Romanov was an effective manager, but a complete ignoramus. Former party leader of Leningrad Grigory Romanov died (video)

Grigory Vasilyevich Romanov was called “master” in Leningrad. His activities are assessed differently: some consider Romanov a strong leader and a good organizer, others consider him a tyrant who stifled dissent. In the mid-1980s, Romanov was tipped for the post of General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and was considered as the main competitor of Mikhail Gorbachev.

Beginning of party career

Grigory Romanov was born in the Novgorod region in a village large family. During the Great Patriotic War he fought on the Leningrad and Baltic fronts. After the war he graduated from the Leningrad Shipbuilding University. In the mid-50s, his party career began, first at the Leningrad Zhdanov plant, where Grigory Vasilyevich worked, then Romanov began to be promoted higher up the party line.

From September 1970 to June 1983, G.V. Romanov headed the Leningrad City Party Committee, becoming the de facto head of the city on the Neva.

Builder and oppressor

These 13 years are key in Romanov’s biography. For them they both thank him and curse him. Under Grigory Vasilyevich, 19 Leningrad metro stations, a large sports and cultural complex, and the Youth Palace were opened... At this time, Leningrad factories produced such world-famous brands as the Kirovets tractor (K-700, which is still successfully used in many farms), ice drift "Arktika", the first to reach the North Pole. Under Romanov, the Leningrad Nuclear Power Plant was launched.

At the same time, Grigory Romanov is associated with repressions against representatives of culture and art, in particular, the persecution of dissidents. Some figures from Leningrad television and the Tovstonogov BDT theater speak about the negative influence of Romanov. At the same time, the Leningrad Rock Club has been operating in Leningrad since 1981, and since 1975 the first rock opera in the USSR, “Orpheus and Eurydice,” has been performed.

There is no unambiguous assessment of Romanov’s attitude towards all these persecutions. Skeptics argue that Grigory Vasilyevich was not such a monster as they want to show him. In particular, Academician Dmitry Likhachev, who repeatedly met with the first secretary of the Leningrad Regional Committee, said that, despite his complex character, it was still “possible to come to an agreement.” Under Romanov, many Leningrad dissidents were indeed arrested or expelled (from the country, to remote regions of the USSR). However, this issue was then dealt with by the “profile” Fifth Directorate of the KGB, and it is unlikely that the personal intervention of the first secretary of the regional committee was required to speed up this process.

However, shortly before his death, Grigory Vasilyevich, in an interview with Rossiyskaya Gazeta, openly admitted his dislike for the work of the writer Daniil Granin - Romanov did not like the writer’s attitude towards the Leningrad blockade. The famous “Siege Book” by D. Granin and A. Adamovich in Leningrad was published only when G. V. Romanov moved to work in Moscow in 1984.

The demonization of the “owner” of the city on the Neva was facilitated by the story of “dishes from the Hermitage”, which Grigory Romanov allegedly used at his daughter’s wedding. This fact, although widely discussed in the foreign press even under Soviet rule, was never confirmed.

Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee

Since 1983, Romanov was in Moscow, he joined the secretariat of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and in this capacity oversaw the military-industrial complex. According to the official, Brezhnev “pulled” him to Moscow. Some historians and political scientists believe that a relatively young and promising politician, Romanov, at one time could hypothetically replace three general secretaries at once - Brezhnev, Andropov and Chernenko: each time he had such an opportunity. But as a result of internal party intrigues of stronger competitors and their supporters, Romanov failed to do this every time.

Why didn't he become secretary general?

Grigory Romanov is considered the antipode of Gorbachev. The leaders of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation still believe that if Grigory Vasilyevich had taken the place of General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee after the death of K. U. Chernenko - instead of Gorbachev, then the USSR would not have collapsed: the West, afraid of the intractable Romanov, was betting on Gorbachev.

When Chernenko died, Romanov was on vacation in Sochi. When Grigory Vasilyevich arrived in Moscow, everything had already been decided without him. Romanov’s team included 2 more members of the Central Committee - Shcherbitsky and Kunaev. Allegedly, both did not arrive at the decisive meeting of the plenum of the Central Committee due to the fault of Gorbachev’s supporters. Shcherbitsky was on a business trip to the USA, and Kunaev was simply not notified in time about the death of Konstantin Ustinovich. As a result, only one candidate for the post of Secretary General of the party’s central committee was discussed at the plenum - M. S. Gorbachev. In essence, Mikhail Sergeevich performed the duties of K.U. Chernenko during his illness.

How a member of the Politburo found himself out of work

In March 1985, Gorbachev became the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and already in July, G.V. Romanov, by decision of the plenum of the Central Committee, was removed from the Politburo and the Secretariat of the Central Committee, explaining this by his retirement “for health reasons.” Although Romanov was only 62 years old at that time, for a politician this is just a mature age. They say that Romanov asked Gorbachev for leadership work, but was refused.

Over the 23 years of his subsequent life, G.V. Romanov no longer held any key positions. In 1998, Yeltsin awarded him a personal pension for his great contribution to the development of domestic industry.

Grigory Romanov died in 2008 in Moscow and was buried at the Kuntsevo cemetery.

Beginning of party career

From September 1970 to June 1983, G.V. Romanov headed the Leningrad City Party Committee, becoming the de facto head of the city on the Neva.

Builder and oppressor

Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee

Why didn't he become secretary general?

How a member of the Politburo found himself out of work

Grigory Romanov died in 2008 in Moscow and was buried at the Kuntsevo cemetery.

ROMANOV Grigory Vasilievich

(02/07/1923). Member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee from 03/05/1976 to 07/01/1985 Candidate member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee from 04/27/1973 to 03/05/1976 Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee from 06/1983 to 07/01/1985 Member of the CPSU Central Committee in 1966 - 1986 Member of the CPSU since 1944

Born in the village of Zikhnovo, Borovichi district, Novgorod region, into a peasant family. Russian. Since 1938 he studied at the technical school. During the Great Patriotic War, at the front, he was severely shell-shocked and frostbitten. In 1946 - 1954 worked as a designer, head of the sector of the Central Design Bureau of the Ministry of Shipbuilding Industry. In 1953 he graduated from the Leningrad Shipbuilding Institute in absentia. In 1954 - 1961 secretary of the plant party committee, secretary, first secretary of the Kirov district party committee of Leningrad. In 1961 - 1963 Secretary of the Leningrad City Committee, Secretary of the Regional Party Committee. From 1963 to 1970, second secretary of the Leningrad Regional Committee of the CPSU. According to I. D. Laptev, who then worked in the magazine “Communist”, he was struck by the office of G. V. Romanov, who held the position of second secretary of the Leningrad Regional Committee of the CPSU: “The office was practically empty - no bookcases, no samples of products from Leningrad enterprises, nor any models of airplanes, tanks, boats that adorned the workdays of many Soviet commanders. What struck me most was Romanov's desk. Not in size - an ordinary office desk covered with green cloth. But absolutely empty! No book, no newspaper, no folder with papers, no stand with a fountain pen, no desk calendar - nothing! As if it had just been delivered from the store and had not yet been processed” (Laptev I.D. Power without glory. M., 2002. P. 32). In 1970, he was elected first secretary of the Leningrad Regional Committee of the CPSU. The first secretary of the Leningrad City Committee of the CPSU, G.I. Popov, was also considered for this position, but after much hesitation, the CPSU Central Committee rejected his candidacy. He showed himself on the positive side. In Leningrad, under his leadership, issues of accelerating scientific and technological progress were actively resolved, the country's first production associations (firms) emerged and strengthened, and comprehensive planning of socio-economic development at enterprises became widespread. He was strict with those who committed abuses. Unlike other regions, Leningrad's leadership was not corrupt. When G.V. Romanov headed the Leningrad Regional Committee of the CPSU, he forbade mentioning his name in newspaper reports about official ceremonies in which he took part on duty. Some saw this not as modesty, but as foresight. He lived in an ordinary city house, in no way standing out among other tenants. A neighbor on the floor above regularly flooded it with water due to a faulty water supply. French President V. J. d'Estaing in his memoirs “Power and Life” (Moscow, 1990, pp. 134 - 136), with reference to L. I. Brezhnev’s friend, Polish leader E. Gierek, wrote that L. I. Brezhnev in 1976 he saw G.V. Romanov as his successor. After this information, d’Estaing asked to be constantly informed about the activities of G.V. Romanov and to send him invitations during the visits of the French president to the USSR. But in 1980, E. Gierek informed d’Estaing that L. I. Brezhnev’s intentions had changed, that he envisioned K. U. Chernenko as his successor. The elderly M.A. Suslov and A.N. Kosygin prepared him for the future management of the party and state in their place. For this purpose, he was introduced, as an equal member, into the Politburo of the Central Committee, where his predecessor V.S. Tolstikov was not admitted, although he dreamed of it. However, with the election of 48-year-old M. S. Gorbachev, at the instigation of Yu. V. Andropov, in 1979 as a candidate member of the Politburo, and in 1980 as a member of the Politburo, the age advantage of 57-year-old G. V. Romanov faded. At the suggestion of Yu. V. Andropov, he was transferred to Moscow. In 1983 - 1985 Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee for Defense Issues. He was one of the contenders for the post of General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. However, inexperienced in hardware combinations, from the first days of his stay in the Central Committee he found himself in isolation. According to V.I. Boldin, he could not rise to the level of national problems and for a long time operated on the scale of a large city and region. He was neither a brilliant politician nor an eloquent speaker. At meetings of the Politburo and the Secretariat of the Central Committee, he remained mostly silent. And if he spoke, he behaved evenly, unlike M. S. Gorbachev, he did not curry favor with his senior colleagues and did not try to impress them with his non-standard judgments. He did not achieve popularity among the party activists either. But he was put forward by forces opposing M.S. Gorbachev. I lost to him in terms of my ability to appear in a way that was beneficial. In terms of political positions, experience, and ability to organize things, he was clearly stronger and could compete with M. S. Gorbachev, which he could not allow. Fearing G.V. Romanov's rise to power, his powerful opponents launched a subtle behind-the-scenes struggle against him. K.U. Chernenko and D.F. Ustinov were informed about the dangerous alliance between the Secretary of the Central Committee for Defense Issues G.V. Romanov and the Chief of the General Staff N.V. Ogarkov. D. F. Ustinov, who suspected that N. V. Ogarkov was aiming for the position of Minister of Defense, persuaded K. U. Chernenko to create the main commands of the directions and transfer the Chief of the General Staff to the Commander-in-Chief of the Western Direction. As a result, N.V. Ogarkov lost real power within the military department, and G.V. Romanov began to slowly fade into the background. The Central Committee staff started talking about the coolness of G.V. Romanov and the democracy of M.S. Gorbachev. A false, provocative rumor was launched that at the wedding of his daughter, G.V. Romanov allowed the use of palace mansions and royal dishes from the Hermitage storerooms, which were smashed on the floor by the guests who were having fun. The parliamentary commission of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR checked the statements spread by someone's masterful hand and found out that the wedding consisted of 12 people, it took place at the dacha of G.V. Romanov, who practically did not participate in it, since there was some conflict in the family. The rumor about museum dishes was not confirmed either. M. S. Gorbachev was reported on the results of the check, it was proposed to publish them in the press, but consent was not received. Then a provocative rumor was launched about G.V. Romanov’s weakness for alcohol. In all the offices they told a joke: they asked the Armenian radio what has changed in Russia since 1770? Answer: “Nothing. They trade in Eliseevsky, they dance in the Mariinsky Theater, and Romanov rules.” He was short, strong built, and very energetic. The West treated him with caution. On March 11, 1985, at a Politburo meeting discussing the issue of electing the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, he spoke in favor of M. S. Gorbachev: “He started with grassroots work in the Komsomol, then the party organization. And here his quality as an organizer and leader of the masses manifested itself. Based on my previous work, I can say that party activists highly appreciate the activities of M. S. Gorbachev. He is an erudite person... Mikhail Sergeevich is very demanding in his work. But this exactingness of his is combined with active help to people, with trust in them. Therefore, I believe that he will fully ensure the continuity of leadership in our party and will fully cope with the responsibilities that will be assigned to him” (TsKhSD. F. 89. Collection of declassified documents). According to V.I. Vorotnikov, M.S. Gorbachev called him on May 13, 1985 and started a conversation about shortcomings in the work of the defense department of the Central Committee, which was headed by G.V. Romanov: “There are many complaints from the heads of large design bureaus and defense factories. There was a detailed conversation about this. After all, he, as the Secretary of the Central Committee, oversees the defense industry. But he does not have good contacts with defense ministries. There are also complaints against him on a personal level - regarding inappropriate behavior on some foreign trips. I will raise the question of replacing him.” Three months after the election of M. S. Gorbachev as General Secretary, he was sent into retirement “due to health reasons.” M. S. Gorbachev directly told him that there was no place for him in the leadership and that it was better to resolve this issue on a voluntary basis, without bringing the matter to a discussion in the Politburo. I took it very painfully, but I wrote a statement. He was not present at the Politburo meeting on May 23, 1985, which discussed his statement. Members of the Politburo supported the proposal to resign their colleague. They understood: these two would not get along in the Politburo. Undeservedly insulted and offended, he did not fight the slander and withdrew from social and political life. He was distinguished by modesty and neatness in his personal behavior. He became a victim of the struggle for the placement of key figures in the upper echelon of power and the elimination of possible contenders, in which not only domestic special services acted. Deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of the 7th - 11th convocations. Hero of Socialist Labor (1983).

Three names of the leaders of the Leningrad communists will forever remain in the people's memory: Sergei Mironovich Kirov, Andrei Andreevich Zhdanov and Grigory Vasilyevich Romanov. The further time separates us from those years when G.V. stood at the head of the Leningrad party organization. Romanov, the more the magnitude of his personality is realized. He was a major state talent and creator.

One of many is one of us

The story of Romanov’s personality is remarkable in that at first it will seem typical for many in Soviet times. The atypicality begins with the manifestation of his remarkable mind as an organizer, capable of recognizing the national significance of his current work, like everyone else’s, and raising it to the highest possible level. Organizational talent is a rare phenomenon at all times. He singled out Romanov among many.

But let's return to the typical. He was born in the village of Zikhnovo, Borovichi district, Petrograd province (now Borovichi district, Novgorod region) into a large peasant family. He was the youngest, sixth child. In 1938 he graduated with honors from junior high school and even before that he joined the Komsomol. In the same year he entered the Leningrad Shipbuilding College. As we see, Stalin’s slogan “Cadres who have mastered technology decide everything!” did not bypass fifteen-year-old Grigory Romanov. But he didn’t have time to graduate from college - the war broke out...

He fought from bell to bell, from 1941 to 1945. In September 1944, he joined the party at the front. He was shell-shocked and awarded two medals - “For the Defense of Leningrad” (1942) and “For Military Merit” (1944).

At the end of the war, he returned to the technical school and in 1946 defended his diploma with honors and received the specialty of a ship-hull builder. Sent to work at TsKB-53 Shipyard named after. A.A. Zhdanov (now “Northern Shipyard”). Here Romanov’s professionalism and organizational skills showed themselves, as stated in the description: “he showed himself to be a technically competent designer and was promoted from an ordinary designer to the position of leading designer, and then head of the sector.” He worked and studied at the evening department of the Leningrad Shipbuilding Institute. He graduated from it in 1953 with a degree in shipbuilding engineer. Thirty years - everything is ahead...

And, in general, a typical biography of a young Soviet man - a front-line soldier. Yes, I attracted attention with my professional culture, organizational skills, will and determination. But there were many of them.

Demanded by time

The originality of Romanov’s personality, his promotion to the ranks of the few who have organizational, managerial talent, and state thinking - all this became obvious with Grigory Vasilyevich’s transition to party work. In 1954, he was elected secretary of the party committee of the plant. A.A. Zhdanova. At thirty-five years old (mature youth!) Romanov is the first secretary of the Kirov district party committee of Leningrad.

People like him were in demand at that time - the time of scientific, technical and social progress in the USSR. In the 60-70s of the twentieth century, the CPSU, in order to remain the leading force of Soviet society, was obliged to promote well-trained party cadres to command positions (in the management of the production sector primarily) - cadres competent in organizing high-tech production. And besides, they know firsthand, but from their own life experience, the social needs and aspirations of ordinary production workers, those who were called ordinary Soviet people. In other words, the party, as always, at the new stage of socialist construction needed personnel who had gone through the school of highly qualified labor, been tested for personal responsibility for decisions made, who had proven their ability to lead knowledgeably and in the best way, and who had received the trust of the party and non-party ranks. Romanov met these requirements fully. In addition, he was unusually talented, smart and, as they said about him, devilishly efficient and completely selfless. His rapid ascent to the top of the party leadership in Leningrad was not accidental: in 1961 he was elected secretary of the Leningrad city committee, and in 1962 - secretary of the regional party committee, in 1963 - its second secretary.

Those were the years of Khrushchev’s voluntarism, which Grigory Vasilyevich did not like to remember. He remained silent, which is understandable: alien to ill-conceived hasty solutions to issues of organizing production, he, a production worker to the core, preferred not to talk about the time during which he had to protect, as far as possible, the Leningrad industry (he was responsible for it in the regional committee) from feverish innovations. What was the cost of just reorganizing party bodies along production lines: dividing them into industrial and rural committees?! But this was also a kind of valuable experience for Romanov: he, as they say, sensed adventurism and incompetence a mile away and did not allow those who suffered from these vices into the party leadership.

First

On September 16, 1970, a turning point occurred in the life of Grigory Vasilyevich - he was elected first secretary of the Leningrad Regional Committee of the CPSU. He was in his forty-eighth year - the time for the blossoming of personality!..

For thirteen years, Romanov headed one of the largest organizations of the CPSU, which by 1983 numbered 497 thousand communists. During these thirteen years, his creative nature revealed itself in full force. His name gained all-Union fame. They started talking about him abroad too.

Imagine at least a sketch of all the complex and varied activities of G.V. Romanov when he was the first secretary of the Leningrad Regional Committee is impossible within the confines of one essay. Its author did not set such a task for himself. But I will try to talk about the outstanding deeds of the great Leningrader.

The first in their series was the creation of large production and research and production associations, which made it possible to effectively develop and implement new technologies. And the main thing is to connect science with production at the time of the scientific and technological revolution. Only in the sixties of the last century, nine sectoral production associations were formed in Leningrad, which covered 43 industrial enterprises and 14 research, design and technological organizations. Associations like LOMO, Svetlana, and Elektrosila did not exist in the West in the nineties (yes!), and they are unlikely to exist there today. Romanov stood at the origins of this epoch-making undertaking, while still being the secretary of the Leningrad Regional Committee. In the seventies, thanks to his will and ability to see the future of production, it received dynamic development. By the end of the eighties, 161 production, scientific-production and industrial-technical associations were already operating in Leningrad and the region. They accounted for 70% of the total production of Leningrad industry. Yes, what a high-tech one! More than one and a half thousand new types of machines and devices were created, including those that had no analogues in the world. The Electrosila association manufactured a turbogenerator with a capacity of 1 million 200 thousand kilowatts. LOMO has a unique optical telescope with a mirror with a diameter of 6 meters. The capitalist West did not know such masterpieces of industrial production at that time.

Romanov, in one of his conversations with me (and there were many of them: when I was a State Duma deputy in 1995-1999, I often met with Grigory Vasilyevich in his Moscow apartment) said: “It’s a lie that we were far behind the West in scientific technically. We were ahead in many ways - in electronics, instrument making, turbo manufacturing, and more. We needed time to translate our achievements in the defense industry into people’s everyday lives. We started this. And they would have pulled ahead if not for Gorbachev’s “perestroika”.

Romanov was one of the few who sought and found a concrete way to combine the advantages of a planned socialist economy with the achievements of scientific and technological progress. This was the essence of creating powerful research and production associations. It is clear that the leading ones were concentrated in the military-industrial complex (MIC), which is the nerve of the entire economy. The USA and the entire West were very worried about this. After the ill-fated “perestroika”, they did not fail to have a hand in removing the said nerve: with feverish privatization, the most powerful associations of the military-industrial complex were dispersed. The pain that Romanov experienced when talking about the tragedy of the Leningrad industry was beyond words. You should have seen his eyes...

He considered the city and region a common home

Another great undertaking of the First Secretary of the Leningrad Regional Committee was the development of a comprehensive plan for the economic and social development of Leningrad and the region for the X Five-Year Plan (1976-1980). Its main link was the same plan for the development of specific production. Industrial enterprises began to acquire institutions for social, everyday and cultural purposes, all that infrastructure for the life support of their workers, which is now completely finished off (everything that was done in the name of man was destroyed in the name of the profit of the owner). Large industrial associations financed the construction of kindergartens, nurseries, cultural and recreation centers, sanatoriums, hospitals and dispensaries. We launched housing construction for workers and their families.

Romanov understood Stalin’s truth better than others: personnel decide everything. I learned it because I realized: it’s not just a matter of the system of training and retraining of personnel. It also consists in creating socio-economic conditions for their fruitful activities.

The experience of integrated planning, born in Leningrad, became widespread in the country and was enshrined in the 1977 Constitution of the USSR.

Under Romanov, a problem of strategic importance for a city of five million was solved: Leningrad began to be provided with basic food products (meat, milk, butter, eggs, vegetables) produced in the agriculture of the Leningrad region. Solving this problem was extremely difficult in the very unfavorable climatic conditions of the North-West. First of all, it was necessary to create a powerful material and technical base. For this, the experience of creating large production associations was useful. With the support of Romanov and under his tutelage, they appeared and grew stronger in the Leningrad region: the association of greenhouse state farms “Leto” (1971), the industrial complex for fattening cattle “Pashsky”, the pig-breeding complex “Vostochny” (1973).

I note that during the period when Romanov was the first secretary of the regional committee, the growth of livestock in agricultural production was not only strictly, but strictly controlled. Its reduction was regarded as causing damage to strategic food resources (what today? who thinks about these resources, and do they even exist?).

Regionalists keep good memories of the demanding first secretary. From the villagers’ memories of him: “Everyone knew Romanov. He was a strict and zealous owner. The region did not offend anyone. He considered the city and the region a common home. In a word - the owner."

For the benefit of the working class

And yet, the most significant of all Romanov’s actions, it seems to me, was his work aimed at replenishing the working class of Leningrad with professionally trained personnel. He was the first Soviet politician to realize the severity of this problem during the period of dynamic development of scientific and technological progress. And he was the first to see the way to solve it through the formation of a system of vocational schools on the basis of general secondary education. Personnel decides everything. But in the case when the workforce is well educated, cultured, and smart. Without general secondary education, they cannot become like that. Romanov approached the solution of the problem not as a technocrat-pragmatist, as his ill-wishers often portray him, but as a statesman and party leader who went through an apprenticeship school in a production team.

Grigory Vasilyevich told me how he convinced the country's leadership of the need to transfer vocational schools to train workers only with secondary education. He involuntarily demonstrated not only his ability to think strategically, but also to tactically correctly pursue his strategic line. He recalled: “Before going to Brezhnev, I asked for an appointment with Suslov. And he began to prove to him that the question of vocational schools with secondary education is a question of the future of the working class, of its leading role. The issue is primarily political. I see that he understands me, agrees, supports me. Well, with his support it’s easier to talk to Leonid Ilyich. After all, this is a serious matter, requiring very significant material costs. The Ministry of Finance resisted. And not everyone in the Politburo agreed. Brezhnev listened to me carefully and agreed. The issue was resolved at the Politburo."

Leningrad was the first city in which, by the end of the seventies, the transition of vocational schools to secondary education was completed. There was no shortage of lofty words about the leading role of the working class in the party press and in oral propaganda. Romanov never competed with anyone in eloquence; he was restrained in his words. He created the conditions for the materialization of the declared great idea. It took time, 10-15 years, for a new generation of workers to form and strengthen, having undergone vocational training on the basis of secondary education. But tragic events for the country (“perestroika” according to Gorbachev and “reforms” according to Yeltsin) stopped the Soviet era and interrupted it.

Slander

Romanov’s time was also interrupted - the time of creation, the creation of something new, a breakthrough into the future. He became an increasingly prominent figure on the political horizon: since 1973 - a candidate member and since 1976 - a member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, since 1983 - Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee (left Leningrad, moved to Moscow). In the West they were looking at him more and more closely. Former French President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, in his book “Power and Life” (1990), recalling his meeting with Romanov in the summer of 1973, noted that he differed from others in the Soviet leadership in his “ease of compulsion, clear acuity of mind.”

Western analysts and Sovietologists saw this well and made efforts to ensure that the myth of the “Leningrad dictator” appeared in the USSR as a gray, limited man who suppressed the slightest dissent. Our dissident intelligentsia picked up this myth, accompanying it with slander. The most common slander is about the alleged use by the family of Grigory Vasilyevich of an ancient service from the Hermitage. Anti-Soviet “intellectuals” did not heed the statement of the director of the Hermitage, Academician Piotrovsky, that this did not and could not have happened. Of course, they could not forgive Romanov for his love for Russian and Soviet classics and, in particular, his respectful attitude towards the Leningrad State Academic Drama Theater named after. A.S. Pushkin and his artistic director Igor Gorbachev.

But the intellectual anti-Sovietists do their best to keep silent about one fact. It happened at the end of a performance in one of the popular drama theaters in Leningrad. Grigory Vasilyevich watched the performance and came to the actors to thank them for their talented performance. One of them, a very famous one, turned to him: “Grigory Vasilyevich, you are our benefactor. I come to you with the humblest request: some land, some land for my dacha.” Romanov’s reaction was immediate: “You are forgetting yourself. I don’t sell land.”

Antipode of Gorbachev

After the death of the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee K.U. Chernenko Romanov was a real candidate for the main role in the party. He learned about the death of the General Secretary on television (a day later than it happened), while on vacation in Sochi, where he was almost forcibly sent by M. Gorbachev, who practically served as the General Secretary of the Party Central Committee during Chernenko’s illness. With great difficulty, Grigory Vasilyevich flew to Moscow - for some reason (?) the plane’s departure was delayed. He arrived at the Politburo meeting when the question of electing the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee was already decided. Romanov’s supporters, Shcherbitsky and Kunaev, were not present at this meeting. The reasons for their absence were also well organized by Gorbachev’s team: the first was allegedly detained out of necessity in the USA, where he was sent; the second was notified of the death of the Secretary General late. At the suggestion of A. Gromyko, one candidate was nominated for the upcoming plenum of the Central Committee - Mikhail Gorbachev.

Gorbachev saw his antipode in Romanov, but, of course, was unable to admit this. In characterizing the rebellious Leningrader, he attributed to him what he himself suffered from: narrow-mindedness and deceit. Speaking about a man of great talent, Gorbachev argued that “one could rarely expect a sensible thought from him.” Dullness always takes revenge on talent.

In July 1985, the plenum of the Central Committee released G.V. Romanov “from his duties as a member of the Politburo and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee in connection with his retirement for health reasons.” Everyone understood everything: Gorbachev was in a hurry to get rid of his antipode in the party leadership. Is 62 years old for a politician? Grigory Vasilyevich was filled with strength and desire to work for the good of the party and the people. He appealed to the Secretary General with a request to reinstate him to party work, but was refused. Gorbachev wrote in his memoirs: “Having met with Romanov, I made it clear quite frankly that there was no place for him in the leadership.”

We know very well who had a place there.

The Courage of a Stoic

Just as heroism is an alternative to betrayal, and creation is an alternative to destruction, so Grigory Romanov was an alternative to Mikhail Gorbachev. In the West, they were well aware of this, as Alexander Zinoviev wrote: “Brezhnev was ill. His days were numbered. Other members of the Politburo are also sick old people. Romanov and Gorbachev began to appear as future leaders of the party... Having thoroughly studied the qualities of both (and perhaps having somehow “hooked” Gorbachev earlier), the relevant services in the West decided to eliminate Romanov and clear the way for Gorbachev. Slander against Romanov was invented and put into use in the media...” And then A. Zinoviev said that, as a reproach to us communists, this was a shameful page in the history of the CPSU: “The inventors of slander were sure that Romanov’s “comrades-in-arms” were not his will protect. And so it happened... No one came out in defense of Romanov.” Cowardice and indifference in the party pave the way for shameless arrogance and betrayal, which is exactly what happened. This is a moral lesson for us. To forget it means to lose your conscience.

Grigory Vasilyevich was very worried about his insecurity. After being expelled from retirement, he remained isolated from the party for a long time, almost throughout the “perestroika”. Few people called him and rarely anyone came, except for his most trusted friends. He was under the surveillance of Gorbachev's spies. Romanov stoically, courageously, and with honor, withstood the political and moral blockade. Didn't bend, didn't break, didn't get embittered. Maintained fortitude and clarity of mind. He was not only a political, but also a moral alternative to Gorbachev.

Romanov adhered to a Puritan lifestyle. Together with his family of six people, he lived in a three-room apartment. He did not tolerate and did not forgive hobbies for materialism. He directly told the leading party workers of Smolny: “Who wants to buy a car and build a dacha - please. But first, write a letter of resignation.” Grigory Vasilyevich was ready for the vicissitudes of fate and never complained about it. I didn’t complain to anyone, I didn’t ask anyone for anything. He was a proud man, independent to the point of scrupulousness. He knew how to take a punch. During “perestroika” he remained rebellious and unconquered. The same can be said about the subsequent times of Romanov’s life.

Legendary person

Grigory Vasilyevich became a member of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation immediately after its II (restoration) congress. He created a community of Leningraders in Moscow and led it until the last day of his life. Provided invaluable assistance to the Leningrad regional organization of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation in the elections to the State Duma of the Russian Federation in 1995. He called and wrote to his colleagues from many years of work in the city and region, where they remembered him more and more often. More than once I witnessed how people at a rally, on the train, in a store said that they saw Romanov either in the city or in the region. I knew that this could not have happened: Grigory Vasilyevich did not leave Moscow, since his wife had been unwell for a long time. I did not try to dissuade my comrades, because I understood: they “saw” him because they really wanted to see him. They wanted order and confidence in the future. Romanov was for Leningraders a symbol of the spirit of Soviet times, when everything was as it should and as needed. It was a symbol of faith for them, and that’s why they saw it. He became a living legend. People like him are not forgotten, just as happiness and joy are not forgotten. They remember not only the great deeds associated with his name, but also his always confident voice, his simplicity, sincerity and openness in communicating with others.

They remember his humanity and nobility. His strict demands, about which there were legends: strict, but fair; First of all, he does not spare himself and does not let anyone down, in a word - a Man!

Leningrad, which became the city of Romanov’s beautiful, heroic fate, the city to which he gave everything he had - talent, soul, selfless work - will never forget him. Leningrad will always be grateful to him.

Who is Grigory Romanov?

Among old communists and everyone who greatly regrets the collapse of the USSR and the collapse of Soviet power, Grigory Romanov is the very savior and hero who could save everything. It is believed that he would have pursued a conservative line, tightened the screws and continued Brezhnev’s work, prolonging the “Era of Stagnation.” Moreover, he was indeed a very real contender for power and, “according to rumors,” a favorite of Yuri Andropov. Since 1976, he was a member of the Politburo. However, Romanov was famous not for this, but for his thirteen years of ruling the “cradle of the Revolution” - Leningrad. There the period is from 1970 to 1983. sometimes called the "Romanov era".

Romanov was considered a strong business executive and a persecutor of dissent

Assessments of Romanov’s activities differ. Range: from “stormy delights” to “a complete nightmare,” from “outstanding organizer” to “persecutor of all living things.” What is it customary to credit Romanov with as the head of the Leningrad Regional Committee? The rapid development of the metro (19 new stations were opened), the construction of a dam began to protect the city from flooding (completed in 2011), as well as the launch of the Leningrad nuclear power plant, the appearance of the Kirovets tractor and the Arktika icebreaker.

On the other hand, his name was associated with the persecution of any dissent and, especially, with the persecution of all those cultural figures who were not eager to share the party line. Many musicians, writers, and poets had a hard time. Romanov is considered almost personally responsible for the fact that Joseph Brodsky and Sergei Dovlatov had to leave the USSR. Political scientist and journalist Boris Vishnevsky even called Romanov “the Apostle of Stagnation.” Paradoxically, in 1981, it was under Romanov, the first rock club in the Soviet Union opened in Leningrad.

Grigory Romanov

If you compare all this, you will come out with a completely typical Soviet leader. “A strong business executive” who does not tolerate when something goes against his plans. Another thing is that from the point of view of the nomenclature, Romanov was successful. And in the Politburo he was considered perhaps the main contender for power, especially since the Union was entering the “five-year period of magnificent funerals.” One after another, the bison of Soviet politics died: Kosygin, Suslov, Brezhnev himself, then Pelshe, Rashidov. Andropov’s hour of death was approaching. Romanov was eight years older than Gorbachev, but significantly younger than Brezhnev’s gerontocrats.

Andropov wanted Romanov to replace him

It was believed that Andropov really wanted Romanov to replace him as General Secretary. Apparently, at that moment, the position of the head of the Leningrad Regional Committee was indeed stronger than ever. But then the Politburo did not dare to go for rejuvenation. Konstantin Chernenko, who went to his grave, was elected General Secretary. He served as head of state for approximately 13 months. Chernenko spent most of this time in the hospital. A couple of times, visiting Politburo meetings were held for him right in the hospital. Chernenko died in March 1985, Gorbachev was appointed chairman of the funeral committee. This is a landmark position. Soviet citizens are already accustomed to the fact that the commission for organizing the funeral of the Secretary General is headed by the future Secretary General. This happened this time too. After this, Romanov's career began to decline. Already on July 1, he was removed from the Politburo, removed from his post as Secretary of the Central Committee. His place was taken by Eduard Shevardnadze.

Could it have been different?

It could, but earlier. There is an opinion that in the winter of 1984, when Andropov died, Romanov was much stronger than in the spring of 1985, when Chernenko died. Within 13 months the wind had changed. The most influential members of the Politburo either initially did not like Romanov very much, or became disillusioned with him over the course of just over a year. Another important circumstance, which, of course, may be a mere coincidence. At the time of Chernenko’s death, Romanov was not in Moscow. The Secretary of the Central Committee was on vacation in Palanga. That is, the entire struggle for power took place without his participation. Was there even a struggle at all?

Konstantin Chernenko

The Afghan war would have continued, the Berlin Wall would have remained in place

After Andropov’s death, the country was left without a secretary general for almost four days. Andropov died on February 9, and Chernenko took office only on the 13th. In the case of Gorbachev, everything happened much faster. Chernenko died on March 10. Already on the 11th the name of the new Secretary General was announced. Gorbachev's candidacy was personally lobbied by Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, a very influential and authoritative man. It is unknown whether anyone lobbied Romanov in March 1985. But, apparently, he learned about Chernenko’s death only when the Politburo had already decided on the choice of successor. Romanov's main supporter was Andropov. That is, in February 1984, Romanov had a real chance of leading the country, but in the spring of 1985 he no longer had a chance.

What would be?

It is difficult to say what would have happened, but we can say for sure what would not have happened. There would be no Perestroika, reforms, cooperatives, warming in relations with the West, and so on. The Afghan war would have continued until it stops (although it is difficult to judge where this stop is), the Berlin Wall would have remained in place and would have divided the city in half. The USSR would have buttoned itself up and, using all its resources, would have tried to preserve the empire at any cost. The emphasis in such situations is on the ideological front. The culture would be clamped in a steel vice. No rock wave for you. In this regard, Romanov would do the same thing that Chernenko did - he would strangle him.

Residents of the GDR dismantle the Berlin Wall

How would the Union solve the problems of falling oil prices? By tightening belts and distracting attention. Romanov loved to build. The Union would take on some large-scale construction project. Perhaps they would remember the idea of diverting the Siberian rivers. But the collapse would have happened anyway. Not in the early 90s, but ten years later. The union was showing a crack that could not be hidden in the foundation of a grandiose construction project. And as soon as this crack became visible to the naked eye, the local elite would pull the republics in different directions. Romanov could delay this moment for 8-10 years. That's all.