Who won the Russian-Finnish war. Preparing the parties for war. Balance of forces and means

"WINTER WAR"

Having signed mutual assistance agreements with the Baltic states, the USSR turned to Finland with a proposal to conclude a similar agreement. Finland refused. The Minister of Foreign Affairs of this country, E. Erkko, stated that “Finland will never make a decision similar to those made by the Baltic states. If this happens, it will only be in the worst case scenario.” The origins of the Soviet-Finnish confrontation are largely explained by the extremely hostile, aggressive position of the ruling circles of Finland towards the USSR. Former Finnish President P. Svinhuvud, under whom Soviet Russia voluntarily recognized the independence of its northern neighbor, said that “any enemy of Russia must always be a friend of Finland.” In the mid-30s. M. M. Litvinov, in a conversation with the Finnish envoy, stated that “in no neighboring country is there such open propaganda for an attack on the USSR and the seizure of its territory as in Finland.”

After the Munich Agreement of Western countries, the Soviet leadership began to show particular persistence towards Finland. During 1938-1939 Negotiations were held during which Moscow sought to ensure the security of Leningrad by moving the border on the Karelian Isthmus. In exchange, Finland was offered territories of Karelia, much larger in size than the lands that were supposed to be transferred to the USSR. In addition, the Soviet government promised to allocate a certain amount for the resettlement of residents. However, the Finnish side stated that the territory ceded to the USSR was insufficient compensation. The Karelian Isthmus had a well-developed infrastructure: a network of railways and highways, buildings, warehouses and other structures. The territory transferred by the Soviet Union to Finland was an area covered with forests and swamps. In order to transform this territory into an area suitable for living and economic needs, it was necessary to invest considerable funds.

Moscow did not give up hope for a peaceful resolution of the conflict and offered various options for concluding an agreement. At the same time, he firmly stated: “Since we cannot move Leningrad, we will move the border to secure it.” At the same time, he referred to Ribbentrop, who explained the German attack on Poland by the need to secure Berlin. Large-scale military construction began on both sides of the border. The Soviet Union was preparing for offensive operations, and Finland for defensive operations. Finnish Foreign Minister Erkko, expressing the mood of the government, confirmed: “Everything has its limits. Finland cannot agree to the proposal of the Soviet Union and will defend its territory, its inviolability and independence by any means.”

The Soviet Union and Finland did not follow the path of finding a compromise acceptable to them. Stalin's imperial ambitions made themselves felt this time too. In the second half of November 1939, diplomatic methods gave way to threats and saber-rattling. The Red Army hastily prepared for military operations. On November 27, 1939, V. M. Molotov issued a statement in which he said that “yesterday, November 26, the Finnish White Guards undertook a new vile provocation by firing artillery fire at a military unit of the Red Army located in the village of Mainila on the Karelian Isthmus.” Disputes are still ongoing as to from whose side these shots were fired. The Finns already in 1939 tried to prove that the shelling could not have been carried out from their territory, and the whole story with the “Maynila incident” was nothing more than a provocation by Moscow.

On November 29, taking advantage of the shelling of its border positions, the USSR terminated the non-aggression pact with Finland. On November 30, hostilities began. On December 1, on Finnish territory, in the city of Terijoki (Zelenogorsk), where Soviet troops entered, on the initiative of Moscow, a new “people's government” of Finland was formed, headed by the Finnish communist O. Kuusinen. The next day, an agreement on mutual assistance and friendship was concluded between the USSR and the Kuusinen government, called the government of the Finnish Democratic Republic.

Events, however, did not develop as well as the Kremlin had hoped. The first stage of the war (November 30, 1939 - February 10, 1940) was particularly unsuccessful for the Red Army. To a large extent, this was due to an underestimation of the combat capability of the Finnish troops. Break through the Mannerheim Line on the move - a complex of defensive fortifications built in 1927-1939. and stretching along the front for 135 km, and in depth up to 95 km, it was not possible. During the fighting, the Red Army suffered huge losses.

In December 1939, the command stopped unsuccessful attempts to advance deep into Finnish territory. Careful preparations for the breakthrough began. The North-Western Front was formed, led by S.K. Timoshenko and member of the Military Council A.A. Zhdanov. The front included two armies, led by K. A. Meretskov and V. D. Grendal (replaced in early March 1940 by F. A. Parusinov). The total number of Soviet troops was increased by 1.4 times and brought to 760 thousand people.

Finland also strengthened its army by receiving military equipment and equipment from abroad. 11.5 thousand volunteers arrived from Scandinavia, the USA and other countries to fight the Soviets. England and France developed their plans for military action, intending to enter the war on the side of Finland. In London and Paris they did not hide their hostile plans towards the USSR.

On February 11, 1940, the final stage of the war began. Soviet troops went on the offensive and broke through the Mannerheim Line. The main forces of the Karelian Army of Finland were defeated. On March 12, a peace treaty was concluded in the Kremlin after short negotiations. Military operations along the entire front ceased from 12 o'clock on March 13. In accordance with the signed agreement, the Karelian Isthmus, the western and northern coasts of Lake Ladoga, and a number of islands in the Gulf of Finland were included in the USSR. The Soviet Union received a 30-year lease on the Hanko Peninsula to create a naval base on it “capable of defending the entrance to the Gulf of Finland from aggression.”

The cost of victory in the “winter war” turned out to be extremely high. In addition to the fact that the Soviet Union as an “aggressor state” was expelled from the League of Nations, during the 105 days of the war the Red Army lost at least 127 thousand people killed, died from wounds and went missing. About 250 thousand military personnel were wounded, frostbitten, and shell-shocked.

The "Winter War" demonstrated major miscalculations in the organization and training of the Red Army troops. Hitler, who closely followed the course of events in Finland, formulated the conclusion that the Red Army was a “colossus with feet of clay” that the Wehrmacht could easily cope with. Certain conclusions from the military campaign of 1939-1940. They did it in the Kremlin too. Thus, K.E. Voroshilov was replaced as People's Commissar of Defense by S.M. Timoshenko. The implementation of a set of measures aimed at strengthening the defense capability of the USSR began.

However, during the “winter war” and after its end, no significant strengthening of security in the north-west was achieved. Although the border was moved away from Leningrad and the Murmansk railway, this did not prevent Leningrad from falling into the siege during the Great Patriotic War. In addition, Finland did not become a friendly or at least neutral country to the USSR - revanchist elements prevailed in its leadership, who relied on supporting Nazi Germany.

I.S. Ratkovsky, M.V. Khodyakov. History of Soviet Russia

POET'S VIEW

From a shabby notebook

Two lines about a boy fighter,

What happened in the forties

Killed on ice in Finland.

It lay somehow awkwardly

Childishly small body.

The frost pressed the overcoat to the ice,

The hat flew far away.

It seemed that the boy was not lying down,

And he was still running

Yes, he held the ice behind the floor...

Among the great cruel war,

I can’t imagine why,

I feel sorry for that distant fate

Like dead, alone,

It's like I'm lying there

Frozen, small, killed

In that unknown war,

Forgotten, small, lying.

A.T. Tvardovsky. Two lines.

NO, MOLOTOV!

Ivan goes to war with a cheerful song,

but, running into the Mannerheim line,

he starts singing a sad song,

as we hear it now:

Finland, Finland,

Ivan is heading there again.

Since Molotov promised that everything would be fine

and tomorrow in Helsinki they will be eating ice cream.

No, Molotov! No, Molotov!

Finland, Finland,

The Mannerheim Line is a serious obstacle,

and when terrible artillery fire began from Karelia

he silenced many Ivans.

No, Molotov! No, Molotov!

You lie even more than Bobrikov!

Finland, Finland,

The invincible Red Army is afraid.

Molotov already said to look for a dacha,

otherwise the Chukhons are threatening to capture us.

No, Molotov! No, Molotov!

You lie even more than Bobrikov!

Go beyond the Urals, go beyond the Urals,

there is a lot of space for a Molotov dacha.

We will send the Stalins and their henchmen there,

political instructors, commissars and Petrozavodsk swindlers.

No, Molotov! No, Molotov!

You lie even more than Bobrikov!

MANNERHEIM LINE: MYTH OR REALITY?

It is good form for supporters of the theory of a strong Red Army that broke through an impregnable defense line, always quoting General Badu, who built the “Mannerheim Line.” He wrote: “Nowhere in the world were natural conditions so favorable for the construction of fortified lines as in Karelia. In this narrow place between two bodies of water - Lake Ladoga and the Gulf of Finland - there are impenetrable forests and huge rocks. The famous “Mannerheim Line” was built from wood and granite, and where necessary from concrete. The anti-tank obstacles made in granite give the Mannerheim Line its greatest strength. Even twenty-five ton tanks cannot overcome them. Using explosions, the Finns built machine-gun and artillery nests in the granite, which were resistant to the most powerful bombs. Where there was a shortage of granite, the Finns did not spare concrete.”

In general, reading these lines, a person imagining the real “Mannerheim Line” will be terribly surprised. In Badu’s description, one sees before one’s eyes some gloomy granite cliffs with firing points carved into them at a dizzying height, over which vultures circle in anticipation of mountains of corpses of the attackers. Badu's description actually fits more closely to the Czech fortifications on the border with Germany. The Karelian Isthmus is a relatively flat area, and there is no need to cut down in the rocks simply due to the absence of the rocks themselves. But one way or another, the image of an impregnable castle was created in the mass consciousness and became firmly entrenched in it.

In reality, the Mannerheim Line was far from the best examples of European fortification. The vast majority of long-term Finnish structures were one-story, partially buried reinforced concrete structures in the form of a bunker, divided into several rooms by internal partitions with armored doors. Three bunkers of the “million-dollar” type had two levels, another three bunkers had three levels. Let me emphasize, precisely the level. That is, their combat casemates and shelters were located at different levels relative to the surface, slightly buried casemates with embrasures in the ground and completely buried galleries connecting them with the barracks. There were negligibly few buildings with what could be called floors. Below each other - such placement - small casemates directly above the premises of the lower tier were only in two bunkers (Sk-10 and Sj-5) and the gun casemate in Patoniemi. This is, to put it mildly, unimpressive. Even if you do not take into account the impressive structures of the Maginot Line, you can find many examples of much more advanced bunkers...

The survivability of the gouges was designed for Renault-type tanks in service in Finland, and did not meet modern requirements. Contrary to Badu's assertions, Finnish anti-tank guns showed during the war their low resistance to attacks from T-28 medium tanks. But it wasn’t even a matter of the quality of the “Mannerheim Line” structures. Any defensive line is characterized by the number of long-term fire structures (DOS) per kilometer. In total, on the “Mannerheim Line” there were 214 permanent structures for 140 km, of which 134 were machine gun or artillery DOS. Directly on the front line in the zone of combat contact in the period from mid-December 1939 to mid-February 1940 there were 55 bunkers, 14 shelters and 3 infantry positions, about half of which were obsolete structures from the first period of construction. For comparison, the Maginot Line had about 5,800 DOS in 300 defense nodes and a length of 400 km (density 14 DOS/km), the Siegfried Line had 16,000 fortifications (weaker than the French ones) on a front of 500 km (density - 32 structures per km) ... And the “Mannerheim Line” is 214 DOS (of which only 8 artillery) on a front of 140 km (average density 1.5 DOS/km, in some areas - up to 3-6 DOS/km).

The Soviet-Finnish War and Finland's participation in World War II are extremely mythologized. A special place in this mythology is occupied by the losses of the parties. Very small in Finland and huge in the USSR. Mannerheim wrote that the Russians walked through minefields, in dense rows and holding hands. Every Russian person who recognizes the incomparability of losses must at the same time admit that our grandfathers were idiots.

I’ll quote Finnish Commander-in-Chief Mannerheim again:
« It happened that in the battles of early December, Russians marched singing in tight ranks - and even holding hands - into Finnish minefields, not paying attention to explosions and accurate fire from the defenders.”

Can you imagine these cretins?

After such statements, the loss figures cited by Mannerheim are not surprising. He counted 24,923 Finns killed and dying from wounds. Russians, in his opinion, killed 200 thousand people.

Why feel sorry for these Russians?

Engle, E. Paanenen L. in the book “The Soviet-Finnish War. Breakthrough of the Mannerheim Line 1939 - 1940.” with reference to Nikita Khrushchev they give the following data:

“Of the total number of 1.5 million people sent to fight in Finland, the USSR’s losses in killed (according to Khrushchev) amounted to 1 million people. The Russians lost about 1000 aircraft, 2300 tanks and armored vehicles, as well as a huge amount of various military equipment... "

Thus, the Russians won, filling the Finns with “meat”.
Mannerheim writes about the reasons for the defeat as follows:
“In the final stages of the war, the weakest point was not the lack of materials, but the lack of manpower.”

Stop!

Why?
According to Mannerheim, the Finns lost only 24 thousand killed and 43 thousand wounded. And after such scanty losses, Finland began to lack manpower?

Something doesn't add up!

But let's see what other researchers write and have written about the losses of the parties.

For example, Pykhalov in “The Great Slandered War” states:
« Of course, during the fighting, the Soviet Armed Forces suffered significantly greater losses than the enemy. According to the name lists, in the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940. 126,875 Red Army soldiers were killed, died or went missing. The losses of the Finnish troops, according to official data, were 21,396 killed and 1,434 missing. However, another figure for Finnish losses is often found in Russian literature - 48,243 killed, 43 thousand wounded. The primary source of this figure is a translation of an article by Lieutenant Colonel of the Finnish General Staff Helge Seppälä published in the newspaper “Abroad” No. 48 for 1989, originally published in the Finnish publication “Maailma ya me”. Regarding the Finnish losses, Seppälä writes the following:
“Finland lost more than 23,000 people killed in the “winter war”; more than 43,000 people were injured. 25,243 people were killed in the bombings, including on merchant ships.”

The last figure - 25,243 killed in bombings - is questionable. Perhaps there is a newspaper typo here. Unfortunately, I did not have the opportunity to familiarize myself with the Finnish original of Seppälä’s article.”

Mannerheim, as you know, assessed the losses from the bombing:
“More than seven hundred civilians were killed and twice that number were wounded.”

The largest figures for Finnish losses are given by Military Historical Journal No. 4, 1993:
“So, according to far from complete data, the losses of the Red Army amounted to 285,510 people (72,408 killed, 17,520 missing, 13,213 frostbitten and 240 shell-shocked). The losses of the Finnish side, according to official data, amounted to 95 thousand killed and 45 thousand wounded.”

And finally, Finnish losses on Wikipedia:
According to Finnish data:
25,904 killed
43,557 wounded
1000 prisoners
According to Russian sources:
up to 95 thousand soldiers killed
45 thousand wounded
806 prisoners

As for the calculation of Soviet losses, the mechanism of these calculations is given in detail in the book “Russia in the Wars of the 20th Century. The Book of Loss." The number of irretrievable losses of the Red Army and the fleet includes even those with whom their relatives broke off contact in 1939-1940.
That is, there is no evidence that they died in the Soviet-Finnish war. And our researchers counted these among the losses of more than 25 thousand people.
Who and how counted the Finnish losses is absolutely unclear. It is known that by the end of the Soviet-Finnish war the total number of Finnish armed forces reached 300 thousand people. The loss of 25 thousand fighters is less than 10% of the armed forces.
But Mannerheim writes that by the end of the war Finland was experiencing a shortage of manpower. However, there is another version. There are few Finns in general, and even minor losses for such a small country are a threat to the gene pool.
However, in the book “Results of the Second World War. Conclusions of the Vanquished,” Professor Helmut Aritz estimates the population of Finland in 1938 at 3 million 697 thousand people.
The irretrievable loss of 25 thousand people does not pose any threat to the gene pool of the nation.
According to Aritz's calculations, the Finns lost in 1941 - 1945. more than 84 thousand people. And after that, the population of Finland by 1947 grew by 238 thousand people!!!

At the same time, Mannerheim, describing the year 1944, again cries in his memoirs about the lack of people:
“Finland was gradually forced to mobilize its trained reserves down to people aged 45, something that had never happened in any country, not even Germany.”

What kind of cunning manipulations the Finns are doing with their losses - I don’t know. On Wikipedia, Finnish losses in the period 1941 - 1945 are indicated as 58 thousand 715 people. Losses during the war of 1939 - 1940 - 25 thousand 904 people.
A total of 84 thousand 619 people.
But the Finnish website http://kronos.narc.fi/menehtyneet/ contains data on 95 thousand Finns who died between 1939 and 1945. Even if we add here the victims of the “Lapland War” (according to Wikipedia, about 1000 people), the numbers still do not add up.

Vladimir Medinsky in his book “War. Myths of the USSR” claims that ardent Finnish historians pulled off a simple trick: they counted only army losses. And the losses of numerous paramilitary formations, such as the Shutskor, were not included in the general loss statistics. And they had many paramilitary forces.
How much - Medinsky does not explain.

Be that as it may, two explanations arise:
First, if the Finnish data about their losses is correct, then the Finns are the most cowardly people in the world, because they “raised their paws” without suffering almost any losses.
Secondly, if we assume that the Finns are a brave and courageous people, then Finnish historians simply vastly underestimated their own losses.

The irretrievable losses of the Soviet military forces amounted to 126 thousand 875 people. The Finnish army lost 21 thousand. 396 people killed. The total losses of Finnish troops amounted to 20% of their total personnel.
Well, what can you say about this? There is clearly yet another anti-Russian falsification covered by the authority of official historiography and the Minister of Defense himself (now former).

In order to understand the details of this nonsense, you will have to take an excursion to the original source to which everyone who cites this ridiculous figure in their works refers.

G.F. Krivosheev (edited). Russia and the USSR in the wars of the 20th century: Losses of the armed forces

Dan information about the total number of irretrievable losses of personnel in the war (according to final reports from the troops on March 15, 1940):

• killed and died from wounds during the sanitary evacuation stages 65,384;
• 14,043 were declared dead among the missing;
• died from wounds, concussions and illness in hospitals (as of March 1, 1941) 15,921.
• The total number of irretrievable losses amounted to 95,348 people.

Further, these figures are broken down in detail by categories of personnel, by armies, by branches of the military, etc.

Everything seems clear. But where do 126 thousand people of irreparable losses come from?

In 1949-1951 V As a result of lengthy and painstaking work to clarify the number of losses, the Main Personnel Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense and the Main Headquarters of the Ground Forces compiled personal lists of Red Army military personnel dead, dead and missing in the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940. In total, they included 126,875 fighters and commanders, workers and employees, who amounted to irretrievable losses. Their main summary indicators, calculated from personal lists, are presented in table 109.

Types of losses	Total number of irrecoverable losses		Exceeding the number of losses
	According to reports from the troops	According to named lists of losses
Killed and died from wounds during the sanitary evacuation stages	65384	71214	5830
Died from wounds and illnesses in hospitals	15921	16292	371
Missing	14043	39369	25326
Total	95348	126875	31527

http://lib.ru/MEMUARY/1939-1945/KRIWOSHEEW/poteri.txt#w04.htm-008

We read what is written there (quotes from this work are highlighted in green):

The number of irretrievable losses given in table 109 diverges greatly from the final data, which were calculated based on reports from troops received before the end of March 1940 and are contained in table 110.

The reason for the discrepancy that emerged is that the nominal lists included first of all out, unaccounted previously recorded losses of Air Force personnel, as well as military personnel who died in hospitals after March 1940, in Tue. oops, died Border guards and other military personnel who were not part of the Red Army were staying in the same hospitals for wounds and illnesses. In addition, the personal lists of irretrievable losses include a large number of military personnel who did not return home (based on requests from relatives), especially those who were called up in 1939-1940, contact with whom ceased during the Soviet-Finnish War. After searching unsuccessfully for many years, they were classified as missing. Note that these lists were compiled ten years after the Soviet-Finnish war. Ime But this also explains the presence on the lists of an excessively large number of missing persons - 39,369 people, which amounts to 31% of all irretrievable losses in the Soviet-Finnish war. According to reports from the troops, a total of 14,043 military personnel went missing during the fighting.

Thus, we have that the losses of the Red Army in the Finnish War incomprehensibly included more than 25 thousand people. those who disappeared are unclear where, unclear under what circumstances, and generally unclear when. Thus, researchers irrecoverable losses of the Red Army in the Finnish War are overestimated by more than a quarter.
On what basis?
However, inAs the final number of irretrievable human losses of the USSR in the Soviet-Finnish war, we accepted the number of all dead, missing and died from wounds and diseases, included in the personal lists, that is126,875 people This figure, in our opinion,more fully reflects the demographic irretrievable losses of the country in the war with Finland.
Just like that. To me, the opinion of the authors of this work seems completely unfounded.
firstly, because they do not justify this method of calculating losses in any way
secondly, because they don’t use it anywhere else. For example, to calculate losses in the Polish campaign.
Thirdly, because it is completely unclear on what grounds they actually declare the loss data presented by the headquarters “hotly” unreliable.
However, to justify Krivosheev and his co-authors, it should be noted that they did not insist that their (in a particular case) dubious assessments were the only correct ones and provided data from alternative, more accurate calculations. They can be understood.

But I refuse to understand the authors of the Second Volume of the Official History of the Second World War who present these unreliable data as the ultimate truth.
The most curious thing from my point of view is that they do not consider the figures given by Krivosheev as the ultimate truth. This is what Krivosheev writes about the losses of the Finns
According to Finnish sources, the human losses of Finland in the war of 1939-1940. amounted to 48,243 people. killed, 43 thousand people. wounded

Compare with the above data on the losses of the Finnish army. They differ significantly!! But in the other direction.

So, let's summarize.
what we have?

Data on losses of the Red Army are overstated.
The losses of our opponents are underestimated.

In my opinion, this is pure defeatist propaganda!

Soviet-Finnish war of 1939–40 (another name is Winter War) took place from November 30, 1939 to March 12, 1940.

The formal cause of hostilities was the so-called Mainila incident - artillery shelling from Finnish territory of Soviet border guards in the village of Mainila on the Karelian Isthmus, which, according to the Soviet side, occurred on November 26, 1939. The Finnish side categorically denied any involvement in the shelling. Two days later, on November 28, the USSR denounced the Soviet-Finnish non-aggression pact concluded in 1932, and on November 30 began hostilities.

The underlying causes of the conflict were based on a number of factors, not the least of which was the fact that in 1918-22 Finland twice attacked the territory of the RSFSR. As a result of the Tartu Peace Treaty of 1920 and the Moscow Agreement on taking measures to ensure the inviolability of the Soviet-Finnish border of 1922 between the governments of the RSFSR and Finland, the original Russian Pecheneg region (Petsamo) and part of the Sredny and Rybachy peninsulas were transferred to Finland.

Despite the fact that a Non-Aggression Pact was signed between Finland and the USSR in 1932, relations between the two countries were quite tense. In Finland they feared that sooner or later the Soviet Union, which had strengthened many times since 1922, would want to return its territories, and in the USSR they were afraid that Finland, as in 1919 (when British torpedo boats attacked Kronstadt from Finnish ports), might give its territory to another unfriendly country to attack. The situation was aggravated by the fact that the second most important city of the USSR, Leningrad, was only 32 kilometers from the Soviet-Finnish border.

During this period, the activities of the Communist Party were banned in Finland and secret consultations were held with the governments of Poland and the Baltic countries on joint actions in the event of war with the USSR. In 1939, the USSR signed a Non-Aggression Pact with Germany, also known as the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. In accordance with the secret protocols to it, Finland moves into the zone of interests of the Soviet Union.

In 1938-39, during lengthy negotiations with Finland, the USSR tried to achieve the exchange of part of the Karelian Isthmus for twice the area, but less suitable for agricultural use, in Karelia, as well as the transfer of several islands and parts of the Hanko Peninsula to the USSR for military bases. Finland, firstly, did not agree with the size of the territories being given to it (not least because of its reluctance to part with the line of defensive fortifications built in the 30s, also known as the Mannerheim Line (see. And ), and secondly, she tried to achieve the conclusion of a Soviet-Finnish trade agreement and the right to armament of the demilitarized Åland Islands.

The negotiations were very difficult and were accompanied by mutual reproaches and accusations (see: ). The last attempt was the USSR's proposal on October 5, 1939 to conclude a Mutual Assistance Pact with Finland.

Negotiations dragged on and reached a dead end. The parties began to prepare for war.

On October 13-14, 1939, general mobilization was announced in Finland. And two weeks later, on November 3, the troops of the Leningrad Military District and the Red Banner Baltic Fleet received directives to begin preparations for military operations. Newspaper article "Is it true" on the same day reported that the Soviet Union intends to ensure its security at any cost. A massive anti-Finnish campaign began in the Soviet press, to which the opposite side immediately responded.

There was less than a month left before the Maynila incident, which served as a formal reason for the war.

Most Western and a number of Russian researchers believe that the shelling was a fiction - either it did not happen at all, but there were only unsubstantiated statements by the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, or the shelling was a provocation. There are no documents confirming this or that version. Finland proposed a joint investigation of the incident, but the Soviet side harshly rejected the proposal.

Immediately after the start of the war, official relations with the Ryti government were terminated, and on December 2, 1939, the USSR signed an agreement on mutual assistance and friendship with the so-called "The People's Government of Finland", formed from communists and headed by Otto Kuusinen. At the same time, in the USSR, on the basis of the 106th Mountain Rifle Division, the "Finnish People's Army" from Finns and Karelians. However, it did not take part in the hostilities and was eventually disbanded, like the Kuusinen government.

The Soviet Union planned to launch military operations in two main directions - the Karelian Isthmus and north of Lake Ladoga. After a successful breakthrough (or bypassing the line of fortifications from the north), the Red Army was able to make maximum use of its advantage in manpower and its overwhelming advantage in technology. According to the timeframe, the operation should have taken place within a period of two weeks to a month. The Finnish command, in turn, counted on stabilizing the front on the Karelian Isthmus and active containment in the northern sector, believing that the army would be able to independently hold off the enemy for up to six months and then wait for help from Western countries. Both plans turned out to be an illusion: the Soviet Union underestimated Finland's strength, while Finland relied too much on the help of foreign powers and on the reliability of its fortifications.

As already mentioned, by the beginning of hostilities in Finland there was a general mobilization. The USSR decided to confine itself to parts of the Leningrad Military District, believing that additional involvement of forces would not be required. At the start of the war, the USSR concentrated 425,640 personnel, 2,876 guns and mortars, 2,289 tanks, and 2,446 aircraft for the operation. They were opposed by 265,000 people, 834 guns, 64 tanks and 270 aircraft.

As part of the Red Army, units of the 7th, 8th, 9th and 14th armies attacked Finland. The 7th Army advanced on the Karelian Isthmus, the 8th Army north of Lake Ladoga, the 9th Army in Karelia, and the 14th Army in the Arctic.

The most favorable situation for the USSR developed at the front of the 14th Army, which, interacting with the Northern Fleet, occupied the Rybachy and Sredny peninsulas, the city of Petsamo (Pechenga) and closed Finland’s access to the Barents Sea. The 9th Army penetrated the Finnish defense to a depth of 35-45 km and was stopped (see. ). The 8th Army initially began to advance successfully, but was also stopped, with part of its forces being surrounded and forced to withdraw. The heaviest and bloodiest battles took place in the sector of the 7th Army, which was advancing on the Karelian Isthmus. The army had to storm the Mannerheim Line.

As it turned out later, the Soviet side had fragmentary and extremely meager information about the enemy opposing it on the Karelian Isthmus, and, most importantly, about the line of fortifications. Underestimating the enemy immediately affected the course of hostilities. The forces allocated to break through the Finnish defenses in this area turned out to be insufficient. By December 12, the Red Army units with losses were able to overcome only the support zone of the Mannerheim Line and stopped. Until the end of December, several desperate attempts to break through were made, but they were also unsuccessful. By the end of December it became obvious that attempts at an offensive in this style were pointless. There was relative calm at the front.

Having understood and studied the reasons for the failure in the first period of the war, the Soviet command undertook a serious reorganization of forces and means. Throughout January and early February, there was a significant reinforcement of troops, saturation of them with large-caliber artillery capable of fighting fortifications, replenishment of material reserves, and reorganization of units and formations. Methods of combating defensive structures were developed, mass exercises and training of personnel were carried out, assault groups and detachments were formed, work was carried out to improve the interaction of military branches and to raise morale (see. ).

The USSR learned quickly. To break through the fortified area, the North-Western Front was created under the command of Army Commander 1st Rank Timoshenko and member of the Leningrad Military District Military Council Zhdanov. The front included the 7th and 13th armies.

Finland at this moment also carried out measures to increase the combat effectiveness of its own troops. Both new equipment and weapons captured in battles and those supplied from abroad entered service, and units received the necessary reinforcements.

Both sides were ready for the second round of the fight.

At the same time, fighting in Karelia did not stop.

The most famous in the historiography of the Soviet-Finnish war during that period was the encirclement of the 163rd and 44th rifle divisions of the 9th Army near Suomussalmi. Since mid-December, the 44th Division had been advancing to help the encircled 163rd Division. In the period from January 3 to January 7, 1940, its units were repeatedly surrounded, but, despite the difficult situation, they continued to fight, having superiority in technical equipment over the Finns. In conditions of constant fighting and a rapidly changing situation, the division command incorrectly assessed the current situation and gave the order to leave the encirclement in groups, leaving behind the heavy equipment. This only made the situation worse. Parts of the division were still able to break out of the encirclement, but with heavy losses... Subsequently, the division commander Vinogradov, the regimental commissar Pakhomenko and the chief of staff Volkov, who left the division at the most difficult moment, were sentenced by a military tribunal to capital punishment and shot in front of the line.

It is also worth noting that since the end of December, the Finns tried to counterattack on the Karelian Isthmus in order to disrupt the preparations for a new Soviet offensive. Counterattacks were unsuccessful and were repulsed.

On February 11, 1940, after a massive multi-day artillery preparation, the Red Army, together with units of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet and the Ladoga Military Flotilla, launched a new offensive. The main blow fell on the Karelian Isthmus. Within three days, the troops of the 7th Army broke through the first line of Finnish defense and brought tank formations into the breach. On February 17, Finnish troops, by order of the command, retreated to the second lane due to the threat of encirclement.

On February 21, the 7th Army reached the second defense line, and the 13th Army reached the main line north of Muolaa. On February 28, both armies of the Northwestern Front launched an offensive along the entire Karelian Isthmus. Finnish troops retreated, putting up fierce resistance. In an attempt to stop the advancing units of the Red Army, the Finns opened the floodgates of the Saimaa Canal, but this did not help: on March 13, Soviet troops entered Vyborg.

In parallel with the fighting, there were battles on the diplomatic front. After the breakthrough of the Mannerheim Line and the entry of Soviet troops into the operational space, the Finnish government understood that there was no chance of continuing the struggle. Therefore, it turned to the USSR with a proposal to begin peace negotiations. On March 7, a Finnish delegation arrived in Moscow, and on March 12 a peace treaty was concluded.

As a result of the war, the Karelian Isthmus and the large cities of Vyborg and Sortavala, a number of islands in the Gulf of Finland, part of the Finnish territory with the city of Kuolajärvi, and part of the Rybachy and Sredny peninsulas went to the USSR. Lake Ladoga became an internal lake of the USSR. The Petsamo (Pechenga) region captured during the fighting was returned to Finland. The USSR leased part of the Hanko (Gangut) peninsula for a period of 30 years to equip a naval base there.

At the same time, the reputation of the Soviet state in the international arena suffered: the USSR was declared an aggressor and expelled from the League of Nations. Mutual distrust between Western countries and the USSR has reached a critical point.

Recommended reading:
1. Irincheev Bair. Stalin's Forgotten Front. M.: Yauza, Eksmo, 2008. (Series: Unknown wars of the 20th century.)
2. Soviet-Finnish War 1939-1940 / Comp. P. Petrov, V. Stepakov. SP b.: Polygon, 2003. In 2 volumes.
3. Tanner Väinö. Winter War. Diplomatic confrontation between the Soviet Union and Finland, 1939–1940. M.: Tsentrpoligraf, 2003.
4. “Winter War”: working on mistakes (April-May 1940). Materials of the commissions of the Main Military Council of the Red Army to summarize the experience of the Finnish campaign / Responsible. comp. N. S. Tarkhova. SP b., Summer Garden, 2003.

Tatiana Vorontsova

On November 30, 1939, the USSR launched a military operation against Finland, but this war became a stain of shame for the country. So, what were the grounds for the outbreak of the Soviet-Finnish war.

Negotiations 1937-1939

The main reason for the military clashes was the desire of the USSR to move the borders from Leningrad to the Finnish side and further strengthen them. Finland, in turn, refused to follow the request of the USSR, since on this territory there was the so-called “Mannerheim Line” - a defensive line built by Finland back in the 1920s to possibly deter the attack of the USSR. That is, if these lands were transferred, Finland would lose all its fortifications for strategic border protection. The Finnish leadership could not conclude an agreement with such requirements.
In this situation, Stalin decided to begin the military occupation of Finnish territories. On November 28, 1939, the unilateral denunciation (refusal) of the non-aggression agreements with Finland, concluded back in 1932, was announced.

The goals of the USSR's participation in the war

Objectives of Finland's participation in the war

Maynila incident

From the very beginning of the war, the advantages were on the side of the USSR; the Soviet army was well equipped with military equipment (land, sea) and human resources. But the “Mannerheim Line” was impregnable for 1.5 months, and only on January 15 did Stalin order a massive counter-offensive of the army. Although the defensive line was broken, the Finnish army was not defeated. The Finns managed to maintain their independence.