prince in Ancient Rus', who participated

in campaigns, management and personal farming. Squad.

6. The Council under the Prince in the Old Russian State was subsequently a permanent estate-representative body under the Grand Duke. Boyar Duma .

a) under an agreement b) took out a loan c) as a result of military actions Answer B.

8.What was the name of the collection of tribute by the ancient Russian prince and his retinue from free community members? Polyudye.

9. Conditional ownership in Russia at the end of the 15th – beginning of the 18th centuries. Estate.

10. Unofficial government under Ivan the Terrible in 40–50. XVI century The chosen one is glad.

11. The highest class representative body in Russia, created by Ivan the Terrible in 1549. Zemsky Sobor.

12.What were the names of the central, state government bodies in Russia? XVI V. - Boyar Duma, XVII V. - Senate, XIX V. - State Council.

13. The system of maintaining officials in Rus' at the expense of the local population. Feeding .

14. Form of peasant dependence: attachment to the land and subordination to the administrative and judicial power of the feudal lords. Serfdom .

15.What is the name of the policy of forced centralization, without sufficient political and economic prerequisites, with the aim of strengthening the personal power of the king? Oprichnina .

16.What was the name of the systemic crisis of the Russian state at the end of the 16th – beginning of the 17th centuries? Time of Troubles .

17. The process of transition from a traditional feudal society to a new industrial one. Modernization .

18. A type of state power characteristic of Russia in the 18th – early 20th centuries, when all legislative, executive, and judicial power was concentrated in the hands of the monarch. Monarchy .

19. List the main directions of Russian social thought of the 19th century. a) those who advocated the development of Russia along the Western European path - Westernism, b) defending the original path of development of Russia- Slavophiles .

20. Name the main political and ideological trends of the 30-50s. XIX century Conservatism, liberalism, radicalism.

21.List the basic principles of the “theory of official nationality.” Orthodoxy, autocracy, nationality.

22. List the main trends of revolutionary populism: rebellious, propagandistic, conspiratorial .

23. A radical revolution, a profound qualitative change in the development of society, a transition from an outdated socio-economic system to a more progressive one. Revolution.

24. A form of government in which the highest state power belongs to an elected representative body, characteristic of the Soviet period of development. Republic.

25.What was the name of the form of power of the working class in alliance with the poor peasantry, established as a result of the socialist revolution. Dictatorship of the proletariat.

26.What was the name of the economic policy of the Soviet government?

a) from 1918 to 1921 - policy of war communism,b) from 1921 to 1929. - new economic policy (NEP).

27.The transition of private enterprises and sectors of the economy into state ownership, the policy of the Bolsheviks in the first years of Soviet power. Nationalization.

28. The process of creating large-scale machine production, the introduction of machine technology into all sectors of the economy. Industrialization .

29. Transformation of small individual farms into large public farms. Collectivization.

30. A model of the socio-political structure of society, characterized by the complete subordination of a person to political power, comprehensive control of the state over society. Totalitarianism.

31. Conventional name for the period in the history of the Soviet state from the mid-50s to the mid-60s. Thaw.

32. What is the name of the period of international relations from the second half of the 40s to the beginning of the 90s? The twentieth century, characterized by the confrontation between two world socio-economic systems. Cold War era.

Task 2

2.a)2, b)4, c)5, d)3, e)1

6.1d), 2e), 3c), 4b). 5a).

7.a), b), d), g).

8.c) 1547, i)1549, g), 1550, a)1551, h)1555, d)1555, b)1555-1556, f)1565, e)1613.

10.b), e), f), g).

11. 1-e), 2-d), 3-a), 4-c), 5-b).

a) 1714 - Peter 1 founded the Academy of Sciences and the library,

c) 1721 - declared Russia an Empire.

d) 1708 - provincial reform, 1719 - founded 12 colleges

e) 1711 - wedding of Peter and Catherine 1.

f) 1712 - St. Petersburg is the capital.

g) 1718 - established the Admiralty Board.

h) 1722 - approved the law on the procedure for civil service in the Russian Empire and the report card in the authorities.

13.b), d), g), c), a, f).

14.a), b), d), f).

15.a), b), d).

16.a), d), f), i).

18. d), i), a), f), c), h), e), b), g)

19. c), i), k).

20. b), d), e), g)

22. c), d), b), g), a), e), h), f)

24. VTsIK - All-Russian Central Executive Committee

RSDLP - Russian Social Democratic Labor Party

GOELRO - abbreviation for State Commission for Electrification of Russia

VKP(b) - All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks)

All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions

Red Army - Workers' and Peasants' Red Army

CPSU - Communist Party of the Soviet Union

GKChP - State Committee for the State of Emergency in the USSR

25. a), b), d), g)

27. a-2; b-2; at 3; g-1; d-1; e-4; f-4; z-2; u-1; k-4; l-1; m-4

Election of B. N. Yeltsin as President of the Russian Federation

Decree of the President of the Russian Federation “On the phased con-

constitutional reform and dissolution of the Supreme Council of the Russian Federation

First war in Chechnya – 1994

Task 3.

Horizontally: 6 Impeachment; 3Christianity; 5. Entente; 7Unia; 9 Formation; 11 Uprising; 13 Dictatorship; 15 Heretic; 17 Trekhpolye; 19 pacification; 21 Civilization; 23 Strike; 25 Label; 27 Empire; 29 Perestroika; 31 Historiography; 33 Occupation; 35 Methodology; 37NATO; 39 Serf; 41 Reformation; 43 Kamenev; 47 feudal lord; 49 Renaissance; 51 defaults; 53 Nevsky; 55 Nationalization; 57Donskoy; 59 Senate; 61Monk; 63 Veche; 65 Romantics; 67batch; 69 World; 71 Rear; 73 Absolutism; 75 Ermak; 77 Repression; 79 Decree; 81 Opposition; 83 Five-Year Plan; 85 subjectivity; 87 Prince.

Vertically: 2 Theory; 4 Cathedral; 6 Industrialization; 8 Manufactory; 10 Gorbachev; 12 Tips; 14 Destiny; 16Intervention; 18 Communism; 20 Crimean; 22 Rotation; 24 Polis; 26 Khrushchev; 28 war; 30 Abroad; 32 Strike; 34 History; 36 Kurchatov; 38 Periodization; 40 Castro; 42 Thaw; 44 Gilyarovsky; 48 Volok; 50 True; 52 Covenant; 54 Yanaev; 56Oprichnina; 58 Revolution; 62 Stolypin; 64 Salavat; 66 Vyatichi; 68 Smerd; 70Community; 72 Atheism; 74 Orthodoxy; 76 Stagnation; 78 System; 79 Duma; 81 Terror; 82 Chronicle; 84 Tiun; 86 Life; 88 Plenum; 90 Hitler.

Of course, I would hardly write about this myself. It’s banal for me and it’s lazy to just write so many letters. But then one of my friends was given an assignment at university to write an essay on this topic. As soon as I found out, I immediately volunteered to help, troll the scoop one more time - it’s always a holiday for me. This is what happened. Considering that the text was not written on my behalf, I tried as much as possible to deviate from my style, not to use harsh value judgments, and generally make it look at least somehow like an essay by an apolitical first-year girl. I was inspired, as always, by the work of Alexander Petrovich.

So, the collapse of the USSR: a pattern or malicious intent.

"The topic of the collapse of the Soviet Union is one of the most controversial and most mysterious for ordinary people. If you ask a person who does not have more or less deep knowledge in the field of economics and politics, it is unlikely that he will be able to clearly answer this question. Most of the people with whom I had the opportunity to talk on this topic either openly admit that they do not know, or suggest various fantastic scenarios not supported by any factual material - the redistribution of power at the top, the machinations of Americans and dissidents, and other “conspiracy theories.”
Here we immediately come to the second version of the collapse of the Union, indicated in the topic - malicious intent. Of course, the Empire had many internal and external enemies, but I could not find any factual material to talk about the machinations of the enemies. And in various articles and books that talk about the death of the USSR, there are also no serious facts - only speculation of varying degrees of fantasticality. It is also difficult to imagine how, in reality, someone could deliberately harm a country that was already rapidly collapsing. Perhaps some actions of the then leaders of the Soviet Union pushed the country towards collapse, but they were not its cause, but only accelerated the inevitable process. In addition, an analysis of the reforms of the late USSR suggests that the people who made decisions were mistaken absolutely sincerely, and the mistakes were most likely due to the lack of economic knowledge among the members of the Politburo (most of whom came from the village with the appropriate level of education) and their excess faith in communism, the power of a planned economy and the sinfulness of market mechanisms.
At the same time, there are more than enough facts indicating the pattern of the country’s collapse. Let's start with the fact that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics carried disintegration already in its very name. It fell apart precisely because it was SOCIALIST. After all, what is socialism essentially? This is an artificial equalization of the incomes of all elements of society. However, we know from the physics course that in order for work to be done, a potential difference is needed - energy flows from points with higher potentials to points with lower ones. When there is no potential difference, no work is done, and thermal death of the system occurs. And society lives by the same laws. In it, the difference in potential is ensured by a shortage of resources, the competitive struggle for which is the driving force of society.
Society in the Soviet Union was organized, to put it simply, according to the principle of “take away and divide,” formulated by Sharikov in “The Heart of a Dog.” The goal of the distribution machine of the USSR was an approximately equal distribution of goods among all members of society, that is, an almost zero difference in wealth, and therefore almost zero energy in society. In such a society, it makes no sense to create and produce anything beyond measure (unless, of course, the party orders it under pain of execution) - they will take it away anyway. By the way, this is precisely why civilization developed so slowly under feudalism - it was unprofitable for peasants to increase production, because the surplus was taken away by the landowner, and the feudal lords themselves had no incentive to somehow improve productivity and work in general - they were fed by serfs.
Therefore, in order for such a system doomed to thermal death to function at least somehow, it must be fed from the outside. For the USSR, such fuel was first the peasants, the brushwood of all the global projects of the last century. The exploitation of the countryside in general is one of the most striking sources of growth for totalitarian regimes. An example of this, in addition to the Union, is China and other countries of the socialist camp. Even a certain pattern emerged - as soon as the demographic scales of a socialist country passed the equilibrium point, that is, as soon as the population in cities was compared with the number of residents in rural areas, the economy began to slow down and collapse. Statistics also speak about this. If you look at the graphs of socio-economic and demographic processes in the USSR (dynamics of GDP, labor productivity, production of consumer goods, agricultural products, nominal wages, retail trade turnover at current prices, etc.), then almost all of them have a sharp turning point of approximately in the mid-sixties, when the number of urban residents in the country equaled the number of rural ones. The reason is clear: the rise and very existence of industry in socialist countries was carried out at the expense of slave agriculture, from which everything was sucked to the limit, as under feudalism.
After this, the country turned completely raw. The USSR lived exclusively from the sale of oil. This money was used to purchase food and equipment. And then, when in the early 80s the price of oil fell sharply (more than 3 times in 6 years), the Soviet Union began to take out loans en masse from other countries, which Russia, the legal successor of the USSR, has not been able to repay to this day. It was loans from abroad that, at the end of the empire, became the fuel that forced the energy-neutral system of socialism to work, at least. But it was impossible to take out loans indefinitely, and our own industry and agriculture could not provide the country with everything necessary; food had to be purchased more and more every year, which ultimately led to natural famine and decay, which in that situation was the only way to save the population from starvation. President Gorbachev’s assistant Anatoly Chernyaev left the following note about that time (1991): “The harvest is dying, connections are being severed, deliveries are stopped, there is nothing in stores, factories are shutting down, transport workers are on strike. What will happen to the Union? I think that by the new year we will not have a country... There will be a shortage of bread. There are thousands of queues at those bakeries where it is... We are on the verge of a bloody catastrophe...” Now many people like to speculate about whether it was possible to save the Soviet Union. But by that time there was nothing left to save. And all the hardships of the nineties were not caused by the reforms of the beginning of the decade, but by the legacy of the late Union, which reverberated around the country for a long time. So, as we see, the collapse of the USSR is a clear pattern. No malicious intent is needed for a fundamentally non-working system to die.
The pattern of such conclusions is confirmed by the events that followed the collapse of the country. For example, in Russia, after the democrats came to power and the market mechanism was launched, hunger and shortages were eliminated in record time. By the end of 1991, the moment of the death of the USSR, there was a total shortage of everything in the country; almost all the few goods were issued using coupons. And just a year after that, the very word “deficit” practically disappeared from the vocabulary of Russian citizens.
So, let me summarize. The Soviet Union, like any socialist society, was initially doomed to collapse, and all the actions of the Soviet leadership were determined not by mythical evil intent, but by ignorance of the basics of economics and a sincere naive faith in the power of socialism and the State Planning Committee. And I cannot help but be concerned that the sad example of the USSR did not benefit everyone, and many people around the world are still trying to build societies similar to the Soviet one, based on the same false socio-economic premises".

Target:

• Expand the educational space of students as part of the development of research skills of students in Russian history lessons;
• Contribute to the formation of creative thinking, development of a personal attitude towards social problems of society;
• Study the events of 1991, the causes and consequences of the collapse of the USSR.

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Municipal educational institution secondary school of the Lenin state farm

Methodological development of the lesson

On the history of Russia, grade 11.

Dukhanina Anna Viktorovna _

Lesson on Russian history, grade 11.

Topic: “The collapse of the USSR: a pattern or an accident.”

Target:

• Expand the educational space of students as part of the development of research skills of students in Russian history lessons;
• Contribute to the formation of creative thinking, development of a personal attitude towards social problems of society;
• Study the events of 1991, the causes and consequences of the collapse of the USSR.

Tasks:

• Continue to develop students’ understanding of the mutual influence of the country’s development trends;
• To develop in students independence, creative activity, initiative, as stable personality traits, and the ability to creatively solve problems that arise in life.
• Develop the ability to study, acquire and deepen or expand knowledge, work with books, multimedia aids, master skills and abilities and creatively apply them in practice;

Planned results
Students will learn about:
- the causes of interethnic conflicts during the years of perestroika;
- objective prerequisites for the formation of national movements to leave the USSR;
- the historical significance of the adoption of the Declaration of State Sovereignty of Russia;
- the origins and manifestations of the constitutional crisis in the USSR;

Attempts by the Soviet leadership to preserve a multinational state and the reasons for the failure of these attempts;
- the circumstances of the termination of the existence of the USSR.

Basic knowledge

Dates and events:

March 17, 1991 - all-Union referendum on the preservation of the USSR; All-Russian referendum on the introduction of the post of President of the RSFSR

Names:

M. S. Gorbachev, N. I. Ryzhkov, B. N. Yeltsin, A. A. Sobchak, R. I. Khasbulatov, A. V. Rutskoy, G. I. Yanaev.

Basic concepts and terms:perestroika, federation, confederation, interethnic conflicts, state sovereignty, constitutional crisis, lease, State Emergency Committee.

Form : combined lesson (updating and deepening previously acquired knowledge (grade 9), learning new material, applying knowledge and developing skills)

Teacher's methods of activity:explanation, story, conversation, organization of individual presentations, work with text,use of multimedia aids,solving cognitive tasks and problematic issues.

Lesson equipment: textbook “” 11th grade, worksheet notebook, multimedia technical teaching aids, Computer textbook “History of Russia. XX century” Antonova T.S., Kharitonova A.L., Danilova A.A., Kosulina L.G.

Zhuravlev V.V. and others. History of modern Russia. 1984-1994 // Teaching history at school. 1995. No. 8. P. 46-47

The collapse of the USSR - a natural or provoked process?

Introduction

The question of the pattern of the collapse of the USSR is still debatable. At the same time, both supporters and opponents of the non-randomness of this event recognize the action of both economic and political factors as its causes.

Were the actions taken by members of the State Committee for the State of Emergency (GKChP) in August 1991 a coup d'état with the aim of suppressing the democratic renewal of society and returning to a totalitarian system, or was it a desperate attempt to save the social order enshrined in the USSR Constitution? There is no consensus on this question. To what extent the agreement signed on December 8, 1991 in Belovezhskaya Pushcha was an unexpected or expected event, necessary or accidental, probably only future historians can answer.

In any case, in my opinion, it should be recognized that the collapse of the USSR is based on both objective and subjective processes. Let's try to briefly characterize them.

Analysis of the reasons for the collapse of the USSR

Let's turn to history.

The basis of the Bolshevik national policy developed by V.I. Lenin, the idea was to provide the peoples of Russia with the right of national self-determination, the opportunity to decide their own future destiny.

Instead of Stalin’s plan of “autonomization,” Lenin proposed the idea of ​​uniting all republics on equal rights into a single state. The main principle of this association was the equality of its member states and the freedom to leave the Union.

The formation of the USSR was an attempt to revive a single state on the territory of the former Russian Empire. Objectively, this led to the strengthening of defense power, the formation of a unified national economic complex, and the equalization of the socio-economic level of the former national outskirts of the country.

By the beginning of the 80s, the Soviet economic system was increasingly failing. There are subjective reasons for this: dissipation of funds, unfinished construction, numerous additions, embezzlement. But the main objective flaw of the economic model was the lack of material incentives for the manufacturer to work.

The reform, which began in the summer of 1987, was based on the idea of ​​maintaining a planned economy. However, the result of the 1987 reform was the beginning of the formation of the private sector in the economy. But this process took place with great difficulty, since it required initial capital.

Over time, the country's leadership decided that they could not do without a transition to a market economy. Gorbachev agreed to a gradual transition to the market. At the first stage, it was planned to transfer some enterprises to rent, ensure demonopolization of the economy, and begin the denationalization of property. But the implementation of most of these measures was delayed until 1991-1995. None of the economic innovations ever worked.

The rapid decline in the standard of living (and this was quite natural) of the population since the summer of 1989 led to the growth of the strike movement throughout the country. The authorities sought to ease social tensions by massive purchases of food abroad.

Since the Union Government was delaying the solution of economic problems, the republics of the USSR began to develop their own programs of economic transformation (which can also be considered quite natural). A step was taken towards exacerbating national separatism and weakening the role of the Center.

The country's population began to lose faith in the ability of the authorities to achieve changes for the better. By the summer of 1991, Gorbachev's economic reforms had completely collapsed. This meant the complete dismantling of the economic management system that had been in place for decades. However, it was never possible to create an economic system based on material incentives for producers. As a result, the previous management structures were destroyed and new ones were not created. There was a noticeable decline in production in the national economy. The collapse of the Soviet economy in these conditions was inevitable (objectively).

In the summer of 1988, the 19th All-Union Party Conference of the CPSU was held, announcing the beginning of political reform. One of the main provisions of the reform was the idea of ​​​​building a rule of law state in which the equality of citizens before the law would be truly ensured. The introduction of this provision required the abolition of Article 6 of the USSR Constitution on the special role of the Communist Party. The crisis of communist ideology was evident. In such a situation, people are looking for a way out on a different ideological and political basis.

The ruling elites of the republics have taken a course towards eliminating any forms of subordination to the center and acquiring full power. Popular fronts began to emerge in the Baltic republics, becoming the first mass independent organizations.

Thus, attempts to democratize the Soviet political system with the abolition of the sixth article of the USSR Constitution objectively led to a crisis and the beginning of the collapse of the union power structures. New models of statehood were never proposed in their place.

The democratization of public life could not but affect the sphere of interethnic relations. Problems that had been accumulating for years appeared in sharp forms as soon as there was a whiff of freedom.

Transcaucasia became the zone of the most acute ethnic conflicts. In 1987, mass unrest began in Nagorno-Karabakh (Azerbaijan) among Armenians, who made up the majority of the population of this autonomous region.

In May 1988, popular fronts were created in Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia. If at first they supported “perestroika,” they soon declared secession from the USSR as their ultimate goal. The Supreme Councils of the Baltic republics decided to declare national languages ​​as state languages.

In Yakutia, Tataria, and Bashkiria, movements were gaining strength that demanded that these autonomous republics be given union rights.

The leaders of national movements, trying to secure mass support for themselves, placed special emphasis on the fact that their republics and peoples “feed Russia” and the Union Center. As the economic crisis deepened, this instilled in people's minds the idea that their prosperity could only be ensured by secession from the USSR. For the party “leaders” of the republics, an opportunity was created for a career and increased prosperity.

The “parade of sovereignties” began in Georgia, Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, RSFSR, Uzbekistan, Moldova, Ukraine, and Belarus.

The real danger of the uncontrolled collapse of the USSR forced us to look for ways to reform the Union. As a result, M. Gorbachev announced the development of a new Union Treaty. The main idea of ​​this document is the idea of ​​broad rights for the union republics, primarily in the economic sphere. The center turned from a governing body into a coordinating one. The signing of the new Union Treaty (scheduled for August 20, 1991) meant not only the preservation of a single state, but also the transition to its real federal structure, as well as the elimination of a number of state structures traditional for the USSR.

This was followed by clashes between the army and the population in Vilnius, which resulted in the death of 14 people. These events once again compromised the Union Center.

Some of the top leaders of the USSR perceived the preparations for signing a new union treaty as a threat to the existence of a single state and tried to prevent it. On the night of August 19, 1991, the State Committee for a State of Emergency (GKChP) was created in Moscow. Members of the State Emergency Committee explained their actions by the desire to prevent society from sliding into a national catastrophe and to preserve a single state in accordance with the results of the national referendum. Resolutions of the State Emergency Committee in a number of regions of the country, mainly in Russia, introduced a state of emergency, prohibited rallies and demonstrations, suspended the activities of democratic parties and organizations, and established control over the media. However, members of the State Emergency Committee did not receive the necessary support from the country's population, and in Moscow they encountered active opposition from democratic forces. As a result, the attempt of members of the State Emergency Committee to save the USSR led to the exact opposite result - the collapse of the united country accelerated.

On December 8, 1991, the denunciation of the Union Treaty of 1922 and the termination of the existence of the USSR was announced. The agreement on the creation of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) was signed on December 8, 1991 in Belovezhskaya Pushcha by the leaders of three republics - Belarus (S. Shushkevich), the Russian Federation (B. Yeltsin) and Ukraine (L. Kravchuk). Later, at a meeting in Almaty, 8 more republics joined the Commonwealth.

Conclusion

An analysis of the economic and political situation that developed in the country by the end of the 80s of the last century allows us to draw a conclusion about a certain pattern of events that led to the collapse of the USSR.

In my opinion, the objective reasons for the collapse of the empire should be sought both in the economy and political system of the country. Perestroika never touched upon national problems or the national-state structure of the Soviet Union. The leadership of the USSR and the union bodies imposed their guidelines in the field of use of natural resources, economic, social and demographic development of the republics without due consideration of their own interests.

The August events only accelerated the collapse of the Soviet Union.

In conclusion. No empire has ever existed forever. The USSR is no exception.

Short description

The prologue to the collapse of the USSR was the liberation of the former union republics from the omnipotence of the union center, which controlled all aspects of their lives. For decades, our country proclaimed the formal equality of all union republics, which were considered sovereign, but in practice everything looked completely different. The question of the existence of the USSR as a single state arose in front of society in the early 90s of the last century.