An event is connected with the State Emergency Committee. GKChP (state emergency committee)

Source - Wikipedia

The State Committee for the State of Emergency is a self-proclaimed government body in the USSR that existed from August 18 to August 21, 1991. It was formed from the first statesmen and officials of the Soviet government who opposed the reforms of Perestroika carried out by USSR President M.S. Gorbachev and the transformation of the Soviet Union into a new “Union of Sovereign States”, which became a confederation consisting of part of the already sovereign republics.
The forces under the leadership of the President of Russia (RSFSR) B. N. Yeltsin refused to obey the State Emergency Committee, calling their actions unconstitutional; there was an attempt to declare a strike. The actions of the State Emergency Committee led to events that became known as the “August Putsch.”
From August 22 to August 29, 1991, former members of the dissolved Emergency Committee and those who actively assisted them were arrested, but from June 1992 to January 1993, they were all released on their own recognizance. In April 1993, the trial began. On February 23, 1994, the defendants in the State Emergency Committee case were amnestied by the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, despite Yeltsin’s objection. One of the defendants, Valentin Varennikov, refused to accept the amnesty and his trial continued. On August 11, 1994, the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of Russia acquitted Varennikov.

By the beginning of 1991, the situation in the USSR became critical. The country entered a period of disintegration. The leadership began to consider the issue of introducing a state of emergency.
From the “Conclusion on the materials of the investigation into the role and participation of USSR KGB officials in the events of August 19-21, 1991”:

Marat Nikolaevich asked my advice on what type of helicopter to choose - the Mi-8 or Mi-24. Naturally, I recommended the Mi-24, since it was armored against 12.7 mm bullets, and all the tanks that were in the White House area had machine guns of this caliber. But if one of the engines failed, the Mi-24 helicopter could not continue flying. The Mi-8 could fly on one engine. Tishchenko agreed with me. However, less than an hour later, he called back and joyfully reported that, according to the information he received from the same KGB department, all the tanks and infantry fighting vehicles brought into Moscow do not have ammunition, so he is preparing the Mi-8. And after some time, a message came that the commander of the Airborne Forces, General Grachev, stopped the division in Kubinka. By the evening it became clear that the State Emergency Committee had failed disgracefully, and by lunchtime on August 21, all the media loudly announced this. The orgy of victory began.

Unfortunately, it was overshadowed by the death of three people under the wheels of an infantry fighting vehicle in the tunnel between Vosstaniya Square and Smolenskaya Square. It all seemed strange to me. Why send troops and armored vehicles into Moscow without ammunition? Why is the Moscow department of the KGB seeking to save Yeltsin and why is KGB Chairman Kryuchkov a member of the State Emergency Committee? All this resembled some kind of farce. Subsequently, in 1993, Yeltsin actually stormed the White House, and the tanks fired direct fire and not with blank charges. And in August 1991, all this looked like a grandiose performance or monstrous stupidity on the part of the leadership of the State Emergency Committee. However, what happened happened. I only express my opinion. Then events developed at lightning speed: the return of Gorbachev from Foros, the ban and dissolution of the CPSU, the Belovezhskaya Agreement on the liquidation of the USSR, the creation of the Union of Independent States on the basis of the former republics of the USSR.

The most absurd thing, of course, seemed to be the collapse of the single Slavic core: Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. It seemed that some kind of insanity had occurred among the leaders of these republics, who demonstrated complete ignorance of the history of the creation of Russian statehood. But the most striking thing was that all this was supported by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, which hastened to dissolve itself, and the Supreme Council of the Russian Federation ratified the Belovezhskaya Conspiracy.

I remembered the words of Denikin and Wrangel, who, after the defeat of the White movement in the Civil War of 1918, addressing descendants in their memoirs, noted the historical merit of the Bolsheviks in that they basically preserved Great Russia. Modern Bolsheviks, dressed in national clothes, completely destroyed a great power, completely disregarding the opinions of its people.

After some time, it became clear that at the head of all these processes was the apparatus of the CPSU Central Committee, headed by Politburo member A.N. Yakovlev and with a very dubious and incomprehensible role of Gorbachev. Most of the rulers in the new states belonged to the cohort of workers of the CPSU party apparatus, and most of the oligarchs and “new” Russians in the past belonged to the party or Komsomol elite. Before the eyes of the entire people, active supporters of the policies of the CPSU turned into its fierce enemies. Calls for a “witch hunt” began, although they were soon suspended, since this clearly could affect them themselves.

The people were deceived.

Links:
1. Ogarkov and Operation Herat
2. Akhromeev Sergey Fedorovich
3. Gorbacheva Raisa Maksimovna (ur. Titarenko)
17.

All members of the State Emergency Committee were arrested, with the exception of the USSR Minister of Internal Affairs Boris Pugo, who committed suicide.

From the point of view of the creators of the State Emergency Committee themselves, their actions were aimed at restoring the rule of law in the USSR and stopping the collapse of the state. Their actions did not receive a legal assessment, since all arrested members of the State Emergency Committee were amnestied even before the trial. Only V.I. Varennikov, who was not a member of the committee, voluntarily appeared before the court and was acquitted.

Formation of the State Emergency Committee

Preparing to create a committee

From the “Conclusion on the materials of the investigation into the role and participation of USSR KGB officials in the events of August 19-21, 1991”:

...in December 1990, the Chairman of the KGB of the USSR Kryuchkov V.A. instructed the former deputy head of the PGU of the KGB of the USSR V.I. Zhizhin and the assistant of the former first deputy chairman of the KGB of the USSR V.F. Grushko. Egorov A.G. to carry out the study of possible primary measures for stabilization situation in the country in case of a state of emergency. From the end of 1990 to the beginning of August 1991, V. A. Kryuchkov, together with other future members of the State Emergency Committee, took possible political and other measures to introduce a state of emergency in the USSR by constitutional means. Having not received the support of the President of the USSR and the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, from the beginning of August 1991 they began to implement specific measures to prepare for the introduction of a state of emergency by illegal means.

From August 7 to 15, V. A. Kryuchkov repeatedly held meetings with some members of the future State Emergency Committee at the secret facility of the PGU KGB of the USSR, code-named UABCF. During the same period of time, V.I. Zhizhin and A.G. Egorov, at the direction of Kryuchkov, carried out adjustments to the December documents on the problems of introducing a state of emergency in the country. They, with the participation of the then commander of the airborne troops, Lieutenant General P.S. Grachev, prepared data for V.A. Kryuchkov on the possible reaction of the country's population to the introduction of a state of emergency in a constitutional form. The content of these documents was later reflected in official decrees, appeals and orders of the State Emergency Committee. On August 17, Zhizhin V.I. participated in the preparation of theses for V.A. Kryuchkov’s speech on television in the event of a state of emergency.

Participants in the conspiracy at various stages of its implementation assigned the USSR KGB a decisive role in:

• removing the President of the USSR from power by isolating him;
• blocking possible attempts by the President of the RSFSR to resist the activities of the State Emergency Committee;
• establishing constant control over the whereabouts of the heads of government bodies of the RSFSR, Moscow, people's deputies of the USSR, the RSFSR and the Moscow City Council, known for their democratic views, and major public figures with a view to their subsequent detention;
• carrying out, together with units of the Soviet Army and units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, an assault on the building of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR with the subsequent internment of persons captured there, including the Russian leadership.

from August 17 to 19, some special forces of the KGB of the USSR and special forces of the PGU of the KGB of the USSR were put on heightened combat readiness and redeployed to pre-designated places to participate, together with units of the SA and the Ministry of Internal Affairs, in measures to ensure the state of emergency. Using specially created groups, on August 18, USSR President Gorbachev was isolated in a vacation spot in Foros, and RSFSR President Yeltsin and other opposition-minded individuals were placed under surveillance.

Members of the Emergency Committee

1. Baklanov Oleg Dmitrievich (born 1932) - First Deputy Chairman of the USSR Defense Council, member of the CPSU Central Committee.
2. Kryuchkov Vladimir Aleksandrovich (1924-2007) - Chairman of the KGB of the USSR, member of the CPSU Central Committee.
3. Pavlov Valentin Sergeevich (1937-2003) - Prime Minister of the USSR.
4. Pugo Boris Karlovich (1937-1991) - Minister of Internal Affairs of the USSR, member of the Central Control Commission of the CPSU.
5. Starodubtsev Vasily Aleksandrovich (born 1931) - Chairman of the Peasant Union of the USSR, member of the CPSU Central Committee.
6. Tizyakov Alexander Ivanovich (born 1926) - President of the Association of State Enterprises and Industrial, Construction, Transport and Communications Facilities of the USSR.
7. Yazov Dmitry Timofeevich (born 1923) - Minister of Defense of the USSR, member of the CPSU Central Committee.
8. Yanaev Gennady Ivanovich (born 1937) - Vice-President of the USSR, Chairman of the State Emergency Committee, member of the CPSU Central Committee.

Political positions of the State Emergency Committee

In its first appeal, the State Emergency Committee assessed the general mood in the country as very skeptical towards the new political course of dismantling the highly centralized federal structure of governing the country, the one-party political system and state regulation of the economy, and condemned the negative phenomena that the new course, according to the drafters, caused life, such as speculation and the shadow economy, proclaimed that “the development of the country cannot be built on the decline in the living standards of the population” and promised to strictly restore order in the country and solve the main economic problems, without, however, mentioning specific measures.

Events of August 19-21, 1991

After the August events

1. The Russian leadership, which led the fight against the State Emergency Committee, ensured the political victory of the supreme bodies of Russia over the Union Center. Since the fall of 1991, the Constitution and laws of the RSFSR, the Congress of People's Deputies and the Supreme Council of the RSFSR, as well as the President of the RSFSR received full supremacy over the laws of the USSR on the territory of Russia. With rare exceptions, the heads of regional authorities of the RSFSR who supported the State Emergency Committee were removed from office.
2. The republics of the USSR declared their independence (in chronological order):
3. The power structures of the USSR were paralyzed and collapsed.
4. The process of concluding a new union treaty (Union of Sovereign States) was disrupted.
5. The CPSU was banned and dissolved.
6. USSR President Gorbachev returned to power, but actually lost his powers and was forced to resign at the end of 1991.

"Accomplices" and "sympathizers"

After the failure of the August putsch, in addition to members of the State Emergency Committee, some persons were brought to criminal liability, who, according to the investigation, actively assisted the State Emergency Committee. All of them were released under an amnesty in 1994. Among the “accomplices” were:

• Anatoly Ivanovich Lukyanov (born 1930) - Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR; his address was broadcast on TV and radio along with the main documents of the State Emergency Committee.
• Shenin Oleg Semyonovich (1937-2009) - member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee.
• Prokofiev Yuri Anatolyevich (born 1939) - member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, 1st Secretary of the Moscow City Committee of the CPSU.
• Varennikov Valentin Ivanovich (1923-2009) - army general.
• Boldin Valery Ivanovich (1935-2006) - head of the General Department of the CPSU Central Committee.
• Medvedev Vladimir Timofeevich (born 1937) - KGB general, head of Gorbachev’s security.
• Ageev Geniy ​​Evgenievich (1929-1994) - Deputy Chairman of the KGB of the USSR.
• Generalov Vyacheslav Vladimirovich (b. 1946) - head of security at Gorbachev’s residence in Foros

Trial of the State Emergency Committee

Formally, it turns out that each of these people, except Varennikov, who accepted the amnesty, seemed to agree that he was guilty, and seemed to agree that he was guilty of what he was accused of, including 64 th article. Formally so. But they all accepted the amnesty with the caveat: “I’m innocent. And only because we are tired, we are tired, in the interests of society, in the interests of the state, responding to the decision of the State Duma on the amnesty, only for this reason we accept the amnesty.”

There is another year in the history of the Russian state that can be called revolutionary. When the country became tense to the limit, and Mikhail Gorbachev could no longer influence even his immediate circle, and they tried in every possible way to resolve the current situation in the state by force, and the people themselves chose who to give their sympathies to, the 1991 putsch occurred.

Old leaders of the state

Many leaders of the CPSU, who remained committed to conservative management methods, realized that the development of perestroika was gradually leading to the loss of their power, but they still remained strong enough to prevent the market reform of the Russian economy. By doing this they tried to prevent the economic crisis.

And yet, these leaders were no longer authoritative enough to use persuasion to hinder the democratic movement. Therefore, the only way out of the current situation, which seemed most possible for them, was to declare a state of emergency. No one then expected that in connection with these events the coup of 1991 would begin.

The ambiguous position of Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev, or the removal of leadership

Some conservative figures even tried to put pressure on Mikhail Gorbachev, who had to maneuver between the old leadership and representatives of the democratic forces in his inner circle. These are Yakovlev and Shevardnadze. This unstable position of Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev led to him gradually losing support from both sides. And soon information about the upcoming coup began to leak into the press.

From April to July, Mikhail Gorbachev prepared an agreement, called “Novo-Ogarevo”, with the help of which he was going to prevent the collapse of the Soviet Union. He intended to transfer the bulk of the powers to the authorities of the union republics. On July 29, Mikhail Sergeevich met with Nursultan Nazarbayev and Boris Yeltsin. The main parts of the agreement were discussed in detail, as well as the upcoming removal of many conservative leaders from their posts. And this became known to the KGB. Thus, events were increasingly approaching the period that in the history of the Russian state began to be called the “August 1991 putsch.”

Conspirators and their demands

Naturally, the leadership of the CPSU was concerned about the decisions of Mikhail Sergeevich. And during his vacation, she decided to take advantage of the situation using force. Many famous personalities took part in this peculiar conspiracy. It was who at that time was the chairman of the KGB, Gennady Ivanovich Yanaev, Dmitry Timofeevich Yazov, Valentin Sergeevich Pavlov, Boris Karlovich Pugo and many others who organized the 1991 putsch.

On August 18, the State Emergency Committee sent a group representing the interests of the conspirators to Mikhail Sergeevich, who was vacationing in Crimea. And they presented him with their demands: to declare a state of emergency in the state. And when Mikhail Gorbachev refused, they surrounded his residence and cut off all types of communications.

Provisional Government, or Expectations Not Met

In the early morning of August 19, about 800 armored vehicles were brought into the Russian capital, accompanied by an army of 4 thousand people. It was announced in all the media that the State Emergency Committee had been created, and all powers to govern the country were transferred to it. On this day, waking up people who turned on their TVs could only see an endless broadcast of the famous ballet called “Swan Lake”. This was the morning when the August 1991 coup began.

The people responsible for the conspiracy claimed that Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev was seriously ill and temporarily unable to govern the state, and therefore his powers were transferred to Yanaev, who was vice president. They hoped that the people, already tired of perestroika, would side with the new government, but the press conference they organized, where Gennady Yanaev spoke, did not make the right impression.

Yeltsin and his supporters

A photograph of Boris Nikolaevich, taken at the time of his speech to people, was published in many newspapers, even in Western countries. Several officials agreed with Boris Yeltsin's opinion and fully supported his position.

Putsch 1991. Briefly about the events that occurred on August 20 in Moscow

A huge number of Muscovites took to the streets on August 20. They all demanded the dissolution of the State Emergency Committee. The White House, where Boris Nikolaevich and his supporters were, was surrounded by defenders (or, as they were called, those resisting the putschists). They built barricades and surrounded the building, not wanting the old order to return.

Among them were a lot of native Muscovites and almost the entire elite of the intelligentsia. Even the famous Mstislav Rostropovich specially flew from the United States to support his compatriots. The August 1991 putsch, the reasons for which was the reluctance of the conservative leadership to voluntarily give up their powers, rallied a huge number of people. Most countries supported those who defended the White House. And all the leading television companies broadcast the events taking place abroad.

Plot failure and the return of the President

A demonstration of such mass disobedience prompted the putschists to decide to storm the White House, which they scheduled for three in the morning. This terrible event resulted in more than one victim. But overall the putsch failed. Generals, soldiers and even most Alpha fighters refused to shoot at ordinary citizens. The conspirators were arrested, and the President returned safely to the capital, canceling absolutely all orders of the State Emergency Committee. This is how the August 1991 coup ended.

But these few days greatly changed not only the capital, but the whole country. Thanks to these events, it occurred in the history of many states. ceased to exist, and the political forces of the state changed their alignment. As soon as the 1991 putsch ended, on August 22, rallies representing the country's democratic movement were held again in Moscow. On them, people carried banners of the new tricolor national flag. Boris Nikolayevich asked the relatives of all those killed during the White House siege for forgiveness, since he could not prevent these tragic events. But overall the festive atmosphere remained.

Reasons for the failure of the coup, or the final collapse of communist power

The 1991 coup ended. The reasons that led to its failure are quite obvious. First of all, the majority of people living in the Russian state no longer wanted to return to the times of stagnation. Distrust in the CPSU began to be expressed very strongly. Other reasons are the indecisive actions of the conspirators themselves. And, on the contrary, quite aggressive on the part of the democratic forces, which were represented by Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin, who received support not only from the large masses of the Russian people, but also from Western countries.

The 1991 coup not only had tragic consequences, but also brought significant changes to the country. He made it impossible to preserve the Soviet Union, and also prevented the further expansion of the power of the CPSU. Thanks to the decree signed by Boris Nikolayevich on the suspension of its activities, after some time all Komsomol and communist organizations throughout the state were dissolved. And on November 6, another decree finally banned the activities of the CPSU.

Consequences of the tragic August coup

The conspirators, or representatives of the State Emergency Committee, as well as those who actively supported their positions, were immediately arrested. Some of them committed suicide during the investigation. The 1991 coup took the lives of several ordinary citizens who defended the White House building. These people were awarded titles and their names forever entered the history of the Russian state. These are Dmitry Komar, Ilya Krichevsky and Vladimir Usov - representatives of Moscow youth who stood in the way of moving armored vehicles.

The events of that period forever erased the era of communist rule in the country. The collapse of the Soviet Union became obvious, and the main public masses fully supported the positions of the democratic forces. The putsch had such an impact on the state. August 1991 can safely be considered the moment that sharply turned the history of the Russian state in a completely different direction. It was during this period that the dictatorship was overthrown by the popular masses, and the choice of the majority was on the side of democracy and freedom. Russia has entered a new period of its development.

On August 19, 1991, 24 years ago, the Soviet people learned from the morning television news about the formation of the State Committee for the State of Emergency in the USSR (GKChP). It was announced that the country's President Mikhail Gorbachev was ill and Vice President Gennady Yanaev, Chairman of the State Emergency Committee, took over his duties.

Meanwhile, armored vehicles were entering Moscow. Columns of armored personnel carriers and tanks obediently stopped when the light turned red. Television announcers transmitted documents from the State Emergency Committee every hour, after which “Swan Lake” was shown on TV. It started to look like a farce.

Boris Yeltsin (by that time already the president of the RSFSR) gathered his comrades-in-arms to the White House to “repel the junta.” The members of the Soviet leadership themselves sat back, as if waiting for something. The press conference that members of the State Emergency Committee gave in the evening did not add any clarity. On the contrary, it caused chuckles about Yanaev’s shaking hands.

It was a very strange putsch.

On August 20, it became clear: the State Emergency Committee was losing to Yeltsin, who gathered a rally at the White House to repel the “putschists” and “defend” Gorbachev, who was illegally removed from power. On the night of the 21st, in a tunnel on the Garden Ring, three guys died under the tracks while trying to stop armored vehicles, and in the afternoon Gorbachev was rescued from Foros. This was followed by arrests by the Russian prosecutor's office of members of the State Emergency Committee and those leaders who actively supported it.

As a result, the following people ended up in the cells of the Matrosskaya Tishina detention center: Vice-President of the USSR G.I. Yanaev, Prime Minister V.S. Pavlov, Minister of Defense D.T. Yazov, Head of the KGB of the USSR V.A. Kryuchkov, Deputy Chairman of the Defense Council O.D. Baklanov, Chairman of the Association of State Enterprises of Industry, Transport and Communications A.I. Tizyakov, chairman of the Agro-Industrial Union and chairman of the collective farm V.A. Starodubtsev. And also their like-minded people: Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and Politburo member O.S. Shenin, Chief of Staff of the President of the USSR V.I. Boldin, Deputy Minister of Defense, Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces General V.I. Varennikov, heads of KGB departments Yu.S. Plekhanov and V.V. Generals. A couple of days later they were joined by the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR A.I. Lukyanov, who was not a member of the committee and did not support it. Russian prosecutor Valentin Stepankov accused all of them of “treason to the Motherland.” There were only 4 months left before the liquidation of the USSR.

The coup lasted only three days, but became a point of no return for the vast country.

The empire, which in August 1991 was just cracking along the borders of the republics, in December of the same year irrevocably broke into several pieces.

But then, on August 21, the victory over the State Emergency Committee was greeted with jubilation. People believed that, even if not immediately, even if it was difficult, but in the foreseeable future we would live in a prosperous, civilized, democratic country. However, this did not happen.

Outside the country

After the end of World War II, the main directions of the struggle against the Russian people were determined, which were later embodied in official documents of the US government, and, above all, in the directives of the US National Security Council and the laws of this country.

In a circular from US Secretary of State J.F. Dulles to American embassies and missions abroad on March 6, 1953, immediately after Stalin's death, emphasized:

Our main goal remains to sow doubts, confusion, and uncertainty regarding the new regime not only among the ruling circles and the masses in the USSR and satellite countries, but also among communist parties outside the Soviet Union.

And finally, the Captive Peoples Act, adopted by the NOA Congress in August 1959, openly raised the issue of dividing Russia into 22 states and inciting hatred against the Russian people. The same law determines the independence of the current Donbass, called Cossackia in the text, and thereby makes the current US policy in relation to the Donetsk and Lugansk People's Republics untenable.

Since 1947, under the pretext of fighting communism, the American government has allocated hundreds of millions of dollars annually to implement programs to combat Russia and the Russian people.

One of the main points of these programs was the training of “like-minded people, allies and assistants” in Russia.

The most detailed plan for the destruction of the USSR was described in US National Security Council Directive 20/1 of August 18, 1948:

Our main goals regarding Russia, in essence, boil down to just two:

a) Reduce the power and influence of Moscow to a minimum;

b) Carry out fundamental changes in the theory and practice of foreign policy,

which are adhered to by the government in power in Russia.

For the peace period, NSS Directive 20/1 provided for the capitulation of the USSR under external pressure. The consequences of such a policy were, of course, foreseen in the NSC Directive 20/1:

Our efforts to get Moscow to accept our concepts are tantamount to a statement: our goal is the overthrow of Soviet power. Starting from this point of view, we can say that these goals are unattainable without war, and, therefore, we thereby admit: our ultimate goal in relation to the Soviet Union is war and the overthrow of Soviet power by force.

It would be a mistake to follow this line of reasoning.

Firstly, we are not bound by a specific deadline to achieve our goals in peacetime. We do not have a strict alternation between periods of war and peace that would prompt us to declare: we must achieve our goals in peacetime by such and such a date or “we will have recourse to other means...”.

Secondly, we should rightly feel absolutely no guilt in seeking to eliminate concepts that are incompatible with international peace and stability and replace them with concepts of tolerance and international cooperation. It is not our place to ponder the internal consequences that the adoption of such concepts in another country might lead to, nor should we think that we bear any responsibility for these events... If the Soviet leaders consider that the growing importance of more enlightened concepts of international relations is incompatible with maintaining their power in Russia, then this is their business, not ours. Our job is to work and ensure that internal events happen there... As a government, we are not responsible for internal conditions in Russia... .

The new US strategic doctrine regarding the USSR NS DD-75, prepared for US President R. Reagan by Harvard historian Richard Pipes, proposed intensifying hostile actions against Russia.

The directive clearly formulated, writes American political scientist Peter Schweitzer, that our next goal is no longer coexistence with the USSR, but a change in the Soviet system. The directive was based on the conviction that changing the Soviet system through external pressure was entirely within our power.

Another American doctrine - “Liberation” and the concept of “Information Warfare”, developed for the administration of President George W. Bush, openly proclaimed the main goal of the Western world “dismantling the USSR” and “dismemberment of Russia”, ordered American legal and illegal structures to monitor the state, initiate and manage anti-Russian sentiments and processes in the republics of Russia and establish a fund of billions of dollars. per year to assist the “resistance movement.”

In the seventies and eighties, the American program for training agents of influence in the USSR acquired a complete and purposeful character. It cannot be said that this program was not known to the Soviet leadership. The facts say that it was. But those people whom we today can with full responsibility call agents of influence deliberately turned a blind eye to it.

Inside the country

The KGB of the USSR prepared a special document on this matter, which was called “On the CIA’s plans to acquire agents of influence among Soviet citizens.”

According to KGB Chairman Kryuchkov, the competent authorities of the USSR knew about these plans:

Pay attention to the deadline - it speaks of a thoughtful, long-term policy, the core of which is genocide.

Today we can speak with complete certainty about the implementation of many plans developed by the world behind the scenes in relation to the USSR. In any case, by the beginning of the eighties, American intelligence had dozens of assistants and like-minded people in the highest echelons of power. The role of some of them is already quite clear, the results of their activities are obvious and data on their cooperation with foreign intelligence services cannot be refuted.

According to data reported by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Latvia, from 1985 to 1992, the West (primarily the USA) invested “in the process of democratization of the USSR (that is, in the destruction of Russia) 90 billion dollars. This money was used to buy the services of the right people, train and pay agents of influence, send special equipment, instructors, literature, etc.

Through the network of representative offices of the Crible Institute and similar institutions, hundreds of people who formed the personnel backbone of the destroyers of the USSR and the future Yeltsin regime, including: G. Popov, G. Starovoitova, M. Poltoranin, A. Murashov, S. Stankevich, underwent instructive training for agents of influence. , E. Gaidar, M. Bocharov, G. Yavlinsky, Yu. Boldyrev, V. Lukin, A. Chubais, A. Nuikin, A. Shabad, V. Boxer, many “shadow people” from Yeltsin’s entourage, in particular the head of his elected campaign in Yekaterinburg A. Urmanov, as well as I. Viryutin, M. Reznikov, N. Andrievskaya, A. Nazarov, prominent journalists and television workers. Thus, a “fifth column” was formed in the USSR, which existed as part of the Interregional Deputy Group and “Democratic Russia”.

It is reliably known that M. Gorbachev knew from the reports of the KGB of the USSR about the existence of special institutions for training agents of influence, and he also knew the lists of their “graduates”. However, he did nothing to stop the activities of the traitors.

Having received a dossier from the KGB leadership containing information about an extensive network of criminals against the state, Gorbachev prohibits the KGB from taking any measures to suppress criminal attacks. Moreover, he does his best to cover and shield the “godfather” of agents of influence in the USSR A.N. Yakovlev, despite the fact that the nature of the information about him coming from intelligence sources did not allow one to doubt the true background of his activities.

Here is what the former KGB chairman Kryuchkov reports about this:

In 1990, the State Security Committee through intelligence and counterintelligence received from several different (and assessed as reliable) sources extremely alarming information regarding A. N. Yakovlev. The meaning of the reports was that, according to Western intelligence services, Yakovlev occupies positions favorable to the West, reliably opposes the “conservative” forces in the Soviet Union, and that he can be firmly counted on in any situation. But, apparently, the West believed that Yakovlev could and should show more persistence and activity, and therefore one American representative was instructed to hold a corresponding conversation with Yakovlev, directly telling him that more was expected of him.

It is worth recalling that many of the “young reformers” went through Andropov’s “Lonjumeau School”, which was the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) in Vienna, where regular, quarterly seminars were held, to which our “trainees” came, accompanied by “curators” " from the KGB and met there with Western "management specialists", half of whom were Western intelligence officers. And Gorbachev himself became friends with Andropov back in the 1970s, which can explain a lot.

Andropov and Gorbachev, Stavropol region, 1973

Even after receiving this information, Gorbachev refuses to do anything. Such behavior of the first person in the state indicated that by that time he, too, was closely integrated into the system of connections of the world behind the scenes.

The first published news about M. Gorbachev’s membership of the free masons appeared on February 1, 1988 in the German small-circulation magazine “Mer Licht” (“More Light”). Similar information is published in the New York newspaper “New Russian Word” (December 4, 1989), there are even photographs of US President Bush and Gorbachev making typical Masonic signs with their hands.

Meeting in Malta. In the photo: on the left is USSR Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, second from left is General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Mikhail Gorbachev, second from right is US President George W. Bush. Photo: RIA Novosti

However, the most compelling evidence of Gorbachev's affiliation with Freemasonry is his close contacts with leading representatives of the world Masonic government and his membership in one of the main mondialist structures - the Trilateral Commission. The mediator between Gorbachev and the Trilateral Commission was the famous financial businessman, freemason and agent of the Israeli intelligence service Mossad, J. Soros, who in 1987 formed the so-called Soros-Soviet Union Foundation, from which the Soviet-American Cultural Initiative Foundation later grew, which had openly anti-Russian character.

AGENTS OF INFLUENCE

Soros funds were used to pay for the anti-Russian activities of politicians who played a tragic role in the fate of the USSR, and in particular Yu. Afanasyev. In 1990, he financed the stay in the United States of a group of developers of the “500 Days” program to destroy the Soviet economy, led by G. Yavlinsky, and later members of the “Gaidar team” (when they were not yet in the government).

Thus, by August 1991, the highest echelons of power in the USSR, as an analysis of relations with the West shows, for the most part had pro-Western sentiments and financial support for the implementation of the goals set by the masters of the West, which did not meet the interests of the country’s population.

Causes of the coup: judgments and opinions

The need to introduce a state of emergency due to the actual collapse of life support systems, a catastrophic shortage of energy resources and the refusal of agricultural enterprises and local authorities to ensure the implementation of the plan for the state supply of food to state reserves, judging by many reports, was repeatedly discussed in the circle of Gorbachev and the authorities subordinate to him. In Lukyanov’s interview with a group of deputies of the USSR Supreme Council, given by him on the second day of the coup, it is said that Gorbachev intended to introduce a state of emergency after the signing of the Union Treaty, on the basis of the “9+1” agreement.

However, the signing of the Union Treaty automatically removed the leaders of the State Emergency Committee from power and, in the opinion of the now former leaders of the basic sectors of the national economy, made it impossible to stabilize the economy and maintain life support systems in working order in view of the upcoming winter.

The signing of the Union Treaty would intensify the collapse of the unified financial system and the economic space of the USSR as a whole, and would eliminate the activities of defense enterprises with long technological chains.

Of the events that undoubtedly stimulated the attempt of the August putsch and the preservation of the USSR as a single power, recreated by the people after the war under the leadership of Joseph Stalin, the following should be noted:

1. Russia's nationalization of the oil and gas industry and the increase in domestic prices for oil and petroleum products promised by Yeltsin in Tyumen, which, according to Pavlov, would blow up the entire economy of the country.
2. The proposed introduction of national currencies in some republics.
3. Nationalization of the gold mining industry by Yakutia and Kazakhstan.
4. Failure to fulfill plans for state supplies of grain from the new harvest and the closure of economic spaces by grain-producing union republics.
5. A 50% reduction in defense orders and the impending paralysis of the defense industry, the social consequences of a thoughtless conversion of defense industries.
6. Avalanche-like commercialization of relations between managers of large enterprises and sub-sectors of the national economy, leading to the loss of planned components of their management.
7. The phenomenon of personal financial independence of heads of enterprises of organizations and the resulting loss of the last levers of managing them.
8. Yeltsin's decree on departition, eliminating the apparatus of the CPSU from the sphere of making any decisions on managing the economy and social life.
9. The need to introduce a state of emergency continues after the failure of the coup. It is likely that it will be introduced, but in different forms and with different leaders.
10. The creation of republican security systems, including their own paramilitary formations and national guards, the beginning of the transition of the republican KGB to the jurisdiction of the republics.

How Gorbachev orchestrated the 1991 August Putsch

During his reign, Gorbachev, step by step, drove a wedge into the state apparatus of power, destroying it to its very foundation. However, it was already clear to him that the plan was a success, and there was very little left before its final implementation.

Former member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, Yuri Prokofiev, later recalled how, back in March 1991, Gorbachev gathered the country’s key leaders and discussed the current situation with them. The situation was difficult:

When the meeting was held with Yazov, a pressing question arose: Gorbachev can conduct business according to the “back and forth” principle, then stop. What to do in this case? Someone said that then Yanaev would have to take the leadership of the country into his own hands. He protested: he was neither physically nor intellectually ready to serve as president; this option was unacceptable.

Pugo and Yazov stated that they agreed to introduce a state of emergency only subject to a constitutional solution to the issue, that is, with the consent of the president and by decision of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. Otherwise, they will not participate in introducing a state of emergency.

Gorbachev knew that the meetings were taking place. For example, when we visited Yazov, he was returning from Japan and called Kryuchkov from the plane. In a conversation with Gorbachev, he said that, fulfilling his instructions, we are now sitting and conferring. So Gorbachev was the initiator of the development of documents on the introduction of a state of emergency in the country, and, in essence, almost the entire composition of the State Emergency Committee was formed by him,

Prokofiev notes.

Marshal Dmitry Yazov himself emphasizes in one of his interviews:

In fact, there was no one to conclude an agreement with in August 1991, but “the process began,” and the state was collapsing literally before our eyes. That’s when the government, headed by Valentin Pavlov, assembled. It happened in one of the KGB secret buildings, near Kryuchkov. The State Emergency Committee was not a question at all at that time. We simply discussed the current situation in the country and decided: in order to fulfill the will of the people and preserve the Soviet Union, it is necessary to introduce a state of emergency. Now there is a lot of speculation on this matter. But the fact remains: leaving on August 3rd for a vacation in Foros, Gorbachev gathered the government and strictly warned that it was necessary to monitor the situation and, if anything happened, introduce a state of emergency,

Yazov notes.

The final document was soon adopted. Based on the prepared materials, President Gorbachev issued a decree on the procedure for introducing a state of emergency in certain regions and sectors of the country's national economy. This decree was published in May and passed almost unnoticed.

The only thing I remember back then was that Gorbachev called and, chuckling, said: “I agreed on a decree with Yeltsin. He agreed and made only one amendment: the decree was introduced only for a year. And we don’t need more than one year”...

Yuri Prokofiev remembers.

On May 24, 1991, changes were adopted to the constitution of the RSFSR on the names of the Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republics (ASSR) - the word “autonomous” was removed from them and they began to be called as Soviet Socialist Republics (SSR) within the RSFSR, which contradicted Article 85 of the USSR Constitution.

And on July 3, 1991, changes were made to the Constitution of the RSFSR to change the status of the Autonomous Regions to the Soviet Socialist Republics within the RSFSR (except for the Jewish Autonomous Region), which also contradicted Article 87 of the USSR Constitution.

The political elite, shaken by the social depression that gripped the country, were preparing for the creation of a new Union of Soviet Sovereign Republics (USSR). However, this option did not suit Gorbachev’s curators - during the formation of a renewed USSR, it would be too easy to remove him from power and return the system to the previous order. Then the Western plan did not work.

Gorbachev went all-in and organized another most cynical political provocation - the “August Putsch.” Almost all direct participants in those events have now admitted that the Secretary General himself was the beneficiary of the Putsch. The August Putsch was directed by Gorbachev.

Writer and historian Nikolai Starikov, in his publication “There Was No Putsch,” directly speaks about the other side of this bloody event, started at the instigation of Mikhail Gorbachev and his foreign counterparts:

It was a crude and cynical deception. There was betrayal. There was a cold-blooded desire for blood to be shed. A lot happened in those August days of 1991. But it was not the State Emergency Committee that did all this. Only there was no putsch. When the Emergency Committee began to carry out the actions agreed upon and assigned to them, Yeltsin declared them traitors and putschists. And after him, the whole world repeated it.

What about Gorbachev? But he simply didn’t pick up the phone in Foros. The stories about “blocking” Gorbachev at his dacha in Foros by “putschists” are complete nonsense. In the August days of 1991, one of the St. Petersburg journalists... reached the Secretary General's dacha using a regular telephone. Gorbachev betrayed his subordinates. He deceived them. And together with the “putschists” who were confused precisely for this reason, he betrayed and deceived his people,

Researcher notes.

Here is a comment from General Varennikov, one of the members of the State Emergency Committee:

There were young people on both sides of the barricades. They pushed her into provocation: to set up an ambush one and a half kilometers from the White House, on the Garden Ring. American and other film and television reporters were placed there in advance so that they would film an episode that no one knew about, neither the police nor, of course, the troops who were on patrol and were ambushed.

Crowds of people quickly formed on the streets of Moscow, incited by provocateurs. Clashes between people and armored vehicles, “highlighted” by television cameras of Western channels and flashes of foreign photographers, showed how well-orchestrated the August scenario was.

There was no Putsch not only in 1991. What happened in August 1991 repeated the events of the summer of 1917:

Then Kerensky (the head of Russia at that time) ordered his subordinate, the commander in chief, General Kornilov, to send troops into Petrograd and restore order. When Lavr Kornilov began to carry out his plans, Kerensky himself declared him a traitor and arrested him along with a group of senior officers. Accused of an attempt to seize power, which in fact never existed even in the thoughts of too honest Russian generals. After which Kerensky released the Bolsheviks from prison and distributed weapons to those who in two months would overthrow him, Kerensky, the “Provisional Government,” the researcher emphasizes. - The scenarios of August 1991 and 1917 are striking in their similarity. An order to restore order. They are declared traitors for this. Confusion of the military. Their defeat is inevitable - after all, they were not prepared to fight. They were only preparing to carry out orders. And then - the defeat of the country. Decay. Civil War.

And in 1991, we can say that at the “curfew” all the activities of the State Emergency Committee ended. It was already clear that the “putschists” gave their honor to the future “Tsar Boris”. It all ended on August 21 with a false curfew: the troops stood quietly, did not touch anyone, waiting for some orders from the “putschists.” It was as if they had scared themselves. This was their last day. As one would expect, the crowd got excited and attacked the troops themselves, who did not know what to do. The blood of the “defenders of democracy,” who were not attacked, was shed, after which the State Emergency Committee was doomed to become a “putsch.” Both for the brethren from television and for the crowd, the fifth day finally came - August 22, when the head of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs was “demolished,” in which Gorbachev’s accomplices formed special police units - OMON.

Someone gave the head of the riot police a “chick” - the last Minister of Internal Affairs of the USSR - Boris Karlovich Pugo - his head was blown off. If you believe the official version, then he shot himself, although everyone on television was shown a pistol that was lying on the bedside table, where he allegedly put it himself after he shot himself.

According to the official version, Pugo shot his wife before shooting himself in the temple. At his request, the pistol was brought in the morning by his son Vadim, a KGB officer who had left for work before the tragedy. Economist Grigory Yavlinsky, who came to arrest the head of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs in the company of the Chairman of the KGB of the RSFSR Viktor Ivanenko, Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs of the RSFSR Viktor Erin and Deputy Prosecutor General of the RSFSR Yevgeny Lisov, described what he saw.

According to the future Yabloko member:

Pugo's wife was wounded and bleeding. The face is marred with blood. It was impossible to figure out whether it was a knife wound or a gunshot wound. She was sitting on the floor on one side of the double bed, and on the other side of the bed lay Pugo in a workout suit. His head fell back on the pillow and he breathed. But he looked like a dead man. The wife looked insane. All her movements were absolutely uncoordinated, her speech was incoherent. …I’m not a professional and didn’t think about the circumstances then. Before me lay a state criminal. And only after Ivanenko and I left, my memory highlighted two circumstances that I cannot explain.

First. The gun lay neatly on the nightstand behind Pugo's head. Even Yavlinsky, a purely civilian man, found it difficult to imagine how a man, having shot himself in the temple, could put it there. And then lie down on the bed and stretch out. If the head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs first lay down on the bed and then shot, it would simply be impossible for him to reach the bedside table, put the gun on it and take the position in which he was found.

The investigation put forward the version that the wife was the last to shoot. She allegedly put the gun on the nightstand. But here's the strange thing: investigators found three spent cartridges!

It should be noted that the “putsch” scenario largely repeated the events of the summer of 1953, when the Minister of Internal Affairs Lavrentiy Pavlovich Beria was eliminated (we wrote a series of articles about this, and tanks were brought into Moscow, after which the country’s course was sharply changed.

The August crisis led to the destruction of governance institutions, the core of which were the CPSU and the KGB. As a result, Russia was struck by a deep crisis of governance, from which the country could not recover for many years. Having interrupted the evolutionary nature of political development, the August putsch contributed to increased polarization of political forces, which ultimately resulted in the bloody drama of October 1993.

According to Doctor of Historical Sciences Mikhail Geller, everything was completed back in August. Witnesses and participants in the events did not yet know that the history of the USSR had ended.

In September 1991, Gorbachev’s book “The Putsch” was published, hastily compiled by his American assistants. In it, the author states that:

The Soviet Union remains and will remain a great power, without which world problems cannot be solved.

According to Geller, the “Putsch” was nothing more than a well-executed performance staged before the whole world.

This is explained by the fact that the main roles in the “Putsch” were played by people, each of whom was carefully chosen and placed in their place by Gorbachev himself. These were his closest associates. The “August Putsch,” although Gorbachev presents it as a betrayal of loved ones, was of a different nature. Until the last minute, the “conspirators” convinced Gorbachev to head the Committee and begin to act decisively to restore order in the country,

Researcher notes.

According to Geller, on August 18, a delegation from the future “putschists” flew to Foros to ask the president to declare a state of emergency. After their arrest, the “putschists” claimed that Gorbachev knew about their intentions and left for Foros with parting words: do as you want.

This should probably be understood: if it succeeds, I will be with you; if it fails, you answer.

Marshal Dmitry Yazov speaks about this in his memoirs:

Its inconsistency was convincingly demonstrated by General Valentin Ivanovich Varennikov. During the trial, he directly asked Gorbachev: “When we left Foros on August 18, were you still president or not?” Gorbachev twisted and turned, but in the end he said: “Yes, I thought that I remained president.” - “So, that means we didn’t seize power from you?” "They didn't capture..."

And it is difficult to call a coup a situation that leaves in place the entire structure of state power, the entire cabinet of ministers, and the entire party hierarchy. Only the head of state was absent. But negotiations were constantly underway with Gorbachev, with him or his supporters, who remained in their offices next to the “conspirators.”

On February 1, 2006, in an interview with the Rossiya TV channel, Boris Yeltsin stated that Gorbachev’s participation in the State Emergency Committee was documented.

Purpose of the Emergency Committee

The main goal of the putschists was to prevent the liquidation of the USSR, which, in their opinion, should have begun on August 20 during the first stage of signing a new union treaty, turning the USSR into a confederation - the Union of Sovereign States. On August 20, the agreement was to be signed by representatives of the RSFSR and the Kazakh SSR, and the remaining future components of the commonwealth during five meetings, until October 22.

On the 20th, we did not allow the signing of a union treaty; we disrupted the signing of this union treaty.

G. I. Yanaev, interview with radio station “Echo of Moscow”

One of the first statements of the State Emergency Committee, disseminated by Soviet radio stations and central television, indicated the following goals, for the implementation of which a state of emergency was introduced in the country:

In order to overcome the deep and comprehensive crisis, political, interethnic and civil confrontation, chaos and anarchy that threaten the life and safety of citizens of the Soviet Union, the sovereignty, territorial integrity, freedom and independence of our Fatherland; based on the results of the national referendum on the preservation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics; guided by the vital interests of the peoples of our Motherland, all Soviet people.

In 2006, the former chairman of the USSR KGB, Vladimir Kryuchkov, stated that the State Emergency Committee did not aim to seize power:

We opposed the signing of a treaty that would destroy the Union. I feel like I was right. I regret that measures were not taken to strictly isolate the President of the USSR, questions were not raised before the Supreme Council about the abdication of the head of state from his post.

Opponents of the State Emergency Committee

The resistance to the State Emergency Committee was led by the political leadership of the Russian Federation (President B.N. Yeltsin, Vice-President A.V. Rutskoi, Chairman of the Government I.S. Silaev, Acting Chairman of the Supreme Council R.I. Khasbulatov).

In an address to Russian citizens on August 19, Boris Yeltsin, characterizing the actions of the State Emergency Committee as a coup, said:

We believe that such forceful methods are unacceptable. They discredit the USSR before the whole world, undermine our prestige in the world community, and return us to the era of the Cold War and isolation of the Soviet Union. All this forces us to declare the so-called committee (GKChP) that came to power illegal. Accordingly, we declare all decisions and orders of this committee illegal.

Khasbulatov was on Yeltsin’s side, although 10 years later in an interview with Radio Liberty he said that, like the State Emergency Committee, he was dissatisfied with the draft of the new Union Treaty:

As for the content of the new Union Treaty, in addition to Afanasyev and someone else, I myself was terribly dissatisfied with this content. Yeltsin and I argued a lot - should we go to a meeting on August 20? And finally, I convinced Yeltsin by saying that if we didn’t even go there, if we didn’t form a delegation, it would be perceived as our desire to destroy the Union. There was, after all, a referendum in March on the unity of the Union. Sixty-three percent, I think, or 61 percent of the population were in favor of preserving the Union. I say: “You and I have no right...”. That’s why I say: “Let’s go, form a delegation, and then we will motivate our comments on the future Union Treaty.”

On the role of non-political communities in those Three Days

Independent research centers, civil associations, and charitable foundations suddenly formed a network - what the Americans call a network - and messages, help, and resources necessary to counter the tanks moved through this network.

This is what Gleb Pavlovsky, director of the POSTFACTUM Information Agency, wrote on August 30, 1991:

Among these cells of civil society, I cannot help but note those closest to us: the editorial offices of the magazine “The 20th Century and the World” and the weekly magazine “Kommersant”, the Center for Political and Legal Research, the Memorial Society, the Institute for Humanitarian and Political Research and, of course, the publishing house “ Progress". At the same time, the true role and scope of the long-term programs of the Soviet-American Cultural Initiative Foundation (known to most as the Soros Foundation) was revealed, especially the Civil Society program - the groups it supported were active participants in the Three Days resistance. The days of confrontation united us in a common effort, the result of which - freedom - is more and more uncertain every day. Freedom as a state is like information: it is open, it is doubtful and dangerous. But this is the risk we actually wanted.

Western reaction

As a result of the anti-Russian coup d'etat in August-December 1991, the plans of the world behind the scenes were achieved. However, institutions for training and instructing agents of influence are not only not dismantled, but are also turning into an important part of the power structure of the Yeltsin regime, developing for him a kind of directive programs of activity and supplying him with advisers.

A legal public center of this structure called the “Russian House” was opened in the USA, headed by influence agent E. Lozansky, although, of course, all important decisions were made within the walls of the CIA and the leadership of the world behind the scenes.

Confident of final victory, Yeltsin no longer hid his direct connection with subversive anti-Russian organizations such as the American National Investment in Democracy, to whose leaders he sent a message, which, in particular, said:

We know and appreciate the fact that you contributed to this victory (fax dated August 23, 1991).

The world behind the scenes rejoiced, each of its representatives in their own way, but they all noted the key role of the CIA. US President Bush immediately after the August 1991 coup, with full knowledge of the matter and as a former director of the CIA, publicly stated that the rise to power of the Yeltsin regime:

Our victory is a victory for the CIA.

Then-CIA Director R. Gates held his own “victory parade” in front of BBC cameras in Moscow's Red Square, declaring:

Here, on Red Square, near the Kremlin and the Mausoleum, I perform my solo victory parade.

Quite naturally, a relationship between master and vassal is established between the CIA and representatives of the Yeltsin regime. For example, in October 1992, R. Gates met with Yeltsin in complete secrecy. Moreover, the latter is not even given the opportunity to use the services of his own translator, who is turned out the door, and the entire translation is carried out by the translator of the CIA director.

Maltese brothers

The world behind the scenes rewards Yeltsin with the title that almost every member of the world Masonic public organization bears - Knight Commander of the Order of Malta. He receives it on November 16, 1991. No longer embarrassed, Yeltsin poses for reporters in full garb of a knight commander.

In August 1992, Yeltsin signed Decree No. 827 “On the restoration of official relations with the Order of Malta.” The contents of this decree were kept completely secret for some time. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs was ordered to sign a protocol on the restoration of official relations between the Russian Federation and the Order of Malta.

Conclusion

Calling the State Emergency Committee a “putsch” or a “coup” is not entirely correct, since it was not intended to break the state system, but on the contrary, measures were proposed to protect the system that exists. This was an “attempt” by a number of senior officials of the state to save the Union from collapse.

On Gorbachev’s part, this was actually a “top action”; the local communists did not receive any instructions about their actions. And this action was carried out to instill fear in society, disperse the CPSU and destroy the Union. The putschists found themselves in the role of “framed up”. They were arrested for the sake of order. But after a while they gave me amnesty.

Attempts by M.S. Gorbachev's plans to take control of the country again encountered resistance from the leaders of the republics. Through the efforts of the putschists, the central government was compromised. In Moscow, the President of the RSFSR B.N. felt like a master. Yeltsin.

The highest body of state power - the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR - on September 5, 1991 announced its self-dissolution and the transfer of power to the State Council composed of the leaders of the republics. M.S. Gorbachev, as the head of a single state, became superfluous.

On December 8, 1991, in Belovezhskaya Pushcha near Minsk, the leaders of Russia (B.N. Yeltsin), Ukraine (L.M. Kravchuk) and Belarus (S.S. Shushkevich) announced the denunciation of the Union Treaty of 1922, the end of the existence of the USSR and creation of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). The great power ceased to exist. The location of Belaya Vezha was chosen as if not by chance, since it was here on July 3, 964 that the Great Forgotten Victory over the Khazar Kaganate was won.

Historical retreat

Svyatoslav not only crushed the Khazar Khaganate, the top of which adopted Judaism, but also tried to secure the conquered territories for himself. In place of Sarkel, the Russian settlement of Belaya Vezha appears, Tmutarakan comes under the rule of Kyiv, there is information that Russian troops were in Itil and Semender until the 990s. The Khazar Khaganate was the first state that Ancient Rus' had to face. The fate of not only the Eastern European tribes, but also many tribes and peoples of Europe and Asia depended on the outcome of the struggle between these two states.

As many researchers note, the crushing of Khazaria, whose leaders professed Judaism and supported it among the subject and surrounding peoples through the dissemination of the same biblical doctrine that was beneficial to their worldview (about it), meant crushing the shackles of the most severe oppression - spiritual, which could destroy the foundations of a bright , the original spiritual life of the Slavs and other peoples of Eastern Europe.

The Khazar kingdom disappeared like smoke immediately after the elimination of the main conditions for its existence: military superiority over its neighbors and the economic benefits that the possession of the most important trade routes between Asia and Europe brought. Since there were no other grounds for its existence, under the blows of the stronger Russian state it crumbled into its component parts, which later dissolved in the Polovtsian Sea,

The historian M.I. Artamonov concludes.

Therefore, it is especially symbolic that in Belaya Vezha, as if in retaliation for that Great Victory of 964, agreements shameful for our country were signed.

December 25, 1991 M.S. Gorbachev resigned as President of the USSR, which meant the end of “Perestroika”.

As a result of the collapse of the USSR - financial and economic scams of the 90s.

J. Soros was the perpetrator of almost all the largest financial and economic scams committed in Russia in the first half of the 90s.

It was he who stood behind Chubais, Gaidar, Burbulis and a number of other newly-minted Russian functionaries during the so-called privatization, as a result of which the overwhelming majority of the property belonging to the Russian people passed into the hands of international financial swindlers.

According to the Chairman of the State Property Committee V.P. Polevanov:

500 largest privatized enterprises in Russia with a real value of at least 200 billion dollars. were sold for next to nothing (about 7.2 billion US dollars) and ended up in the hands of foreign companies and their front structures.

In the mid-90s, the Soros Foundation carried out a number of operations to undermine the Russian economy. According to the Wall Street Journal (1994.10.11.), American financial experts believe that the collapse of the ruble in Russia on the so-called Black Tuesday on October 11, 1994 was the result of the activities of a group of funds headed by Soros. Attention is drawn to the fact that by the beginning of the summer of 1994, the Soros Foundation acquired shares of Russian enterprises worth $10 million. At the end of August - beginning of September, Soros, waiting for the stock price to rise, sold them. According to experts, he made a profit equivalent to $400 million from this operation. At the end of September, the Soros Foundation began purchasing dollars for rubles, which, according to American experts, caused a rapid rise in the exchange rate of the US dollar and a rapid fall in the ruble, the collapse of the financial system and the rapid ruin of many Russian enterprises.

“FAVORITES” OF THE WORLD BACKSTAGE

Opinions of event participants

In 2008, Mikhail Gorbachev commented on the situation in August 1991 as follows:

I regret now - I shouldn’t have left. Error, yes, I already said that. Just as it was a mistake that I did not send Yeltsin forever somewhere in the country to procure banana products. After known processes. When the plenum demanded - expulsion from the members of the Central Committee. Some of the party demanded to be expelled for what he had started.

Member of the State Emergency Committee, Marshal Dmitry Yazov in 2001 spoke about the impossibility of managing public opinion in 1991:

I would not call the events of 1991 a putsch for the reason that there was no putsch. There was a desire by a certain group of people, the leadership of a certain former Soviet Union, aimed at preserving the Soviet Union as a state by any means. This was the main goal of these people. None of them pursued any selfish goals, no one shared portfolios of power. One goal is to preserve the Soviet Union. .

conclusions

It should be noted that all participants in the events are from the same managerial “elite”, which had the abbreviation of the Central Committee of the CPSU, which many reveal as the Central Committee of the Capitulatory Party of Self-Liquidation of Socialism. Perhaps, if not they themselves, then their “puppeteers” simply agreed who would rule in the new conditions, and who, after a short stay in prison, should go to a well-deserved rest, having previously secured for themselves the aura of “sufferers for the people’s happiness”, and the “puppeteers” - the possibility of a legitimate return to the “socialist” policy scenario in the future.

After all, if after Yeltsin’s victory the lawyers substantiated the illegality of the State Emergency Committee, then, if necessary, another team of lawyers will no less strictly justify the fact of high treason by Gorbachev and his associates and, accordingly, the competence and legality of the State Emergency Committee, whose fault in this case will only be that they have not achieved success and such figures and scenarios are already being tried to promote.

And if you remember about conceptual power and the fact that any legislation is a line of defense on which one concept protects itself from the implementation in the same society of another concept that is fundamentally incompatible with it. In a conceptually undefined society, such as the USSR was in the last years of its existence, mutually exclusive concepts were expressed in the same legislation. That is why, on its basis, having been conceptually defined, it is possible to legally flawlessly substantiate an indictment against Gorbachev, and against the State Emergency Committee, and against Yeltsin and the team of reformers of the “Gaidar-Chernomyrdin” era.

The August “putsch” was one of those events that marked the end of the power of the CPSU and the collapse of the USSR and, according to the widespread opinion of liberals, gave impetus to democratic changes in Russia.

On the other hand, supporters of preserving the Soviet Union argue that the country began to be in chaos due to the inconsistent policies of the then government.

The events that took place from August to December 1991 in the USSR can safely be called the most important in the entire post-war world history. It was not for nothing that Russian President Vladimir Putin described the collapse of the Soviet Union as the largest geopolitical catastrophe of the century. And its course was determined to a certain extent by the coup attempt carried out by the State Committee for the State of Emergency (GKChP). 25 years have passed, new generations of Russian citizens have grown up, for whom these events are purely history, and those who lived in those years have probably forgotten a lot. However, the very fact of the destruction of the USSR and the timid attempt to save it still causes lively debate.

The weakening of the USSR: objective and artificial reasons

Centrifugal tendencies in the USSR began to be clearly visible already in the late 80s. Today we can confidently say that they were the consequences of not only internal crisis phenomena. Immediately after the end of World War II, the entire Western world, and primarily the United States of America, set a course for the destruction of the Soviet Union. This was enshrined in a number of directives, circulars and doctrines. Every year, fabulous funds were allocated for these purposes. Since 1985 alone, about $90 billion has been spent on the collapse of the USSR.

In the 1980s, the US authorities and intelligence services were able to form a fairly powerful agency of influence in the Soviet Union, which, although it did not seem to occupy key positions in the country, was capable of having a serious impact on the course of events at the national level. According to numerous evidence, the leadership of the KGB of the USSR repeatedly reported on what was happening to the Secretary General Mikhail Gorbachev, as well as the US plans to destroy the USSR, take control of its territory and reduce the population to 150-160 million people. However, Gorbachev did not take any actions aimed at blocking the activities of Western supporters and actively opposing Washington.

The Soviet elites were divided into two camps: conservatives, who proposed returning the country to traditional ways, and reformers, whose informal leader was Boris Yeltsin, demanding democratic reforms and greater freedom for the republics.

March 17, 1991 An all-Union referendum on the fate of the Soviet Union took place, in which 79.5% of citizens who had the right to vote took part. Almost 76.5% of them were in favor of preserving the USSR , but with a cunning wording - how "a renewed federation of equal sovereign republics."

On August 20, 1991, the old Union Treaty was supposed to be canceled and a new one was signed, giving rise to a virtually renewed state - the Union of Soviet Sovereign Republics (or Union of Sovereign States), of which he planned to become Prime Minister Nursultan Nazarbaev.

It was, in fact, the members of the State Committee for the State of Emergency who opposed these reforms and for preserving the USSR in its traditional form.

According to information actively disseminated by Western and Russian liberal media, KGB officers allegedly overheard a confidential conversation about the creation of the JIT between Gorbachev, Yeltsin and Nazarbayev and decided to act. According to the Western version, they blocked Gorbachev, who did not want to introduce a state of emergency, in Foros (and even planned his physical liquidation), declared a state of emergency, brought army and KGB forces to the streets of Moscow, wanted to storm the White House, capture or kill Yeltsin and destroy democracy. Arrest warrants were printed en masse in printing houses, and handcuffs were produced in huge quantities in factories.

But this theory has not been objectively confirmed by anything. What really happened?

State Emergency Committee. Chronology of main events

August 17 Some of the heads of law enforcement agencies and executive authorities held a meeting at one of the secret facilities of the USSR KGB in Moscow, during which they discussed the situation in the country.

August 18 Some future members and sympathizers of the State Emergency Committee flew to Crimea to see Gorbachev, who was ill there, to convince him to introduce a state of emergency. According to the version popular in Western and liberal media, Gorbachev refused. However, evidence from participants in the events clearly indicates that Gorbachev, although he did not want to take responsibility for making a difficult decision, gave the go-ahead to the people who came to him to act at their own discretion, after which he shook their hands.

In the afternoon, according to the well-known version, communications were cut off at the presidential dacha. However, there is information that journalists managed to call there using a regular phone. There is also evidence that government special communications were working at the dacha all the time.

On the evening of August 18, documents on the creation of the State Emergency Committee are being prepared. And at 01:00 on August 19, the Vice-President of the USSR Yanaev signed them, including himself, Pavlov, Kryuchkov, Yazov, Pugo, Baklanov, Tizyakov and Starodubtsev in the committee, after which the State Emergency Committee decided to introduce a state of emergency in certain areas of the Union.

On the morning of August 19th The media announced Gorbachev’s inability to perform duties due to health reasons, the transfer of power to Gennady Yanaev and the creation of the State Emergency Committee for the entire country. In turn, the head of the RSFSR Yeltsin signed a decree “On the illegality of the actions of the State Emergency Committee” and began mobilizing his supporters, including through the radio station “Echo of Moscow”.

In the morning, units of the army, the KGB and the Ministry of Internal Affairs are moving to Moscow, taking a number of important objects under protection. And at lunchtime, crowds of Yeltsin’s supporters begin to gather in the center of the capital. The head of the RSFSR publicly demands to “repel the putschists.” Opponents of the State Emergency Committee begin to build barricades, and a state of emergency is introduced in Moscow.

August 20 A large rally is taking place near the White House. Yeltsin personally addresses its participants. Participants in mass actions are beginning to be frightened by rumors of an impending assault.

Later, Western media would tell heartbreaking stories about how the putschists were going to throw tanks and special forces at the “defenders of democracy,” and the special forces commanders refused to carry out such orders.

Objectively, there is no data on the preparation of the assault. The special forces officers would later deny both the existence of orders to attack the White House and their refusal to carry them out.

In the evening Yeltsin appoints himself and... O. Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces on the territory of the RSFSR, and Konstantin Kobets- Minister of Defense. Kobets orders the troops to return to their places of permanent deployment.

In the evening and at night from August 20 to 21 In the capital, there is a movement of troops, local clashes occur between protesters and the military, and three participants in mass actions die.

The command of the internal troops refuses to move units to the center of Moscow. Armed cadets from educational institutions of the Ministry of Internal Affairs arrive to protect the White House.

As morning approaches, the troops begin to leave the city. In the evening, Gorbachev already refuses to accept the State Emergency Committee delegation, and Yanaev officially dissolves it. Prosecutor General Stepankov signs a decree on the arrest of committee members.

August 22 Gorbachev returns to Moscow, interrogations of members of the State Emergency Committee begin, and they are relieved of their positions.

August 23“Defenders of Democracy” demolish the monument Dzerzhinsky(reminds me of nothing?), the activities of the Communist Party are prohibited in Russia.

website

On August 24, Gorbachev resigned as General Secretary of the CPSU and proposed that the Central Committee dissolve itself. The process of the collapse of the USSR became irreversible, ending with the well-known events of December 1991.

Life after the USSR. Assessment of the events of 1991

Judging by the results of referendums and elections that took place at the end of 1991 in various parts of the USSR, the majority of the population of the Union then actually supported its collapse.

There is no time on the territory Wars and ethnic cleansing began to break out one after another as a unified state, the economies of most republics collapsed, crime increased catastrophically and the population began to decline rapidly. The “dashing 90s” burst into people’s lives like a whirlwind.

The fate of the republics developed differently. In Russia, the era of the aforementioned “dashing 90s” ended with the coming to power Vladimir Putin, and in Belarus - Alexandra Lukashenko. In Ukraine, the drift towards traditional ties began at the start of the 2000s, but it was interrupted by the Orange Revolution. Georgia moved away from the common Soviet history in fits and starts. Kazakhstan emerged from the crisis relatively smoothly and rushed towards Eurasian integration.

Objectively, nowhere in the post-Soviet territory does the population have social guarantees at the level of the USSR. In most of the former Soviet republics, the standard of living did not approach the Soviet one.

Even in Russia, where household incomes have increased significantly, social security problems call into question the thesis of an increase in the standard of living compared to what it was before 1991.

Not to mention the fact that a huge superpower, which shared first place in the world in military, political and economic power only with the United States, of which the Russian people were proud for many years, ceased to exist on the world map.

It is indicative how Russians assess the events of 1991 today, 25 years later. The data from a study conducted by the Levada Center to some extent sums up the numerous disputes about the State Emergency Committee and the actions of Yeltsin’s team.

Thus, only 16% of Russian residents said that they would come out to “defend democracy” - that is, they would support Yeltsin and defend the White House - if they were the participants in the events of 1991! 44% answered categorically that they would not defend the new government. 41% of respondents are not ready to answer this question.

Today, only 8% of Russian residents call the events of August 1991 a victory of the democratic revolution. 30% characterize what happened as a tragic event that had disastrous consequences for the country and people, 35% - simply as an episode in the struggle for power, 27% found it difficult to answer.

Speaking about the possible consequences after the victory of the State Emergency Committee, 16% of respondents said that with this development of events Russia would live better today, 19% - that it would live worse, 23% - that it would live the same way as it lives today. 43% could not decide on an answer.

15% of Russians believe that in August 1991 the representatives of the State Emergency Committee were right, 13% - that Yeltsin’s supporters. 39% claim that they did not have time to understand the situation, and 33% do not know what to answer.

40% of respondents said that after the events of August 1991 the country went in the wrong direction, 33% said that it was in the right direction. 28% found it difficult to answer.

It turns out that approximately one third to half of Russians are not sufficiently informed about the events of August 1991 and cannot unambiguously assess them. Among the remaining part of the population, those who evaluate the “August revolution” and the activities of the “defenders of democracy” negatively predominate moderately. The overwhelming majority of Russian residents would not take any action to counter the State Emergency Committee. In general, few people today are happy about the defeat of the committee.

So what really happened in those days and how to evaluate these events?

State Emergency Committee - an attempt to save the country, an anti-democratic putsch or a provocation?

The day before it became known that the CIA predicted the emergence of the State Emergency Committee back in April 1991! An unknown speaker from Moscow informed the leadership of the intelligence service that “supporters of tough measures”, traditionalists, are ready to remove Gorbachev from power and reverse the situation. At the same time, Langley believed that it would be difficult for Soviet conservatives to retain power. A Moscow source listed all the leaders of the future State Emergency Committee and predicted that Gorbachev, in the event of a potential revolt, would try to maintain control over the country.

It is clear that there is not a word about the US response in the information document. But of course they had to be. When the State Emergency Committee arose, the US leadership harshly condemned it and did everything to achieve similar actions from other Western countries. The position of the heads of the USA, Great Britain and other Western states was voiced by journalists directly in the Vesti program, which, in turn, could not but influence the consciousness of doubting Soviet citizens.

In the whole story with the State Emergency Committee, there are a number of oddities.

Firstly, The leaders of the powerful security forces of the USSR, undisputed intellectuals and excellent organizers of the old school, for some reason acted spontaneously, uncertainly and even somehow confused. They were never able to decide on a tactic of action. Yanaev’s shaking hands while speaking on camera went down in history.

From which it is logical to assume that the creation of the State Emergency Committee was a completely unprepared step.

Secondly, Yeltsin’s team, which was by no means composed of such experienced and powerful people as their opponents, worked like clockwork. Warning schemes, transport, and communications operated effectively; the defenders of the barricades were well fed and watered; leaflets were printed and distributed in huge quantities; their own media worked.

Everything indicates that Yeltsin was well prepared for such a development of events.

Third, Mikhail Gorbachev, who continued to be the official head of the USSR, fell ill at the right time and left Moscow. Thus, the country was deprived of supreme power, and he himself remained as if he had nothing to do with it.

Fourthly, The President of the USSR did not take any measures to try to stop the leaders of the State Emergency Committee. On the contrary, with his words he gave them complete freedom of action.

Fifthly, Today it is known that back in June 1991, the US authorities discussed the prospect of a putsch in the USSR with Gorbachev and the leadership of the USSR Foreign Ministry. Surely, in two months, the President of the Union, if he wanted, would not have prevented it?

All these strange facts raise questions and doubts in the official interpretation of the victorious side, according to which the State Emergency Committee was an illegal military junta that, without the knowledge of Gorbachev, tried to strangle the sprouts of democracy. Moreover, all of the above suggests the version that Gorbachev and Yeltsin could deliberately provoke their political opponents to take active action at an inconvenient time for them.

On the one hand, the signing of the new Union Treaty was a victory for the reformers. But the victory, to put it mildly, was half-hearted. The traditionalists, who occupied virtually all the key positions in the state, had, if they had been well prepared, all the necessary tools to disrupt the signing of the treaty during the event itself through political means and for a political counterattack during the crisis that would inevitably follow the signing itself. In fact, the traditionalists found themselves forced to act without preparation, at an inconvenient time, against opponents who, on the contrary, were well prepared for the fight.

Everything indicates that Gorbachev and Yeltsin could simply have lured the organizers of the State Emergency Committee into a trap, after falling into which they were forced to act according to someone else’s scenario. Everyone who could stop the death of the USSR in 1991 was thrown out of the game overnight.

Some of the members of the State Emergency Committee and people sympathizing with the committee died soon after the coup under mysterious circumstances, committing strange suicides, and the other part was quietly amnestied in 1994, when they no longer posed any threat. The Gakachepists were framed, but when this became clear, it was too late to do anything.

The events of August 1991 fit perfectly into the scheme of color revolutions, with the only difference being that the head of state actually played on the side of the “revolutionaries - defenders of democracy.” Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev could probably tell a lot of interesting things, but he is unlikely to do so. A man whom fate had elevated to the very top of world politics, the head of a superpower, exchanged all this for advertising pizza and bags. And Russian citizens, even 25 years later, understand this perfectly well and evaluate it accordingly.

Those who propose to forget the history of August 1991 as a bad dream are categorically wrong. Then we experienced one of the most tragic events in our history, and it is simply vital to correct mistakes in this regard. The bloody consequences of the collapse of the USSR still have to be dealt with - including in Ukraine: people are now being killed in the Donbass largely due to the fact that the State Emergency Committee was unable to stop the local princelings who wanted to tear apart the state for the sake of personal power.

At the same time, supporters of the other extreme, who deny the right to exist of the Russian Federation because of the tragedy of August 1991, are also wrong. Yes, the USSR was destroyed contrary to the will of the people, expressed in the referendum on March 17, but this is not a reason to deny Russia its current statehood - the guarantee of the sovereign existence of the Russian people. On the contrary, everything must be done to develop the Russian Federation as an internationally recognized successor to the USSR. And the ultimate task is to use it to restore the former greatness of our Fatherland.